Opinion of the Court
Clarence Thomas
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE ET AL. v. KONAN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–351. Argued October 8, 2025—Decided February 24, 2026
Respondent Lebene Konan and the local post office in Euless, Texas, had
an extended dispute concerning mail delivery to two rental properties
owned by Konan. Konan alleged that, among other things, United
States Postal Service employees intentionally withheld her mail and
interfered with its delivery. After administrative complaints proved
unsuccessful, Konan sued the United States in federal court, bringing
various state-law tort claims alleging that the United States Postal
Service intentionally and wrongfully withheld her mail. The District
Court dismissed Konan’s complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act’s postal exception, under which the United States retains
sovereign immunity for all claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage,
or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter,” 28
U. S. C. §2680 (b). The District Court concluded that the United States
enjoys sovereign immunity from Konan’s claims because they all relate
to personal or financial harms arising from nondelivery of mail. The
District Court further held that the postal exception is not limited to
merely negligent failure to properly carry the mail. The Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the terms “loss,” “miscarriage,” and “negligent
transmission” do not encompass the intentional act of not delivering
the mail at all. In contrast, the First and Second Circuits have inter-
preted the postal exception to apply to suits even when they arise from
harms caused by intentional misconduct. The Court granted certiorari
to resolve the split.
Held: The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising
out of the intentional nondelivery of mail because both “miscarriage”
and “loss” of mail under the FTCA’s postal exception can occur as a
2 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
Syllabus
result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail.
Pp. 5–13.
(a) The postal exception reflects Congress’s judgment that redress
for “harms” of “the sort primarily identified with the Postal Service’s
function of transporting mail throughout the United States” should not
come from potentially burdensome tort suits. Dolan v. Postal Service,
546 U. S. 481, 489 . Pp. 5–6.
(b) Both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the postal exception
can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to de-
liver the mail. Pp. 6–11.
(1) The Court interprets statutory terms according to the ordinary
meanings they had when they were enacted. Wisconsin Central Ltd.
v. United States, 585 U. S. 274, 277 . When Congress enacted the FTCA
in 1946, the “miscarriage” of mail ordinarily included any failure of
mail to properly arrive at its intended destination. Dictionaries pub-
lished around that time confirm that a “miscarriage” of mail happened
when mail failed to arrive at its destination. The Court declines to
limit “miscarriage” to negligent failures, as no dictionaries cited im-
pose this limitation, and ordinary speakers used “miscarriage” to refer
to problems with mail caused by intentional misconduct, such as when
mail was stolen or burned. The Court also declines to limit “miscar-
riage” to when mail goes to the wrong address, as speakers used the
term when mail failed to reach its intended destination regardless of
where the mail ended up, including when mail was delayed, came too
late, or was left in the post office. Pp. 6–8.
(2) When Congress enacted the FTCA, the “loss” of mail ordinarily
meant a deprivation of mail, regardless of how the deprivation was
brought about. Contemporary dictionaries defined “loss” as the act or
fact of losing or suffering deprivation, and one can suffer a deprivation
of something when another intentionally keeps that thing for himself.
Konan alleged that she was entitled to possession of her mail but that
the Postal Service converted it, meaning she was “deprived of the use
and possession of the property,” Black’s Law Dictionary 421, so her
claims arise out of the loss of her mail. The Court disagrees with the
attempt by Konan to limit “loss” to only inadvertent losses. A loss can
be the result of another person’s intentional misconduct, and ordinary
speakers commonly described a “loss” of mail from theft, including
theft by the carrier. The Court also disagrees with the argument that
the postal exception applies only when the Postal Service lost the mail,
because Congress applied the postal exception to all “claim[s] arising
out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission” of mail, describ-
ing kinds of harms, not kinds of actions by the postal workers. This
interpretation is consistent with the principal provision of the FTCA,
which includes losses caused by intentional misconduct and does not
Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 3
Syllabus
require that the Government lost anything. The Court rejects Konan’s
proposal to limit “loss” to only “destruction.” Ordinary speakers re-
ferred to losses of mail even when the mail was not destroyed, and the
dictionary definitions Konan pointed to were listed first because they
were the oldest, not because they were primary. Pp. 8–11.
(c) The Court rejects Konan’s remaining arguments that her claims
must not be barred by the postal exception. Pp. 11–13.
(1) Konan argues that the postal exception’s “negligent transmis-
sion” category narrows the meaning of “miscarriage” and “loss,” but
Congress intentionally limited the “negligent” qualifier to “transmis-
sion” and did not use it to qualify “loss” or “miscarriage.” An adjective
before the final noun in a list cannot be transplanted to qualify the
preceding nouns. See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26 . The Court
does not think that the “negligent” qualifier suggests that Congress
was trying to enable suits involving intentional misconduct. Instead,
the inclusion of “negligent” to qualify “transmission” forecloses claims
involving mail even though nothing went wrong with its transport or
delivery, keeping the focus of the postal exception on mail-delivery
problems. Pp. 11–12.
(2) Konan also argues that the Court’s interpretations of “miscar-
riage” and “loss” run afoul of the presumption against surplusage, be-
cause many claims—including Konan’s here—will arise from both a
“miscarriage” and a “loss” of mail. But Konan’s proposal to solve the
surplusage—three nonoverlapping definitions of the statutory terms—
is inconsistent with ordinary meaning, which shows that these terms
are often used in an overlapping manner. In Dolan, the Court inter-
preted the terms in the postal exception to substantially overlap, 546
U. S., at 487 , and the canon against surplusage is subordinate to the
cardinal canon that “a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there,” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Ger-
main, 503 U. S. 249 , 253–254. Congress likely used broad, overlapping
terms to better keep complaints about mail delivery out of court.
Pp. 12–13.
(d) The Court does not decide whether all of Konan’s claims are
barred by the postal exception, or which arguments Konan adequately
preserved. P. 13.
96 F. 4th 799 , vacated and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, GORSUCH, and JACKSON, JJ.,
joined.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24–351
_________________
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. LEBENE KONAN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[February 24, 2026]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot
be sued without its consent. By means of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, Congress waived that sovereign immunity for
certain tort suits based on the conduct of Government em-
ployees. See 28 U. S. C. §§2674 , 1346(b). But, in the provi-
sion at issue in this case, Congress retained sovereign im-
munity for a wide range of claims about mail. Specifically,
the FTCA’s postal exception retains sovereign immunity for
all claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter.” §2680(b). This
case concerns whether this exception applies when postal
workers intentionally fail to deliver the mail. We hold that
it does.
