Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1

 Syllabus

 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
 being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
 The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
 prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
 See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 Syllabus

 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION ET
 AL. v. EAGLE COUNTY, COLORADO, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
 THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

 No. 23–975. Argued December 10, 2024—Decided May 29, 2025
Under federal law, new railroad construction and operation must first be
 approved by the U. S. Surface Transportation Board. 49 U. S. C.
 §10901 . In 2020, the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition applied to
 the Board for approval of an 88-mile railroad line connecting Utah’s
 oil-rich Uinta Basin to the national freight rail network, facilitating
 the transportation of crude oil to refineries along the Gulf Coast. As
 part of its project review, the Board prepared an environmental impact
 statement (EIS) that addressed significant environmental effects of
 the project and identified feasible alternatives that could mitigate
 those effects, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
 (NEPA). The Board issued a draft EIS and invited public comment.
 After holding six public meetings and collecting more than 1,900 com-
 ments, the Board prepared a 3,600-page EIS that analyzed numerous
 impacts of the railway’s construction and operation. Relevant here,
 the EIS noted, but did not fully analyze, the potential environmental
 effects of increased upstream oil drilling in the Uinta Basin and in-
 creased downstream refining of crude oil. The Board subsequently ap-
 proved the railroad line, concluding that the project’s transportation
 and economic benefits outweighed its environmental impacts. Peti-
 tions challenging the Board’s action were filed in the D. C. Circuit by
 a Colorado county and several environmental organizations. The D. C.
 Circuit found “numerous NEPA violations arising from the EIS.” 82 F.
 4th 1152, 1196 . Specifically, the D. C. Circuit held that the Board im-
 permissibly limited its analysis of the environmental effects from up-
 stream oil drilling and downstream oil refining projects, concluding
 that those effects were reasonably foreseeable impacts that the EIS
 should have analyzed more extensively. Based on the deficiencies it
2 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Syllabus

 found in the EIS, the D. C. Circuit vacated both the EIS and the
 Board’s final approval order.
Held: The D. C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial
 deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA
 to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream
 and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the
 Uinta Basin Railway. Pp. 6–22.
 (a) NEPA ensures that agencies and the public are aware of the en-
 vironmental consequences of certain proposed infrastructure projects.
 As a purely procedural statute, NEPA “does not mandate particular
 results, but simply prescribes the necessary process” for an agency’s
 environmental review of a project. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citi-
 zens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 350 . Some federal courts reviewing NEPA
 cases have assumed an aggressive role in policing agency compliance
 with NEPA, and have not applied NEPA with the judicial deference
 demanded by the statutory text and the Court’s cases.
 When, as here, a party argues that an agency action was arbitrary
 and capricious due to a deficiency in an EIS, the “only role for a court”
 is to confirm that the agency has addressed environmental conse-
 quences and feasible alternatives as to the relevant project. Strycker’s
 Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U. S. 223, 227 . Further,
 the adequacy of an EIS is relevant only to the question of whether an
 agency’s final decision (here, to approve the railroad project) was rea-
 sonably explained.
 Judicial deference in NEPA cases extends to an agency’s determina-
 tion of what details are relevant in an EIS. While NEPA requires an
 EIS to be “detailed,” 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C), and the meaning of “de-
 tailed” is a legal question, see Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,
 603 U. S. 369 , 391–392, what details need to be included in any given
 EIS is a factual determination for the agency. The textual focus of
 NEPA is the “proposed action”—the project at hand—not other sepa-
 rate projects. §4332(2)(C). Courts should defer to agencies’ discretion-
 ary decisions about where to draw the line when considering indirect
 environmental effects and whether to analyze effects from other pro-
 jects separate in time or place. See Department of Transportation v.
 Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752, 767 . In sum, when assessing significant
 environmental effects and feasible alternatives for purposes of NEPA,
 an agency will invariably make a series of fact-dependent, context-spe-
 cific, and policy-laden choices about the depth and breadth of its in-
 quiry—and also about the length, content, and level of detail of the
 resulting EIS. Courts should afford substantial deference and should
 not micromanage those agency choices so long as they fall within a
 broad zone of reasonableness. Even a deficient EIS does not neces-
 sarily require vacating an agency’s project approval, absent reason to
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

 Syllabus

 believe that the agency might disapprove the project if it added more
 to the EIS. Cf. 5 U. S. C. §706 . Pp. 6–15.
 (b) Contrary to the D. C. Circuit’s NEPA analysis, the Board’s deter-
 mination that its EIS need not evaluate possible environmental effects
 from upstream and downstream projects separate from the Uinta Ba-
 sin Railway complied with NEPA’s procedural requirements, particu-
 larly NEPA’s textually mandated focus on the “proposed action” under
 agency review. While indirect environmental effects of the project it-
 self may fall within NEPA’s scope even if they might extend outside
 the geographical territory of the project or materialize later in time,
 the fact that the project might foreseeably lead to the construction or
 increased use of a separate project does not mean the agency must con-
 sider that separate project’s environmental effects. See Public Citizen,
 541 U. S., at 767 . This is particularly true where, as here, those sepa-
 rate projects fall outside the agency’s regulatory authority. Pp. 15–21.
 (c) NEPA does not allow courts, “under the guise of judicial review”
 of agency compliance with NEPA, to delay or block agency projects
 based on the environmental effects of other projects separate from the
 project at hand. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
 sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 558 . Pp. 21–22.
 82 F. 4th 1152 , reversed and remanded.

 KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which KAGAN and JACKSON,
JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

 Opinion of the Court

 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
 United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
 Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
 pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 No. 23–975
 _________________

 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION,
 ET AL., PETITIONERS v. EAGLE COUNTY,
 COLORADO, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
 [May 29, 2025]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
 Some 55 years ago, Congress passed and President Nixon
signed the National Environmental Policy Act, known as
NEPA. For certain infrastructure projects that are built,
funded, or approved by the Federal Government, NEPA
requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental
impact statement, or EIS. The EIS must address the
significant environmental effects of a proposed project and
identify feasible alternatives that could mitigate those
effects.
 NEPA was the first of several landmark environmental
laws enacted by Congress in the 1970s. Subsequent
statutes included the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the
Clean Water Act of 1972, and the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, among others.
 Unlike those later-enacted laws, however, NEPA imposes
no substantive environmental obligations or restrictions.
NEPA is a purely procedural statute that, as relevant here,
simply requires an agency to prepare an EIS—in essence, a
report. Importantly, NEPA does not require the agency to
weigh environmental consequences in any particular way.
2 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

