Opinion of the Court
Ketanji Brown Jackson
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
URIAS-ORELLANA ET AL. v. BONDI, ATTORNEY
GENERAL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 24–777. Argued December 1, 2025—Decided March 4, 2026
This case presents the question whether the courts of appeals must apply
substantial-evidence review to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ de-
termination whether a given set of undisputed facts constitutes “per-
secution” under 8 U. S. C §1101(a)(42).
Petitioners Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife Sayra Iliana
Gamez-Mejia, and their minor child G. E. U. G., are natives of El Sal-
vador who entered the United States without authorization in 2021.
After being placed in removal proceedings, petitioners applied for asy-
lum. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the U. S. Gov-
ernment “may grant asylum” to a noncitizen if it “determines” that he
“is a refugee.” §1158(b)(1)(A). An asylum seeker qualifies as a “refu-
gee” if he “is unable or unwilling to return” to his country of nationality
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” §1101(a)(42)(A).
In support of petitioners’ applications for asylum, Urias-Orellana
testified that he was being targeted by a hitman in El Salvador. The
Immigration Judge (IJ) found Urias-Orellana’s testimony credible but
concluded that it did not establish past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution under the INA. The IJ accordingly denied
the petitioners’ asylum applications and ordered their removal. The
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. On petition for review,
the U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also affirmed, holding
that, under the substantial-evidence standard of review, the record did
not compel a contrary finding.
Held: The INA requires application of the substantial-evidence standard
2 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI
Syllabus
to the agency’s determination whether a given set of undisputed facts
rises to the level of persecution under §1101(a)(42)(A). Pp. 5–13.
(a) Section 1252(b)(4) sets forth the scope and standard of review for
courts of appeals evaluating IJ and BIA removal orders; subparagraph
(B) provides that “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the con-
trary.” The Court has previously interpreted this provision to pre-
scribe a deferential, “substantial-evidence standard,” Nasrallah v.
Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 584 , meaning “ ‘such relevant evidence as a rea-
sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’ ”
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 97, 103 . The courts of appeals have split
over the extent to which this standard applies to the agency’s determi-
nation that an asylum applicant has established persecution. Pp. 5–7.
(b) Though the courts of appeals apply varying standards, the Court
has already concluded that the persecution determination—including
both the underlying factual findings and the application of the INA to
those findings—receives substantial-evidence review. In INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U. S. 478 , the Court held that to obtain judicial reversal
of the agency’s persecution determination, an asylum applicant must
show that the evidence presented was “so compelling that no reasona-
ble factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Id.,
at 484 . Congress amended the INA shortly after the Court’s decision,
but those amendments—and the addition of §1252(b)(4)(B) in particu-
lar—codified the Elias-Zacarias standard. The statute as it reads to-
day therefore requires substantial-evidence review. Pp. 7–11.
(c) The Court rejects petitioners’ arguments that de novo review
should apply because §1252(b)(4)(B) requires deference only for “find-
ings of fact” and no subparagraph explicitly addresses the mixed ques-
tion of law and fact that is the determination of persecution. However,
Elias-Zacarias and the subsequent statutory history suggest that Con-
gress meant for the entirety of this “mixed” determination to receive
deference under §1252(b)(4)(B). The Court’s decisions in Wilkinson v.
Garland, 601 U. S. 209 , and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221 ,
are not to the contrary. Those cases addressed whether a mixed ques-
tion qualifies as a “question of law” exempt from §1252(a)’s bar on ju-
dicial review, 601 U. S., at 212 , 589 U. S., at 225 ; but whether a given
issue is treated as a question of law exempt from the INA’s jurisdiction-
stripping provisions says nothing about the type of review the court
must afford to that issue under other provisions of the statute. Pp. 11–
13.