I
A
The United States Postal Service is a frequent point of
contact between citizens and the Federal Government. In
2024, the Postal Service’s more than 600,000 employees de-
livered more than 112 billion pieces of mail—over 300 mil-
lion a day—to more than 165 million delivery points. See
2 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
Opinion of the Court
United States Postal Service, Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Re-
port to Congress 3, 29, 32, 34. Unsurprisingly, given this
volume, not all mail arrives properly and on time. The
Postal Service reports receiving approximately 335,000 cus-
tomer complaints per year. See Brief for Petitioners 24.
Because it is a Government agency, recourse against the
Postal Service in the form of lawsuits for money damages is
limited. As part of “the executive branch of the Government
of the United States,” 39 U. S. C. §201 , “the Postal Service
enjoys federal sovereign immunity absent a waiver,” Dolan
v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 484 (2006). Before 1946,
that sovereign immunity generally prevented those injured
by Government employees from receiving compensation
through lawsuits. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U. S.
301, 304 (1992). That year, Congress enacted a “limited
waiver” of immunity through the FTCA. Id., at 305 . Sub-
ject to enumerated exceptions, the FTCA allows a plaintiff
to sue the Government for injuries or loss of property
“caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of ” a
federal employee “acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment.” 28 U. S. C. §1346 (b)(1).
The FTCA’s postal exception retains the Government’s
sovereign immunity for lawsuits about failing to properly
carry or deliver mail. It forecloses “[a]ny claim arising out
of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters
or postal matter.” §2680(b). This Court has interpreted the
postal exception to apply when the plaintiff is harmed “be-
cause mail either fails to arrive at all or arrives late, in dam-
aged condition, or at the wrong address.” Dolan, 546 U. S.,
at 489 .
B
This case arises from the dismissal of a complaint, so we
accept the complaint’s allegations as true, although the
Government disputes them. National Rifle Association of
America v. Vullo, 602 U. S. 175 , 181 (2024). Respondent
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
Opinion of the Court
Lebene Konan owns two houses a block apart in Euless,
Texas—one on Saratoga Drive and the other on Trenton
Lane. Konan leases rooms to tenants in both houses and
occasionally stays at them herself. The Postal Service de-
livers mail for all the houses in the neighborhood to a cen-
tral structure with a box for each house. The Postal Service
distributes keys to the owners of the houses so that they can
retrieve their mail. As the homeowner, Konan received the
keys to the boxes for both houses. Konan kept the keys and
distributed the mail to her tenants daily, and she also re-
ceived some of her own mail at the Saratoga address.
Konan’s grievances with her mail service began in May
2020. After Konan noticed that no mail had arrived at her
Saratoga house in several days, she learned that the as-
signed carrier had changed the listed owner from Konan’s
name to a tenant’s name. The same carrier then authorized
a change of the lock to allow the tenant to have his own mail
key without Konan’s consent. Konan confronted the em-
ployees at the local post office about these changes. A su-
pervisor at the local post office explained to Konan that the
Postal Service would stop delivering mail to her Saratoga
address until the Postal Service Inspector General’s office
investigated and determined the proper owner. Konan then
received no mail to the Saratoga address for a couple of
months before service resumed.
Konan then learned that the same carrier had mail ad-
dressed to her and her tenants returned to senders as “un-
deliverable.” As a result, Konan and her tenants did not
receive important mail. Konan resorted to private carriers.
The disruptions in mail service resulted in the loss of ten-
ants and made it more difficult for Konan to attract new
tenants. The carrier also taped a red notice inside the mail-
box stating that mail addressed to some, but not all, of the
Saratoga residents could be delivered to the box. In 2021,
postal workers also allegedly stopped delivering mail to the
4 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
Opinion of the Court
Trenton house after discovering that Konan owned it as
well.
In response, Konan signed up for the Postal Service’s “In-
formed Delivery” service, which allows customers to view
scans of incoming mail. When she discovered that mail on
its way to her addresses was not being delivered, she re-
quested that the mail for the Saratoga residence be held at
the post office so that she could retrieve it in person. But
the postal employees did not give her the mail because Ko-
nan failed to provide identification for the addressees. In
addition to these efforts, Konan also filed administrative
complaints, but without success.
C
In January 2022, Konan sued the United States in fed-
eral court. Konan alleged that the Postal Service intention-
ally and wrongfully withheld her mail. As relevant here,
Konan brought claims under state law for nuisance, tor-
tious interference with prospective business relations, con-
version, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
She sought damages for loss of rental income, the depriva-
tion of her rightful mail, and the distress that the postal
workers caused her.*
The District Court dismissed Konan’s complaint based on
sovereign immunity. Relying on the postal exception, it
concluded that the United States enjoys sovereign immun-
ity from her claims “because they all relate to ‘personal or
financial harms arising from nondelivery . . . of sensitive
materials or information . . .’ and other mail.” 652 F. Supp.
3d 721 , 731 (ND Tex. 2023) (quoting Dolan, 546 U. S., at
——————
*Konan also brought discrimination claims against the postal workers
under 42 U. S. C. §§1981 and 1985, alleging that they were motivated by
racial animus. The District Court dismissed these claims. 652 F. Supp.
3d 721 , 731–732 (ND Tex. 2023). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 96
F. 4th 799 , 804–805 (CA5 2024). We denied Konan’s cross-petition for
certiorari regarding those claims, so they are not before us. 604 U. S.
1256 (2025).
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
Opinion of the Court
489). The District Court held that the postal exception is
not limited to merely negligent failure to properly carry the
mail. 652 F. Supp. 3d, at 730–731.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It
held that “the terms ‘loss,’ ‘miscarriage,’ and ‘negligent
transmission’ do no not encompass the intentional act of not
delivering the mail at all.” 96 F. 4th 799, 804 (2024). It
reasoned that Konan’s claims did not arise out of the “loss”
of mail “because the mail was not destroyed or misplaced
by unintentional action.” Id., at 802 (emphasis added). It
also reasoned that Konan’s claims did not arise from the
“miscarriage” of mail “because there was no attempt at a
carriage.” Ibid. And it reasoned that Konan’s claims did
not arise from the “negligent transmission” of mail because
“the postal workers’ actions were intentional.” Ibid.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision conflicts with those of the
First and Second Circuits, which have interpreted the
postal exception to apply to suits even when they arise from
harms caused by intentional misconduct. See Levasseur v.
United States Postal Serv., 543 F. 3d 23 , 23–24 (CA1 2008)
(per curiam); Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 378 F. 2d
812 , 813–814 (CA2 1967). We granted certiorari to resolve
the split. 604 U. S. 1256 (2025).