Rather, an agency may weigh environmental consequences
as the agency reasonably sees fit under its governing
statute and any relevant substantive environmental laws.
 Simply stated, NEPA is a procedural cross-check, not a
substantive roadblock. The goal of the law is to inform
agency decisionmaking, not to paralyze it.
 In this case, the U. S. Surface Transportation Board
considered a proposal by a group of seven Utah counties for
the construction and operation of an approximately 88-mile
railroad line in northeastern Utah. Under federal law, the
Board determines whether to approve construction of new
railroad lines. The railroad line here would connect Utah’s
oil-rich Uinta Basin—a rural territory roughly the size of
the State of Maryland—to the national rail network. By
doing so, the new railroad line would facilitate the
transportation of crude oil from Utah to refineries in
Louisiana, Texas, and elsewhere. And the project would
bring significant economic development and jobs to the
isolated Uinta Basin by better connecting the Basin to the
national economy.
 For that proposed 88-mile Utah railroad line, the Board
prepared an extraordinarily lengthy EIS, spanning more
than 3,600 pages of environmental analysis. The Board’s
EIS addressed the environmental effects of the railroad
line. But the U. S. Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit
nonetheless faulted the EIS for not sufficiently considering
the environmental effects of projects separate from the
railroad line itself—primarily, the environmental effects
that could ensue from (i) increased oil drilling upstream in
the Uinta Basin and (ii) increased oil refining downstream
along the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Texas.
 On that basis, the D. C. Circuit vacated the Board’s EIS
and the Board’s approval of the 88-mile railroad line. As a
result, construction still has not begun even though the
Board approved the project back in December 2021.
 We reverse. First, the D. C. Circuit did not afford the
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

 Opinion of the Court

Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA
cases. Second, the D. C. Circuit ordered the Board to
address the environmental effects of projects separate in
time or place from the construction and operation of the
railroad line. But NEPA requires agencies to focus on the
environmental effects of the project at issue. Under NEPA,
the Board’s EIS did not need to address the environmental
effects of upstream oil drilling or downstream oil refining.
Rather, it needed to address only the effects of the 88-mile
railroad line. And the Board’s EIS did so.
 I
 Under federal law, new railroad construction and
operation must first be approved by the U. S. Surface
Transportation Board. 49 U. S. C. §10901 . After receiving
an application for a new railroad line, the Board issues a
public notice and initiates an agency proceeding to review
the proposal; alternatively, the Board may streamline
approval through a statutory exemption process. §§10101,
10502, 10901. In addition, for covered projects, NEPA
compels the Board to prepare an environmental impact
statement, or EIS.
 In 2020, the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition—a
group of seven Utah counties—applied to the Board for
approval of an 88-mile railroad line in northeastern Utah.
The new railroad line would connect the Uinta Basin with
the interstate freight rail network—and via that network,
to refineries in Louisiana, Texas, and other destinations.
 The Uinta Basin contains significant quantities of crude
oil and other fossil fuels. The Uinta Basin Railway would
provide oil producers a more efficient option for
transporting oil out of the Basin to refineries. As of now, oil
from the Basin is carried by trucks that must navigate
mountain passes on narrow roads, a difficult and slow
journey in any season.
 The Board’s environmental review of the Uinta Basin
4 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

Railway followed standard NEPA procedures. In October
2020, the Board issued a draft EIS and invited public
comment. During the public comment period, the Board
held six public meetings and collected more than 1,900
comments. In August 2021, the Board published its final
EIS.
 All told, the Board’s final EIS clocked in at more than
3,600 pages. The EIS identified and analyzed numerous
“significant and adverse impacts that could occur as a
result” of the railroad line’s construction and operation—
including disruptions to local wetlands, land use, and
recreation. App. 121; see id., at 94–105, 121–126, 206–347.
The EIS likewise addressed several “minor impacts,” such
as air pollution and big-game movement around the
construction site. Id., at 126; see id., at 126–134, 251–259,
309–325.
 The EIS also noted, but did not fully analyze, the
potential effects of increased upstream oil drilling in the
Uinta Basin and increased downstream refining of crude oil
carried by the railroad. Id., at 135, 348–482, 511–516, 520–
534, 539–543.
 As to the environmental effects of upstream oil drilling,
the EIS explained why further analysis of those “potential
future, as yet unplanned, oil and gas development projects”
was not needed. Id., at 520. To begin with, the project at
issue was an 88-mile railroad line, not an oil well or a
drilling permit in the Uinta Basin. Moreover, the Board
possesses “no authority or control over potential future oil
and gas development” in the Basin. Id., at 522. Future
projects would be “subject to the approval processes of other
federal, state, local, and tribal agencies.” Ibid. In any
event, the environmental effects of future oil and gas
development in the Basin are “speculative” and attenuated
from the project at hand. Id., at 525; see id., at 525–527
(citing Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541
U. S. 752 , 767–768, 770 (2004)).
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 5

 Opinion of the Court

 As for the environmental effects of downstream oil
refining projects, the Board recognized that “trains
originating on the proposed rail line would transport crude
oil to markets in other regions of the United States,” such
as Louisiana and Texas, and that oil refining (and the
associated effects on the environment) could increase in
those locations as a result. App. 477; see id., at 477–482.
But the identity of specific destinations “would depend on
the ability and willingness of refineries in other markets to
receive rail cars carrying Uinta Basin crude oil and process
the oil in their refineries.” Id., at 477 . Moreover, the Board
“would have no role in approving or regulating the
production, refining, or use” of Uinta Basin crude oil. Id.,
at 540–541. So the Board did not fully evaluate the effects
of additional oil refining along the Gulf Coast.
 In December 2021, a few months after issuing the final
EIS, the Board approved the construction and operation of
the Uinta Basin Railway. Recognizing that “rail
construction projects are in the public interest,” the Board
concluded that the new railroad line would “have
substantial transportation and economic benefits,” and that
those benefits outweighed the environmental impacts
identified in the EIS. App. to Pet. for Cert. 121a, 119a; see
 id., at 118a–121a.
 In the wake of the Board’s final approval, a Colorado
county and several environmental organizations sued by
filing petitions for review in the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the D. C. Circuit.
 The D. C. Circuit found “numerous NEPA violations
arising from the EIS.” Eagle Cty. v. Surface Transp. Bd.,
 82 F. 4th 1152, 1196 (2023). In the court’s view, the Board
“failed” to take “the requisite ‘hard look’ at all of the
environmental impacts of the Railway.” Id., at 1175 .
 Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the Board
impermissibly limited its analysis of upstream and
downstream projects. The court concluded that the
6 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

environmental effects from oil drilling in the Uinta Basin
and oil refining along the Gulf Coast were “ ‘reasonably
foreseeable impacts’ ” that the EIS should have analyzed
more extensively. Id., at 1177 . The court rejected the
Board’s argument that those effects would arise from other
projects (upstream oil drilling, downstream oil refining, and
the like) that are separate from the current project and
regulated by other agencies. Id., at 1177–1180 (citing
Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F. 3d 1357 , 1372–1375 (CADC
2017) (Sabal Trail)).
 Based on the deficiencies it found in the EIS, the Court of
Appeals vacated the EIS and the Board’s final approval
order. 82 F. 4th, at 1196 . The Coalition and the Uinta
Basin Railway sought review in this Court, and we granted
certiorari. 602 U. S. ___ (2024).
 II
 For certain infrastructure projects that are built, funded,
or approved by the Federal Government, NEPA requires
federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact
statement, or EIS, identifying significant environmental
effects of the projects, as well as feasible alternatives. The
law ensures that the agency and the public are aware of the
environmental consequences of proposed projects. Properly
applied, NEPA helps agencies to make better decisions and
to ensure good project management.
 Importantly, however, NEPA is purely procedural. In
ultimately deciding whether to build, fund, or approve a
project, an “agency is not constrained by NEPA from
deciding that other values outweigh the environmental
costs.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U. S. 332, 350 (1989). Otherwise stated, NEPA “does not
mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the
necessary process” for an agency’s environmental review of
a project. Ibid.; see Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen, 541 U. S. 752 , 756–757 (2004); Marsh v. Oregon
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 7

