Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, President of U.S.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1

 Syllabus

 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
 being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
 The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
 prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
 See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 Syllabus

 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL. v. TRUMP,
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.

 CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 24–1287. Argued November 5, 2025—Decided February 20, 2026*

The question presented is whether the International Emergency Eco-
 nomic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose tariffs.
 See 91 Stat. 1626 . Shortly after taking office, President Trump sought
 to address two foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada,
 Mexico, and China, Presidential Proclamation No. 10886, 90 Fed. Reg.
 8327 ; Exec. Order No. 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113 ; Exec. Order No.
 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117 ; Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121 ,
 and “large and persistent” trade deficits, Exec. Order No. 14257, 90
 Fed. Reg. 15041 . The President determined that the drug influx had
 “created a public health crisis,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113 , and that the trade
 deficits had “led to the hollowing out” of the American manufacturing
 base and “undermined critical supply chains,” id., at 15041. The Pres-
 ident declared a national emergency as to both threats, deeming them
 “unusual and extraordinary,” and invoked his authority under IEEPA
 to respond.
 He imposed tariffs to deal with each threat. As to the drug traffick-
 ing tariffs, the President imposed a 25% duty on most Canadian and
 Mexican imports and a 10% duty on most Chinese imports. Id., at
 9114, 9118, 9122–9123. As to the trade deficit (“reciprocal”) tariffs, the
 President imposed a duty “on all imports from all trading partners” of

——————

 *Together with No. 25–250, Trump, President of the United States, et

al. v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al., on certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Syllabus

 at least 10%, with dozens of nations facing higher rates. Id., at 15045,
 15049. Since imposing each set of tariffs, the President has issued sev-
 eral increases, reductions, and other modifications.
 Petitioners in Learning Resources and respondents in V.O.S. Selec-
 tions filed suit, alleging that IEEPA does not authorize the reciprocal
 or drug trafficking tariffs. The Learning Resources plaintiffs—two
 small businesses—sued in the United States District Court for the Dis-
 trict of Columbia. That court denied the Government’s motion to
 transfer the case to the United States Court of International Trade
 (CIT) and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
 concluding that IEEPA did not grant the President the power to im-
 pose tariffs. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs—five small businesses
 and 12 States—sued in the CIT. That court granted summary judg-
 ment for the plaintiffs. And the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, af-
 firmed in relevant part, concluding that IEEPA’s grant of authority to
 “regulate . . . importation” did not authorize the challenged tariffs,
 which “are unbounded in scope, amount, and duration.” 149 F. 4th
 1312 , 1338. The Government filed a petition for certiorari in V.O.S.
 Selections, and the Learning Resources plaintiffs filed a petition for
 certiorari before judgment. The Court granted the petitions and con-
 solidated the cases.
Held: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The
 judgment in No. 24–1287 is vacated, and the case is remanded with
 instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; the judgment in No. 25–
 250 is affirmed.
No. 24–1287, 784 F. Supp. 3d 209 , vacated and remanded; No. 25–250,
 149 F. 4th 1312 , affirmed.
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
 to Parts I and II–A–1:
 Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution specifies that “The Congress
 shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
 cises.” The Framers recognized the unique importance of this taxing
 power—a power which “very clear[ly]” includes the power to impose
 tariffs. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201 . And they gave Congress
 “alone . . . access to the pockets of the people.” The Federalist No. 48,
 p. 310 (J. Madison). The Framers did not vest any part of the taxing
 power in the Executive Branch. See Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 515 .
 The Government thus concedes that the President enjoys no inher-
 ent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime. It instead relies ex-
 clusively on IEEPA to defend the challenged tariffs. It reads the words
 “regulate” and “importation” to effect a sweeping delegation of Con-
 gress’s power to set tariff policy—authorizing the President to impose
 tariffs of unlimited amount and duration, on any product from any
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 3

 Syllabus

country. 50 U. S. C. §1702 (a)(1)(B). Pp. 5–7.
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE GORSUCH and JUSTICE
BARRETT, concluded in Part II–A–2:
 The Court has long expressed “reluctan[ce] to read into ambiguous
statutory text” extraordinary delegations of Congress’s powers. West
Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (quoting Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302 , 324). In several cases described as in-
volving “major questions,” the Court has reasoned that “both separa-
tion of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative
intent” suggest Congress would not have delegated “highly consequen-
tial power” through ambiguous language. Id., at 723–724. These con-
siderations apply with particular force where, as here, the purported
delegation involves the core congressional power of the purse. Con-
gressional practice confirms as much. When Congress has delegated
its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms and subject to strict
limits.
 Against that backdrop of clear and limited delegations, the Govern-
ment reads IEEPA to give the President power to unilaterally impose
unbounded tariffs and change them at will. That view would represent
a transformative expansion of the President’s authority over tariff pol-
icy. It is also telling that in IEEPA’s half century of existence, no Pres-
ident has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs, let alone tariffs of
this magnitude and scope. That “ ‘lack of historical precedent,’ coupled
with the breadth of authority” that the President now claims, suggests
that the tariffs extend beyond the President’s “legitimate reach.” Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109, 119
(quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 , 505). The “ ‘economic and political signifi-
cance’ ” of the authority the President has asserted likewise “provide[s]
a ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer
such authority.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721 (quoting FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120 , 159–160). The
stakes here dwarf those of other major questions cases. And as in those
cases, “a reasonable interpreter would [not] expect” Congress to
“pawn[ ]” such a “big-time policy call[ ] . . . off to another branch.” Biden
v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 515 (BARRETT, J., concurring).
 There is no exception to the major questions doctrine for emergency
statutes. Nor does the fact that tariffs implicate foreign affairs render
the doctrine inapplicable. The Framers gave “Congress alone” the
power to impose tariffs during peacetime. Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S.
694, 700 . And the foreign affairs implications of tariffs do not make it
any more likely that Congress would relinquish its tariff power
through vague language, or without careful limits. Accordingly, the
President must “point to clear congressional authorization” to justify
4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Syllabus