121 F. 4th 327 , affirmed.
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24–777
_________________
DOUGLAS HUMBERTO URIAS-ORELLANA, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY
GENERAL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
[March 4, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners Douglas Humberto Urias-Orellana, his wife
Sayra Iliana Gamez-Mejia, and their minor child
G. E. U. G. are Salvadoran natives who sought asylum af-
ter entering the United States without authorization. An
Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their applications and or-
dered their removal, determining that they had neither
demonstrated past “persecution” nor established a “well-
founded fear” of future “persecution” as required under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163 , 8
U. S. C. §1101 (a)(42)(A). After unsuccessfully challenging
their removal order with the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), petitioners sought review in federal court. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s ruling, holding that “substan-
tial evidence” supported the agency’s persecution determi-
nation. Urias-Orellana v. Garland, 121 F. 4th 327 , 335–
338 (CA1 2024).
We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of
Appeals applied the appropriate standard of review under
the INA. We conclude that the statute requires application
of the substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s
2 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI
Opinion of the Court
conclusion that a given set of undisputed facts does not con-
stitute persecution. Accordingly, we affirm.
I
A
Petitioners entered the United States without authoriza-
tion in 2021. Soon after they arrived, the Government
served petitioners with notices to appear in federal immi-
gration court for a removal hearing. When they appeared
as scheduled in an immigration court in Boston, petitioners
conceded their removability but claimed asylum (along with
other forms of relief from removal that are no longer at is-
sue).
Petitioner Urias-Orellana was the sole witness at the re-
moval hearing. He testified that a “sicario” (i.e., hitman)
from his hometown had been targeting him since 2016.
That year, the sicario shot two of Urias-Orellana’s half-
brothers and vowed to kill every member of his family. Id.,
at 332 . To escape the sicario’s threats, Urias-Orellana,
Gamez-Mejia, and G. E. U. G. relocated within El Salvador
several times over the next few years. After each move,
Urias-Orellana was threatened by men who demanded
money and warned that they would leave him like his
brothers if he did not pay up. One of the men even physi-
cally assaulted Urias-Orellana when he returned to his
hometown for a brief visit. Id., at 333 .
The last straw came soon after Urias-Orellana’s fourth
and final move in 2021, when he learned that men had been
asking around town about the arrival of any newcomers. It
was at this point that Urias-Orellana, Gamez-Mejia, and
G. E. U. G. left El Salvador for the United States.
Under the INA, the U. S. Government “may grant asy-
lum” to a noncitizen if it “determines” that he “is a refugee.”
8 U. S. C. §1158 (b)(1)(A). An asylum seeker qualifies as a
“refugee,” and is thus eligible for asylum, if he “is unable or
unwilling to return” to his country of nationality “because
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
Opinion of the Court
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion.” §1101(a)(42)(A). An
asylum seeker can submit an affirmative application to the
Department of Homeland Security, see §1158(a), or raise
asylum eligibility as a defense to removal proceedings be-
fore an IJ, see §1229a(c)(4). Urias-Orellana and his family
chose the latter path: When the Government initiated re-
moval proceedings against them, they defended by assert-
ing asylum eligibility.
The IJ credited Urias-Orellana’s account of the facts but
concluded that those facts were insufficient to establish ei-
ther past persecution or a well-founded fear of future per-
secution. The IJ explained that, under First Circuit prece-
dent, death threats may establish past persecution only
when they are “ ‘so menacing as to cause significant actual
suffering or harm.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a (quoting
Bonilla v. Mukasey, 539 F. 3d 72, 77 (CA1 2008)). The IJ
concluded that Urias-Orellana’s past-persecution claim
failed under that standard, as he had not submitted any
medical, psychiatric, or psychological evaluations indicat-
ing that he had experienced such suffering or harm. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 31a–32a. The IJ further found the evidence
regarding Urias-Orellana’s alleged fear of future persecu-
tion to be lacking. He observed that Urias-Orellana had
successfully escaped danger after many of his relocations
and that any risk resurfaced only when Urias-Orellana re-
turned to his hometown or nearby areas. Id., at 32a–35a.
Given the dearth of evidence establishing past or future
persecution, the IJ determined that Urias-Orellana did not
qualify as a refugee eligible for asylum under §1101(a)(42).
See id., at 44a. The IJ determined that Gamez-Mejia and
G. E. U. G. were likewise ineligible for asylum, as their
claims were “derivativ[e]” of Urias-Orellana’s. Id., at 28a.