 Opinion of the Court

Natural Resources Council, 490 U. S. 360 , 370–372 (1989);
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 462 U. S. 87 , 97–98 (1983); Strycker’s Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U. S. 223 , 227–
228 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 558
(1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 21
(1976).1
 Here, the Board’s EIS evaluated the environmental
effects of the proposed 88-mile railroad line in Utah’s rural
Uinta Basin. But the D. C. Circuit, following Circuit
precedent applying NEPA, concluded that the EIS did not
sufficiently address the reasonably foreseeable
environmental impacts of increased upstream oil drilling in
the Uinta Basin, as well as the environmental effects of

——————
 1 As it was phrased at the time of the Board’s EIS (before a 2023

amendment to the statute, see n. 3, infra), NEPA directed federal
agencies to
 “include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
 legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting
 the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
 responsible official on—
 “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
 “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
 should the proposal be implemented,
 “(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
 “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s
 environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
 productivity, and
 “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
 which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
 implemented.
 “Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal
 official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
 agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
 respect to any environmental impact involved.” §102(2)(C), 83 Stat.
 853 , as amended, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C) (2018).
8 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

increased downstream oil refining along the Gulf Coast. 82
F. 4th, at 1196 .
 As we will explain, we disagree with the D. C. Circuit’s
decision on two grounds. First, the court did not afford the
Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA
cases. Second, the court incorrectly interpreted NEPA to
require the Board to consider the environmental effects of
upstream and downstream projects that are separate in
time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.
 A
 Since the early 1970s, federal courts have reviewed
NEPA cases. Over time, some courts have assumed an
aggressive role in policing agency compliance with NEPA.
Other courts have adopted a more restrained approach. In
light of the continuing confusion and disagreement in the
Courts of Appeals over how to handle NEPA cases, we think
it important to reiterate and clarify the fundamental
principles of judicial review applicable in those cases. As
we will explain, the central principle of judicial review in
NEPA cases is deference.2
 As a general matter, when an agency interprets a statute,
judicial review of the agency’s interpretation is de novo.
See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369 ,
391–392 (2024). But when an agency exercises discretion
——————
 2 Some have debated whether Congress and the President in 1970

actually intended or anticipated judicial review of agency compliance
with NEPA. See R. Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in
the U.S. Supreme Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains,
100 Geo. L. J. 1507, 1515 (2012) (describing the history). In any event,
an early D. C. Circuit case concluded that an agency’s compliance with
NEPA was judicially reviewable. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. U. S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F. 2d 1109 (1971). And
this Court’s cases have treated NEPA compliance as judicially
reviewable. That said, courts must conduct their review with significant
deference to the agency. When reviewing compliance with NEPA, “courts
are to play only a limited role.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 558 (1978).
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 9

 Opinion of the Court

granted by a statute, judicial review is typically conducted
under the Administrative Procedure Act’s deferential
arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Under that standard, a
court asks not whether it agrees with the agency decision,
but rather only whether the agency action was reasonable
and reasonably explained. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983); FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project,
 592 U. S. 414, 423 (2021).
 When a party argues that an agency action was arbitrary
and capricious due to a deficiency in an EIS, the reviewing
court must account for the fact that NEPA is a purely
procedural statute. Under NEPA, an agency’s only
obligation is to prepare an adequate report. “NEPA
requires no more.” Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council,
 444 U. S., at 228 . Unlike a plethora of other federal
environmental statutes (such as the Clean Air Act, the
Clean Water Act, etc.), NEPA imposes no substantive
constraints on the agency’s ultimate decision to build, fund,
or approve a proposed project. So when reviewing an
agency’s EIS, “the only role for a court” is to confirm that
the agency has addressed environmental consequences and
feasible alternatives as to the relevant project. Id., at 227 ;
see Vermont Yankee, 435 U. S., at 551, 555 . Because an EIS
is only one input into an agency’s decision and does not
itself require any particular substantive outcome, the
adequacy of an EIS is relevant only to the question of
whether an agency’s final decision (here, to approve the
railroad) was reasonably explained.
 In short, when determining whether an agency’s EIS
complied with NEPA, a court should afford substantial
deference to the agency.
 In practice, judicial deference in NEPA cases can take
several forms. For example, NEPA says that the EIS
should be “detailed.” 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C). Of course, the
meaning of “detailed” is a question of law to be decided by
10 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

a court. Loper Bright, 603 U. S., at 391–392. But what
details need to be included in any given EIS? For the most
part, that question does not turn on the meaning of
“detailed”—instead, it “involves primarily issues of fact.”
Marsh, 490 U. S., at 377 . The agency is better equipped to
assess what facts are relevant to the agency’s own decision
than a court is. As a result, “agencies determine whether
and to what extent to prepare an EIS based on the
usefulness of any new potential information to the
decisionmaking process.” Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 767
(emphasis added). So the question of whether a particular
report is detailed enough in a particular case itself requires
the exercise of agency discretion—which should not be
excessively second-guessed by a court. Brevity should not
be mistaken for lack of detail. A relatively brief agency
explanation can be reasoned and detailed; an EIS need not
meander on for hundreds or thousands of pages. So courts
should not insist on length as a prerequisite for finding an
EIS to be detailed.3
 The EIS also must identify significant environmental
impacts and feasible alternatives. But there too, an agency
exercises substantial discretion. An agency must make
predictive and scientific judgments in assessing the
relevant impacts (what are the likely impacts; do they rise
to the level of “significant”?) and alternatives (what are the
——————
 3 Indeed, federal law now strictly prohibits an agency’s EIS from going

on endlessly. In 2023, two years after the Board issued its final EIS for
the Uinta Basin Railway, Congress passed and President Biden signed
an Act amending NEPA meaningfully titled the “Building United States
Infrastructure through Limited Delays and Efficient Reviews Act of
2023.” Pub. L. 118–5, Div. C, Tit. III, §321, 137 Stat. 38–39. Under that
BUILDER Act, an EIS “shall not exceed 150 pages” and must be
completed in “2 years” or less. Id., at 41–42 (42 U. S. C. §§4336a(e)(1)(A),
(g)(1)(A)). That Act strongly reinforces the basic principles that NEPA,
correctly interpreted, already embodied but that have been too often
overlooked. The analysis in this opinion thus applies to NEPA as
amended by the BUILDER Act.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 11

