Thompson v. United States

Opinion of the Court

John G. Roberts Jr.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1

 Syllabus

 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
 being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
 The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
 prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
 See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 Syllabus

 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
 THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

 No. 23–1095. Argued January 14, 2025—Decided March 21, 2025
Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from one bank.
 After the bank failed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
 (FDIC) became responsible for collecting the outstanding loans. Dur-
 ing a call with the FDIC’s loan servicer, Thompson disputed the
 $269,120.58 balance shown on his invoice (which consisted of the
 $219,000 Thompson had borrowed plus interest), stating that he had
 “no idea where the 269 number comes from” and that he “borrowed . . .
 $110,000.” Thompson made similar statements in a later call with
 FDIC contractors. Thompson was later charged with violating 18
 U. S. C. §1014 , which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state-
 ment” to influence the FDIC’s action on any loan. A jury found Thomp-
 son guilty, and he moved for acquittal, arguing that his statements
 were not false because he had in fact borrowed $110,000, even though
 he later borrowed more. The courts below concluded that they did not
 need to reach that argument because they read §1014 to also criminal-
 ize misleading statements, and Thompson’s statements were at least
 misleading.
Held: Section 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state-
 ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not
 false. Pp. 4–10.
 (a) The statutory text criminalizes “false statement[s]” but does not
 use the word “misleading.” False and misleading are two different
 things. A misleading statement can be true, and a true statement is
 not false. Given that, it is significant that the statute uses only the
 word “false,” which means “not true.” Adding “any” before “false state-
 ment” does not transform the scope of the statute. A statute that ap-
 plies to “any false statement” does not cover all misleading statements,
 only the “false” ones. While the Government argues that “false” and
2 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

 Syllabus

 “misleading” have long been considered synonyms, the overlap be-
 tween false statements and misleading ones is beside the point. The
 only relevant question under the text of §1014 is whether the state-
 ment—even if misleading, deceitful, or some other adjective—is also
 “false.” Pp. 4–6.
 (b) Statutory context confirms that §1014 does not cover all mislead-
 ing statements. Many other statutes, including other criminal stat-
 utes in Title 18, expressly prohibit both “false” and “misleading” state-
 ments. Interpreting “false” in §1014 to include “misleading” would
 make the inclusion of “misleading” in those statutes superfluous. Fur-
 ther, when §1014 was enacted in 1948, none of the 11 predecessor pro-
 visions consolidated into §1014 used the word “misleading,” while
 many other statutes from the same period used the phrase “false or
 misleading.” Historical context thus confirms that when Congress in-
 tended to cover all misleading statements, “it knew how to do so.” Cus-
 tis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485, 492 . Pp. 6–7.
 (c) Precedent supports the Court’s reading of §1014. In United
 States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 , the Court held that §1014 does not in-
 corporate a materiality requirement because the statute does not “so
 much as mention materiality,” whereas many other statutes do. Id.,
 at 490, 492. The same logic suggests that §1014 does not reach all
 misleading statements. In Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279 ,
 the Court reversed a conviction under §1014 for depositing several bad
 checks, on the basis that the defendant’s conduct “did not involve the
 making of a ‘false statement’ ” because “a check is not a factual asser-
 tion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as ‘true’ or ‘false.’ ”
 Id., at 284. That logic shows that a conviction under §1014 requires at
 least two things: (1) the defendant made a statement, and (2) that
 statement can be characterized as “false” and not “true.” Section 1014
 does not cover a statement rendered misleading by virtue of a material
 omission unless that statement can be characterized as “false” and not
 “true.” Finally, the Court’s decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S.
 1 , does not support the Government, as Kay did not suggest that mis-
 leading statements were independently unlawful under §1014’s prede-
 cessor. Pp. 7–9.
 (d) The right question under §1014 is whether Thompson’s state-
 ments were false, and the Court agrees that at least some context is
 relevant to that determination. The Court remands for the Seventh
 Circuit to determine whether a reasonable jury could find that Thomp-
 son’s statements were false. Pp. 9–10.
 89 F. 4th 1010 , vacated and remanded.

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO,
J., and JACKSON, J., filed concurring opinions.
 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

 Opinion of the Court

 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
 United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
 Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
 pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 No. 23–1095
 _________________

 PATRICK D. THOMPSON, PETITIONER
 v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 [March 21, 2025]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
 Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000
from the same bank. Later, Thompson told the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that he had “borrowed
. . . $110,000” from the bank. Thompson was indicted under
 18 U. S. C. §1014 for making “false statement[s]” to the
FDIC. Thompson argued that his statements were not false
because he had in fact taken out a loan for $110,000 just as
he said. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit
held that they did not need to consider that argument. In
their view, the prohibition in §1014 against “false state-
ment[s]” extends to misleading ones as well, and Thomp-
son’s statements were at least misleading in failing to men-
tion the additional loans. The question presented is
whether §1014 criminalizes statements that are misleading
but not false.
 I
 A
 Between 2011 and 2014, Patrick Thompson took out
three loans from the Washington Federal Bank for Savings.
2 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

 Opinion of the Court

Thompson first borrowed $110,000 in 2011 to make an eq-
uity contribution to a law firm. Thompson then borrowed
$20,000 from the Bank in 2013 and another $89,000 in
2014, resulting in a total loan balance of $219,000. In 2017,
the Bank failed, and the FDIC became responsible for col-
lecting the Bank’s outstanding loans. As part of that pro-
cess, the FDIC’s loan servicer—Planet Home Lending—
sent Thompson an invoice in February 2018 listing a bal-
ance due of $269,120.58, which consisted of the $219,000
Thompson had borrowed plus interest.
 On February 23, 2018, Thompson called the customer
service line of Planet Home Lending. During the call, which
was recorded, Thompson told the customer service agent
that he had “no idea where the 269 number comes from.”
App. 52. Thompson said, “I borrowed the money, I owe the
money—but I borrowed . . . I think it was $110,000.” Id., at
56. Thompson agreed with the agent that he was claiming
a “discrepancy,” and said that he was “disput[ing]” the bal-
ance listed on the invoice. Id., at 53, 61. The agent told
Thompson that Planet Home Lending would research the
issue. Id., at 62.
 On March 1, 2018, Thompson received a call from two
FDIC contractors. The call was not recorded, but the con-
tractors took notes. According to those notes, Thompson
mentioned borrowing $110,000 for “home improvement.”
Id., at 138.
 Thompson and the FDIC ultimately agreed to settle
Thompson’s debt for $219,000—the principal amount of his
loans.
 B
 Thompson was later charged with two counts of violating
 18 U. S. C. §1014 . That statute prohibits “knowingly
mak[ing] any false statement or report . . . for the purpose
of influencing in any way the action of . . . the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation . . . upon any . . . loan.” Count
 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