 his extraordinary assertion of that power. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 506
 (internal quotation marks omitted). He cannot. Pp. 7–13.
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
 to Part II–B, concluding:
 (a) IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate, block during the
 pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
 prevent or prohibit . . . importation or exportation.” §1702(a)(1)(B).
 Absent from this lengthy list of specific powers is any mention of tariffs
 or duties. Had Congress intended to convey the distinct and extraor-
 dinary power to impose tariffs, it would have done so expressly, as it
 consistently has in other tariff statutes.
 The power to “regulate . . . importation” does not fill that void. The
 term “regulate,” as ordinarily used, means to “fix, establish, or control;
 to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or re-
 striction; to subject to governing principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dic-
 tionary 1156. The facial breadth of this definition places in stark relief
 what ”regulate” is not usually thought to include: taxation. Many stat-
 utes grant the Executive the power to “regulate.” Yet the Government
 cannot identify any statute in which the power to regulate includes the
 power to tax. The Court is therefore skeptical that in IEEPA—and
 IEEPA alone—Congress hid a delegation of its birth-right power to tax
 within the quotidian power to “regulate.”
 While taxes may accomplish regulatory ends, it does not follow that
 the power to regulate includes the power to tax as a means of regula-
 tion. Indeed, when Congress addresses both the power to regulate and
 the power to tax, it does so separately and expressly. That it did not
 do so here is strong evidence that “regulate” in IEEPA does not include
 taxation.
 A contrary reading would render IEEPA partly unconstitutional.
 IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate . . . importation or expor-
 tation.” §1702(a)(1)(B). But taxing exports is expressly forbidden by
 the Constitution. Art. I, §9, cl. 5.
 The “neighboring words” with which “regulate” “is associated” also
 suggest that Congress did not intend for “regulate” to include the rev-
 enue-raising power. United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 .
 Each of the nine verbs in §1702(a)(1)(B) authorizes a distinct action a
 President might take in sanctioning foreign actors or controlling do-
 mestic actors engaged in foreign commerce, as Presidential practice
 confirms. And none of the listed authorities includes the distinct and
 extraordinary power to raise revenue—a power which no President has
 ever found in IEEPA. Pp. 14–16.
 (b) Several arguments marshaled in response are unpersuasive.
 First, the contention that IEEPA confers the power to impose tariffs
 because early commentators and the Court’s cases discuss tariffs in
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 5

 Syllabus

the context of the Commerce Clause answers the wrong question. The
question is not whether tariffs can ever be a means of regulating com-
merce. It is instead whether Congress, when conferring the power to
“regulate . . . importation,” gave the President the power to impose tar-
iffs at his sole discretion. And Congress’s pattern of usage is plain:
When Congress grants the power to impose tariffs, it does so clearly
and with careful constraints. It did neither in IEEPA.
 Second, the argument that “regulate” naturally includes tariffs be-
cause the term lies between two poles in IEEPA—“compel” on the af-
firmative end and “prohibit” on the negative end—is unavailing. Alt-
hough tariffs may be less extreme than an outright compulsion or
prohibition, it does not follow that tariffs lie on the spectrum between
those poles; they are different in kind, not degree, from the other au-
thorities in IEEPA. Tariffs operate directly on domestic importers to
raise revenue for the Treasury and are “very clear[ly] . . . a branch of
the taxing power.” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201 . Thus, they fall outside
the spectrum entirely.
 Third, the argument based on IEEPA’s predecessor, the Trading
with the Enemy Act (TWEA), and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals’ decision in United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560 ,
cannot bear the weight placed on it. A single, expressly limited opinion
from a specialized intermediate appellate court does not establish a
well-settled meaning that the Court can assume Congress incorpo-
rated into IEEPA.
 Fourth, the historical argument based on the Court’s wartime prec-
edents fails. Those precedents are facially inapposite, as all agree the
President lacks inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs. And
the attenuated chain of inferences from wartime precedents through
multiple iterations of TWEA to IEEPA cannot support—much less
clearly support—a reading of IEEPA that includes the distinct power
to impose tariffs.
 Finally, arguments relying on this Court’s precedents lack merit.
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 ,
bears little on the meaning of IEEPA. Section 232(b) of the Trade Ex-
pansion Act of 1962 contains sweeping, discretion-conferring language
that IEEPA does not contain, and the explicit reference to duties in
Section 232(a) renders it natural for Section 232(b) itself to authorize
duties. Nor does Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654 , offer support
because that case was exceedingly narrow, did not address the Presi-
dent’s power to “regulate,” and did not involve tariffs at all. Pp. 16–
20.
 JUSTICE KAGAN, joined by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE
JACKSON, agreed that IEEPA does not authorize the President to im-
pose tariffs, but concluded that the Court need not invoke the major
6 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Syllabus

 questions doctrine because the ordinary tools of statutory interpreta-
 tion amply support that result. Pp. 1–7.
 JUSTICE JACKSON would also consult legislative history—in particu-
 lar, the House and Senate Reports that accompanied IEEPA and its
 predecessor statute, TWEA—to determine that Congress did not in-
 tend for IEEPA to authorize the Executive to impose tariffs. Pp. 1–5.

 ROBERTS, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B, in which
SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined, and
an opinion with respect to Parts II–A–2 and III, in which GORSUCH and
BARRETT, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., and BARRETT, J., filed concurring
opinions. KAGAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
JACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. KAVANAUGH, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

 Opinion of the Court

 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
 United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
 Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
 pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 Nos. 24–1287 and 25–250
 _________________

 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
24–1287 v.
 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 CIRCUIT

 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–250 v.
 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 [February 20, 2026]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to
Parts II–A–2 and III.*
 We decide whether the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to im-
pose tariffs.

——————
 *JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON join only
Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B of this opinion.
2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of the Court

 I
 A
 Shortly after taking office, President Trump sought to ad-
dress two foreign threats. The first was the influx of illegal
drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China. Presidential Proc-
lamation No. 10886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (2025); Exec. Order
No. 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14194,
 90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9121 (2025). The second was “large and persistent”
trade deficits. Exec. Order No. 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041
(2025). The President determined that the first threat had
“created a public health crisis,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113 , and that
the second had “led to the hollowing out” of the American
manufacturing base and “undermined critical supply
chains,” id., at 15041. He invoked his authority under
IEEPA to respond.
 Enacted in 1977, IEEPA gives the President economic
tools to address significant foreign threats. 91 Stat. 1626 .
When acting under IEEPA, the President must identify an
“unusual and extraordinary threat” to American national
security, foreign policy, or the economy, originating primar-
ily “outside the United States.” 50 U. S. C. §1701 (a). And
he must “declare[ ] a national emergency” under the Na-
tional Emergencies Act. Ibid.; see 90 Stat. 1255 . He may
then, “by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise,”
take the following actions to “deal with” the threat: “inves-
tigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regu-
late, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, with-
drawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with
respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.”
§§1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B).
 President Trump declared a national emergency as to
both the drug trafficking and the trade deficits, which he
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