 Opinion of the Court

potential alternatives; are they really “feasible”?). As this
Court has said, “the term ‘alternatives’ is not self-defining,”
and “[c]ommon sense” should be brought to bear. Vermont
Yankee, 435 U. S., at 551 . Black-letter administrative law
instructs that when an agency makes those kinds of
speculative assessments or predictive or scientific
judgments, and decides what qualifies as significant or
feasible or the like, a reviewing court must be at its “most
deferential.” Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U. S., at 103 ; see
Marsh, 490 U. S., at 378 ; State Farm, 463 U. S., at 43 .
 In preparing an EIS, an agency also must determine the
scope of the environmental effects that it will address. The
textual focus of NEPA is the “proposed action”—that is, the
project at hand. 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C) (2018). The agency
therefore will obviously seek to assess significant effects
from the project at issue. But how far will the agency go in
considering the indirect effects that might occur outside the
area of the immediate project—for example, due to
emissions or run off from the project carried elsewhere by
air or water? And will the agency evaluate the
environmental effects from other future or geographically
separate projects that may be initiated (or expanded) as a
result of or in the wake of the current project? And what if
another agency also possesses regulatory authority over a
related project?
 In analyzing those scope questions, it is critical to
disaggregate the agency’s role from the court’s role. So long
as the EIS addresses environmental effects from the project
at issue, courts should defer to agencies’ decisions about
where to draw the line—including (i) how far to go in
considering indirect environmental effects from the project
at hand and (ii) whether to analyze environmental effects
from other projects separate in time or place from the
project at hand. On those kinds of questions, as this Court
has often said, agencies possess discretion and must have
broad latitude to draw a “manageable line.” Public Citizen,
12 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

 541 U. S., at 767 (quoting Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People
Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U. S. 766, 774, n. 7 (1983)).
 To tie all of this together: When assessing significant
environmental effects and feasible alternatives for
purposes of NEPA, an agency will invariably make a series
of fact-dependent, context-specific, and policy-laden choices
about the depth and breadth of its inquiry—and also about
the length, content, and level of detail of the resulting EIS.
Courts should afford substantial deference and should not
micromanage those agency choices so long as they fall
within a broad zone of reasonableness. As the Court has
emphasized on several occasions, and we doubly underscore
again today, “inherent in NEPA . . . is a ‘rule of reason,’
which ensures that agencies determine whether and to
what extent to prepare an EIS based on the usefulness of
any new potential information to the decisionmaking
process.” Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 767 . A reviewing
court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions.”
Kleppe, 427 U. S., at 410, n. 21 .
 Some courts have strayed and not applied NEPA with the
level of deference demanded by the statutory text and this
Court’s cases. Those decisions have instead engaged in
overly intrusive (and unpredictable) review in NEPA cases.
Those rulings have slowed down or blocked many projects
and, in turn, caused litigation-averse agencies to take ever
more time and to prepare ever longer EISs for future
projects.
 The upshot: NEPA has transformed from a modest
procedural requirement into a blunt and haphazard tool
employed by project opponents (who may not always be
entirely motivated by concern for the environment) to try to
stop or at least slow down new infrastructure and
construction projects. Some project opponents have
invoked NEPA and sought to enlist the courts in blocking
or delaying even those projects that otherwise comply with
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 13

 Opinion of the Court

all relevant substantive environmental laws. Indeed,
certain project opponents have relied on NEPA to fight even
clean-energy projects—from wind farms to hydroelectric
dams, from solar farms to geothermal wells. See, e.g., Brief
for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
et al. as Amici Curiae 19–20.
 All of that has led to more agency analysis of separate
projects, more consideration of attenuated effects, more
exploration of alternatives to proposed agency action, more
speculation and consultation and estimation and litigation.
Delay upon delay, so much so that the process sometimes
seems to “borde[r] on the Kafkaesque.” Vermont Yankee,
 435 U. S., at 557 . Fewer projects make it to the finish line.
Indeed, fewer projects make it to the starting line. Those
that survive often end up costing much more than is
anticipated or necessary, both for the agency preparing the
EIS and for the builder of the project. And that in turn
means fewer and more expensive railroads, airports, wind
turbines, transmission lines, dams, housing developments,
highways, bridges, subways, stadiums, arenas, data
centers, and the like. And that also means fewer jobs, as
new projects become difficult to finance and build in a
timely fashion.
 A 1970 legislative acorn has grown over the years into a
judicial oak that has hindered infrastructure development
“under the guise” of just a little more process. Id., at 558 .
A course correction of sorts is appropriate to bring judicial
review under NEPA back in line with the statutory text and
common sense. Id., at 525 . Congress did not design NEPA
for judges to hamstring new infrastructure and
construction projects. On the contrary, as this Court has
stressed, courts should and “must defer to ‘the informed
discretion of the responsible federal agencies.’ ” Marsh, 490
U. S., at 377 .
 Critically, as the Government and the Coalition
explained at oral argument, courts not only must defer to
14 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

the agency’s reasonable choices regarding the scope and
contents of the EIS, but also must keep in mind that review
of an agency’s EIS is not the same thing as review of the
agency’s final decision concerning the project. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 31–32, 70–71. That, too, follows from NEPA’s
status as a purely procedural statute. The ultimate
question is not whether an EIS in and of itself is
inadequate, but whether the agency’s final decision was
reasonable and reasonably explained. Review of an EIS is
only one component of that analysis. Even if an EIS falls
short in some respects, that deficiency may not necessarily
require a court to vacate the agency’s ultimate approval of
a project, at least absent reason to believe that the agency
might disapprove the project if it added more to the EIS.
Cf. 5 U. S. C. §706 . For example, in a case like this one,
even if the EIS drew the line on the effects of separate
upstream or downstream projects too narrowly, that
mistake would not necessarily require a court to vacate the
agency’s approval of the railroad project. Cf. Vermont
Yankee, 435 U. S., at 558 .4
 In other words, as this Court has said before, NEPA does
not authorize a court to “ ‘interject itself within the area of
discretion . . . as to the choice of the action to be taken’ ” by
the agency. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, 444
U. S., at 227–228 (quoting Kleppe, 427 U. S., at 410, n. 21 ).
NEPA’s procedural mandate helps “to insure a fully
informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a
decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or this Court
——————
 4 When, unlike this case, an agency denies approval of a project, the

denied applicant may ordinarily challenge the denial under the APA or
the relevant agency’s governing statute. The denied applicant may
argue, among other things, that the agency acted unreasonably in
denying approval by weighing environmental consequences too heavily
in light of the agency’s governing statute and other relevant factors, or
perhaps that the agency erred because the governing statute did not
allow the agency to weigh environmental consequences at all. NEPA
does not alter those judicial inquiries.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 15

 Opinion of the Court

would have reached had they been members of the
decisionmaking unit of the agency.” Vermont Yankee, 435
U. S., at 558 .
 The “role of a court in reviewing the sufficiency of an
agency’s consideration of environmental factors is a limited
one.” Id., at 555 . The bedrock principle of judicial review
in NEPA cases can be stated in a word: Deference.
 B
 Even apart from failing to afford sufficient deference to
the Surface Transportation Board, the D. C. Circuit’s
decision was mistaken on the merits under NEPA. The
D. C. Circuit erroneously required the Board to address
environmental effects from projects that are separate in
time or place from the 88-mile railroad project at hand—
that is, effects from potential future projects or from
geographically separate projects. Moreover, those separate
projects fall outside the Board’s authority and would be
initiated, if at all, by third parties.
 In its EIS, the Board determined that upstream oil
drilling in the Uinta Basin and downstream oil refining
along the Gulf Coast were separate from the construction
and operation of the 88-mile railroad line. The Board’s EIS
explained that the “proposed rail line and any future oil and
gas development projects are not two phases of a single
action,” but “separate, independent projects.” App. 523.
Those other projects, the Board reasoned, should not be
considered “part of the proposed action assessed in the
EIS.” Ibid. The Board concluded that its EIS need not
evaluate the possible environmental effects from separate
upstream or downstream projects.5
——————
 5 Even though not mandated by NEPA to do so, the Board did identify

some of the potential effects and marginal risks from projects separate
from the 88 miles of additional railroad track in rural Utah. See, e.g.,
App. 354–358 (forecasting the number of oil wells that could be added in
the Uinta Basin as a result of increased production spurred by the new
16 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