So, the IJ ordered all three petitioners’ removal. Id., at 44a.
4 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI
Opinion of the Court
B
Petitioners appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA. See 8
CFR §1003.1 (b) (2025) (providing authority for such an ap-
peal). But the BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Urias-
Orellana’s testimony “did not establish that he suffered
past harm in the aggregate rising to the level of persecu-
tion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. It also agreed that because
Urias-Orellana “only had problems when he returned to his
hometown,” his testimony did not establish a well-founded
fear of future persecution. Id., at 22a.
Petitioners then sought further review in the U. S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit pursuant to 8 U. S. C.
§1252 (b)(2). See 121 F. 4th, at 331 . Petitioners did not dis-
pute that death threats may establish past persecution only
when they are “so menacing as to cause significant actual
suffering or harm.” Opening Brief for Petitioners in No. 24–
1042 (CA1), pp. 9–10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Instead, they argued that the undisputed facts of this case
met that standard. The Court of Appeals emphasized that
its review was “cabin[ed]” to “whether the Agency conclu-
sion [that petitioners] had not demonstrated past persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of future persecution was sup-
ported by substantial evidence.” 121 F. 4th, at 335 . Under
that standard, reversal was warranted only “if, in reviewing
the record as a whole, any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ibid. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, concluding
that Urias-Orellana’s testimony did not compel a finding of
either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future per-
secution. See id., at 336–338. In particular, it determined
that “[t]he Agency reasonably concluded that the threats
experienced by Urias-Orellana” were not “so menacing as to
cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Id., at 336 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). It similarly determined
that, because “Urias-Orellana was able to live in towns
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
Opinion of the Court
across El Salvador for years without harassment and only
encountered difficulties once he returned to his hometown,”
a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find a
well-founded fear of future persecution. Id., at 338.
We granted certiorari, 606 U. S. 903 (2025), to evaluate
whether the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate
standard of review when evaluating Urias-Orellana’s asy-
lum claim.1
II
Section 1252(b)(4) does not use the phrase “substantial
evidence.” But it does specifically address the “[s]cope and
standard for review” that the courts of appeals must apply
when evaluating IJ and BIA removal orders.
As relevant here, each of §1252(b)(4)’s four subpara-
graphs truncates the court’s review in a particular manner.
Subparagraph (A) states that “the court of appeals shall de-
cide the petition only on the administrative record on which
the order of removal is based.” Subparagraph (C) says that
“a decision [by the agency] that [a noncitizen] is not eligible
for admission to the United States is conclusive unless
manifestly contrary to law.” And, per subparagraph (D),
“the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment whether to
grant relief under section 1158(a) of this title shall be con-
clusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse
of discretion.”
This case involves subparagraph (B), which provides that
“the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless
——————
1 Because petitioners have not challenged the standard of persecution
that the agency applied—i.e., that death threats are sufficient to estab-
lish past persecution only when they are so menacing as to cause signif-
icant actual suffering or harm, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a—we con-
sider only the appropriate standard of review for the agency’s application
of that standard to the facts. We note the Solicitor General agrees with
petitioners that “purely legal questions about the appropriate standard”
of persecution are subject to de novo review. Brief for Respondent 40; see
Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
6 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI
Opinion of the Court
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
to the contrary.” §1252(b)(4)(B). This Court has previously
interpreted subparagraph (B) to prescribe a deferential,
“substantial-evidence standard” for review of agency fac-
tual findings. Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 584 (2020).
Substantial evidence, we have long emphasized, is “ ‘more
than a mere scintilla,’ ” but “means—and means only—
‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Biestek v. Berryhill,
587 U. S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938)). Or, to come full circle,
“ ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable ad-
judicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’ ”
Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 584 (quoting §1252(b)(4)(B)).
Whether a given agency determination fits within the
purview of subparagraph (B)—and is thus reviewed for sub-
stantial evidence—is not always clear. Indeed, the courts
of appeals have split over the standard of review that
should apply to the agency’s determination that an asylum
applicant has not established past “persecution” or a “well-
founded fear of [future] persecution” within the meaning of
§1101(a)(42)(A).