 Opinion of the Court

deemed “unusual and extraordinary” threats. He then im-
posed tariffs to deal with each threat. As to the drug traf-
ficking tariffs, the President imposed a 25% duty on most
Canadian and Mexican imports and a 10% duty on most
Chinese imports. 90 Fed. Reg. 9114 , 9118, 9122–9123. As
to the trade deficit (or “reciprocal”) tariffs, the President im-
posed a duty “on all imports from all trading partners” of at
least 10%. Id., at 15045. Dozens of nations faced higher
rates. Id., at 15049. And these tariffs applied notwith-
standing any extant trade agreements. Id., at 15045.
 Since imposing each set of tariffs, the President has is-
sued several increases, reductions, and other modifications.
One month after imposing the 10% drug trafficking tariffs
on Chinese goods, he increased the rate to 20%. See Exec.
Order No. 14228, 90 Fed. Reg. 11463 (2025). One month
later, he removed a statutory exemption for Chinese goods
under $800. Exec. Order No. 14256, 90 Fed. Reg. 14899
(2025). Less than a week after imposing the reciprocal tar-
iffs, the President increased the rate on Chinese goods from
34% to 84%. Exec. Order No. 14259, 90 Fed. Reg. 15509
(2025). The very next day, he increased the rate further
still, to 125%. Exec. Order No. 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625 ,
15626 (2025). This brought the total effective tariff rate on
most Chinese goods to 145%. The President has also shifted
sets of goods into and out of the reciprocal tariff framework.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14360, 90 Fed. Reg. 54091 (2025)
(exempting from reciprocal tariffs beef, fruits, coffee, tea,
spices, and some fertilizers); Exec. Order No. 14346, 90 Fed.
Reg. 43737 (2025). And he has issued a variety of other ad-
justments. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14358, 90 Fed. Reg.
50729 , 50730 (2025) (extending “the suspension of height-
ened reciprocal tariffs” on Chinese imports).
 B
 Petitioners in Learning Resources and respondents in
V.O.S. Selections filed suit, alleging that IEEPA does not
4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of the Court

authorize the reciprocal or drug trafficking tariffs. The
Learning Resources plaintiffs—two small businesses—sued
in the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs—five small busi-
nesses and 12 States—sued in the United States Court of
International Trade (CIT).
 The Government moved to transfer the Learning Re-
sources case to the CIT. It argued that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1581 (i)(1), which
gives the CIT “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action com-
menced against” the Government “that arises out of any
law of the United States providing for . . . tariffs” or their
“administration and enforcement.” The District Court de-
nied that motion and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, concluding that IEEPA did not
grant the President the power to impose tariffs. 784
F. Supp. 3d 209 (DC 2025).
 In the V.O.S. Selections case, the CIT granted the plain-
tiffs’ motion for summary judgment. 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350
(2025). The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed in
relevant part. 149 F. 4th 1312 (2025). It first concluded
that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction because the plain-
tiffs’ claims arose out of modifications to the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Id., at 1329.
On the merits, it agreed with the CIT that IEEPA’s grant
of authority to “regulate . . . importation” did not authorize
the challenged tariffs, which “are unbounded in scope,
amount, and duration.” Id., at 1338. Judge Cunningham
concurred (for four judges), reasoning that IEEPA did not
authorize the President to impose any tariffs. Id., at 1340.
Judge Taranto dissented (for four judges), concluding that
IEEPA authorized the challenged tariffs. Id., at 1348.
 The Government filed a motion to expedite and a petition
for certiorari in V.O.S. Selections, and the Learning Re-
sources plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

 Opinion of the Court

judgment. We granted the motion and petitions and con-
solidated the cases. 606 U. S. 1050 (2025).1
 II
 Based on two words separated by 16 others in Section
1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA—“regulate” and “importation”—the
President asserts the independent power to impose tariffs
on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate,
for any amount of time. Those words cannot bear such
weight.
 A
 1
 Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution sets forth the pow-
ers of the Legislative Branch. The first Clause of that pro-
vision specifies that “The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” It is no
accident that this power appears first. The power to tax
was, Alexander Hamilton explained, “the most important of
the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union.”
The Federalist No. 33, pp. 202–203 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
It is both a “power to destroy,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 431 (1819), and a power “necessary to the ex-
istence and prosperity of a nation”—“the one great power
upon which the whole national fabric is based.” Nicol v.
Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 515 (1899).

——————
 1 We agree with the Federal Circuit that the V.O.S. Selections case falls

within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT. The plaintiffs’ challenges
“arise[ ] out of ” modifications to the HTSUS. 28 U. S. C. §1581 (i)(1).
Where, as here, such modifications are made under an “Act[ ] affecting
import treatment,” 19 U. S. C. §2483 , they are “considered to be statu-
tory provisions of law for all purposes,” §3004(c)(1)(C). Thus, the plain-
tiffs’ challenges “arise[ ] out of [a] law of the United States providing for
. . . tariffs.” 28 U. S. C. §1581 (i)(1). For the same reasons, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia lacked jurisdiction in
the Learning Resources case.
6 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of the Court

 The power to impose tariffs is “very clear[ly] . . . a branch
of the taxing power.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201
(1824). “A tariff,” after all, “is a tax levied on imported
goods and services.” Congressional Research Service
(CRS), C. Casey, U. S. Tariff Policy: Overview 1 (2025). And
tariffs “raise[ ] revenue,” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
 512 U. S. 186, 193 (1994)—the defining feature of a tax,
United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28 , and n. 4 (1953);
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 514 (1937). In-
deed, the Framers expected that the Government would for
“a long time depend . . . chiefly on” tariffs for revenue. The
Federalist No. 12, at 93 (A. Hamilton). Little wonder, then,
that the First Congress’s first exercise of its taxing power
(and its second enacted law, right after the one providing
for the new officials to take an oath) was a tariff law. See
Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24 .
 Recognizing the taxing power’s unique importance, and
having just fought a revolution motivated in large part by
“taxation without representation,” the Framers gave Con-
gress “alone . . . access to the pockets of the people.” The
Federalist No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison); see also Declaration
of Independence ¶19. They required “All Bills for raising
Revenue [to] originate in the House of Representatives.”
U. S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 1. And in doing so, they ensured
that only the House could “propose the supplies requisite
for the support of government,” thereby reducing “all the
overgrown prerogatives of the other branches.” The Feder-
alist No. 58, at 359 (J. Madison). They did not vest any part
of the taxing power in the Executive Branch. See Nicol, 173
U. S., at 515 (“[T]he whole power of taxation rests with Con-
gress”).
 The Government thus concedes, as it must, that the Pres-
ident enjoys no inherent authority to impose tariffs during
peacetime. Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71. And it does not defend
the challenged tariffs as an exercise of the President’s
warmaking powers. The United States, after all, is not at
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7

