Opinion of the Court
Ketanji Brown Jackson
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC, ET AL. v.
TRUSTEES OF THE IAM NATIONAL PENSION FUND
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 23–1209. Argued January 20, 2026—Decided May 21, 2026
Pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), as amended, an employer that stops participating in an un-
derfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan (MPP), must pay the plan
“withdrawal liability,” i.e., the employer’s share of the plan’s unfunded
vested benefits (UVBs). See 29 U. S. C. §1391. Withdrawal liability is
calculated based on the plan’s UVBs “as of ” the statutory measure-
ment date—the last day of the plan year preceding the employer’s
withdrawal. §§1391(b)(2)(E)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i), (3)(A), (4)(A). Determining
the value of a plan’s UVBs depends upon both hard data (such as the
number of beneficiaries and the value of the plan’s assets) and a vari-
ety of actuarial predictions about the future. One key actuarial as-
sumption is the discount rate, which is the interest rate “used to dis-
count future benefit payments to their present value.” 87 Fed. Reg.
62317.
Petitioners are four employers who withdrew from the IAM National
Pension Fund (Fund)—an underfunded MPP—between April and De-
cember 2018. The Fund assessed each employer’s withdrawal liability
“as of ” December 31, 2017 (the measurement date). In making this
calculation, the Fund applied a discount rate of 6.50%, which it had
adopted with its actuarial firm in January 2018. The Fund had previ-
ously used a discount rate of 7.50% to value its UVBs. Petitioners each
initiated arbitrations challenging their assessments. In each case, the
arbitrators determined that the assessments were erroneous because
the Fund had applied actuarial assumptions adopted after the meas-
urement date. The arbitrators instead required the Fund to use the
2 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. TRUSTEES OF
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Syllabus
actuarial assumptions that were “in effect” on the measurement date—
i.e., the 7.50% discount rate. App. 293. The Fund sought review in
Federal District Court. The courts disagreed with the arbitrators and
held that actuaries could use assumptions adopted after the measure-
ment date. The D.C. Circuit affirmed in a consolidated appeal. Its
decision conflicted with a decision of the Second Circuit, and this Court
granted certiorari to resolve when actuarial assumptions may be se-
lected for purposes of calculating withdrawal liability.
Held: The provisions of ERISA governing the calculation of withdrawal
liability—§§1391 and 1393—do not require the actuarial assumptions
underlying that calculation to be selected on or before the measure-
ment date. Pp. 6–11.
(a) Section 1391 requires withdrawal liability to be calculated based
on the value of a plan’s UVBs “as of ” the measurement date. Petition-
ers contend that §1391’s “as of ” language establishes a deadline for the
selection of actuarial assumptions. But §1391 sets no such deadline.
The term “as of ” is understood “to assign an event to one time and the
recognition of it to another.” W. Follett, Modern American Usage 41.
Section 1391’s “as of ” language thus means that the hard data that
feeds the UVB calculation must be fixed on the measurement date, but
the calculation itself can be performed after that date. Actuarial as-
sumptions are not observable facts about the plan; instead, they are
predictive judgments used as tools to calculate UVBs. Accordingly,
while §1391’s “as of ” requirement sets the reference point for factual
inputs, it has no bearing on when actuaries must select their assump-
tions. Pp. 6–8.
(b) Section 1393, which governs the use of actuarial assumptions for
assessing withdrawal liability, states that the assumptions must be
“reasonable,” “tak[e] into account the experience of the plan and rea-
sonable expectations,” and “offer the actuary’s best estimate of antici-
pated experience under the plan.” §1393(a)(1). Section 1393 provides
no deadline by which actuaries must select their assumptions, and the
Court does not generally read limitations into statutes that do not ap-
pear in their text. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590
U. S. 212, 215. Indeed, because Congress included a deadline for the
selection of actuarial assumptions in a different section of the statute,
but imposed no similar limit in §1393, the Court presumes that the
omission in §1393 is intentional. See Russello v. United States, 464
U. S. 16, 23. Moreover, §1393’s instruction that actuarial assumptions
reflect the actuary’s “best estimate,” §1393(a)(1), supports the conclu-
sion that actuaries can select their assumptions after the measure-
ment date. Requiring actuaries to use assumptions selected before the
measurement date could prevent them from relying on the most up-to-
date data when selecting their assumptions, resulting in assumptions
Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026) 3
Syllabus
that do not reflect their “best estimate.” Pp. 8–10.