 Opinion of the Court

one of the indictment alleged that on the February 23 phone
call, Thompson “falsely stated he only owed . . . $110,000 to
[the Bank] and that any higher amount was incorrect, when
[he] then knew he had received $219,000.” App. 4. Count
two alleged that on the March 1 phone call, Thompson
“falsely stated that he only owed $110,000 to [the Bank],
that any higher amount was incorrect, and that these funds
were for home improvement, when [he] then knew he had
received $219,000 from [the Bank] and the $110,000 was
paid to a law firm as [his] capital contribution.” Id., at 5 .
 The jury found Thompson guilty on both counts. He
moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing that a “convic-
tion for false statements cannot be sustained where, as
here, the alleged statements are literally true, even if mis-
leading.” Defendant’s Post-Trial Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal and for New Trial in No. 1:21–cr–00279 (ND Ill.,
Mar. 17, 2022), ECF Doc. 154, p. 7. Thompson argued that
his statements about borrowing $110,000 were literally
true because he had in fact borrowed that amount of money
from the Bank, even though he later borrowed more. Id., at
10–11.*
 The District Court denied Thompson’s motion. It found
that “the Seventh Circuit does not require literal falsity in
Section 1014 cases.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a (citing
United States v. Freed, 921 F. 3d 716, 723 (CA7 2019)). The
District Court acknowledged that “Thompson’s argument
would have more traction” in the Sixth Circuit, where “a
Section 1014 conviction cannot rest on material omissions
or implied misrepresentations.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a
(citing United States v. Kurlemann, 736 F. 3d 439 (CA6
2013)). But the District Court concluded that Thompson
had “failed to direct the Court to a Supreme Court case or

——————
 *Thompson did not argue that his alleged statement about “home im-
provement” was a true statement. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 28 (“That is
a false statement.”).
4 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

 Opinion of the Court

Seventh Circuit case that holds that a Section 1014 convic-
tion requires a literally false statement.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 52a. The District Court therefore found it unneces-
sary to “address the Government’s argument that Thomp-
son’s statements were literally false,” because “literal fal-
sity is not required to sustain a Section 1014 conviction.”
 Id., at 56a.
 The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Like the District Court,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that it “need not decide
whether Thompson’s statements were literally true because
his argument runs headfirst into [Seventh Circuit] prece-
dent.” 89 F. 4th 1010, 1016 (2024). According to the panel,
the Seventh Circuit had “already decided [in Freed] that
§1014 criminalizes misleading representations.” Ibid. The
panel found that Thompson’s statements were misleading
because “the implication of his statements was that he owed
[the Bank] no more than $110,000.” Id., at 1017. The panel
acknowledged the Sixth Circuit’s contrary holding in
United States v. Kurlemann, 736 F. 3d 439 , but it concluded
that it was bound by Seventh Circuit precedent. 89 F. 4th,
at 1017–1018.
 We granted certiorari to determine whether §1014 crimi-
nalizes statements that are misleading but not false. 603
U. S. ___ (2024).
 II
 A
 We start with the text. Section 1014 criminalizes “know-
ingly mak[ing] any false statement or report.” It does not
use the word “misleading.” Yet false and misleading are
two different things. A misleading statement can be true.
See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n
of Ill., 496 U. S. 91, 102 (1990) (noting that a “statement,
even if true, could be misleading”). And a true statement is
obviously not false. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. 1, 10
(1994) (“[T]o suppose that the same proposition is both true
 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 5

 Opinion of the Court

and false . . . is manifestly absurd.” (quoting 1 Works of
James Wilson 519 (J. Andrews ed. 1896))). So basic logic
dictates that at least some misleading statements are not
false.
 The Government agrees with this principle, and even
suggested an example at oral argument: If a tennis player
says she “won the championship” when her opponent for-
feited, her statement—even if true—might be misleading
because it could lead people to think she had won a con-
tested match. Tr. of Oral Arg. 69. The Government also
agreed at oral argument with another example: If a doctor
tells a patient, “I’ve done a hundred of these surgeries,”
when 99 of those patients died, the statement—even if
true—would be misleading because it might lead people to
think those surgeries were successful. Id., at 71 .
 Given that some misleading statements are also true, it
is significant that the statute uses only the word “false.” If
that word means anything, it means “not true,” both today
and in 1948 when the statute was enacted. Black’s Law
Dictionary 742 (12th ed. 2024) (“Untrue <a false state-
ment>”); id., at 721 (4th ed. 1951) (“Not true”). Just as a
matter of plain text, then, a statement that is misleading
but true is by definition not a “false statement.”
 Adding “any” before “false statement” does not change
that result. Contra, Brief for United States 19–20. Cer-
tainly, “any” has an “expansive meaning.” Department of
Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U. S. 125,
131 (2002) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1,
5 (1997)). But “[e]xpansive, yes; transformative, no.” Free-
man v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012). A
statute that applies to “any Ford owner” does not cover all
car owners, because the car must still be a Ford. So too a
statute that applies to “any false statement” does not cover
all misleading statements, because the statement must still
be false. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U. S. 398 , 400
6 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