 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

war with every nation in the world. The Government in-
stead relies exclusively on IEEPA. It reads the words “reg-
ulate” and “importation” to effect a sweeping delegation of
Congress’s power to set tariff policy—authorizing the Pres-
ident to impose tariffs of unlimited amount and duration,
on any product from any country. 50 U. S. C.
§1702 (a)(1)(B).
 2
 We have long expressed “reluctan[ce] to read into ambig-
uous statutory text” extraordinary delegations of Con-
gress’s powers. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723
(2022) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573
U. S. 302 , 324 (2014)). In Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477
(2023), for example, we declined to read authorization to
“waive or modify” statutory or regulatory provisions appli-
cable to financial assistance programs as a delegation of
power to cancel $430 billion in student loan debt. Id., at
494 (quoting 20 U. S. C. §1098bb(a)(1)). In West Virginia v.
EPA, we declined to read authorization to determine the
“best system of emission reduction” as a delegation of power
to force a nationwide transition away from the use of coal.
 597 U. S., at 732 (quoting 42 U. S. C. §7411 (a)(1)). And in
National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595
U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam), we declined to read authori-
zation to ensure “safe and healthful working conditions” as
a delegation of power to impose a vaccine mandate on 84
million Americans. Id., at 114 , 117 (quoting 29 U. S. C.
§651 (b)); see also, e.g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758 , 764–765
(2021) (per curiam); King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473 , 485–
486 (2015); Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324.
 We have described several of these cases as “major ques-
tions” cases. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 505 ; West Virginia,
 597 U. S., at 732 ; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000) (citing S. Breyer,
8 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin.
L. Rev. 363 , 370 (1986)). In each, the Government claimed
broad, expansive power on an uncertain statutory basis.
And in each, the statutory text might “[a]s a matter of defi-
nitional possibilities” have been read to delegate the as-
serted power. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 732 (internal
quotation marks omitted). But “context” counseled “skepti-
cism.” Id., at 721, 732 . That context included not just other
language within the statute, but “constitutional structure”
and “common sense.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512, 515
(BARRETT, J., concurring). “[B]oth separation of powers
principles and a practical understanding of legislative in-
tent” suggested Congress would not have delegated “highly
consequential power” through ambiguous language. West
Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723–724.
 These considerations apply with particular force where,
as here, the purported delegation involves the core congres-
sional power of the purse. “Congress would likely . . . in-
tend[ ] for itself ” the “basic and consequential tradeoffs,”
id., at 730, inherent in uses of this “most complete and ef-
fectual weapon,” The Federalist No. 58, at 359. And if Con-
gress were to relinquish that weapon to another branch, a
“reasonable interpreter” would expect it to do so “ ‘clearly.’ ”
Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514–515 (BARRETT, J., concurring)
(quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324).
 What common sense suggests, congressional practice con-
firms. When Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it
has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits.
Congress has consistently used words like “duty” in stat-
utes delegating authority to impose tariffs. (A customs
“duty” is simply “the federal tax levied on goods shipped
into the United States.” Black’s Law Dictionary 638 (12th
ed. 2024).) See, e.g., 19 U. S. C. §1338 (d) (“rates of duty”);
§2132(a) (“temporary import surcharge . . . in the form of
duties”); §2253(a)(3)(A) (“duty on the imported article”);
§2411(c)(1)(B) (“duties or other import restrictions”). It has
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9

 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

capped the amount and duration of tariffs. See, e.g.,
§1338(d) (50% cap); §2132(a) (15% cap, 150-day time limit);
§2253(e) (50% cap, phasedown requirement after one year).
And it has conditioned exercise of the tariff power on de-
manding procedural prerequisites. See, e.g., §2252 (inves-
tigation by the United States International Trade Commis-
sion, public hearings, report of findings and
recommendation); §§2411–2414 (investigation by the
United States Trade Representative, consultation with rel-
evant country and interested parties, publication of find-
ings).2
 Against this backdrop of clear and limited delegations,
the Government reads IEEPA to give the President power
to unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs. On this reading,
moreover, the President is unconstrained by the significant
procedural limitations in other tariff statutes and free to
issue a dizzying array of modifications at will. See supra,
at 3. All it takes to unlock that extraordinary power is a
Presidential declaration of emergency, which the Govern-
ment asserts is unreviewable. Brief for Federal Parties 42.
And the only way of restraining the exercise of that power
is a veto-proof majority in Congress. See 50 U. S. C.
§1622 (a)(1) (requiring a “joint resolution” “enacted into law”
to terminate a national emergency). That view, if credited,
would “represent[ ] a ‘transformative expansion’ ” of the
President’s authority over tariff policy, West Virginia, 597
——————
 2 The same is true of Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,

 76 Stat. 877 , which we have held authorizes sector-specific import “li-
cense fee[s].” Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
 426 U. S. 548, 571 (1976). Section 232(a) expressly references “duties.”
 19 U. S. C. §1862 (a); see infra, at 19. And Section 232(c) authorizes the
President to “adjust the imports” of an “article,” §1862(c), but only after
the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
fense, conducts an investigation and prepares a report finding that the
“article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security,”
§1862(b).
10 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

U. S., at 724 (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324), and in-
deed—as demonstrated by the exercise of that authority in
this case—over the broader economy as well. See Congres-
sional Budget Office, CBO’s Current View of the Economy
From 2025 to 2028, p. 5 (Sept. 2025); Brief for Federal Par-
ties 2–3. It would replace the longstanding executive-legis-
lative collaboration over trade policy with unchecked Pres-
idential policymaking. See CRS, Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy
(2015). Congress seldom effects such sea changes through
“vague language.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724 .
 It is also telling that in IEEPA’s “half century of exist-
ence,” no President has invoked the statute to impose any
tariffs—let alone tariffs of this magnitude and scope. Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business, 595 U. S., at
119 .3 Presidents have, by contrast, regularly invoked
IEEPA for other purposes. CRS, C. Casey, J. Elsea, & L.
Rosen, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act:
Origins, Evolution, and Use 18–21 (2025). At the same
time, they have invoked other statutes—but never
IEEPA—to impose tariffs, on products ranging from car
tires to washing machines. See, e.g., Presidential Procla-
mation No. 8414, 3 CFR 115 (2009 Comp.); Presidential