II
The postal exception retains the Federal Government’s
sovereign immunity for “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss,
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal
matter.” 28 U. S. C. §2680 (b). The postal exception reflects
Congress’s judgment that redress for “harms” of “the sort
primarily identified with the Postal Service’s function of
transporting mail throughout the United States” should not
come from tort suits. Dolan, 546 U. S., at 489 . Given the
frequency of postal workers’ interactions with citizens,
those suits would arise so often that they would create a
significant burden for the Government and the courts. And
6 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
Opinion of the Court
their cost to taxpayers would depend on the value and im-
portance of the mail’s contents, over which the Government
typically has no control. See, e.g., Marine Ins. Co., 378
F. 2d, at 813 (theft from mail of six emeralds valued at
$152,190 in 1967 dollars).
According to Konan and the dissent, the postal exception
does not apply to Konan’s claims because she alleges that
postal workers intentionally refused to deliver her mail.
We disagree. Both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under
the postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Ser-
vice’s intentional failure to deliver the mail.
A
Absent a reason to think otherwise, we interpret statu-
tory terms according to the ordinary meanings they had
when they were enacted. Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United
States, 585 U. S. 274, 277 (2018). When Congress enacted
the FTCA in 1946, the “miscarriage” of mail ordinarily in-
cluded any failure of mail to properly arrive at its intended
destination. Konan would limit “miscarriage” to uninten-
tional failures or failures where the mail went to the wrong
address. Neither limitation is well founded.
Dictionaries published around the time Congress enacted
the FTCA confirm that a “miscarriage” of mail happened
when mail failed to arrive properly. Two dictionaries indi-
cate that “miscarriage” of mail meant the “failure of a letter
. . . to reach its destination.” 2 New Century Dictionary of
the English Language 1069 (1927); accord, 6 Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary 497 (1933 ed.) (“The failure (of a letter, etc.)
to reach its destination”). In a third, “miscarriage” meant
the “[f]ailure (of something sent) to arrive.” Webster’s New
International Dictionary 1568 (2d ed. 1934) (Webster’s Sec-
ond). Definitions of “miscarry” were similarly broad. Ibid.
(“To fail of reaching the destination”); 6 Oxford English Dic-
tionary, at 498 (“To fail to reach its proper destination”).
Something can “fail” to happen as a result of intentional
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
Opinion of the Court
misconduct. See, e.g., 26 U. S. C. §291 (1940 ed.) (imposing
a penalty for “failure to make and file [a tax] return” “unless
it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and
not due to willful neglect”). Because a “miscarriage” in-
cludes any failure of mail to arrive properly, a person expe-
riences a miscarriage of mail when his mail is delivered to
his neighbor, held at the post office, or returned to the
sender—regardless of why it happened. Konan’s claims
about the Postal Service’s willful failure to deliver her mail
therefore result from the miscarriage of her mail.
We disagree with Konan’s attempt to limit “miscarriage”
to negligent failures of mail to arrive properly. Brief for Re-
spondent 19–20; accord, post, at 9 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissent-
ing). Neither Konan nor the dissent cites any dictionaries
imposing this limitation. Instead, Konan cites examples of
uses of the term “miscarriage” that suggest that the miscar-
riage in question was unintentional, such as an 1868 tele-
graph-law decision explaining that a telegraph company
should not be liable “for every mistake, miscarriage, or ac-
cidental delay that may occur.” United States Tel. Co. v.
Gildersleve, 29 Md. 232, 246 (1868). We agree that miscar-
riage of mail can be unintentional, but “the fact that the
phrase was commonly used in a particular context does not
show that it is limited to that context.” District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 588 (2008).
In fact, ordinary speakers used “miscarriage” to refer to
problems with mail caused by intentional misconduct.
When a mail pouch was “stolen,” a newspaper reported that
the letters “[m]iscarried.” Kansas City Star, Oct. 20, 1911,
p. 6A. When a priest failed to receive a summons because
it was “burned by an ecclesiastic,” the headline read “His
Letter Miscarried.” The Carbondale Leader, Jan. 3, 1893,
p. 1. And when litigants’ documents failed to arrive, courts
classified “miscarriage” of mail as an excuse, without any
suggestion as to whether the carrier acted intentionally.
See, e.g., Lake v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 375, 402 , 182 P. 2d 824 , 835
8 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
Opinion of the Court
(1947) (per curiam); Wagner v. Lucas, 79 Okla. 231 , 232–
233, 193 P. 421 , 422–423 (1920). We see no reason to sup-
pose that these uses of “miscarriage” were extraordinary.
Konan separately contends that a “miscarriage” of mail
happens only when the mail goes to the “wrong address,”
not when it is (like her mail) held at the post office or re-
turned to the sender. Brief for Respondent 15. We again
decline to impose a limitation that has no basis in the dic-
tionaries or ordinary usage. Speakers used the term “mis-
carriage” when the mail failed to reach its intended desti-
nation, regardless of where it ended up. One newspaper,
for example, explained that a letter “ ‘[m]iscarried’ ” because
it was “ ‘delayed.’ ” Muskogee Times-Democrat, June 15,
1934, p. 1. Another ran a story in which a correspondent’s
“letter miscarried and came too late.” Jersey City, N. J.,
The Evening Journal, June 10, 1907, p. 10. And a court de-
scribed mail mistakenly left “in the post office” as having
“miscarried.” Heinrich v. First Nat. Bank, 219 N. Y. 1, 4, 6 ,
113 N. E. 531 , 531–532 (1916).
We decline Konan’s invitations to “artificially narrow or-
dinary meaning.” Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U. S. 69, 77
(2023). A “miscarriage of mail” includes failure of the mail
to arrive at its intended destination, regardless of the car-
rier’s intent or where the mail goes instead.
B
Konan’s withholding claims also arise out of the “loss” of
mail and are therefore within the postal exception. 28
U. S. C. §2680 (b). When Congress enacted the FTCA, the
“loss” of mail ordinarily meant a deprivation of mail, re-
gardless of how the deprivation was brought about. So, like
“miscarriage,” intentional refusal to deliver mail could
cause the “loss” of mail.
A “loss” of mail is a deprivation of mail. “Loss is a generic
and relative term; it is not a word of limited, hard and fast
meaning.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1094 (4th ed. 1968). But
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
Opinion of the Court
it is commonly used to refer to any “deprivation” or “that
which is withheld,” id., at 1095 , such as when someone suf-
fers the loss of property in a fire or the loss of income from
being laid off. Webster’s defined “loss” as the “[a]ct or fact
of losing (in various senses) or suffering deprivation.” Web-
ster’s Second 1460. Oxford English Dictionary defined it as
“being deprived of, or the failure to keep” something. 6 Ox-
ford English Dictionary, at 452. One can, of course, suffer
a deprivation of something when another intentionally
keeps that thing for himself. Konan alleged that she was
“entitled to possession” of her mail but that the Postal Ser-
vice “converted” it. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a–59a. Conver-
sion means that Konan was “deprived of the use and pos-
session of the property” in question. Black’s Law Dictionary
421 (12th ed. 2024). Konan’s claims therefore arise out of
the loss of her mail.