 The Board’s approach complied with NEPA and this
Court’s longstanding NEPA precedents. Importantly, the
textually mandated focus of NEPA is the “proposed
action”—that is, the project at hand—not other future or
geographically separate projects that may be built (or
expanded) as a result of or in the wake of the immediate
project under consideration. 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C) (2018);
see Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U. S. 289 ,
322–324 (1975); Kleppe, 427 U. S., at 398–402. Therefore,
when the effects of an agency action arise from a separate
project—for example, a possible future project or one that
is geographically distinct from the project at hand—NEPA
does not require the agency to evaluate the effects of that
separate project.
 To be clear, the environmental effects of the project at
issue may fall within NEPA even if those effects might
extend outside the geographical territory of the project or
might materialize later in time—for example, run-off into a
river that flows many miles from the project and affects fish
populations elsewhere, or emissions that travel downwind
and predictably pollute other areas. Those so-called
indirect effects can sometimes fall within NEPA, as the
Government explained at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 59–63.
 But if the project at issue might lead to the construction
or increased use of a separate project—for example, a
housing development that might someday be built near a
highway—the agency need not consider the environmental
effects of that separate project. To put it in legal terms, the
——————
railway); id., at 420–423, 539–542 (evaluating effects from increased oil
refining along the Gulf Coast). The Board should not necessarily earn
bonus points for studying more than NEPA demanded. But it should
definitely not receive a failing grade just because its 3,600-page EIS was
less thorough in analyzing the effects from other projects than the Court
of Appeals might have preferred.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 17

 Opinion of the Court

separate project breaks the chain of proximate causation
between the project at hand and the environmental effects
of the separate project. See Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 767
(citing Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 774 , and n. 7).
The effects from a separate project may be factually
foreseeable, but that does not mean that those effects are
relevant to the agency’s decisionmaking process or that it is
reasonable to hold the agency responsible for those effects.
Cf. Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 766–767. In those
circumstances, “the causal chain is too attenuated.”
Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 774 . In other words,
there is no “ ‘reasonably close causal relationship’ ” between
the project at hand and the environmental effects of those
other projects. Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 767 (quoting
Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 774 ).
 Moreover, and importantly, the Board here possesses no
regulatory authority over those separate projects. The
Board does not regulate oil drilling, oil wells, oil and gas
leases, or oil refineries. The Board approves railroad lines.
See 49 U. S. C. §§10101 , 10901. Other agencies possess
authority to regulate those separate projects and their
environmental effects. As this Court stated in one of the
more important sentences in the NEPA canon, “where an
agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its
limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the
agency cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of the
effect.” Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 770 . In other words,
agencies are not required to analyze the effects of projects
over which they do not exercise regulatory authority. For
that reason as well, there is no “ ‘reasonably close causal
relationship’ ” between the 88-mile railroad project at hand
and the environmental effects of the separate oil drilling
and oil refining projects. Id., at 767 (quoting Metropolitan
Edison, 460 U. S., at 774 ); see also Robertson, 490 U. S., at
350–353; Vermont Yankee, 435 U. S., at 550–551, 558.
 To be sure, NEPA mandates that an agency “consult
18 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

with” other agencies as appropriate. 42 U. S. C.
§4332 (2)(C). But there is a vast difference between, for
example, an agency’s consulting with the Forest Service to
determine the effects of a railroad line that would pass
through a national forest and an agency’s asking another
agency to assess how 88 miles of additional track in rural
Utah would contribute to emissions or climate change along
the Gulf Coast. Indeed, “no rule of reason worthy of that
title would require an agency to prepare an EIS” addressing
effects from another project that is separate in time or place
from the project at hand—particularly when it would
require the agency to speculate about the effects of a
separate project that is outside its regulatory jurisdiction.
Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 767–768 (citing Aberdeen &
Rockfish R. Co., 422 U. S., at 325 ).
 In this case, the Uinta Basin Railway was the relevant
project. NEPA therefore required the Board to consider the
environmental effects of that 88-mile railroad line’s
construction and operation. To the extent that the new 88-
mile railroad line could disrupt the habitat of protected
species, or the new rail embankments could cause soil
erosion into local bodies of water, or trains on the new line
could pollute the air, NEPA dictated that the Board
evaluate those effects. And consistent with NEPA, the
Board here did comprehensively evaluate those effects,
including via consultation with other agencies. As the D. C.
Circuit itself recognized, the Board explained that
“construction and operation of the Railway” would affect
“water resources, air quality, [and] special status species
like the greater sage-grouse.” 82 F. 4th, at 1168 . But
nothing in NEPA required the Board to go further and
study environmental impacts from upstream or
downstream projects separate in time or place from the 88-
mile railroad line’s construction and operation.
 Under NEPA, it also bears emphasis, a mere “ ‘but for’
causal relationship is insufficient to make an agency
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 19

 Opinion of the Court

responsible for a particular effect.” Public Citizen, 541
U. S., at 767 . Likewise, the fact that other projects might
foreseeably be built or expanded in the wake of the current
project does not, by itself, make the agency responsible for
addressing the environmental effects of those other
projects. The agency may draw what it reasonably
concludes is a “ ‘manageable line’ ”—one that encompasses
the effects of the project at hand, but not the effects of
projects separate in time or place. Ibid. (quoting
Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 774, n. 7 ). True, a new
airport may someday lead to a new stretch of highway; a
new pipeline to a new power plant; a new housing
development to a new subway stop. But the environmental
effects of the project at hand constitute NEPA’s textual
focus. An agency need not assess the environmental effects
of other separate projects simply because those projects
(and effects) might not materialize but for the project at
hand, or are in some sense foreseeable.
 Simply stated, a court may not invoke but-for causation
or mere foreseeability to order agency analysis of the effects
of every project that might somehow or someday follow from
the current project. See Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 767–
768; Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 774–775. NEPA
calls for the agency to focus on the environmental effects of
the project itself, not on the potential environmental effects
of future or geographically separate projects. A relatively
modest infrastructure project should not be turned into a
scapegoat for everything that ensues from upstream oil
drilling to downstream refinery emissions. As Justice
Rehnquist underscored in Vermont Yankee, NEPA is not a
“game” where project objectors can engage in “unjustified
obstructionism”—here, for example, by raising a slew of
remote effects that they think “ ‘ought to be’ considered.”
435 U. S., at 553–554.
 To be sure, in certain circumstances, other projects may
be interrelated and close in time and place to the project at
20 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