Some courts review the entire inquiry (both the underly-
ing factual findings about what happened to the applicant
in her home country and the agency’s application of the
statute to those findings) under the substantial-evidence
standard.2 Other courts break down the inquiry into two
parts, reviewing the agency’s factual findings for substan-
tial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo.3 Yet even
——————
2 See Gómez-Medina v. Barr, 975 F. 3d 27, 31, 33 (CA1 2020); Ai Hua
Chen v. Holder, 742 F. 3d 171 , 177–178 (CA4 2014); Yu v. Ashcroft, 364
F. 3d 700 , 702–703 (CA6 2004); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 467 F. 3d 669, 673
(CA7 2006); Vicente-Elias v. Mukasey, 532 F. 3d 1086, 1091 (CA10 2008).
3 See Diallo v. INS, 232 F. 3d 279, 287 (CA2 2000); Herrera-Reyes v.
Attorney Gen., 952 F. 3d 101, 106 (CA3 2020); Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft,
263 F. 3d 442, 444 (CA5 2001) (per curiam); Njong v. Whitaker, 911 F. 3d
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
Opinion of the Court
those courts are not always careful when differentiating be-
tween factual findings and the application of the law to
those findings, sometimes applying substantial-evidence
review to the entire inquiry.4
Today we resolve the proper-standard question as it re-
lates to the courts of appeals’ review of the agency’s perse-
cution determination. As explained in Part III, infra, we
hold that §1252(b)(4)(B) requires courts to review the en-
tirety of the agency’s conclusions—both the underlying fac-
tual findings and the application of the INA to those find-
ings—for substantial evidence. Thus, in the language of the
statute, the agency’s determination whether a given set of
undisputed facts rises to the level of persecution under
§1101(a)(42)(A) is generally “conclusive unless any reason-
able adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the con-
trary.” §1252(b)(4)(B).
III
Though the courts of appeals apply varying standards to
the agency’s persecution determination, we have already
concluded that these determinations receive substantial-
evidence review. Specifically, in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
U. S. 478 (1992), we held that “to obtain judicial reversal”
of the agency’s persecution determination, an asylum appli-
cant “must show that the evidence he presented was so com-
pelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the
requisite fear of persecution.” Id., at 483–484. To be sure,
Congress amended the INA shortly after our decision. But
those amendments—and the addition of §1252(b)(4) in par-
ticular—codified the Elias-Zacarias standard. As such, the
——————
919, 922 (CA8 2018); Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986 F. 3d 1216, 1221 (CA9
2021); Mejia v. Attorney Gen., 498 F. 3d 1253, 1256 (CA11 2007).
4 See Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F. 3d 316, 328, 336 (CA2 2020); Thayalan v.
Attorney Gen., 997 F. 3d 132 , 137–138, n. 1 (CA3 2021); Gjetani v. Barr,
968 F. 3d 393 , 396–397, and n. 2 (CA5 2020); Brizuela v. Garland, 71
F. 4th 1087, 1093 (CA8 2023); Sharma v. Garland, 9 F. 4th 1052 , 1060
(CA9 2021); Martinez v. Attorney Gen., 992 F. 3d 1283, 1292 (CA11 2021).
8 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI
Opinion of the Court
statute as it reads today requires substantial-evidence re-
view for the entirety of the persecution determination.
A
Like this case, Elias-Zacarias began with an IJ’s deter-
mination that a noncitizen was ineligible for asylum. Id.,
at 480. Elias-Zacarias had testified that he feared retalia-
tion in his home country of Guatemala after he refused to
join a group of guerillas who had attempted to recruit him.
Id., at 479–480. But the IJ concluded that this testimony
“failed to demonstrate persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion” as
the INA requires. Id., at 480 (citing 8 U. S. C.
§§1101 (a)(42), 1158(a)). After the BIA affirmed, Elias-Zac-
arias sought review in federal court. 502 U. S., at 480 .