As with “miscarriage,” we disagree with Konan’s attempt
to limit “loss” to only inadvertent losses. See Brief for Re-
spondent 27–28; post, at 6–7 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). A
loss can be the result of another person’s intentional mis-
conduct. One can, for example, suffer a tax “loss” that re-
sults from “embezzlement.” See, e.g., Burnet v. Huff, 288
U. S. 156, 160 (1933). An army can suffer “loss” of soldiers
as a result of the intentional conduct of the enemy. Funk &
Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage 1465 (1942 ed.). And, in the mail context, ordinary
speakers commonly described a “loss” of mail from theft, in-
cluding theft by the carrier. Just a year before Congress
enacted the FTCA, the Army explained that “[v]irtually all
loss of mail through theft occurs at terminal transfer points
outside this country.” Pittsfield, Mass., Berkshire Evening
Eagle, Feb. 9, 1945, p. 3 (emphasis added). A few years ear-
lier, a reported “[l]oss of [l]ocal [m]ail” was caused by a
rogue “mail handler, who admitted the theft of considerable
mail during the past few months.” Belvidere News, Dec. 3,
1936, p. 1. Pre-FTCA decisions also described a “loss” of
10 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
Opinion of the Court
mail when the carrier stole it. E.g., Boerner v. United
States, 117 F. 2d 387 , 387–388 (CA2 1941); Martin v.
United States, 280 F. 513, 514 (CA4 1922).
We also disagree with Konan’s, and the dissent’s, rejoin-
der that the postal exception applies only when the Postal
Service lost the mail. See post, at 7–8. Congress could have
written the postal exception to apply only when “the Postal
Service lost, miscarried, or negligently transmitted” mail.
But Congress applied the postal exception to all “claim[s]
arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmis-
sion” of mail. It described kinds of harms, not kinds of ac-
tions by the postal workers. See Dolan, 546 U. S., at 489 ;
contra, post, at 4 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). We decline to
rescue Konan’s claims by inserting the Postal Service as the
sentence’s subject and then converting the three nouns into
three verbs. Cf. Terry v. United States, 593 U. S. 486, 494
(2021) (“[W]e will not convert nouns to adjectives and vice
versa”).
Our interpretation of “loss” is also consistent with the
principal provision of the FTCA. Under that provision, a
plaintiff must allege a “loss of property . . . caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal em-
ployee. 28 U. S. C. §1346 (b)(1). All agree that this provi-
sion includes losses caused by intentional misconduct and
does not require that the Government “lost” anything. Be-
cause Congress used “loss” in this sense in the FTCA’s prin-
cipal provision, our interpretation adheres to the unrebut-
ted presumption that “the term bears a consistent meaning
throughout” the FTCA. See Azar v. Allina Health Services,
587 U. S. 566, 576 (2019).
Last, Konan proposes limiting “loss” to only “destruc-
tion.” She contends that the “primary” meaning of “loss” in
1946 was “destruction,” not any other kind of deprivation.
Brief for Respondent 25–26. But, as we have explained, or-
dinary speakers referred to “losses” of mail, even when the
mail was not destroyed. Judge Cardozo wrote that when an
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11
Opinion of the Court
envelope fell behind a radiator in the post office, it caused
the “loss” of the checks inside even though they were later
recovered. Heinrich, 219 N. Y., at 4 , 113 N. E., at 531 . And,
contemporaneous regulations treated “loss” and “destruc-
tion” separately, not, as Konan suggests, synonymously.
See, e.g., Postal Laws and Regulations §159 (1940 ed.) (de-
laying certain procedures until officials have “determined
that such loss, destruction, or damage resulted from no
fault or negligence on the part of ” a postmaster). Konan
asserts that “destruction” was the “primary” meaning of
loss because it was listed as the first definition in dictionar-
ies. Brief for Respondent 25–26. But, “[a]lthough many
people assume that the first sense listed in a dictionary is
the ‘main’ sense, that is often quite untrue.” A. Scalia & B.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
418 (2012). The definitions Konan pointed to were listed
first because they were the oldest, not because they were
primary. See 1 Oxford English Dictionary, at xxxi (“[T]hat
sense is placed first which was actually the earliest in the
language . . . ”); 1 New Century Dictionary, at iii (“In gen-
eral, the senses of each word are arranged, as far as possi-
ble, in the order of their derivation and development from
the original source . . . ”); Webster’s New International Dic-
tionary ix (1927) (following “[ t]he principle of historical ar-
rangement followed in the earlier editions”). We do not pre-
sume that Congress intended the oldest usage, but rather
the ordinary one in 1946, and contemporaneous evidence
shows that Konan’s usage was not the primary one.
III
Konan proffers two remaining arguments that her claims
must not be barred by the postal exception. We address
them in turn.
First, Konan argues that the postal exception’s “negligent
transmission” category narrows the meaning of “miscar-
riage” and “loss.” She argues that the qualifier “negligent”
12 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
Opinion of the Court
in the term “negligent transmission” implicitly qualifies the
other two terms. But Congress intentionally limited the
“negligent” qualifier to “transmission” and did not use it to
qualify “loss” or “miscarriage.” Konan’s “argument seems
to assume that pairing a broad statutory term with a nar-
row one shrinks the broad one, but there is no such general
usage.” S. D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental
Protection, 547 U. S. 370, 379 (2006). Just like “a limiting
clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying
only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows,” an ad-
jective before the final noun in a list cannot be transplanted
to qualify the preceding nouns. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540
U. S. 20, 26 (2003). We also do not think that the “negli-
gent” qualifier suggests that Congress was trying to enable
suits involving intentional misconduct. Contra, post, at 5–
6 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). If Congress had written the
postal exception to refer to all “transmission” of mail, the
category—unlike “miscarriage” and “loss”—would have en-
compassed claims that involved mail even though nothing
went wrong with its transport or delivery. See Dolan, 546
U. S., at 486 (acknowledging the broad meaning of “trans-
mission” in isolation). The inclusion of “negligent” to qual-
ify “transmission” forecloses that result and thereby keeps
the focus of the postal exception on mail-delivery problems,
but, in doing so, it does not limit the other two categories.