 Opinion of the Court

(1998) (defining “ ‘any’ false statement” as “a false state-
ment ‘of whatever kind’ ” (quoting Gonzales, 520 U. S., at 5 ;
emphasis added)).
 The Government wisely agrees that “false” means “not
true.” Brief for United States 14. But, dictionary in hand,
the Government notes that “false” can also mean “deceit-
ful.” Id., at 15 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 748 (3d ed.
1933); alterations omitted). And, thesaurus in the other
hand, the Government adds that “false and misleading
have long been considered synonyms.” Brief for United
States 26 (citing Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms 327,
549–550 (1942)). Absent from the Government’s account,
however, is the fact that some misleading statements are
not false, as the Government acknowledged at oral argu-
ment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 68. Given that fact, the Govern-
ment’s textual arguments simply point out the “substantial
overlap” between the two terms. Brief for United States 26.
That overlap is beside the point. Certainly, the statute’s
prohibition on “false statement[s]” could reach some state-
ments that are “mislead[ing],” “deceitful,” “deceptive,” or
“mendacious,” id., at 15 , but only because those particular
statements are also false. Regardless of whether other ad-
jectives apply, the only relevant question according to the
text of the statute is whether the statement is “false.”
 B
 Statutory context confirms that §1014 does not cover all
misleading statements. Again, the statute uses the word
“false.” It does not use “misleading.” Many other statutes
do, including other criminal statutes in Title 18 of the U. S.
Code. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §1038 (a) (“convey false or mis-
leading information”); §1365(b) (“renders materially false
or misleading the labeling of . . . a consumer product”);
§1515(b) (“making a false or misleading statement”); see
also Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84–85, as amended, 15
U. S. C. §77q(a)(2) (prohibiting obtaining property through
 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 7

 Opinion of the Court

“any untrue statement of a material fact” or “any omission”
that renders a statement “misleading”). Interpreting the
word “false” to include “misleading” would make the inclu-
sion of “misleading” in those statutes superfluous. See Gus-
tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court
will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether
redundant.”).
 Context from the time of enactment of §1014 further con-
firms that the statute does not reach all misleading state-
ments. As we explained in a previous case, “Congress orig-
inally enacted §1014 as part of its recodification of the
federal criminal code in 1948.” United States v. Wells, 519
U. S. 482, 492 (1997). Eleven of the thirteen provisions
brought together by §1014 prohibited “false” statements,
and none used the word “misleading,” see 7 U. S. C.
§§1026 (a), 1514(a) (1946 ed.); 12 U. S. C. §§596 , 981, 1122,
1138d(a), 1248, 1312, 1441(a), 1467(a) (1946 ed.); 15
U. S. C. §616 (a) (1946 ed.). These predecessor statutes
were all enacted in the decades prior to 1948. Many other
statutes enacted in the same period used the phrase “false
or misleading.” See, e.g., Perishable Agricultural Commod-
ities Act, 1930, §2(4), 46 Stat. 532 ; Public Utility Act of
1935, §16(a), 49 Stat. 829 ; Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of 1938, §602(a), 52 Stat. 1054 . The language of
these other statutes shows that when Congress intended to
cover all misleading statements, “it knew how to do so.”
Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485, 492 (1994).
 C
 Precedent supports our reading of the text. For example,
in United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 , we held that §1014
does not incorporate a materiality requirement because the
statute does not “so much as mention materiality,” whereas
many other statutes do. Id., at 490, 492. The same logic
suggests that §1014 does not reach all misleading state-
ments.
8 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

 Opinion of the Court

 Our decision in Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279
(1982), is also instructive. The defendant in that case de-
posited several bad checks, then was convicted under §1014
on the theory that he falsely represented having more
money than he had. See id., at 283. We reversed the con-
viction because the defendant’s “course of conduct did not
involve the making of a ‘false statement’ ” for the “simple
reason” that “a check is not a factual assertion at all, and
therefore cannot be characterized as ‘true’ or ‘false.’ ” Id., at
284. That logic shows that a conviction under §1014 re-
quires at least two things: (1) the defendant made a state-
ment, and (2) that statement can be characterized as “false”
and not “true.” The dissent in Williams observed that this
reasoning “would apply equally to material omissions.” Id.,
at 296 (opinion of Marshall, J.). Precisely so. If a material
omission renders a statement misleading, §1014 still does
not cover that statement unless it can be characterized as
“false” and not “true.” A statement that is true but mislead-
ing does not fit the bill.
 The Government contends that one of our precedents
points in the opposite direction. In Kay v. United States,
 303 U. S. 1 (1938), this Court described a predecessor stat-
ute to §1014 as “secur[ing] protection against false and mis-
leading representations,” even though that statute used
only the word “false.” Id., at 7 (emphasis added); see also
id., at 3, n. 1. Indeed, as the Government points out, this
Court used the word “misleading” (or “mislead”) several
times throughout the opinion. Id., at 6, 7, 8. But nearly
every time the word appears, it describes a person’s intent
while making a false statement, not the statement itself.
See id., at 5–6 (“making false statements with intent to mis-
lead”); id., at 6 (“falsely with intent to mislead”); id., at 7
(“false statements designed to mislead”). And in describing
the statute as “secur[ing] protections against false and mis-
leading representations,” the Court used the word “and” ra-
ther than “or.” Id., at 7; see also id., at 8. Kay thus did not
 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 9

 Opinion of the Court

suggest that misleading statements were independently
unlawful under §1014’s predecessor. Instead, the Govern-
ment’s argument about Kay again comes down to the over-
lap between false and misleading. Certainly, a statute that
criminalizes “false” statements also criminalizes state-
ments that are both false and misleading, or false state-
ments made with intent to mislead. But the question before
us is whether such a statute also criminalizes statements
that are misleading but not false. The answer to that ques-
tion must be no.
 III
 The Government argues that we should affirm on the al-
ternative basis that Thompson’s statements were false. But
neither the District Court nor the Seventh Circuit an-
swered that question, and “we are a court of review, not of
first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7
(2005). Our holding shows, however, that this question is
the right one to ask under §1014. And as the litigation be-
fore us has clarified, even Thompson agrees that “[c]ontext
obviously matters in determining whether a statement is
false.” Reply Brief 7. Thompson concedes, for example, that
if he “had made his statement in response to a question like
‘did you borrow $269,000?,’ ” then “his statement, in con-
text, would have been false.” Id., at 9. We agree with the
parties that at least some context is relevant to determining
whether a statement is false under §1014. We leave for re-
mand the question whether a reasonable jury could find
that Thompson’s statements in this case were false.
 * * *
 In casual conversation, people use many overlapping
words to describe shady statements: false, misleading, dis-
honest, deceptive, literally true, and more. Only one of
those words appears in the statute. Section 1014 does not
10 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