(c) Petitioners’ remaining arguments do not overcome the absence of
a textual deadline for adopting actuarial assumptions. First, petition-
ers point to a different provision of ERISA that prohibits plans from
applying any new “plan rule or amendment” to an employer’s with-
drawal liability if the rule or amendment is adopted after the employer
withdraws. §1394(a). But the retroactivity limits in §1394 concededly
do not apply to actuarial assumptions. Congress chose not to enact a
similar antiretroactivity rule in §1393, and inferring one would over-
ride Congress’s choice.
Petitioners fall back on a policy argument, contending that allowing
plans to adopt actuarial assumptions after the measurement date will
invite manipulation, enabling plans and their actuaries to retroac-
tively select assumptions in order to increase withdrawing employers’
liability. But petitioners’ proposed rule does not address these con-
cerns, and in any event, “policy concerns cannot trump the best inter-
pretation of the statutory text.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 346.
Congress chose which limits to impose on the selection of actuarial as-
sumptions, and it is not the role of the Court to supplant Congress’s
choices. Pp. 10–11.
92 F. 4th 316, affirmed.
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 23–1209
_________________
M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TRUSTEES OF THE IAM
NATIONAL PENSION FUND
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May 21, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
An employer that stops participating in an underfunded
Multiemployer Pension Plan must pay the plan “with-
drawal liability”—i.e., its share of the plan’s unfunded
vested benefits. Calculating the unfunded vested benefits
is a complicated endeavor because the plan’s actuary must
predict the value of the plan’s future assets and obligations.
To do so, the actuary makes certain assumptions about, for
example, retirees’ life expectancies and the anticipated
growth rate of the plan’s investments. By statute, an em-
ployer’s withdrawal liability is based on the value of the
plan’s unfunded vested benefits “as of ” the last day of the
plan year preceding the employer’s withdrawal, also known
as the measurement date. 29 U. S. C. §1391.
The question presented in this case is whether the “as of ”
language sets the measurement date as the deadline by
which actuaries must select the assumptions that underlie
the withdrawal-liability calculation. The Court of Appeals
for the D. C. Circuit held that it does not, concluding that
actuaries may select their assumptions after the measure-
ment date. We agree. The statute governing the selection
2 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. TRUSTEES OF
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Opinion of the Court
and use of actuarial assumptions in the withdrawal-liabil-
ity context contains no requirement that actuaries use as-
sumptions adopted prior to the measurement date.
I
A
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) provides “comprehensive regulation for private
pension plans.” Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration, 475 U. S. 211, 214 (1986). One type of pension
plan that ERISA regulates is a Multiemployer Pension Plan
(MPP). An MPP is a plan “to which more than one employer
contributes” and is “maintained to fulfill the terms of collec-
tive-bargaining agreements.” Concrete Pipe & Products of
Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for South-
ern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 605 (1993); see 29 U. S. C.
§1002(37).
As amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amend-
ments Act of 1980, ERISA requires employers that with-
draw from an underfunded MPP to pay “withdrawal liabil-
ity.” §1381(a); see Milwaukee Brewery Workers’ Pension
Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U. S. 414, 417 (1995).
Withdrawal liability reflects the employer’s share of the
plan’s unfunded vested benefits (UVBs)—that is, the differ-
ence between the present value of the benefits owed to em-
ployees and the current value of the plan’s assets.
§§1381(b)(1), 1393(c). By requiring employers to pay their
share of the UVBs, ERISA seeks to ensure that plans do not
become insolvent when employers withdraw. Milwaukee
Brewery, 513 U. S., at 416–417.