hand—a residential development next door to and built at
the same time as a ski resort, for example. See, e.g.,
Robertson, 490 U. S., at 338–340. The question then is
whether that is a single project within the authority of the
agency in question. There may be a gray area in defining
the project at hand. Even in those circumstances, however,
a court’s review still must remain deferential, as we
explained in Part II–A above. In other words, even if the
reviewing court in such a case might think that NEPA
would support drawing a different line, a court should defer
to an agency so long as the agency drew a reasonable and
“ ‘manageable line.’ ” Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 767
(quoting Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 774, n. 7 ). All
of that is to again underscore that a difference may exist
between what an agency should do as a matter of good
policy and best practices under NEPA, and what a
reviewing court may subsequently order an agency to do
under NEPA.
 In this case, in any event, the NEPA question is not close.
The Board did not need to evaluate potential environmental
impacts of the separate upstream and downstream projects.
As to other projects upstream, the EIS rightly explained
that the environmental consequences of future oil drilling
in the Basin are distinct from construction and operation of
the railroad line. App. 525–527. As for other projects
downstream, the Board likewise correctly explained that
any environmental effects from highly regulated oil
refineries along the Gulf Coast are well outside the scope of
the 88-mile railroad project in rural Utah. Id., at 420–423,
539–542.6
——————
 6 In addition, inherent in Board approval of railroad lines is the

understanding that any new freight railroad may transport different
kinds of cargo over an approved line—from corn to cars to coal and the
like. See Brief for Association of American Railroads as Amicus Curiae
2, 8–9. As common carriers, railroads subject to the Board’s jurisdiction
are required to provide “transportation or service on reasonable request”
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 21

 Opinion of the Court

 An agency may decline to evaluate environmental effects
from separate projects upstream or downstream from the
project at issue. Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 770 . Here, the
Board’s EIS concluded that the “proposed rail line and any
future oil and gas development projects are not two phases
of a single action,” but “separate, independent projects.”
App. 523. So the Board concluded that they need not be
considered “part of the proposed action assessed in the
EIS.” Ibid. Absolutely correct.
 * * *
 In deciding cases involving the American economy, courts
should strive, where possible, for clarity and predictability.
Some courts’ NEPA decisions have fallen short of that
objective. The proper judicial approach for NEPA cases is
straightforward: Courts should review an agency’s EIS to
check that it addresses the environmental effects of the
project at hand. The EIS need not address the effects of
separate projects. In conducting that review, courts should
afford substantial deference to the agency as to the scope
and contents of the EIS.
 Plaintiffs’ policy objections to this 88-mile Utah railroad
may or may not be persuasive. But neither “the language
nor the history of NEPA suggests that it was intended to
give citizens a general opportunity to air their policy
objections to proposed federal actions. The political process,
and not NEPA, provides the appropriate forum in which to
air policy disagreements.” Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S.,
——————
to any person or commodity. 49 U. S. C. §§11101 (a), 10102(9). Railroad
lines approved by the Board cannot decline to provide “common carrier”
transport based on the product or commodity to be carried. §11101(a).
For that additional reason, the EIS here correctly explained that the
Board was “not required to analyze impacts related to the destinations
or end uses of any such products or commodities” transported by the 88-
mile railroad line, including Uinta Basin crude oil. App. 422; see
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752 , 766–770
(2004).
22 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 Opinion of the Court

at 777. Citizens may not enlist the federal courts, “under
the guise of judicial review” of agency compliance with
NEPA, to delay or block agency projects based on the
environmental effects of other projects separate from the
project at hand. Vermont Yankee, 435 U. S., at 558 .
 We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
 It is so ordered.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 No. 23–975
 _________________

 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION,
 ET AL., PETITIONERS v. EAGLE COUNTY,
 COLORADO, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
 [May 29, 2025]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, concurring in the judgment.
 The National Environmental Policy Act improves agency
decisionmaking by requiring agencies to consider environ-
mental impacts for which their decisions would be respon-
sible. I agree with the Court that the Surface Transporta-
tion Board would not be responsible for the harms caused
by the oil industry, even though the railway it approved
would deliver oil to refineries and spur drilling in the Uinta
Basin. I reach that conclusion because, under its organic
statute, the Board had no authority to reject petitioners’ ap-
plication on account of the harms third parties would cause
with products transported on the proposed railway. The
majority takes a different path, unnecessarily grounding its
analysis largely in matters of policy. Accordingly, I write
separately to explain why the result in this case follows in-
exorably from our precedent.
 I
 A
 The Uinta Basin spans thousands of square miles across
northwestern Utah and Colorado. Bookended by the Uinta
Mountains in the north and the Roan Cliffs in the south,
2 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

the Basin is hard to access and has few residents. The Ba-
sin, however, contains “ ‘extensive deposits of valuable min-
erals,’ ” including large reserves of “waxy crude,” a form of
petroleum known for its thick consistency at ambient tem-
peratures. 82 F. 4th 1152 , 1165–1166 (CADC 2023). For
over a decade, oil producers have transported this oil out of
the Basin in heated tanker trucks, to be sold to refineries in
Utah and beyond.
 Petitioners, the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition
and the Uinta Basin Railway, LLC, plan to build a railway
connecting the Uinta Basin with the Union Pacific Railroad
Company station in Kyune, Utah, and from there to the na-
tional rail network. As the Coalition recognizes, “the Rail-
way’s predominant and expected primary purpose would
be” to enable Basin oil producers to transport, with greater
ease and in greater quantities, waxy crude to refineries in
the Gulf Coast. Ibid. Nearly all the waxy crude transported
by train out of the Uinta Basin would continue its travels
over the Union Pacific track from Kyune to Denver, which
runs through Eagle County, Colorado, and closely abuts the
Colorado River.
 B
 No person may “construct an additional railroad line” or
“provide transportation over . . . an extended or additional
railroad line” without a certificate of approval from the Sur-
face Transportation Board. 49 U. S. C. §10901 (a). Appli-
cants can file a formal application for such a certificate,
§10901(c), or they can seek approval through an abbrevi-
ated exemption process, §10502(a). In either case, the Act
expresses a clear presumption in favor of approving rail-
ways. See ibid. (exemptions must be granted “to the maxi-
mum extent” consistent with law); §10901(c) (the Board
“shall” issue a certificate “unless” inconsistent with public
convenience and necessity).
 In May 2020, petitioners requested permission to build
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

the Railway by way of the exemption procedure. Because
the proposed railway constitutes a “major Federal action
significantly affecting” the environment, the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the Board to pre-
pare a “detailed” statement addressing its environmental
impacts. 42 U. S. C. §4332 (C). The Board conditionally ap-
proved petitioners’ request based on the Railway’s “ ‘trans-
portation merits,’ ” but it deferred a final decision pending
the results of its environmental review. Surface Transpor-
tation Board, Office of Environmental Analysis, Uinta Ba-
sin Railway Final Environmental Impact Statement S–2,
n. 2 (Aug. 2021) (Final EIS).
 After soliciting public comment, the Board completed its
environmental impact statement on August 6, 2021.1 App.
to Pet. for Cert. 76a. The statement recognized that “be-
tween 3.68 and 10.52 trains” would travel daily on the pro-
posed new railway, which would be used “primarily to
transport crude oil from the Basin to markets across the
United States.” Final EIS 1–4. Consistent with its obliga-
tions under NEPA, the Board discussed the comparative
environmental merits of alternative railway routes as well
as the environmental consequences common to all alterna-
tives. Among other things, the Board analyzed the Rail-
way’s likely impact on the Basin’s natural environment and
the impacts increased freight traffic from the Railway
would have on the existing Union Pacific line running
through Eagle County.
 Of particular relevance here, the Board recognized that
“[r]efiners would refine the crude oil transported by the pro-
posed rail line into various fuels,” which in turn would be