——————
 3 Indeed, even before IEEPA was enacted, only one President relied on

its predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), ch. 106, 40
Stat. 411 , to impose tariffs—and then only as a post hoc defense to a legal
challenge. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15724
(1971) (initially invoking the Tariff Act of 1930 and Trade Expansion Act
of 1962); United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572 (CCPA
1975). Those tariffs were also of limited amount, duration, and scope.
See id., at 568–569, 577–578 (noting that the 10-percent surcharge was
described by President Nixon as “ ‘a temporary measure,’ ” was in effect
less than five months, applied only to “articles which had been the sub-
ject of prior tariff concessions,” and was capped at congressionally au-
thorized rates); Economic Report of the President 70 (1972) (“When all
exceptions to the 10-percent rule were taken into account, the effective
rate of surcharge came down to 4.8 percent”).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11

 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Proclamation No. 9694, 83 Fed. Reg. 3553 (2018). And
those tariffs did not “even beg[in] to approach the size or
scope” of the IEEPA tariffs at issue here. Nebraska, 600
U. S., at 502 (quoting Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 765 ).
The “ ‘lack of historical precedent’ ” for the IEEPA tariffs,
“coupled with the breadth of authority” that the President
now claims, “is a ‘telling indication’ ” that the tariffs extend
beyond the President’s “legitimate reach.” National Feder-
ation of Independent Business, 595 U. S., at 119 (quoting
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 , 505 (2010)).
 The “ ‘economic and political significance’ ” of the author-
ity the President has asserted likewise “provide[s] a ‘reason
to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer
such authority.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721 (quoting
Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160). The Presi-
dent’s assertion here of broad “statutory power over the na-
tional economy” is “extravagant” by any measure. Utility
Air, 573 U. S., at 324. And as the Government admits—
indeed, boasts—the economic and political consequences of
the IEEPA tariffs are astonishing. The Government points
to projections that the tariffs will reduce the national deficit
by $4 trillion, and that international agreements reached in
reliance on the tariffs could be worth $15 trillion. Brief for
Federal Parties 3, 11. In the President’s view, whether “we
are a rich nation” or a “poor” one hangs in the balance. Id.,
at 2. These stakes dwarf those of other major questions
cases. See, e.g., Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 483 ($430 billion);
Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 764 (nearly $50 billion); West
Virginia, 597 U. S., at 714 (“billions of dollars in compliance
costs”). As in those cases, “a reasonable interpreter would
[not] expect” Congress to “pawn[ ]” such a “big-time policy
call[ ] . . . off to another branch.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at
515 (BARRETT, J., concurring).
12 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

 The Government and the principal dissent attempt to
avoid application of the major questions doctrine on several
grounds. None is convincing.
 The Government argues first that the doctrine should not
apply to emergency statutes. Brief for Federal Parties 35–
36. But this argument is nearly identical to one it already
advanced in Nebraska. There, the Government contended
that a different emergency statute should be interpreted
broadly because its “whole point” was to provide “substan-
tial discretion to . . . respond to unforeseen emergencies.”
 600 U. S., at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
rejected that argument in Nebraska, and we reject it here
as well. “Emergency powers,” after all, “tend to kindle
emergencies.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Dozens of
IEEPA emergencies remain ongoing today, including the
first—declared over four decades ago in response to the Ira-
nian hostage crisis. CRS, Casey, International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, at 20. And as the Framers under-
stood, emergencies can “afford a ready pretext for usurpa-
tion” of congressional power. Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 650
(Jackson, J., concurring). Where Congress has reason to be
worried about its powers “slipping through its fingers,” id.,
at 654 , we in turn have every reason to expect Congress to
use clear language to effectuate unbounded delegations—
particularly of its “one great power,” Nicol, 173 U. S., at
515 .
 The Government’s and the principal dissent’s proposed
foreign affairs exception fares no better. Brief for Federal
Parties 34–35; post, at 45–57 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).
As a general matter, the President of course enjoys some
“independent constitutional power[s]” over foreign affairs
“even without congressional authorization.” FCC v. Con-
sumers’ Research, 606 U. S. 656, 707 (2025) (KAVANAUGH,
J., concurring). And Congress certainly may intend to “give
the President substantial authority and flexibility” in many
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13

 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

foreign affairs or national security contexts. Post, at 48
(opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (quoting Consumers’ Research,
 606 U. S., at 706 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring)). But
“flip[ping]” the “presumption” under the major questions
doctrine, Brief for Federal Parties 34, makes little sense
when it comes to tariffs. As the Government admits, the
President and Congress do not “enjoy concurrent constitu-
tional authority” to impose tariffs during peacetime. Ibid.;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71. The Framers gave that power to
“Congress alone”—notwithstanding the obvious foreign af-
fairs implications of tariffs. Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S. 694,
700 (1882). And whatever may be said of other powers that
implicate foreign affairs, we would not expect Congress to
relinquish its tariff power through vague language, or with-
out careful limits.
 The central thrust of the Government’s and the principal
dissent’s proposed exceptions appears to be that ambiguous
delegations in statutes addressing “the most major of major
questions” should necessarily be construed broadly. Brief
for Federal Parties 35. But it simply does not follow from
the fact that a statute deals with major problems that it
should be read to delegate all major powers for which there
may be a “colorable textual basis.” West Virginia, 597 U. S.,
at 722 . It is in precisely such cases that we should be alert
to claims that sweeping delegations—particularly delega-
tions of core congressional powers—“lurk[ ]” in “ambiguous
statutory text.” Id., at 723 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). There is no major questions exception to the major
questions doctrine.
 Accordingly, the President must “point to clear congres-
sional authorization” to justify his extraordinary assertion
of the power to impose tariffs. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 506
(internal quotation marks omitted). He cannot.
14 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of the Court