Second, Konan argues that our interpretations of “mis-
carriage” and “loss” run afoul of the presumption against
surplusage. On our interpretation, she argues, many
claims—including Konan’s here—will arise from both a
“miscarriage” and a “loss” of mail, making one or the other
redundant. To solve the surplusage, Konan proposes three
nonoverlapping definitions: “Loss” covers “damage” to mail;
“miscarriage” covers “what happens” to mail “when it leaves
the USPS’s custody and ends up in the wrong place”; and
“negligent transmission” covers “detention or delays of the
mail while still in the USPS’s possession.” Brief for
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13
Opinion of the Court
Respondent 9. Konan’s proposal is inconsistent with ordi-
nary meaning, which shows that these terms were often
used in an overlapping manner. See, e.g., Heinrich, 219
N. Y., at 4–6, 113 N. E., at 531–532 (describing “[t]he loss
of the checks” that “miscarried in the mails”); Brevard v.
Wimberly, 89 Mo. App. 331 , 338–339 (1901) (“miscarriage
of . . . packages” could lead to “the loss of a registered pack-
age”). And, in Dolan, the Court interpreted the terms in the
postal exception to substantially overlap. See 546 U. S., at
487 . The canon against surplusage is subordinate to the
“cardinal canon” that “a legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there.” Con-
necticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249 , 253–254
(1992). We think that Congress likely used broad, overlap-
ping terms to better keep complaints about mail delivery
out of court.
IV
We hold that the postal exception covers suits against the
United States for the intentional nondelivery of mail. We
do not decide whether all of Konan’s claims are barred by
the postal exception, or which arguments Konan ade-
quately preserved. We vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24–351
_________________
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL.,
PETITIONER v. LEBENE KONAN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[February 24, 2026]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN,
JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
For two years, respondent Lebene Konan and her tenants
did not receive mail addressed to the rental properties that
Konan owned. According to Konan, negligence was not to
blame. Quite the opposite: She alleges that United States
Postal Service employees intentionally withheld delivery
because they did not like “ ‘that a black person own[ed]’ ” the
properties and “ ‘lease[d] rooms . . . to white people.’ ” 652
F. Supp. 3d 721 , 725 (ND Tex. 2023).
Konan brought this action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) against the United States to recover damages
she sustained as a result of this alleged years-long harass-
ment campaign. The United States is generally protected
by sovereign immunity, but Congress, through the FTCA,
has enacted a capacious waiver of that immunity for tort
suits when an individual is harmed by a federal employee
acting within the scope of her employment. That waiver,
however, is subject to several exceptions. Today, the Court
holds that one exception—the postal exception—prevents
individuals from recovering for injuries based on a postal
employee’s intentional misconduct, including when an em-
ployee maliciously withholds their mail. Because this read-
ing of the postal exception transforms, rather than honors,
the exception Congress enacted, I respectfully dissent.
2 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
I
The FTCA serves a simple purpose: “ ‘to remove the sov-
ereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort.’ ”
Levin v. United States, 568 U. S. 503, 506 (2013). This
“broad waiver” of immunity, Millbrook v. United States, 569
U. S. 50, 52 (2013), allows an individual harmed by a fed-
eral employee “acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment” to recover for “injury or loss of property, or per-
sonal injury or death caused by the” employee’s “negligent
or wrongful act or omission,” 28 U. S. C. §1346 (b)(1); see
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543, 547 (1951)
(describing the waiver as “sweeping”).
Congress has also enacted several exceptions preserving
the United States’ immunity in some circumstances. See
§2680 (listing 13 such exceptions). The exceptions “are de-
signed to protect certain important governmental functions
and prerogatives from disruption.” Molzof v. United States,
502 U. S. 301, 311 (1992). They thus “mark the ‘boundary
between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon
the United States and its desire to protect certain govern-
mental activities from exposure to suit by private individu-
als.’ ” Ibid.
At the same time, courts must be careful not to interpret
these exceptions too broadly. “‘[U]nduly generous interpre-
tations,’ ” this Court has warned, “ ‘run the risk of defeating
the central purpose of the statute’”—to “ ‘waiv[e] the Gov-
ernment’s immunity from suit in sweeping language.’ ” Do-
lan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 492 (2006) (quoting
Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, 853, n. 9 (1984); Yel-
low Cab, 340 U. S., at 547 ). To harmonize these considera-
tions, “ ‘the proper objective of a court attempting to con-
strue one of the’” exceptions “ ‘is to identify those
circumstances which are within the words and reason of the
exception—no less and no more.’ ” Dolan, 546 U. S., at 492
(quoting Kosak, 465 U. S., at 853–854, n. 9 (some internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
This case calls on the Court to interpret the postal excep-
tion, which covers “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, mis-
carriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal mat-
ter.” §2680(b). The wording of this exception is noticeably
narrower than some of its neighbors. For example, all
claims for “damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system” are
barred. §2680(i). So too are all “claim[s] arising from the
activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority,” the “Panama
Canal Company,” and “a Federal Bank, a Federal interme-
diate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives,” §§2680(l),
(m), (n).
By comparison, Congress did not paint with as broad of a
brush in designing the postal exception. Like it had for
these other agencies and activities, Congress could have
granted immunity for all “claims arising from the mail ac-
tivities of the Postal Service.” Instead, Congress identified
certain “misconduct for which the Government was not as-
suming financial responsibility—namely, ‘the loss, miscar-
riage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal mat-
ter.’ ” Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855 . By using “specificity” over
“generality,” it follows that Congress intended for this ex-
ception “to be less encompassing” than the coverage pro-
vided by the broader exceptions, and for the Government to
“assum[e] financial responsibility” for certain classes of
“misconduct” related to postal activities. Ibid.
This Court has already identified some of those classes.
In Kosak, the Court explained that claims arising from car
accidents caused by postal employees delivering mail fall
outside the exception. Ibid. In Dolan, the Court recognized
a second class of claims for slip and falls caused by an em-
ployee negligently placing a package on a porch step. 546
U. S., at 483 . Today, I would have affirmed the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s well-reasoned decision that acknowledged a third
class: claims concerning intentional misconduct committed
4 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
by postal employees, which would necessarily include with-
holding a person’s mail for malicious reasons.
II
A
The postal exception’s text shows that Congress did not
intend to immunize intentional misconduct. Recall that the
exception covers the “loss,” “miscarriage,” and “negligent
transmission” of mail. §2680(b). As Kosak observed, the
terms describe three categories of “misconduct” that postal
employees can commit without incurring liability for the
United States. 465 U. S., at 855 . The majority, however,
contends that these terms focus on “harms” rather than
Government wrongdoing, citing Dolan. Ante, at 2, 5, 10. To
be sure, Dolan described these terms as “harm[s],” but in
the same breath, it also emphasized that the three terms
protect “only a subset of postal wrongdoing.” 546 U. S., at
490 .