——————
 1 The final statement consisted of a 600-page report accompanied by

supporting appendixes and responses to the public comments. See
www.uintabasinrailwayeis.com (Board-created website containing the
complete EIS and all related documentation); cf. ante, at 2, 4, 15, n. 5, 22
(asserting that the EIS spanned more than 3,600 pages of analysis).
4 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

combusted, causing an increase in greenhouse-gas emis-
sions. Id., at 3 .15–35. Depending on market conditions, the
Board estimated that increased oil production made possi-
ble by the Railway would cause greenhouse-gas emissions
equivalent to between 0.04 and 0.1 percent of the global to-
tal. Id., at 3 .15–36. (By way of comparison, Sweden and
Ireland are each responsible for about 0.1 percent of global
emissions.2) Although the Board recognized the “massive
deleterious impacts” of climate change, it explained that it
was “not required to analyze impacts related to the destina-
tions or end uses of ” products transported on proposed rail
lines. Ibid. After all, the Board explained, “railroads have
a common carrier obligation to carry all commodities, in-
cluding hazardous materials, upon reasonable request,”
meaning the Board cannot control the products “trans-
ported on the proposed rail line.” Ibid. (citing 49 U. S. C.
§11101 and Riffin v. STB, 733 F. 3d 340 , 345–347 (CADC
2013)). For that reason, the Board did not consider in fur-
ther detail the effects of increased drilling for oil in the Ba-
sin, or increased refining of oil in the Gulf Coast.
 After completing this analysis, the Board issued a deci-
sion approving the railway. With respect to the anticipated
increase in oil production, the Board again concluded that
it had “no authority or jurisdiction over development of oil
and gas in the Basin nor any authority to control or miti-
gate the impacts of any such development.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 108a. Board member Oberman dissented. In his
view, the Board did have “the power to deny construction
approval based on weighing all of the environmental im-
pacts that will arise from oil and gas development in the
Basin,” particularly because the Railway’s “ ‘entire pur-
pose’ ” would be to stimulate such production. Id., at 124a.

——————
 2 See European Commission, Emissions Database for Global Atmos-

pheric Research Report 2024 (last accessed May 7, 2025), https://
edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/report_2024#emissions_table.
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 5

 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

 C
 Several environmental groups filed a petition for review
of the Board’s decision to approve the railway, arguing prin-
cipally that the Board should have further considered the
consequences of increased oil drilling and refining that the
Railway’s construction would enable. Eagle County sepa-
rately petitioned for review of the Board’s decision, alleging
that the Board’s environmental analysis was deficient be-
cause it ignored or underestimated the Railway’s impacts,
through increased rail traffic, on the County and the nearby
Colorado River. Petitioners intervened in support of the
Board’s decision.
 The D. C. Circuit rejected several claims no longer at is-
sue here, but it sided with the challengers on others. With
regard to the environmental respondents’ challenge, the
court held that the Board should have more carefully con-
sidered the deleterious environmental effects of increased
oil production made possible by the Railway’s construction.
 82 F. 4th, at 1180 . Among other things, the court explained,
the Board should have “estimate[d] the emissions or other
environmental impacts” of oil refining as localized for the
“specific regions that will receive the oil based on expected
train traffic.” Id., at 1179 . The court rejected the Board’s
argument “that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or
mitigate those developments.” Id., at 1180 . Instead, in the
D. C. Circuit’s view, the Board’s statutory obligation to con-
sider whether the Railway would serve the “ ‘public conven-
ience and necessity’ ” encompassed “reasonably foreseeable
environmental harms,” including those resulting from the
increase in oil production on the Gulf Coast. Ibid.
 Moving to the County’s claims, the D. C. Circuit agreed
the Board’s analysis of the Railway’s effect on the Union
Pacific track and the Colorado River contained serious, un-
explained errors and omissions. The court further con-
cluded that the Board had failed to comply with several
6 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

other statutory requirements unrelated to NEPA. Accord-
ingly, the D. C. Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and re-
manded it to the agency for further proceedings.
 Petitioners asked this Court to review only one part of the
D. C. Circuit’s decision: whether NEPA required the Board
to study the environmental impacts of oil wells and refiner-
ies that lie outside the Board’s regulatory authority. Pet.
for Cert. i. This Court granted review to decide that ques-
tion.
 II
 A
 NEPA requires agencies to prepare and publish a “de-
tailed statement” reviewing the environmental impact of
any major federal action. 42 U. S. C. §4332 . That “action-
forcing” requirement serves dual purposes, ensuring both
that an agency considers a project’s environmental conse-
quences before deciding whether to approve it, and render-
ing the agency publicly accountable for environmental
harms it decides to tolerate. See Robertson v. Methow Val-
ley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332 , 349–350 (1989). The
point, as this Court has recognized, is not merely that an
agency produce a report but “that environmental concerns
be integrated into the very process of decision-making.” An-
drus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 350 (1979); see also
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390 , 409–410 (1976); Rob-
ertson, 490 U. S., at 350. In that way, NEPA’s procedural
requirements advance Congress’s aim that the Federal
Government “use all practicable means [to ensure] that the
Nation may . . . fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.”
§4331(b)(1).
 Because NEPA’s central aim is to improve agency deci-
sionmaking, an agency need not consider every conceivable
environmental consequence of a proposed federal action.
Rather, agencies need only analyze environmental impacts
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 7

 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

for which their decision would be (at least in part) “respon-
sible,” a requirement akin to “the familiar doctrine of prox-
imate cause from tort law.” Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Peo-
ple Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U. S. 766, 774 , and n. 7
(1983). An agency is not responsible for environmental im-
pacts it could not lawfully have acted to avoid, either
through mitigation or by disapproving the federal action.
See Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541
U. S. 752, 770 (2004). Nor is an agency responsible for im-
pacts that, though technically avoidable, are so causally at-
tenuated from or ancillary to the agency’s statutorily as-
signed tasks that it could not reasonably have been
expected to consider them as part of its decisionmaking pro-
cess. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U. S., at 774 . Together
these limitations serve to keep the scope of the agency’s re-
view targeted to environmental impacts it is well positioned
to address.
 Precedent makes these abstract principles concrete. In
Public Citizen, this Court evaluated the Federal Motor Car-
rier Safety Administration’s environmental analysis of reg-
ulations establishing an application process for Mexican
motor carriers who wanted to operate in the United States.
541 U. S., at 758–763. The application system itself had
only minimal environmental impacts (related to antici-
pated roadside inspections of the Mexican trucks and
buses). Yet the agency developed it at the direction of the
President, who had decided to lift a long-running morato-
rium on Mexican carriers’ operation in the United States
following the system’s completion. Id., at 760. Thus, prom-
ulgation of the agency’s regulations would enable a sub-
stantial influx of new trucking, which in turn would have
major environmental implications.
 This Court concluded that, though the agency’s regula-
tions would be a “but-for” cause of the new trucking, it did
not need to consider the related environmental impacts be-
cause it had “no authority to prevent” them. Id., at 766–
8 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