Section 1391 specifies the methods that plans may use to
calculate withdrawal liability. The common feature of each
method is the requirement that withdrawal liability be cal-
culated based on the plan’s UVBs “as of ” the last day of the
Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
Opinion of the Court
plan year preceding the employer’s withdrawal—the meas-
urement date. See §§1391(b)(2)(E)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i), (3)(A),
(4)(A); Milwaukee Brewery, 513 U. S., at 417–418.
Determining a plan’s UVBs is not a matter of simple
arithmetic. The value of the UVBs depends upon both hard
data about the plan (such as the number of beneficiaries
and the value of the plan’s assets) and a variety of predic-
tions about the future. For example, how many employees
will draw on their benefits and for how long? And what is
the value of those future benefits in today’s dollars?
To make these predictions, a plan’s actuary must select
demographic and economic assumptions about how the
plan’s assets and obligations will change over time. Amer-
ican Academy of Actuaries, Issue Brief: Selection of Actuar-
ial Assumptions for Multiemployer Plans 3 (July 2020). A
key actuarial assumption—the one relevant here—is the
discount rate: the interest rate “used to discount future ben-
efit payments to their present value.” 87 Fed. Reg. 62317
(2022); see Actuarial Standards Board, Actuarial Standard
of Practice No. 27, §3.3 (2023) (ASOP). A higher discount
rate reduces the value of the plan’s UVBs. 87 Fed. Reg.
62317. Lower UVBs, in turn, correspond to a lower with-
drawal liability for employers. Ibid.
Actuaries select the assumptions underlying their UVB
calculations based on relevant “current and historical
data,” ASOP No. 27, §3.5, including growth in the plan’s
earnings, inflation, yields on securities, and other macroe-
conomic conditions, id., §3.7. ERISA imposes few substan-
tive requirements on the selection of these assumptions.
Section 1393, which governs the use of actuarial assump-
tions in calculating withdrawal liability, says only that the
actuary must use “actuarial assumptions and methods
which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account
the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and
4 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. TRUSTEES OF
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Opinion of the Court
which, in combination, offer the actuary’s best estimate of
anticipated experience under the plan.” §1393(a)(1).1
B
The IAM National Pension Fund (Fund) is an MPP serv-
ing employees who are covered by collective bargaining
agreements with the International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers. In November 2017, its actuar-
ial firm, Cheiron, published the annual valuation of the
Fund’s assets and liabilities for the 2016 Plan Year. Using
a discount rate of 7.50%, Cheiron valued the Fund’s UVBs
at close to $500 million. Two months later, on January 24,
2018, Cheiron met with the Fund’s trustees to discuss the
actuarial assumptions it would use to calculate withdrawal
liability for employers who withdrew in 2018. They settled
on a discount rate of 6.50%, 1% lower than the rate previ-
ously used. Cheiron published its actuarial valuation for
Plan Year 2017 on April 17, 2019. Using the 6.50% discount
rate, it valued the Fund’s UVBs at just over $3 billion—six
times the prior year’s figure.
Petitioners are four employers who used to contribute to
the Fund. Each withdrew from the Fund between April and
December 2018. Pursuant to §1391, the Fund assessed
each employer’s withdrawal liability “as of ” December 31,
2017 (the last day of the plan year preceding the year in
which they withdrew). The Fund applied the 6.50% dis-
count rate adopted in January 2018 to calculate their with-
drawal liability. Using the 6.50% discount rate, as com-
pared to the previously adopted 7.50% discount rate,
dramatically increased petitioners’ withdrawal liability;
M&K Employee Solutions, for example, was assessed with-
drawal liability of around $6.2 million, whereas it would
——————
1 In the alternative, the actuary can use “assumptions and methods set
forth in the [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s] regulations.” 29
U. S. C. §1393(a)(2); see §1301(a)(4). This alternative is not at issue
here.
Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
Opinion of the Court
have owed only around $1.8 million using the prior assump-
tions.