A focus on misconduct is consistent with most other
FTCA exceptions, which generally are triggered by certain
types of Government conduct, rather than the type of harm
the plaintiff experiences. For instance, some exceptions di-
rectly cover different “act[s] or omission[s]” of Government
employees, §§2680(a) (discretionary acts), (e) (administer-
ing §§1–31 of Title 50). Another addresses intentional ac-
tions by employees, capturing, for example, assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, and other intentional torts like
them. §2680(h). A different group immunizes the “activi-
ties” of a given Government instrumentality. §§2680(j), (l),
(m), (n). Yet a different subset describes a specific type of
Government action, such as the “assessment or collection of
any tax or customs duty,” §2680(c), the “imposition or es-
tablishment of a quarantine,” §2680(f ), and the “fiscal op-
erations of the Treasury,” §2680(i). The focus of each is on
the Government conduct. The same is necessarily true of
the postal exception.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
The key question is thus as follows: What kind of miscon-
duct falls within the “ ‘words and reason’ ” of the postal ex-
ception? Dolan, 546 U. S., at 492 (quoting Kosak, 465 U. S.,
at 854, n. 9 ). All signs point to Congress leaving intentional
misconduct outside of the exception’s scope.
1
Begin with “negligent transmission.” This term covers
“negligence causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in dam-
aged condition, or at the wrong address.” Dolan, 546 U. S.,
at 486 . It goes without saying that this term therefore does
not immunize intentional misconduct.
Beyond that basic insight, however, Congress’s express
inclusion of “negligent transmission” provides other im-
portant clues for deciphering statutory meaning about the
scope of the postal exception. As the majority recognizes, if
Congress had included all claims arising out of the “trans-
mission” of mail in the postal exception, the term “would
have encompassed claims that involved mail even though
nothing went wrong with its transport or delivery.” Ante,
at 12. To avoid that outcome, Congress needed to add a
narrowing modifier to focus on when things go wrong.1
Critically, Congress did not have to choose “negligent” as
that modifier (or the only modifier). Congress could have,
for example, modified “transmission” with both “negligent”
and “wrongful.” Doing so would have avoided the problem
the majority identifies while also clarifying that both clas-
ses of conduct fall within the exception’s scope. Yet Con-
gress elected to immunize negligent conduct alone. Its
choice to do so carries significance. It raises the natural
inference that Congress intended for at least some inten-
tional wrongdoing related to transmitting mail to fall out-
side the scope of the exception.
——————
1 Congress did not need to add “negligent” before “miscarriage” or “loss”
because the ordinary meaning of those terms, plus statutory context, con-
vey inadvertence on their own. See infra, at 6–12.
6 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Indeed, before this Court, the Government emphasizes
repeatedly that “negligent transmission” is “significant” be-
cause the term “shows that Congress knew how to exclude
intentional conduct when it wanted to.” Brief for Petition-
ers 3, 17, 35. Yet, according to the Government and the
majority, this was a hollow choice. In their view, Congress
excluded some set of intentional conduct through the “neg-
ligent transmission” modifier only to sweep that conduct
back into the exception through “miscarriage” and “loss.”
The majority adopts the Government’s definition of “mis-
carriage” as capturing situations where “mail fail[s] to ar-
rive properly,” regardless of the actor’s intent. Ante, at 6.
It also adopts the Government’s definition of “loss” as cap-
turing the “deprivation of mail,” regardless, again, of the
depriver’s intent. Ante, at 8. It is difficult to see how a
postal employee could intentionally transmit mail wrong-
fully—such as by refusing to deliver the mail, lighting it on
fire, or shredding it into pieces—without falling within
these definitions of “miscarriage” or “loss.” In this world,
Congress did not even need to bother with the modifier to
transmission that it adopted.
Congress did not make this odd choice. As explained be-
low, “loss” and “miscarriage,” as used in the postal excep-
tion, do not capture intentional misconduct either.
2
Turn, then, to “loss.” As the Government acknowledged
in its petition for certiorari, “loss” is ordinarily understood
to capture unintentional conduct. Pet. for Cert. 14; see also
Webster’s New International Dictionary 1460 (2d ed. 1934)
(defining “loss” as an “[a]ct or fact of losing . . . esp[ecially],
unintentional parting with something of value”). For good
reason: As the Fifth Circuit observed below, “no one inten-
tionally loses something.” 96 F. 4th 799, 802 (2024). People
lose their keys when they misplace them, not when they
give them to their children. People lose their mail when it
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
gets stuck behind a drawer, not when they intentionally
throw it away. If someone said that they “lost” their car, no
one would think it was stolen, only that the person forgot
where they had parked it. The same is true when the Postal
Service loses someone’s mail. The reason is an error, not
deliberate wrongdoing.
To reach its contrary result, the majority defines “loss” as
any “deprivation of mail,” which it concludes captures all
situations where the individual does not receive mail, no
matter the cause. Ante, at 8. To do so, however, the major-
ity must shift away from a focus on harms that befall the
mail to harms that befall Konan. The majority says that
the postal exception encompasses three “kinds of harms,
not kinds of actions by the postal workers.” Ante, at 10. The
majority defines the first two terms, “miscarriage” and
“negligent transmission,” to encompass “harms” to the mail.
Yet, under the majority’s interpretation, “loss” is an en-
tirely distinct kind of “harm.” That is because the mail does
not “suffer a deprivation” in the same way that mail fails to
arrive (miscarriage) or mail is damaged due to negligence
(negligent transmission). The only way “loss” could mean a
“deprivation” is if it were a harm experienced by Konan, not
by the mail. No such inconsistency, however, arises if (as
explained above) all three terms are read to refer to the
Government’s misconduct: the Postal Service’s loss, miscar-
riage, or negligent transmission of mail. See supra, at 4–5.
When used in this sense, “loss” plainly and sensibly denotes
unintentional conduct, consistent with its ordinary mean-
ing.2
——————
2 The Government also contends that “loss” in the postal exception in-
corporates intentional misconduct because it asks “whether the alleged
victims ‘lost’ mail.” Brief for Petitioners 41 (emphasis deleted); Tr. of
Oral Arg. 21 (same). That again requires the same shift in perspective:
asking, on one hand, whether mail was “miscarr[ied]” or “negligently
transmitted” by the Postal Service, and, on the other hand, whether Ko-
nan “los[t]” (and so was deprived of ) her mail.
8 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
The majority also invokes the presumption of consistent
usage. It points to the use of “loss” in the FTCA’s sovereign
immunity waiver as meaning “deprivation,” and argues
that “loss” as used in the postal exception must take on the
same meaning. Ante, at 10. The consistent-usage canon,
however, “ ‘readily yields’ to context,” Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302 , 320 (2014), and here, compar-
ing the context of the FTCA’s waiver to the context of the
postal exception shows that “loss” is being used in two dif-
ferent ways.