The Court of Appeals sided with Elias-Zacarias, holding
that “a guerilla organization’s attempt to conscript a person
into its military forces necessarily constitutes ‘persecution
on account of . . . political opinion,’ because ‘the person re-
sisting forced recruitment is expressing a political opinion
hostile to the persecutor.’ ” Id., at 481 (quoting Elias-Zaca-
rias v. INS, 921 F. 2d 844, 850 (CA9 1990)). We reversed
the Court of Appeals, however, reading the INA to require
substantial-evidence review. See 502 U. S., at 481 , 483–
484.
The version of the INA in place at the time of our decision
did not contain what is now §1252(b)(4)(B). But it con-
tained a similar provision, which specified that agency
“findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial,
and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,
shall be conclusive.” 8 U. S. C. §1105a(a)(4) (1988 ed.). We
interpreted that provision to require substantial-evidence
review of the BIA’s determination that Elias-Zacarias was
ineligible for asylum. More specifically, we explained that
the provision set forth the substantial-evidence standard
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
Opinion of the Court
for review, allowing reversal “only if the evidence presented
. . . was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to con-
clude that the requisite fear of persecution existed.” 502
U. S., at 481 . Though we did not explicitly use the term
“substantial evidence,” our explanation accorded with how
we have long understood that standard to apply in the ad-
ministrative context. See Consolidated Edison, 305 U. S.,
at 229 (explaining that a statute providing that an agency’s
“findings . . . as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall
be conclusive” means “substantial evidence” and requires
only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
We then went on to apply the substantial-evidence stand-
ard to the entirety of the agency’s persecution determina-
tion—including its conclusion that Elias-Zacarias’s testi-
mony did not satisfy the legal standard for persecution. We
explained that Elias-Zacarias had failed to establish a
“well-founded fear” that the guerillas would “persecute him
because of ” his political opinion “with the degree of clarity
necessary to permit reversal of a BIA finding to the con-
trary.” 502 U. S., at 483 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). In other words, even accepting his allegations as true,
they were not “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Id., at
484 .
Elias-Zacarias thus clarified that the INA’s provision for
substantial-evidence review encompassed not only the
agency’s factual findings but also the application of those
findings to the statutory standard for persecution. Indeed,
following our decision, the courts of appeals overwhelm-
ingly understood it to require substantial-evidence review
of the entirety of the persecution determination. See, e.g.,
Klawitter v. INS, 970 F. 2d 149, 152 (CA6 1992) (“According
to the Supreme Court, the Board’s determination [a noncit-
izen] is not eligible for asylum must be upheld unless the
10 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI
Opinion of the Court
[noncitizen] shows that the evidence he or she presented
was ‘so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail
to find the requisite fear of persecution’ ” (quoting Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U. S., at 483–484)).5
B
Just a few years after we decided Elias-Zacarias, Con-
gress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), amending sev-
eral provisions of the INA governing judicial review.
§306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–607. Among other things,
IIRIRA added §1252(b)(4), clarifying the relevant stand-
ards of review for IJ and BIA removal orders. But
§1252(b)(4) did not depart from our decision in Elias-Zaca-
rias. To the contrary, §1252(b)(4) stayed the course.
Indeed, subparagraph (B) largely tracks our opinion in
Elias-Zacarias. Compare §1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that
“administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary”) with 502 U. S., at 483–484 (stating that, if an
asylum applicant “seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the
BIA’s determination, he must show that the evidence he
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution”). Thus,
§1252(b)(4)(B) effectively restates the pre-IIRIRA practice
of applying the INA’s deferential standard for factual find-
ings to the persecution determination. Cf. Bartenwerfer v.
Buckley, 598 U. S. 69 , 80 (2023) (“This Court generally as-
sumes that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of
this Court’s relevant precedents” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
——————
5 See also Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F. 2d 995, 999 (CA4 1992) (cit-
ing Elias-Zacarias, 502 U. S., at 483–484); Chun v. INS, 40 F. 3d 76, 78
(CA5 1994) (per curiam) (same); Milosevic v. INS, 18 F. 3d 366, 370 (CA7
1994) (same); Yacoub v. INS, 999 F. 2d 1296, 1297 (CA8 1993) (per cu-
riam) (same); Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F. 3d 902, 905 (CA9 1995) (same).