Petitioners initiated separate arbitrations to challenge
their withdrawal-liability assessments. See §1401(a). Each
of the arbitrators determined that the assessment was er-
roneous because the Fund had applied actuarial assump-
tions adopted after December 31, 2017. Doing so, the arbi-
trators reasoned, conflicted with §1391’s requirement that
withdrawal liability be calculated “as of ” the measurement
date. The arbitrators instead required the Fund to use the
actuarial assumptions that were “in effect” on the measure-
ment date—i.e., the 7.50% discount rate. App. 293 (empha-
sis deleted); see also id., at 26–27, 49, 71.
The Fund sought review of the arbitral awards in Federal
District Court. Three of the actions were consolidated,
while the fourth proceeded separately. In both cases, the
District Courts disagreed with the arbitrators, holding that
actuaries could use assumptions adopted after the meas-
urement date to calculate withdrawal liability. 2022 WL
4534998, *11 (D DC, Sept. 28, 2022); Trustees of the IAM
Nat. Pension Fund v. Ohio Magnetics, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 3d
112, 136–137 (DC 2023).
In a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
D. C. Circuit affirmed. 92 F. 4th 316, 322 (2024). The court
reasoned that “requir[ing] an actuary to determine what as-
sumptions to use before the close of business on the meas-
urement date” would conflict with Congress’s instruction in
§1393(a)(1) “that an actuary use its ‘best estimate’ of the
plan’s anticipated experience as of the measurement date.”
Id., at 322–323. Accordingly, the court held that actuaries
could adopt assumptions after the measurement date as
long as the assumptions were “based on the body of
knowledge available up to the measurement date.” Id., at
322 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The D. C. Circuit’s decision conflicted with a decision of
the Second Circuit, which held that MPPs must adopt their
6 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. TRUSTEES OF
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Opinion of the Court
interest rate assumptions for withdrawal-liability purposes
on or before the measurement date. National Retirement
Fund v. Metz Culinary Mgmt., Inc., 946 F. 3d 146, 152
(2020). We granted certiorari to resolve this split over when
actuarial assumptions may be selected for purposes of cal-
culating withdrawal liability. 606 U. S. 930, amended 606
U. S. 958 (2025).2 For the reasons that follow, we now hold
that withdrawal liability can be calculated based on actu-
arial assumptions adopted after the measurement date.
II
Two sections of ERISA govern the calculation of with-
drawal liability: §§1391 and 1393. Neither requires that
actuarial assumptions be selected on or before the measure-
ment date.
A
Section 1391 lays out the various methods that plans can
use to calculate withdrawal liability. It does not mention
actuarial assumptions at all. Nevertheless, petitioners ask
us to identify a deadline for the selection of assumptions
from §1391’s directive that withdrawal liability be calcu-
lated based on the plan’s UVBs “as of ” the measurement
date. See, e.g., §1391(b)(2)(E)(i). But the “as of ” language
sets no such deadline.
Dictionaries define “as of ” to mean “at the date men-
tioned.” Oxford American Dictionary 34 (1980); see also
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 129 (1976)
(“at or on (a specific time or date)”). In context, the term is
understood “to assign an event to one time and the recogni-
tion of it to another.” W. Follett, Modern American Usage
41 (rev. ed. 1998). Thus, §1391’s use of “as of ” means two
things. First, the hard data about the plan that feeds the
——————
2 The parties also disputed below whether actuarial assumptions must
be based on only the information available as of the measurement date.
We leave that question for another day.
Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
Opinion of the Court
UVB calculation must be fixed on the measurement date.
Second, and as all agree, the actual UVB calculation can be
performed after the measurement date. For purposes of
this case, then, the key question is whether actuarial as-
sumptions are akin to the facts about the plan that must be
fixed on the measurement date, or whether they are a part
of the UVB calculation itself and can therefore be selected
after the measurement date.
Petitioners argue that actuarial assumptions are factual
inputs into the UVB calculation, much like hard data such
as the number of plan beneficiaries. On this view, to comply
with §1391, the actuarial assumptions must be “frozen” on
the measurement date. Brief for Petitioners 23. In other
words, they say, the actuary must use the assumptions that
are “in effect” on the measurement date—i.e., the assump-
tions most recently adopted before the measurement date—
to value the UVBs. Brief for Petitioners 37.