 B
 To begin, IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate,
block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, di-
rect and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit . . . impor-
tation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702 (a)(1)(B). Absent
from this lengthy list of powers is any mention of tariffs or
duties. That omission is notable in light of the significant
but specific powers Congress did go to the trouble of nam-
ing. It stands to reason that had Congress intended to con-
vey the distinct and extraordinary power to impose tariffs,
it would have done so expressly—as it consistently has in
other tariff statutes. See supra, at 8; accord, post, at 11, 26–
27 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).
 The power to “regulate . . . importation” does not fill that
void. “Regulate,” as that term is ordinarily used, means to
“fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or es-
tablished mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to
governing principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156
(5th ed. 1979); see also Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596
U. S. 685, 697 (2022). This definition captures much of
what a government does on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, if
“regulate” is as broad as the principal dissent suggests,
post, at 10–11, then the other eight verbs in §1702(a)(1)(B)
are simply wasted ink. But the facial breadth of “regulate”
places in stark relief what the term is not usually thought
to include: taxation. The U. S. Code is replete with statutes
granting the Executive the authority to “regulate” someone
or something. Yet the Government cannot identify any
statute in which the power to regulate includes the power
to tax. The Government concedes, for example, that the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission cannot tax the trading
of securities, even though it is expressly authorized to “reg-
ulate the trading of . . . securities.” 15 U. S. C. §78i(h)(1);
see Brief for Federal Parties 31–32. We are therefore skep-
tical that in IEEPA—and IEEPA alone—Congress hid a
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 15

 Opinion of the Court

delegation of its birth-right power to tax within the quotid-
ian power to “regulate.”
 Taxes, to be sure, may accomplish regulatory ends. See
Sonzinsky, 300 U. S., at 513 ; Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201–
202. But it does not follow that the power to regulate some-
thing includes the power to tax it as a means of regulation.
Congressional practice suggests as much. When Congress
addresses both the power to regulate and the power to tax,
it does so separately and expressly. See, e.g., 16 U. S. C.
§460bbb–9(a) (distinguishing between the power to “tax
persons, franchise, or private property” on lands and the
power “to regulate the private lands”); 2 U. S. C.
§622 (8)(B)(i) (“government-sponsored enterprise” does not
have the “power to tax or to regulate interstate commerce”).
That is unsurprising, as the “power to regulate commerce”
is “entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes.” Gibbons,
 9 Wheat., at 201 . That Congress did not grant those au-
thorities separately here is strong evidence that “regulate”
in IEEPA does not include taxation.
 A contrary reading would render IEEPA partly unconsti-
tutional. IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate . . .
importation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702 (a)(1)(B) (em-
phasis added). Taxing exports, however, is expressly for-
bidden by the Constitution. Art. I, §9, cl. 5.
 The “neighboring words” with which “regulate” “is asso-
ciated” also suggest that Congress did not intend for “regu-
late” to include the revenue-raising power. United States v.
Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008). “Regulate” is one of
nine verbs listed in §1702(a)(1)(B). Each authorizes a dis-
tinct action a President might take in sanctioning foreign
actors or controlling domestic actors engaged in foreign
commerce—blocking imports, for example, or prohibiting
transactions. Presidential practice under IEEPA demon-
strates as much. See CRS, Casey, International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, at 79–106 (Table A–3); see, e.g., Exec.
Order No. 13194, 3 CFR 741 (2001 Comp.) (blocking
16 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of the Court

importation of diamonds from insurgent regime in Sierra
Leone); Exec. Order No. 12947, 3 CFR 319 (1995 Comp.)
(prohibiting transactions with those “who threaten to dis-
rupt the Middle East peace process”). None of IEEPA’s au-
thorities includes the distinct and extraordinary power to
raise revenue. And the fact that no President has ever
found such power in IEEPA is strong evidence that it does
not exist. See supra, at 10; FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312
U. S. 349 , 351–352 (1941).
 We do not attempt to set forth the metes and bounds of
the President’s authority to “regulate . . . importation” un-
der IEEPA. That “interpretive question” is “not at issue” in
this case, and any answer would be “plain dicta.” West Vir-
ginia, 597 U. S., at 734–735, and n. 5. Our task today is to
decide only whether the power to “regulate . . . importa-
tion,” as granted to the President in IEEPA, embraces the
power to impose tariffs. It does not.4
 The Government, echoed point-for-point by the principal
dissent, marshals several arguments in response. First, it
contends that IEEPA confers the power to impose tariffs be-
cause early commentators and this Court’s cases discuss
tariffs in the context of the Constitution’s Commerce
Clause. See Brief for Federal Parties 24–25; post, at 12–13
(opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). But that answers the wrong
question. The question is not, as the Government would
have it, whether tariffs can ever be a means of regulating
commerce. It is instead whether Congress, when conferring
the power to “regulate . . . importation,” gave the President
the power to impose tariffs at his sole discretion. And
——————
 4 The principal dissent surmises that the President could impose “most

if not all” of the tariffs at issue under statutes other than IEEPA. Post,
at 62 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). The cited statutes contain various com-
binations of procedural prerequisites, required agency determinations,
and limits on the duration, amount, and scope of the tariffs they author-
ize. See supra, at 8–9; post, at 62–63. We do not speculate on hypothet-
ical cases not before us.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 17

 Opinion of the Court

Congress’s pattern of usage is most relevant to answering
that question. That pattern is plain: When Congress grants
the power to impose tariffs, it does so clearly and with care-
ful constraints. It did neither here.
 The Government raises another contextual argument.
Because “regulate” “lies between” two “poles” in IEEPA—
“compel” on the affirmative end and “prohibit” on the nega-
tive end—the term naturally includes the “less extreme,
more flexible” tool of tariffs. Reply Brief 9 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see post, at 29–30 (opinion of
KAVANAUGH, J.) (making a greater-includes-the-lesser ar-
gument). But tariffs, as discussed above, are different in
kind, not degree, from the other authorities in IEEPA. Un-
like those authorities, tariffs operate directly on domestic
importers to raise revenue for the Treasury. See 19 U. S. C.
§1505 (a); 19 CFR §141.1 (b) (2025). Even though a tariff is,
in some sense, “less extreme” than an outright compulsion
or prohibition, it does not follow that tariffs lie on the spec-
trum between those poles. They are instead “very clear[ly]
. . . a branch of the taxing power,” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at
201 , and fall outside the spectrum entirely.
 Finding no support in the statute the President invoked,
the Government turns to one he did not: IEEPA’s predeces-
sor, TWEA. Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 . In 1975, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals held that the authority to
“regulate . . . importation” in TWEA authorized President
Nixon to impose limited tariffs. United States v. Yoshida
Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572 , 577–578. When Congress en-
acted IEEPA two years later, the Government contends, it
conveyed that same authority (except without the limits).
See also post, at 14–17 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).
 This argument cannot bear the weight the Government
places on it. While this Court sometimes assumes that Con-
gress incorporates judicial definitions into legislation, we do
so “only when [the] term’s meaning was ‘well-settled’ ” be-
fore the adoption. Kemp v. United States, 596 U. S. 528 ,
18 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of the Court