767. After all, the decision to lift the moratorium had been
the President’s, not the agency’s, and the agency could not
lawfully refuse to issue its regulations in order to block the
President’s decision. Id., at 761. The agency had no means
to prevent, and thus was not responsible for, the conse-
quences of lifting the moratorium. Hence NEPA did not re-
quire it to analyze those consequences.
 The Court’s decision in Metropolitan Edison illustrates
the companion principle: Some environmental impacts are
connected to an agency action by way of so “attenuated” a
causal chain that the agency may reasonably dismiss them
as ancillary to its decision. 460 U. S., at 774 . In Metropol-
itan Edison, the Court considered whether the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission had to analyze not only the risk
that a proposed nuclear plant would cause an accident, but
also the psychological concern nearby residents might ex-
perience when they learned about that risk. Ibid. Although
the psychological concern would be “caused by” the nuclear
plant, the Court held that NEPA did not require the agency
to consider it. Id., at 774–775. That makes sense: Prevent-
ing nuclear accidents is a core element of the Commission’s
statutory task; preventing psychological distress is not. See
 id., at 776 (noting that “psychiatric expertise” is “not other-
wise relevant to [the agency’s] congressionally assigned
functions”). Because the agency could reasonably disregard
psychological distress in deciding whether to approve a
power plant, it could disregard that risk in its environmen-
tal analysis as well.
 As these cases show, the dual limitations on an agency’s
duty to consider information under NEPA yield a “ ‘rule of
reason,’ which ensures that agencies determine whether
and to what extent to prepare an EIS based on the useful-
ness of any new potential information to the decisionmak-
ing process.” Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 767 (quoting
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U. S. 360 ,
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 9

 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

373–374 (1989)). NEPA requires consideration of environ-
mental impacts only if such consideration would result in
information on which the agency could act.
 B
 Consistent with these principles, judicial review of an
agency’s environmental impact statement involves a two-
step analysis. First, courts must consider the grounds on
which an agency may rely under its organic statute to mod-
ify (by mitigation) or reject a proposed federal action. If the
organic statute precludes consideration of a particular is-
sue, the agency may set it aside for purposes of its NEPA
review as well. That is the rule of Public Citizen.3
 Second, if an agency decided not to review an environ-
mental impact because (in its judgment) the impact was too
causally attenuated from the question at hand, courts must
ask whether the agency “acted arbitrarily” in doing so.
Kleppe, 427 U. S., at 412 . That deferential standard of re-
view is appropriate here, as it is across substantive areas of
administrative law, because “[a]gencies . . . have ‘unique ex-
pertise,’ often of a scientific or technical nature, relevant to
applying a regulation ‘to complex or changing circum-
stances.’ ” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 571 (2019) (plural-
ity opinion). Thus, as the majority points out, agencies of-
ten are “better equipped to assess what facts are relevant
to the[ir] . . . own decision than a court is.” Ante, at 10; cf.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 456
(2024) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (“[A]gencies often know
things about a statute’s subject matter that courts could not
hope to”).4
——————
 3 It follows from this rule that the proper scope of an agency’s NEPA

review depends in part on the nature of the agency’s statutory authority.
The greater an agency’s authority to consider and prevent environmental
impacts in its decisionmaking process, the greater its duty under NEPA
to consider those impacts, and vice versa.
 4 Of course, that point applies equally when an agency decides that an

environmental impact is relevant to its decision.
10 SEVEN COUNTY INFRASTRUCTURE COALITION v.
 EAGLE COUNTY
 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

 This case provides no occasion to consider the second step
because the question presented is resolved at the first. The
Board twice decided it lacked authority to reject railway ap-
plications on account of the ways in which third parties
would use the products “transported on the proposed rail
line.” Final EIS 3.15–36; App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a (“Here,
the Board has no authority or jurisdiction over development
of oil and gas in the Basin nor any authority to control or
mitigate the impacts of any such development”). Each time,
the agency cited Public Citizen to justify its decision not to
analyze further the environmental effects of oil drilling and
refining made possible by the Railway. See Final EIS 3.15–
36; App. to Pet. for Cert. 108a.
 Review of the Board’s organic statute, the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act, confirms the
Board’s understanding of the scope of its review. “As com-
mon carriers, railroads subject to the Board’s jurisdiction
are required to provide ‘transportation or service on reason-
able request’ to any person or commodity.” Ante, at 20, n. 6
(quoting 49 U. S. C. §11101 (a)). In addition, the Act con-
tains a clear presumption in favor of approving new rail-
ways. See supra, at 3. And of the 15 statutory policies the
Board must consider in the exemption process, not one con-
cerns the anticipated use of commodities that will be trans-
ported on the proposed railway. See §§10101(1)–(15). Un-
like the Board, meanwhile, other entities do have authority
“to approve oil and gas development projects” and to regu-
late the effects of refining. See Brief for Federal Respond-
ents 19. All this suggests, as the Board concluded, that the
Board could not have rejected petitioners’ application in or-
der to prevent the harmful effects of oil drilling and refin-
ing.5 Short of rejecting the Railway entirely, moreover, the
——————
 5 The D. C. Circuit came to the opposite conclusion because it viewed

the Board’s authority to license railroad construction based on the “ ‘pub-
lic convenience and necessity’ ” as encompassing the effects of oil drilling
and refining enabled by the Railway. 82 F. 4th 1152, 1180 (2023). That
 Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 11

 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment

common carrier mandate prevented the Board from miti-
gating, by limiting the transport of crude oil, the Railway’s
spurring of the oil industry. See §11101(a).
 The environmental respondents concede that the Board
correctly understood the scope of its decisionmaking au-
thority. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 84–85. Instead, they argue
that the Board should have analyzed even environmental
impacts it could not lawfully prevent. Yet Public Citizen
squarely forecloses that position. See supra, at 9–10. Even
a foreseeable environmental effect is outside of NEPA’s
scope if the agency could not lawfully decide to modify or
reject the proposed action on account of it. NEPA thus did
not require the Board to consider the effects of oil drilling
and refining.
 * * *
 Under NEPA, agencies must consider the environmental
impacts for which their decisions would be responsible.
Here, the Board correctly determined it would not be re-
sponsible for the consequences of oil production upstream
or downstream from the Railway because it could not law-
fully consider those consequences as part of the approval
process. For that reason, I concur in the Court’s judgment
reversing the D. C. Circuit’s holding requiring the Board to
consider in further detail harms caused by the oil industry.

——————
phrase, however, must be read “with a view to [its] place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803,
809 (1989). Here, the Board’s organic statute contains clear indicators,
most significantly the common carrier mandate, that the Board’s author-
ity does not extend so far.