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11
Opinion of the Court
Supporting this reading of §1252(b)(4)(B) are IIRIRA’s
other amendments to the INA, which tend to restrict (ra-
ther than expand) review of immigration-related determi-
nations in federal court. IIRIRA added, for instance,
§1252(a)(2)(D), which strips courts of jurisdiction to review
certain types of removal orders entirely, restoring jurisdic-
tion only for “constitutional claims or questions of law.”
IIRIRA similarly limited the scope of review under
§1252(b)(4), even in the areas where courts retain their ju-
risdiction over removal orders. Not only does subparagraph
(B) require deference toward “administrative findings of
fact,” but subparagraphs (C) and (D) mandate that certain
agency determinations are “conclusive unless manifestly
contrary to the law.” Against this backdrop, it would make
little sense to interpret subparagraph (B) as expanding ju-
dicial review beyond the pre-IIRIRA practice of applying
deference to agency persecution determinations.
IV
Given the force of Elias-Zacarias and IIRIRA’s enact-
ment history, we cannot accept petitioners’ arguments
about the applicable standard of review. Petitioners pri-
marily contend that Congress meant for de novo review to
apply to persecution determinations because §1252(b)(4)(B)
requires deference only for “findings of fact” and no subpar-
agraph of §1252(b)(4) explicitly addresses the “mixed ques-
tion of law and fact” that is the determination of past per-
secution and fear of future persecution. See Brief for
Petitioners 15–16.
With their focus on the metaphorical trees, we think pe-
titioners have missed the forest. It is certainly true that
the required persecution determination turns on more than
just the facts: The INA’s legal standard for “persecution”
must be applied to the IJ’s findings of fact. But Elias-Zac-
arias and the subsequent statutory history suggest that
Congress meant for the entirety of this kind of “mixed”
12 URIAS-ORELLANA v. BONDI
Opinion of the Court
determination—including both the IJ’s factual findings and
the application of the statute to those findings—to receive
deference under §1252(b)(4)(B). That makes sense because
the overall determination of refugee status primarily re-
quires the IJ to make critical factual findings about a given
applicant’s experiences in his country of nationality. And
even where, as here, the IJ accepts the applicant’s testi-
mony as true, the IJ must make an antecedent determina-
tion on the factual question of the applicant’s credibility.
See Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U. S. 357, 373 (2021) (ex-
plaining that, during immigration proceedings, the IJ
“makes findings of fact, including determinations as to the
credibility of particular witness testimony”). Given that
Congress has required the courts of appeals to give signifi-
cant deference to IJ factfinding throughout §1252(b)(4), it
would be anomalous indeed to conclude that courts can re-
view substantially similar persecution-related findings de
novo.6
Our decisions in Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209
(2024), and Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221
(2020), are not to the contrary. In those cases, we held that
a mixed question of law and fact could qualify as a “question
of law” exempt from §1252(a)’s bar on judicial review. 601
U. S., at 212 ; 589 U. S., at 225 . But unlike §1252(b),
§1252(a) does not speak to the standards of review for re-
moval orders; rather, it addresses a court’s ability to review
removal orders at all. As a result, whether a given issue is
treated as a question of law exempt from the INA’s
——————
6 Our conclusion that §1252(b)(4)(B) applies to the persecution deter-
mination and sets forth a deferential standard of review means we need
not address petitioners’ argument about Loper Bright Enterprises v. Rai-
mondo, 603 U. S. 369 (2024). See Brief for Petitioners 23–24 (maintain-
ing that Loper Bright requires de novo review under these circum-
stances). That decision is not applicable “when a particular statute”
mandates deferential review or otherwise “delegates authority to an
agency consistent with constitutional limits.” 603 U. S., at 413.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13
Opinion of the Court
jurisdiction-stripping provisions tells us nothing about the
type of review the court must afford to that issue under
other provisions of the statute. See Wilkinson, 601 U. S., at
222 (recognizing that the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping pro-
visions do not govern the standard of review); Guerrero-
Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 228 (same). Neither case, then, re-
quires de novo review here.
* * *
Because the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate
standard under §1252(b)(4)(B) when it reviewed the agency
persecution determination for substantial evidence, the
judgment below is affirmed.
It is so ordered.