The waiver uses “loss” to describe the form of damages an
individual harmed by a federal employee can seek to re-
cover. It states that plaintiffs can bring claims against the
United States for “loss of property” “caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment” while acting within the scope of their employment.
§1346(b)(1). The plaintiff ’s “loss” could be due to “negligent
or wrongful” conduct, as the waiver states explicitly. Ibid.
In contrast, the postal exception uses “loss” to describe the
form of the employee’s misconduct that is protected from
liability. If an employee lost the mail, the plaintiff suffered
a “loss” under the waiver and the claim arose “out of the
loss” of the mail, meaning the postal exception applies. If
an employee intentionally destroyed the mail, the waiver
would still be implicated because the plaintiff suffered a rel-
evant “loss” for purposes of the waiver. The postal excep-
tion would not apply, however, because the employee de-
stroyed the mail and did not lose it. “Loss” is thus being
clearly used in two different ways and carries two different
meanings.
3
That brings us to “miscarriage.” The majority is correct
that “miscarriage” covers misconduct by the Postal Service
that causes mail to “fai[l] to arrive properly,” ante, at 6, but
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
the majority is wrong to extend this meaning to cover situ-
ations that involve intentional misconduct.
As the majority recognizes, “miscarriage” commonly co-
vers negligence or inadvertence. Ante, at 7. Indeed, there
are many examples of “miscarriage” being used when mail
“fails to arrive” due to negligence, including as illustrated
by the Government’s own cases. See, e.g., Heinrich v. First
Nat. Bank, 219 N. Y. 1 , 113 N. E. 531 , 531–532 (1916); Elam
v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 453 , 93 S. W. 851
(1906); see n. 3, infra. From here, as the majority sees it,
mail that is intentionally not delivered, even for malicious
reasons, also “failed to arrive properly,” so Congress must
have intended to include intentional misconduct within the
exception by using “miscarriage.” Ante, at 6. The majority,
however, offers no persuasive evidence suggesting that
“miscarriage” is commonly used in this way.
To start, the majority relies on several dictionary defini-
tions. Ante, at 6–7. None of those definitions addresses an
individual’s mens rea. The phrase “failure to arrive,” more-
over, does not immediately suggest intentional wrongdoing.
“A diplomat might ‘fail to arrive’ at a treaty negotiation if
her flight were cancelled, but no one would describe her as
‘failing to arrive’ if she deliberately skipped the talks to un-
dermine the treaty (‘refused to attend’ would be more accu-
rate).” Brief for Respondent 23.
Next, the majority turns to real-life examples. Here, the
majority does not rely on any cases cited by the Govern-
ment. That is not a surprise, as the Government failed to
identify a single example of “miscarriage” being used to de-
scribe mail “failing to arrive properly” due to intentional
misconduct.3 The majority thus searches elsewhere, citing
——————
3 See Reply Brief 8–10 (citing Bowen v. Wilson, 15 F. 2d 733, 734 (DC
1926) (“miscarriage” when delivery was attempted but returned because
the recipient could not be found); Heinrich v. First Nat. Bank, 219 N. Y.
1 , 113 N. E. 531 , 531–532 (1916) (mail was “miscarried” when it was mis-
placed behind a radiator due to “the negligence of employees of the post-
10 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
examples of its own: two cherry-picked newspaper refer-
ences almost 20 years apart, and at least 30 years before
the enactment of the FTCA, that used “miscarried,” not
“miscarriage.” Ante, at 7–8. If “miscarriage” were in fact
ordinarily used to describe intentional misconduct, one
might expect that actual examples of the usage would be
easier to come by.
The majority also cites cases in which the reason behind
a “miscarriage” was not identified, but those cases do not
support its position. Ante, at 7–8. How a word is used when
the cause is unknown hardly informs whether an ordinary
speaker would use the same word when the cause is known.
Those cases, moreover, simply reflect the general presump-
tion that issues with mail are typically not a result of inten-
tional misconduct by postal workers. For example, in Lake
v. Lake, 63 Wyo. 375 , 182 P. 2d 824 (1947) (per curiam), the
court explained that when a motion arrived in court “a day
too late” due to a “miscarriage of the mails,” with no further
cause explained, that “ ‘mere accident’ ” should not be held
against the party. Id., at 402 , 182 P. 2d, at 835 . Similarly,
in Wagner v. Lucas, 79 Okla. 231 , 193 P. 421 (1920), the
court described “miscarriage of the mails” as a situation
that “human prudence, foresight, and sagacity . . . could not
——————
office”); Southern Express Co. v. Hill, 81 Ark. 1 , 98 S. W. 371 , 372–373
(1906) (“miscarriage” due to the sender mistakenly writing the wrong
address); Elam v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 453 , 93 S. W.
851 (1906) (“miscarriage” due to the “negligence” of the postal carrier);
Western Home Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 40 Neb. 1 , 58 N. W. 597, 598 (1894)
(cause unknown); Fosters v. McKibben, 14 Pa. 168, 170 (1850) (describing
a letter that “miscarrie[s] for want of publication”); People ex rel.
Holdsworth v. Superior Ct., 18 Wend. 675 , 678 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)
(cause unknown)). See also Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ellis, 53 Okla.
264 , 156 P. 226, 228 (1916) (although the cause of the mail arriving late
was unknown, the court referred to the “miscarriage of the mail” as an
“accident”); Kellogg v. Smith, 171 Okla. 355 , 42 P. 2d 493, 495 (1935) (per
curiam) (similar); Hogan v. Bailey, 27 Okla. 15 , 110 P. 890, 891 (1910)
(similar); Chichester v. Cande, 3 Cow. 39, 48 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) (simi-
lar).
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
prevent,” like a “mistake in the wording of a telegram.” Id.,
at 232–233, 193 P., at 423 . Accordingly, the use of the term
“miscarriage” in these cases does not prove that the term
covers intentional misconduct; in context, had the courts
suspected that the late delivery, for instance, was a result
of such misconduct, they likely would have used a different
word.
The contemporaneous Postal Laws and Regulations from
before the FTCA was enacted—the “backdrop” against
which “Congress enacted the postal exception,” Brief for Pe-
titioners 35—further undermine the majority’s interpreta-
tion. For example, those regulations directed the Division
of Stamps to make adjustments in “cases of loss, miscar-
riage, or detention of stamped supplies in transit.” Post Of-
fice Dept., Postal Law & Regs. §13.6 (1940 ed.). This sug-
gests that when the stamped supplies were intentionally
held back and not delivered (i.e., failed to arrive), “deten-
tion” was used instead of “miscarriage,” even though, on the
majority’s reading, “miscarriage” would have sufficed. The
regulations also directed postal employees to “hold” pack-
ages dropped off for “forwarding” if they contained “destruc-
tive mail matter,” to “notify the sender” of the “detention of
the package,” and to let them know it cannot be “trans-
ported by mail.” §728. This is another use of “detention” in
the context where, under the majority’s view, “miscarriage”
would have been appropriate because the mail “failed to ar-
rive” at its destination. Yet, in each, the cause of the non-
delivery was known, it was not inadvertence, and a differ-
ent term was used.