 Opinion of the Court

criminalize statements that are misleading but true. Un-
der the statute, it is not enough that a statement is mis-
leading. It must be “false.”
 The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

 It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

 ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 No. 23–1095
 _________________

 PATRICK D. THOMPSON, PETITIONER
 v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 [March 21, 2025]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring.
 I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to
summarize my understanding of the decision. Five aspects
of today’s decision are most important.
 First, the Court holds that 18 U. S. C. §1014 criminalizes
only those statements that are “false.” Other related stat-
utes refer to both “false” and “misleading” statements. But
§1014 does not, so we assume the omission was intentional.
See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U. S. 8 , 14 (2019) (“Congress
has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted lan-
guage”). The decision below, which held that §1014 applies
to merely “misleading representations,” 89 F. 4th 1010,
1016 (CA7 2024), was therefore erroneous.
 Second, as used in §1014, the term “false” means “not
true.” Ante, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). That
is what it means in ordinary speech. See, e.g., Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 819 (1976) (“not corre-
sponding to truth or reality: not true”); Random House Dic-
tionary of the English Language 695 (2d ed. 1987) (“not true
or correct; erroneous”). Neither party advocates giving
“false statement” a specialized or term-of-art reading, and
the Court rightly declines to do so. Accordingly, “false
statement” in §1014 bears its ordinary meaning.
 Third, in considering whether a statement is “false,”
judges and juries must view the statement in “the context
2 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

 ALITO, J., concurring

in which it is made.” United States v. Briggs, 592 U. S. 69,
72 (2020). That is how people generally evaluate the truth
or falsity of a statement. Cf. Deal v. United States, 508 U. S.
129, 132 (1993) (discussing the “fundamental principle . . .
of language” that “the meaning of a word” or statement
“cannot be determined in isolation”). And since §1014 uses
the adjective “false” in the ordinary sense of the term, the
same approach applies.
 In ordinary speech, we do not regard a statement as true
or false based solely on the literal or semantic meaning of
its words viewed in isolation. Two examples illustrate this
principle. Start with an example adapted from the parties’
briefs. See Brief for United States 16; Reply Brief 8–9. Af-
ter noticing that a plate of 12 fresh-baked cookies has only
crumbs remaining, a mother asks her daughter, “Did you
eat all the cookies?” If the child says “I ate three” when she
actually had all 12, her words would be literally true in iso-
lation but false in context. The child did eat three cookies
(then nine more). In context, however, the child is implic-
itly saying that she ate only three cookies, and that is false.
 Consider another example, adapted from a law-review ar-
ticle by Professor Richard Fallon. See The Statutory Inter-
pretation Muddle, 114 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269 , 272 (2019). Par-
ents James and Rachel are talking about their teenage son
Alex. James enlists Alex to help rake leaves, but Alex is
distracted and does little work. Afterwards, James tells Ra-
chel: “As usual, Alex was a big help.” Taken literally, his
statement is false. But if James and Rachel have often spo-
ken about Alex’s unwillingness to help with household
chores, Rachel would understand that James’s statement
was ironic and that James actually meant Alex was no help
at all. So, in context, James’s statement is actually true.
 Petitioner readily acknowledges that falsity must be
judged in context. See Reply Brief 7–8; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–
7. Courts should keep this important point in mind in fu-
ture §1014 cases.
 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

 ALITO, J., concurring

 Fourth, as used in ordinary speech, the terms “false” and
“misleading” may “overlap.” Ante, at 6. A statement that
might in ordinary speech be casually described as “mislead-
ing” may actually be misleading and false when viewed in
context. Because there is no clear line demarcating state-
ments that are false in context from those that are merely
misleading, there is no reason why a court should make any
reference to misleading statements in a §1014 case. It was
error for the Court of Appeals to hold that §1014 applies to
“misleading” statements, and it would likewise be wrong for
a court to instruct a jury that it must acquit if it finds that
a charged statement is misleading. The pattern jury in-
structions used in the various Circuits avoid this problem,*
and our decision in this case does not necessitate any
change.
 Finally, the question that the Seventh Circuit must ad-
dress on remand is narrow. Although the Court of Appeals
affirmed petitioner’s conviction on the ground that his
statements were “misleading,” the trial judge gave no such
instruction to the jury. Petitioner did not object to the
judge’s §1014 instructions below, and he does not challenge
them here. Instead of basing his request for reversal on in-
structional error, he moved after trial for a judgment of ac-
quittal based on insufficient evidence. See Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 29(c). Thus, the applicable test on remand is whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Gov-
ernment, any rational finder of fact could conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that petitioner’s statements were false
——————
 *Most Circuits simply have the trial judge instruct the jury, in relevant
part, that it must find the defendant “made a false statement.” E.g.,
Model Crim. Jury Instr. §15.41 (CA9 2022); Pattern Crim. Jury Instr.
§2.48 (CA10 2025). Some Circuits also have the judge add that “[a] state-
ment is ‘false’ if it was untrue when made.” E.g., Pattern Crim. Jury
Instr. §4.18.1014 (CA1 2024); Model Crim. Jury Instr. §6.18.1014 (CA8
2023). And it appears that none of the pattern jury instructions men-
tions “misleading” statements. See 2 L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury
Instructions–Criminal ¶37.03 (2024).
4 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES

 ALITO, J., concurring

in context. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 , 318–319
(1979); United States v. Armbruster, 48 F. 4th 527, 531
(CA7 2022).
 With these observations, I join the Court’s opinion.
 Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

 JACKSON, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 No. 23–1095
 _________________

 PATRICK D. THOMPSON, PETITIONER
 v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 [March 21, 2025]

 JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.
 I agree with the Court’s conclusion that 18 U. S. C. §1014
criminalizes only false statements. Ante, at 10. I write sep-
arately to note that the pre-verdict instructions the District
Court provided to the jury in this case did not say otherwise.
That is, while the lower courts may have misunderstood the
scope of §1014, the jury was properly instructed that it
could find Thompson guilty only if the prosecution proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson “made the
charged false statement[s].” App. 157–158. For count two,
the jury specifically found that Thompson made all of the
statements alleged. Id., at 160. Moreover, and im-
portantly, the jury was not advised that §1014 “criminalizes
misleading representations,” 89 F. 4th 1010, 1016 (CA7
2024), as was mistakenly required by the Seventh Circuit
precedent the Court rejects today.
 Thus, in my view, there is little for the Seventh Circuit to
do on remand but affirm the District Court’s judgment up-
holding the jury’s guilty verdict. Whether Thompson’s
statements were, in fact, false is a question for the jury—
and here, one the jury has already answered. At most, then,
the Seventh Circuit can properly assess whether any rea-
sonable jury could have found that Thompson’s statements
satisfied §1014’s falsity element. On this record, I think
that legal issue is not subject to reasonable debate.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 . SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 23–1095. Argued January 14, 2025—Decided March 21, 2025 Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from one bank. After the bank failed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became responsible for collecting the outstanding loans. Dur- ing a call with the FDIC’s loan servicer, Thompson disputed the $269,120.58 balance shown on his invoice (which consisted of the $219,000 Thompson had borrowed plus interest), stating that he had “no idea where the 269 number comes from” and that he “borrowed . . . $110,000.” Thompson made similar statements in a later call with FDIC contractors. Thompson was later charged with violating 18 U. S. C. §1014 , which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state- ment” to influence the FDIC’s action on any loan. A jury found Thomp- son guilty, and he moved for acquittal, arguing that his statements were not false because he had in fact borrowed $110,000, even though he later borrowed more. The courts below concluded that they did not need to reach that argument because they read §1014 to also criminal- ize misleading statements, and Thompson’s statements were at least misleading. Held: Section 1014, which prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false state- ment,” does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false. Pp. 4–10. (a) The statutory text criminalizes “false statement[s]” but does not use the word “misleading.” False and misleading are two different things. A misleading statement can be true, and a true statement is not false. Given that, it is significant that the statute uses only the word “false,” which means “not true.” Adding “any” before “false state- ment” does not transform the scope of the statute. A statute that ap- plies to “any false statement” does not cover all misleading statements, only the “false” ones. While the Government argues that “false” and 2 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES Syllabus “misleading” have long been considered synonyms, the overlap be- tween false statements and misleading ones is beside the point. The only relevant question under the text of §1014 is whether the state- ment—even if misleading, deceitful, or some other adjective—is also “false.” Pp. 4–6. (b) Statutory context confirms that §1014 does not cover all mislead- ing statements. Many other statutes, including other criminal stat- utes in Title 18, expressly prohibit both “false” and “misleading” state- ments. Interpreting “false” in §1014 to include “misleading” would make the inclusion of “misleading” in those statutes superfluous. Fur- ther, when §1014 was enacted in 1948, none of the 11 predecessor pro- visions consolidated into §1014 used the word “misleading,” while many other statutes from the same period used the phrase “false or misleading.” Historical context thus confirms that when Congress in- tended to cover all misleading statements, “it knew how to do so.” Cus- tis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485, 492 . Pp. 6–7. (c) Precedent supports the Court’s reading of §1014. In United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 , the Court held that §1014 does not in- corporate a materiality requirement because the statute does not “so much as mention materiality,” whereas many other statutes do. Id., at 490, 492. The same logic suggests that §1014 does not reach all misleading statements. In Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279 , the Court reversed a conviction under §1014 for depositing several bad checks, on the basis that the defendant’s conduct “did not involve the making of a ‘false statement’ ” because “a check is not a factual asser- tion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as ‘true’ or ‘false.’ ” Id., at 284. That logic shows that a conviction under §1014 requires at least two things: (1) the defendant made a statement, and (2) that statement can be characterized as “false” and not “true.” Section 1014 does not cover a statement rendered misleading by virtue of a material omission unless that statement can be characterized as “false” and not “true.” Finally, the Court’s decision in Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 , does not support the Government, as Kay did not suggest that mis- leading statements were independently unlawful under §1014’s prede- cessor. Pp. 7–9. (d) The right question under §1014 is whether Thompson’s state- ments were false, and the Court agrees that at least some context is relevant to that determination. The Court remands for the Seventh Circuit to determine whether a reasonable jury could find that Thomp- son’s statements were false. Pp. 9–10. 89 F. 4th 1010 , vacated and remanded. ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J., and JACKSON, J., filed concurring opinions. Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 23–1095 _________________ PATRICK D. THOMPSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT [March 21, 2025] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from the same bank. Later, Thompson told the Federal De- posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that he had “borrowed . . . $110,000” from the bank. Thompson was indicted under 18 U. S. C. §1014 for making “false statement[s]” to the FDIC. Thompson argued that his statements were not false because he had in fact taken out a loan for $110,000 just as he said. Both the District Court and the Seventh Circuit held that they did not need to consider that argument. In their view, the prohibition in §1014 against “false state- ment[s]” extends to misleading ones as well, and Thomp- son’s statements were at least misleading in failing to men- tion the additional loans. The question presented is whether §1014 criminalizes statements that are misleading but not false. I A Between 2011 and 2014, Patrick Thompson took out three loans from the Washington Federal Bank for Savings. 