But petitioners’ argument is based on a flawed under-
standing of actuarial assumptions. These assumptions are
not factual inputs. Instead, they are predictive judgments
about a plan’s anticipated future performance—tools actu-
aries use to calculate the plan’s UVBs. The distinction be-
tween tool and fact is clear from the text of ERISA: Section
1393 groups actuarial assumptions together with “meth-
ods” in prescribing how withdrawal liability must be calcu-
lated. See §1393(a)(1). The relevant similarity between as-
sumptions and methods is that both are tools used to make
actuarial valuations. See, e.g., §1393(a) (referring to actu-
arial assumptions as something “used” to determine UVBs);
§1401(a)(3)(B)(i) (same).
The Actuarial Standards of Practice likewise support our
conclusion that actuarial assumptions are not observable
facts about the plan that are “in effect” on a particular
8 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. TRUSTEES OF
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Opinion of the Court
date.3 These professional guidelines instruct actuaries to
select assumptions for the purpose of making a particular
calculation or measurement. See ASOP No. 27, §3.3 (“The
actuary should identify the types of assumptions to use for
a specific measurement,” taking into account, among other
things, “the purpose of the measurement”); id., §3.8 (“The
actuary should take into account the purpose of the meas-
urement as a primary factor in selecting a discount rate”).
In other words, actuaries make assumptions when the need
for an actuarial valuation arises.
In this case, for example, the Fund’s actuary adopted as-
sumptions for purposes of its 2016 Plan Year annual valu-
ation. The Fund then adopted new actuarial assumptions
for purposes of calculating withdrawal liability for employ-
ers who withdrew in 2018, and later for its 2017 Plan Year
annual valuation. As this case illustrates, actuarial as-
sumptions are adopted for the purpose of a particular cal-
culation or measurement; they are not generally “in effect”
in the way that petitioners urge.
With this understanding of actuarial assumptions, peti-
tioners’ proposed interpretation of §1391 falls apart. Be-
cause actuarial assumptions are tools used to calculate
UVBs rather than hard data about the plan, they cannot be
“frozen” on the measurement date. Section 1391’s “as of ”
requirement sets the reference point for the factual inputs
into the UVB calculation. It has no bearing on when actu-
aries must select the tools, including assumptions, they use
to calculate a plan’s UVBs.
——————
3 Consulting the Actuarial Standards of Practice is appropriate here
because this is a statute “addressed to specialists,” so it “must be read by
judges with the minds of the specialists.” Becerra v. Empire Health
Foundation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center, 597 U. S. 424, 434 (2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
Opinion of the Court
B
Section 1393, the section of ERISA that governs the use
of actuarial assumptions for assessing withdrawal liability,
confirms that the measurement date is not a deadline by
which actuaries must select their assumptions. Indeed,
§1393 provides no deadline at all. The statute merely says
that the actuary’s assumptions must be “reasonable,” must
“tak[e] into account the experience of the plan and reason-
able expectations,” and must “offer the actuary’s best esti-
mate of anticipated experience under the plan.”
§1393(a)(1). We generally do not read limitations into stat-
utes that do not appear in their text, Romag Fasteners, Inc.
v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. 212, 215 (2020), and we dis-
cern no basis for doing so here.
The omission of any deadline in §1393 is significant given
Congress’s inclusion of a similar deadline in a different sec-
tion of the statute. Specifically: The amortization period for
an employer’s withdrawal-liability payments must be de-
termined based on “the assumptions used for the most re-
cent actuarial valuation for the plan.” §1399(c)(1)(A)(ii).
But Congress imposed no similar limit for the actuarial as-
sumptions used to calculate withdrawal liability; we pre-
sume this omission is intentional. See Russello v. United
States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the dis-
parate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Moreover, §1393’s instruction that actuarial assumptions
reflect the actuary’s “best estimate of anticipated experi-
ence under the plan,” §1393(a)(1), supports the conclusion
that actuaries can select their assumptions after the meas-
urement date. Recall that actuaries choose assumptions
based on the plan’s past performance, changes in the mar-
ket, and other relevant information. ASOP No. 27, §3.5.