At most, the majority shows that certain dictionary defi-
nitions of “miscarriage” could conceivably capture inten-
tionally withholding mail, or tearing up a letter into pieces,
or lighting a package on fire—in all those situations, the
mail “failed to arrive properly.” Ante, at 6. “That a defini-
tion is broad enough to encompass one sense of a word,”
however, “does not establish that the word is ordinarily
12 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
understood in that sense.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Sai-
pan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 568 (2012). Here, neither the ma-
jority nor the Government has offered any meaningful evi-
dence supporting the view that “miscarriage” was
commonly used in situations when the mail failed to arrive
properly due to intentional wrongdoing, and that, by includ-
ing “miscarriage” within the postal exception, Congress in-
tended to capture such wrongdoing.
If there were any doubt, the words surrounding “miscar-
riage” resolve it. As the Court in Dolan explained, when
construed in context, “[a] word in a statute may or may not
extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.”
546 U. S., at 486 . For example, “ ‘[a] word is known by the
company it keeps,’ ” and “ ‘[w]ords grouped in a list should
be given related meaning.’ ” Id., at 486–487. Without this
rule, courts risk “ ‘ascribing to one word a meaning so broad
that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words, thus
giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’ ” Yates
v. United States, 574 U. S. 528 , 543 (2015) (plurality opin-
ion).
Here, reading “miscarriage” to capture intentional mis-
conduct does precisely that. As noted above, the word “loss”
typically connotes negligence, see supra, at 6–7, and the
majority’s reading makes Congress’s specific inclusion of
the “negligent” modifier for “transmission” entirely ineffec-
tive at serving its purpose—excluding intentional miscon-
duct. See supra, at 5–6. There also does not appear to be
any good reason why Congress would have wanted one term
(“miscarriage,” alone) to cover intentional misconduct and
not the other two terms. Indeed, under the majority’s broad
definition of “miscarriage,” the words “loss” and “negligent
transmission” become no more than “misleading surplus-
age.” Yates, 574 U. S., at 546.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
B
For all these reasons, a faithful interpretation of the
postal exception leads to the conclusion that intentional
misconduct is excluded from its reach. Congress used “over-
lapping” terms in the exception, ante, at 13, but Congress
intended for that overlap to keep claims alleging negli-
gence, not intentional wrongdoing, out of court. This read-
ing gives meaning to Congress’s choice to put “negligent”
before “transmission” and to use the words “miscarriage”
and “loss” in their common understanding, and it respects
the “specificity” Congress used in the postal exception as
compared to the broadly worded exceptions Congress used
for other agencies. Kosak, 465 U. S., at 855 .
Undeterred by this evidence, the majority gives the
Postal Service the blanket exception Congress withheld. In
its view, the exception immunizes the agency for all inten-
tional and nonintentional actions in the delivery of mail
(apart from auto accidents and slip and falls, as Dolan and
Kosak require). Relying on “loss, miscarriage, and negli-
gent transmission” is an odd way to cover this waterfront.
If Congress had intended this outcome, why not follow the
same approach that it used for other broad exceptions in the
FTCA? See supra, at 3. The answer is that Congress in-
tended no such thing. By expanding the “words and reason”
of the postal exception beyond their “specifi[c]” scope,
Kosak, 565 U. S., at 855, the majority undermines the
“ ‘sweeping’ ” waiver of immunity Congress adopted, Dolan,
546 U. S., at 492 .
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion otherwise, adher-
ing to the text Congress enacted would not flood the Gov-
ernment or courts with frivolous lawsuits.4 That is because
——————
4 The majority points to the 335,000 complaints filed with the Postal
Service each year to suggest that those claims arise out of mail failing to
“arriv[e] properly and on time.” Ante, at 2. This is misleading. As Konan
explains, those complaints include “everything from ‘[r]ude or unprofes-
sional . . . employee behavior’ to ‘[c]omplaints about . . . vehicle parking.’ ”
14 POSTAL SERVICE v. KONAN
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
the FTCA has additional safeguards that bar many claims
premised on intentional misconduct. Liability for the
United States will arise only in the rare situation in which
the employee’s intentional conduct is tortious, falls within
the scope of her employment, and falls outside of the due-
care and discretionary-function exceptions. See 28 U. S. C.
§2680 (a). For example, the majority cites one case of an
insurance company suing after a federal employee stole an
expensive package it had insured, see ante, at 6, but most
States likely do not consider intentional torts like theft to
fall within an individual’s scope of employment, see Re-
statement (Second) of Agency §228 (1957) (torts fall outside
the scope of employment when they are “too little actuated
by a purpose to serve” the employer); Brief for Respondent
43, n. 21 (collecting cases where theft fell outside the scope
of employment). The United States, accordingly, would not
incur liability in those circumstances or others involving
claims of similar misconduct.
In addition, there are ordinary litigation tools to prevent
any threat of abuses, from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to the plausibility standards in Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662 (2009). These tools suffice in many
other circumstances where the threats of disruption posed
by large volumes of litigation are also high. Other excep-
tions, like the intentional-tort exception, §2680(h), and the
due-care exception, §2680(a), turn on Government officials’
mens rea, and courts are well equipped to assess the plau-
sibility of any given case based on the facts before them.
——————
Brief for Respondent 43. Submitting a “ ‘customer complaint,’ ” moreo-
ver, requires “typing a few sentences into an online form,” whereas “[f]il-
ing an FTCA claim requires first exhausting administrative remedies
and then filing suit in court.” Ibid. The raw number of complaints there-
fore does not provide an accurate gauge of the consequences for recogniz-
ing that intentional misconduct does not fall within the postal exception.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 15
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Finally, even if ruling for Konan today would mean more
suits against the Government for mail-related intentional
torts tomorrow, that would not provide this Court with au-
thority to change the text Congress enacted. Ultimately,
this regime is the consequence of Congress’s choice to have
the exception turn on certain types of misconduct, rather
than providing the Postal Service with a blanket exception.
It is not the role of the Judiciary to supplant the choice Con-
gress made because it would have chosen differently.
* * *
Today, the majority concludes that the postal exception
captures, and therefore protects, the intentional nondeliv-
ery of mail, even when that nondelivery was driven by ma-
licious reasons. Because this interpretation expands the
scope of the exception beyond what it can reasonably sup-
port, and undermines the FTCA’s sweeping waiver in the
process, I respectfully dissent.