2 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Thompson first borrowed $110,000 in 2011 to make an eq- uity contribution to a law firm. Thompson then borrowed $20,000 from the Bank in 2013 and another $89,000 in 2014, resulting in a total loan balance of $219,000. In 2017, the Bank failed, and the FDIC became responsible for col- lecting the Bank’s outstanding loans. As part of that pro- cess, the FDIC’s loan servicer—Planet Home Lending— sent Thompson an invoice in February 2018 listing a bal- ance due of $269,120.58, which consisted of the $219,000 Thompson had borrowed plus interest. On February 23, 2018, Thompson called the customer service line of Planet Home Lending. During the call, which was recorded, Thompson told the customer service agent that he had “no idea where the 269 number comes from.” App. 52. Thompson said, “I borrowed the money, I owe the money—but I borrowed . . . I think it was $110,000.” Id., at 56. Thompson agreed with the agent that he was claiming a “discrepancy,” and said that he was “disput[ing]” the bal- ance listed on the invoice. Id., at 53, 61. The agent told Thompson that Planet Home Lending would research the issue. Id., at 62. On March 1, 2018, Thompson received a call from two FDIC contractors. The call was not recorded, but the con- tractors took notes. According to those notes, Thompson mentioned borrowing $110,000 for “home improvement.” Id., at 138. Thompson and the FDIC ultimately agreed to settle Thompson’s debt for $219,000—the principal amount of his loans. B Thompson was later charged with two counts of violating 18 U. S. C. §1014 . That statute prohibits “knowingly mak[ing] any false statement or report . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of . . . the Federal De- posit Insurance Corporation . . . upon any . . . loan.” Count Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 3 Opinion of the Court one of the indictment alleged that on the February 23 phone call, Thompson “falsely stated he only owed . . . $110,000 to [the Bank] and that any higher amount was incorrect, when [he] then knew he had received $219,000.” App. 4. Count two alleged that on the March 1 phone call, Thompson “falsely stated that he only owed $110,000 to [the Bank], that any higher amount was incorrect, and that these funds were for home improvement, when [he] then knew he had received $219,000 from [the Bank] and the $110,000 was paid to a law firm as [his] capital contribution.” Id., at 5 . The jury found Thompson guilty on both counts. He moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing that a “convic- tion for false statements cannot be sustained where, as here, the alleged statements are literally true, even if mis- leading.” Defendant’s Post-Trial Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and for New Trial in No. 1:21–cr–00279 (ND Ill., Mar. 17, 2022), ECF Doc. 154, p. 7. Thompson argued that his statements about borrowing $110,000 were literally true because he had in fact borrowed that amount of money from the Bank, even though he later borrowed more. Id., at 10–11.* The District Court denied Thompson’s motion. It found that “the Seventh Circuit does not require literal falsity in Section 1014 cases.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a (citing United States v. Freed, 921 F. 3d 716, 723 (CA7 2019)). The District Court acknowledged that “Thompson’s argument would have more traction” in the Sixth Circuit, where “a Section 1014 conviction cannot rest on material omissions or implied misrepresentations.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a (citing United States v. Kurlemann, 736 F. 3d 439 (CA6 2013)). But the District Court concluded that Thompson had “failed to direct the Court to a Supreme Court case or —————— *Thompson did not argue that his alleged statement about “home im- provement” was a true statement. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 28 (“That is a false statement.”). 4 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Seventh Circuit case that holds that a Section 1014 convic- tion requires a literally false statement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a. The District Court therefore found it unneces- sary to “address the Government’s argument that Thomp- son’s statements were literally false,” because “literal fal- sity is not required to sustain a Section 1014 conviction.” Id., at 56a. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Like the District Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that it “need not decide whether Thompson’s statements were literally true because his argument runs headfirst into [Seventh Circuit] prece- dent.” 89 F. 4th 1010, 1016 (2024). According to the panel, the Seventh Circuit had “already decided [in Freed] that §1014 criminalizes misleading representations.” Ibid. The panel found that Thompson’s statements were misleading because “the implication of his statements was that he owed [the Bank] no more than $110,000.” Id., at 1017. The panel acknowledged the Sixth Circuit’s contrary holding in United States v. Kurlemann, 736 F. 3d 439 , but it concluded that it was bound by Seventh Circuit precedent. 89 F. 4th, at 1017–1018. We granted certiorari to determine whether §1014 crimi- nalizes statements that are misleading but not false. 603 U. S. ___ (2024). II A We start with the text. Section 1014 criminalizes “know- ingly mak[ing] any false statement or report.” It does not use the word “misleading.” Yet false and misleading are two different things. A misleading statement can be true. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U. S. 91, 102 (1990) (noting that a “statement, even if true, could be misleading”). And a true statement is obviously not false. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. 1, 10 (1994) (“[T]o suppose that the same proposition is both true Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 5 Opinion of the Court and false . . . is manifestly absurd.” (quoting 1 Works of James Wilson 519 (J. Andrews ed. 1896))). So basic logic dictates that at least some misleading statements are not false. The Government agrees with this principle, and even suggested an example at oral argument: If a tennis player says she “won the championship” when her opponent for- feited, her statement—even if true—might be misleading because it could lead people to think she had won a con- tested match. Tr. of Oral Arg. 69. The Government also agreed at oral argument with another example: If a doctor tells a patient, “I’ve done a hundred of these surgeries,” when 99 of those patients died, the statement—even if true—would be misleading because it might lead people to think those surgeries were successful. Id., at 71 . Given that some misleading statements are also true, it is significant that the statute uses only the word “false.” If that word means anything, it means “not true,” both today and in 1948 when the statute was enacted. Black’s Law Dictionary 742 (12th ed. 2024) (“Untrue <a false state- ment>”); id., at 721 (4th ed. 1951) (“Not true”). Just as a matter of plain text, then, a statement that is misleading but true is by definition not a “false statement.” Adding “any” before “false statement” does not change that result. Contra, Brief for United States 19–20. Cer- tainly, “any” has an “expansive meaning.” Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U. S. 125, 131 (2002) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997)). But “[e]xpansive, yes; transformative, no.” Free- man v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012). A statute that applies to “any Ford owner” does not cover all car owners, because the car must still be a Ford. So too a statute that applies to “any false statement” does not cover all misleading statements, because the statement must still be false. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U. S. 398 , 400 6 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court (1998) (defining “ ‘any’ false statement” as “a false state- ment ‘of whatever kind’ ” (quoting Gonzales, 520 U. S., at 5 ; emphasis added)). The Government wisely agrees that “false” means “not true.” Brief for United States 14. But, dictionary in hand, the Government notes that “false” can also mean “deceit- ful.” Id., at 15 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 748 (3d ed. 1933); alterations omitted). And, thesaurus in the other hand, the Government adds that “false and misleading have long been considered synonyms.” Brief for United States 26 (citing Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms 327, 549–550 (1942)). Absent from the Government’s account, however, is the fact that some misleading statements are not false, as the Government acknowledged at oral argu- ment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 68. Given that fact, the Govern- ment’s textual arguments simply point out the “substantial overlap” between the two terms. Brief for United States 26. That overlap is beside the point. Certainly, the statute’s prohibition on “false statement[s]” could reach some state- ments that are “mislead[ing],” “deceitful,” “deceptive,” or “mendacious,” id., at 15 , but only because those particular statements are also false. Regardless of whether other ad- jectives apply, the only relevant question according to the text of the statute is whether the statement is “false.” B Statutory context confirms that §1014 does not cover all misleading statements. Again, the statute uses the word “false.” It does not use “misleading.” Many other statutes do, including other criminal statutes in Title 18 of the U. S. Code. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §1038 (a) (“convey false or mis- leading information”); §1365(b) (“renders materially false or misleading the labeling of . . . a consumer product”); §1515(b) (“making a false or misleading statement”); see also Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84–85, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §77q(a)(2) (prohibiting obtaining property through Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 7 Opinion of the Court “any untrue statement of a material fact” or “any omission” that renders a statement “misleading”). Interpreting the word “false” to include “misleading” would make the inclu- sion of “misleading” in those statutes superfluous. See Gus- tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant.”). Context from the time of enactment of §1014 further con- firms that the statute does not reach all misleading state- ments. As we explained in a previous case, “Congress orig- inally enacted §1014 as part of its recodification of the federal criminal code in 1948.” United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 492 (1997). Eleven of the thirteen provisions brought together by §1014 prohibited “false” statements, and none used the word “misleading,” see 7 U. S. C. §§1026 (a), 1514(a) (1946 ed.); 12 U. S. C. §§596 , 981, 1122, 1138d(a), 1248, 1312, 1441(a), 1467(a) (1946 ed.); 15 U. S. C. §616 (a) (1946 ed.). These predecessor statutes were all enacted in the decades prior to 1948. Many other statutes enacted in the same period used the phrase “false or misleading.” See, e.g., Perishable Agricultural Commod- ities Act, 1930, §2(4), 46 Stat. 532 ; Public Utility Act of 1935, §16(a), 49 Stat. 829 ; Federal Food, Drug, and Cos- metic Act of 1938, §602(a), 52 Stat. 1054 . The language of these other statutes shows that when Congress intended to cover all misleading statements, “it knew how to do so.” Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485, 492 (1994). C Precedent supports our reading of the text. For example, in United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 , we held that §1014 does not incorporate a materiality requirement because the statute does not “so much as mention materiality,” whereas many other statutes do. Id., at 490, 492. The same logic suggests that §1014 does not reach all misleading state- ments. 8 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court Our decision in Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279 (1982), is also instructive. The defendant in that case de- posited several bad checks, then was convicted under §1014 on the theory that he falsely represented having more money than he had. See id., at 283. We reversed the con- viction because the defendant’s “course of conduct did not involve the making of a ‘false statement’ ” for the “simple reason” that “a check is not a factual assertion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as ‘true’ or ‘false.’ ” Id., at 284. That logic shows that a conviction under §1014 re- quires at least two things: (1) the defendant made a state- ment, and (2) that statement can be characterized as “false” and not “true.” The dissent in Williams observed that this reasoning “would apply equally to material omissions.” Id., at 296 (opinion of Marshall, J.). Precisely so. If a material omission renders a statement misleading, §1014 still does not cover that statement unless it can be characterized as “false” and not “true.” A statement that is true but mislead- ing does not fit the bill. The Government contends that one of our precedents points in the opposite direction. In Kay v. United States, 303 U. S. 1 (1938), this Court described a predecessor stat- ute to §1014 as “secur[ing] protection against false and mis- leading representations,” even though that statute used only the word “false.” Id., at 7 (emphasis added); see also id., at 3, n. 1. Indeed, as the Government points out, this Court used the word “misleading” (or “mislead”) several times throughout the opinion. Id., at 6, 7, 8. But nearly every time the word appears, it describes a person’s intent while making a false statement, not the statement itself. See id., at 5–6 (“making false statements with intent to mis- lead”); id., at 6 (“falsely with intent to mislead”); id., at 7 (“false statements designed to mislead”). And in describing the statute as “secur[ing] protections against false and mis- leading representations,” the Court used the word “and” ra- ther than “or.” Id., at 7; see also id., at 8. Kay thus did not Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 9 Opinion of the Court suggest that misleading statements were independently unlawful under §1014’s predecessor. Instead, the Govern- ment’s argument about Kay again comes down to the over- lap between false and misleading. Certainly, a statute that criminalizes “false” statements also criminalizes state- ments that are both false and misleading, or false state- ments made with intent to mislead. But the question before us is whether such a statute also criminalizes statements that are misleading but not false. The answer to that ques- tion must be no. III The Government argues that we should affirm on the al- ternative basis that Thompson’s statements were false. But neither the District Court nor the Seventh Circuit an- swered that question, and “we are a court of review, not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). Our holding shows, however, that this question is the right one to ask under §1014. And as the litigation be- fore us has clarified, even Thompson agrees that “[c]ontext obviously matters in determining whether a statement is false.” Reply Brief 7. Thompson concedes, for example, that if he “had made his statement in response to a question like ‘did you borrow $269,000?,’ ” then “his statement, in con- text, would have been false.” Id., at 9. We agree with the parties that at least some context is relevant to determining whether a statement is false under §1014. We leave for re- mand the question whether a reasonable jury could find that Thompson’s statements in this case were false. * * * In casual conversation, people use many overlapping words to describe shady statements: false, misleading, dis- honest, deceptive, literally true, and more. Only one of those words appears in the statute. Section 1014 does not 10 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court criminalize statements that are misleading but true. Un- der the statute, it is not enough that a statement is mis- leading. It must be “false.” The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir- cuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further pro- ceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1 ALITO, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 23–1095 _________________ PATRICK D. THOMPSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT [March 21, 2025] JUSTICE ALITO, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court but write separately to summarize my understanding of the decision. Five aspects of today’s decision are most important. First, the Court holds that 18 U. S. C. §1014 criminalizes only those statements that are “false.” Other related stat- utes refer to both “false” and “misleading” statements. But §1014 does not, so we assume the omission was intentional. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U. S. 8 , 14 (2019) (“Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted lan- guage”). The decision below, which held that §1014 applies to merely “misleading representations,” 89 F. 4th 1010, 1016 (CA7 2024), was therefore erroneous. Second, as used in §1014, the term “false” means “not true.” Ante, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is what it means in ordinary speech. See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 819 (1976) (“not corre- sponding to truth or reality: not true”); Random House Dic- tionary of the English Language 695 (2d ed. 1987) (“not true or correct; erroneous”). Neither party advocates giving “false statement” a specialized or term-of-art reading, and the Court rightly declines to do so. Accordingly, “false statement” in §1014 bears its ordinary meaning. Third, in considering whether a statement is “false,” judges and juries must view the statement in “the context 2 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES ALITO, J., concurring in which it is made.” United States v. Briggs, 592 U. S. 69, 72 (2020). That is how people generally evaluate the truth or falsity of a statement. Cf. Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993) (discussing the “fundamental principle . . . of language” that “the meaning of a word” or statement “cannot be determined in isolation”). And since §1014 uses the adjective “false” in the ordinary sense of the term, the same approach applies. In ordinary speech, we do not regard a statement as true or false based solely on the literal or semantic meaning of its words viewed in isolation. Two examples illustrate this principle. Start with an example adapted from the parties’ briefs. See Brief for United States 16; Reply Brief 8–9. Af- ter noticing that a plate of 12 fresh-baked cookies has only crumbs remaining, a mother asks her daughter, “Did you eat all the cookies?” If the child says “I ate three” when she actually had all 12, her words would be literally true in iso- lation but false in context. The child did eat three cookies (then nine more). In context, however, the child is implic- itly saying that she ate only three cookies, and that is false. Consider another example, adapted from a law-review ar- ticle by Professor Richard Fallon. See The Statutory Inter- pretation Muddle, 114 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269 , 272 (2019). Par- ents James and Rachel are talking about their teenage son Alex. James enlists Alex to help rake leaves, but Alex is distracted and does little work. Afterwards, James tells Ra- chel: “As usual, Alex was a big help.” Taken literally, his statement is false. But if James and Rachel have often spo- ken about Alex’s unwillingness to help with household chores, Rachel would understand that James’s statement was ironic and that James actually meant Alex was no help at all. So, in context, James’s statement is actually true. Petitioner readily acknowledges that falsity must be judged in context. See Reply Brief 7–8; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6– 7. Courts should keep this important point in mind in fu- ture §1014 cases. Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 3 ALITO, J., concurring Fourth, as used in ordinary speech, the terms “false” and “misleading” may “overlap.” Ante, at 6. A statement that might in ordinary speech be casually described as “mislead- ing” may actually be misleading and false when viewed in context. Because there is no clear line demarcating state- ments that are false in context from those that are merely misleading, there is no reason why a court should make any reference to misleading statements in a §1014 case. It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold that §1014 applies to “misleading” statements, and it would likewise be wrong for a court to instruct a jury that it must acquit if it finds that a charged statement is misleading. The pattern jury in- structions used in the various Circuits avoid this problem,* and our decision in this case does not necessitate any change. Finally, the question that the Seventh Circuit must ad- dress on remand is narrow. Although the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s conviction on the ground that his statements were “misleading,” the trial judge gave no such instruction to the jury. Petitioner did not object to the judge’s §1014 instructions below, and he does not challenge them here. Instead of basing his request for reversal on in- structional error, he moved after trial for a judgment of ac- quittal based on insufficient evidence. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29(c). Thus, the applicable test on remand is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Gov- ernment, any rational finder of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner’s statements were false —————— *Most Circuits simply have the trial judge instruct the jury, in relevant part, that it must find the defendant “made a false statement.” E.g., Model Crim. Jury Instr. §15.41 (CA9 2022); Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. §2.48 (CA10 2025). Some Circuits also have the judge add that “[a] state- ment is ‘false’ if it was untrue when made.” E.g., Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. §4.18.1014 (CA1 2024); Model Crim. Jury Instr. §6.18.1014 (CA8 2023). And it appears that none of the pattern jury instructions men- tions “misleading” statements. See 2 L. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions–Criminal ¶37.03 (2024). 4 THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES ALITO, J., concurring in context. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 , 318–319 (1979); United States v. Armbruster, 48 F. 4th 527, 531 (CA7 2022). With these observations, I join the Court’s opinion. Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1 JACKSON, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 23–1095 _________________ PATRICK D. THOMPSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT [March 21, 2025] JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that 18 U. S. C. §1014 criminalizes only false statements. Ante, at 10. I write sep- arately to note that the pre-verdict instructions the District Court provided to the jury in this case did not say otherwise. That is, while the lower courts may have misunderstood the scope of §1014, the jury was properly instructed that it could find Thompson guilty only if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson “made the charged false statement[s].” App. 157–158. For count two, the jury specifically found that Thompson made all of the statements alleged. Id., at 160. Moreover, and im- portantly, the jury was not advised that §1014 “criminalizes misleading representations,” 89 F. 4th 1010, 1016 (CA7 2024), as was mistakenly required by the Seventh Circuit precedent the Court rejects today. Thus, in my view, there is little for the Seventh Circuit to do on remand but affirm the District Court’s judgment up- holding the jury’s guilty verdict. Whether Thompson’s statements were, in fact, false is a question for the jury— and here, one the jury has already answered. At most, then, the Seventh Circuit can properly assess whether any rea- sonable jury could have found that Thompson’s statements satisfied §1014’s falsity element. On this record, I think that legal issue is not subject to reasonable debate.

Thompson v. United States

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Thompson v. United States

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