539 (2022) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 22
(1999)); see also United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S.
402 , 412–415 (2015). A single, expressly limited opinion
from a specialized intermediate appellate court does not
clear that hurdle.5 See BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 244 (2021). The tariff authority
asserted by President Nixon, moreover, was “far removed”
from TWEA’s “original purposes” of sanctioning foreign bel-
ligerents. Cohen, Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign Trade Pol-
icy, at 178–179. We are therefore skeptical that Congress
enacted IEEPA with an eye toward granting that novel
power.
 The Government has another historical argument based
on this Court’s wartime precedents. See generally Brief for
Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae; Reply Brief 9–
11, 18. According to the Government, those precedents
acknowledge an inherent Presidential power to impose tar-
iffs during armed conflict. And, the argument goes, Con-
gress in TWEA, and then in IEEPA, codified those prece-
dents. But this argument fails at both steps. Insofar as the
Government relies on our wartime cases themselves, they
are facially inapposite. Regardless of what they might
mean for the President’s inherent wartime authority, all
——————
 5 The Government, citing the IEEPA House Committee Report, con-

tends that Congress “indisputably knew of ” Yoshida’s interpretation of
TWEA. Brief for Federal Parties 26; see also post, at 15–16, and n. 11
(opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). But even taking the Report at face value, it
hardly helps the Government. The Report explains that “[s]uccessive
Presidents have seized upon the open-endedness of [TWEA] section 5(b)
to turn that section, through usage, into something quite different from
what was envisioned in 1917.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, pp. 8–9 (1977);
accord, S. Cohen, R. Blecker, & P. Whitney, Fundamentals of U. S. For-
eign Trade Policy 178–179 (2d ed. 2003). That is not exactly a stamp of
approval on the action Yoshida guardedly endorsed. And in any event,
the Government’s “knew of ” standard falls well short of the “broad and
unquestioned” “judicial consensus” we have required to conclude that
Congress incorporated a judicial definition into a statutory term. Jama
v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 349 (2005).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 19

 Opinion of the Court

agree that the President has no inherent peacetime author-
ity to impose tariffs.
 Nor are we persuaded that the dots connect from our war-
time precedents, through multiple iterations of TWEA, to
IEEPA, such that IEEPA should be interpreted to grant the
President an expansive peacetime tariff power. This argu-
ment relies extensively on a series of inferences drawn from
scant legislative history. Such an attenuated chain cannot
support—much less “clearly” support—a reading of IEEPA
that includes the distinct power to impose tariffs. Alabama
Assn., 594 U. S., at 764 .
 Turning to this Court’s precedents, the Government first
relies on Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG,
Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976). There, we held that Section
232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the
President to “adjust the imports” of particular goods to pro-
tect national security, includes the power to impose “license
fees.” Id., at 561 . But that holding bears little on the mean-
ing of IEEPA. As a textual matter, Section 232(b) author-
izes the President not only to “adjust . . . imports,” but (as
the Government emphasized in Algonquin) to “take such ac-
tion . . . as he deems necessary” to adjust the imports of a
good. Brief for Petitioners 26 (emphasis in original) and Tr.
of Oral Arg. 6–7, in Federal Energy Administration v. Al-
gonquin SNG, Inc., O. T. 1975, No. 75–382. IEEPA does not
contain such sweeping, discretion-conferring language. As
for context, Section 232(a) states that “[n]o action shall be
taken” to “decrease or eliminate” an existing “duty or other
import restriction” if doing so would threaten national se-
curity. 19 U. S. C. §1862 (a) (1970 ed.). This explicit refer-
ence to duties preceding Section 232(b) renders it natural
for Section 232(b) itself to authorize duties. Thus, we de-
cline to extend Algonquin’s expressly “limited” holding any
further. 426 U. S., at 571 .
 Finally, the Government invokes Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan, 453 U. S. 654 (1981), but that case offers no support.
20 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

Dames & Moore was exceedingly narrow,6 did not address
the President’s power to “regulate,” and did not involve tar-
iffs at all. If anything, that case highlights the importance
of close attention to IEEPA’s text. “The terms of . . .
IEEPA,” we held, “do not authorize” the suspension of
claims. Id., at 675 . So too here; the terms of IEEPA do not
authorize tariffs.
 III
 The President asserts the extraordinary power to unilat-
erally impose tariffs of unlimited amount, duration, and
scope. In light of the breadth, history, and constitutional
context of that asserted authority, he must identify clear
congressional authorization to exercise it.
 IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate . . . importation”
falls short. IEEPA contains no reference to tariffs or duties.
The Government points to no statute in which Congress
used the word “regulate” to authorize taxation. And until
now no President has read IEEPA to confer such power.
 We claim no special competence in matters of economics
or foreign affairs. We claim only, as we must, the limited
role assigned to us by Article III of the Constitution. Ful-
filling that role, we hold that IEEPA does not authorize the
President to impose tariffs.

——————
 6 See, e.g., 453 U. S., at 660 (“We are confined to a resolution of the

dispute presented to us”); ibid. (We are “acutely aware of the necessity
to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable of deciding the
case”); id., at 661 (“We attempt to lay down no general ‘guidelines’ cover-
ing other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the opinion
only to the very questions necessary to decision of the case”); ibid. (“[T]he
decisions of the Court in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford
little precedential value for subsequent cases”); id., at 688 (“[W]e re-em-
phasize the narrowness of our decision”). This is not quite “no, no, a
thousand times no,” but should have sufficed to dissuade the principal
dissent from invoking the case, see post, at 55–56, with respect to the
quite distinct legal and factual issues present here.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 21

 Opinion of the Court

 The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit in case No. 25–250 is affirmed. The
judgment of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in case No. 24–1287 is vacated, and the
case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of ju-
risdiction.
 It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 Nos. 24–1287 and 25–250
 _________________

 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
24–1287 v.
 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 CIRCUIT

 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–250 v.
 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 [February 20, 2026]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.
 The President claims that Congress delegated to him an
extraordinary power in the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (IEEPA)—the power to impose tariffs on
practically any products he wants, from any countries he
chooses, in any amounts he selects. Applying the major
questions doctrine, the principal opinion rejects that argu-
ment. I join in full. The Constitution lodges the Nation’s
lawmaking powers in Congress alone, and the major ques-
tions doctrine safeguards that assignment against execu-
tive encroachment. Under the doctrine’s terms, the Presi-
dent must identify clear statutory authority for the
extraordinary delegated power he claims. And, as the prin-
cipal opinion explains, that is a standard he cannot meet.
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