10 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. TRUSTEES OF
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Opinion of the Court
Thus, the assumptions should “reflect the actuary’s
knowledge as of the measurement date.” id., §3.4.6. But
the relevant information about the plan’s performance or
macroeconomic conditions, as it stood on the measurement
date, may not become available until after the measure-
ment date. See American Academy of Actuaries, Issue
Brief: Selection of Actuarial Assumptions for Multiem-
ployer Plans 4. Requiring actuaries to use assumptions se-
lected before the measurement date could therefore prevent
them from relying on the most up-to-date data when select-
ing their assumptions. This, in turn, could mean that their
assumptions do not reflect their “best estimate.”
§1393(a)(1).
More fundamentally, requiring actuaries to use assump-
tions based on stale data would result in an incoherent stat-
utory scheme. Under petitioners’ view, actuaries must
value a plan’s UVBs based on hard data as it stood on the
measurement date while at the same time applying as-
sumptions selected based on an older set of facts. The stat-
ute does not mandate this mismatch. Instead, actuaries
may select their assumptions after the measurement date
in order to value the UVBs as of the measurement date.
III
Unable to identify a deadline for adopting actuarial as-
sumptions in the text of ERISA, petitioners turn to two
other arguments—one about statutory context and the
other related to policy concerns. Neither has merit.
First, petitioners contend that the statute contains a
broad antiretroactivity principle. They point to a different
section of ERISA, §1394, for support. This section prohibits
plans from applying any new “plan rule or amendment” to
an employer’s withdrawal liability if the rule or amendment
is adopted after the employer withdraws. §1394(a).
But this section hurts rather than helps petitioners. As
they acknowledge, actuarial assumptions are not plan rules
Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 11
Opinion of the Court
or amendments. Accordingly, the retroactivity limits in
§1394 do not apply to actuarial assumptions. Congress
chose not to enact a similar antiretroactivity rule in §1393,
which strongly suggests that actuarial assumptions are not
subject to any such limitation. See Russello, 464 U. S., at
23. Inferring an antiretroactivity rule for the selection of
actuarial assumptions would override Congress’s choice.
So petitioners fall back on a policy argument. They con-
tend that allowing plans to adopt actuarial assumptions af-
ter the measurement date will open the door to manipula-
tion. Plans and their actuaries, petitioners worry, will
retroactively select assumptions in order to increase with-
drawing employers’ liability. But their proposed rule—that
withdrawal liability must be based on assumptions adopted
before the measurement date—does nothing to address
these concerns. Plans and actuaries could still select as-
sumptions with an eye towards inflating withdrawal liabil-
ity before the measurement date given the significant dis-
cretion they enjoy in selecting assumptions.
In any event, “policy concerns cannot trump the best in-
terpretation of the statutory text.” Patel v. Garland, 596
U. S. 328, 346 (2022). Congress chose which limits to im-
pose on the selection of actuarial assumptions. The statute
requires that actuarial assumptions be “reasonable” and re-
flect actuaries’ “best estimate.” §1393(a)(1). And the stat-
ute permits employers to challenge actuarial assumptions
in arbitration, including on the ground that they were “un-
reasonable.” §1401(a)(3)(B)(i). Indeed, many of the worst-
case scenarios petitioners posit—for example, that actuar-
ies will adopt intentionally low discount rates for with-
drawal liability but high discount rates for other pur-
poses—are subject to challenge in arbitration. It is not the
role of the Court to supplant Congress’s choices, as reflected
in the statutory text, with our own.
12 M & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS, LLC v. TRUSTEES OF
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Opinion of the Court
* * *
ERISA does not require pension plans to assess with-
drawal liability based on actuarial assumptions adopted be-
fore the measurement date. We therefore affirm the judg-
ment of the D. C. Circuit.
It is so ordered.