Whatever else might be said about Congress’s work in
IEEPA, it did not clearly surrender to the President the
sweeping tariff power he seeks to wield.
 Not everyone sees it this way. Past critics of the major
questions doctrine do not object to its application in this
case, and they even join much of today’s principal opinion.
But, they insist, they can reach the same result by employ-
ing only routine tools of statutory interpretation. Post, at 1
(KAGAN, J., joined by SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment). Meanwhile,
one colleague who joins the principal opinion in full sug-
gests the major questions doctrine is nothing more than
routine statutory interpretation. Post, at 1 (BARRETT, J.,
concurring). Still others who have joined major questions
decisions in the past dissent from today’s application of the
doctrine. Post, at 1 (KAVANAUGH, J., joined by THOMAS and
ALITO, JJ., dissenting). Finally, seeking to sidestep the ma-
jor questions doctrine altogether, one colleague submits
that Congress may hand over to the President most of its
powers, including the tariff power, without limit. Post, at
1–2 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). It is an interesting turn of
events. Each camp warrants a visit.
 I
 Start with the critics. In the past, they have criticized
the major questions doctrine for two main reasons. The doc-
trine, they have suggested, is a novelty without basis in
law. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 779 (2022)
(KAGAN, J., joined by, inter alios, SOTOMAYOR, J., dissent-
ing) (calling the doctrine a “special cano[n]” that has “mag-
ically appear[ed]”). And, they have argued, the doctrine is
rooted in an “anti-administrative-state stance” that pre-
vents Congress from employing executive agency officials to
“d[o] important work.” Id., at 780 . Today, the critics pro-
ceed differently. They join a section of the principal opinion
that applies the major questions doctrine. Ante, at 14–20.
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

And rather than critique the doctrine, they say only that it
is “unnecessary” in this case “because ordinary principles of
statutory interpretation lead to the same result.” Post, at
2–3 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).
 A
 Unpack that last claim first. My concurring colleagues
contend that, as a matter of “straight-up statutory construc-
tion,” IEEPA does not grant the President the power to im-
pose tariffs. Post, at 7. In doing so, they make thoughtful
points about the statute’s text and context. But their ap-
proach today is difficult to square with how they have in-
terpreted other statutes. Dissenting in past major ques-
tions cases, they have argued that broad statutory language
granting powers to executive officials should be read for all
it is worth. Yet, now, when it comes to IEEPA’s similarly
broad language granting powers to the President, they take
a more constrained approach.
 Consider some examples of how they have proceeded in
the past. Dissenting in National Federation of Independent
Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam)
(NFIB), two of my concurring colleagues confronted a stat-
ute charging the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration with promoting “safe and healthful working con-
ditions.” Id., at 127, 132 (joint opinion of Breyer,
SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.) (internal quotation marks
omitted). They read that language as authorizing the
agency to impose a vaccine mandate on 84 million Ameri-
cans. Id., at 132 ; id., at 120 (per curiam). In support of
their reading, my colleagues stressed the statute’s “expan-
sive language,” another provision authorizing the agency to
issue temporary “emergency standards,” and “the scope of
the crisis” the agency was trying to address. Id., at 132, 135
(joint dissent) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 Dissenting in Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of
Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758 (2021)
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

(per curiam), my colleagues addressed a statute permitting
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to issue reg-
ulations “necessary to prevent the . . . transmission . . . of
communicable diseases.” Id., at 768 (opinion of Breyer, J.,
joined by SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.) (internal quotation
marks omitted). As they saw it, those terms granted the
agency the power to regulate landlord-tenant relations na-
tionwide during COVID–19. Ibid. In reaching this conclu-
sion, my colleagues again highlighted the statute’s “broad”
language and suggested that it permitted the agency to im-
pose even “greater restrictions” than the ones at issue in the
case. Id., at 769 .
 Dissenting in West Virginia, my colleagues faced a stat-
ute allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to en-
sure power plants employ the “best system of emission re-
duction.” 597 U. S., at 758 (opinion of KAGAN, J.) (internal
quotation marks omitted). They read that provision as au-
thorizing the agency to effectively close many power plants
and transform the electricity industry from coast to coast.
See id., at 754–755. In support, they once more argued that
the statutory language was “broad” and “expansive,” with
“no ifs, ands, or buts.” Id., at 756–758. They stressed, too,
that the relevant statutory terms appeared in “major legis-
lation” intended to address “big problems,” and that the
statute authorized actions in the agency’s “traditional lane”
or “wheelhouse.” Id., at 756–757, 765.
 Finally, dissenting in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477
(2023), my colleagues took up a statute permitting the Sec-
retary of Education to “waive or modify any statutory or
regulatory provision applying to [a federal] student-loan
program” during a national emergency. Id., at 533 (opinion
of KAGAN, J., joined by SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ.) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). They said that language
allowed the Secretary to cancel $430 billion in federal stu-
dent-loan debt because of COVID–19. See ibid.; id., at 501
(majority opinion). Once again, they argued that the
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

statutory terms were “broad,” “expansive,” “capacious,” and
designed to afford the Secretary a “poten[t]” power to re-
spond to “national emergencies” that were “major in scope.”
 Id., at 533–542 (KAGAN, J., dissenting).
 Now compare all that to how my colleagues proceed here.
This case, they say, is “nearly the opposite.” Post, at 3.
While straight-up statutory interpretation granted execu-
tive officials all the power they sought in all those other
cases, my colleagues insist this one is different because
IEEPA simply does not “give the President the power he
wants.” Ibid.
 That’s a striking turn given the statutory terms before
us. When the President declares a national emergency “to
deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States,” 50 U. S. C. §1701 (a), IEEPA permits him to “regu-
late . . . importation . . . of . . . any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,”
§1702(a)(1)(B). Surely, the authority granted here is
“broad” and “expansive.” See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
758–759 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). It has “no ifs, ands, or
buts” either. Id., at 756. As a matter of ordinary meaning,
the term “regulate” means to “fix, establish or control,” “ad-
just by rule, method, or established mode,” “direct by rule
or restriction,” or “subject to governing principles or laws.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979); see also post, at
4. And tariffs do just that—they fix rules that control, ad-
just, or govern imports of “property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest.”
§1702(a)(1)(B).
 Without question IEEPA is also “major legislation” de-
signed to address “big problems” and “crises,” West Vir-
ginia, 597 U. S., at 754 , 756–758 (KAGAN, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted), along with “emergen-
cies” that are “major in scope,” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 542
(KAGAN, J., dissenting). By its terms, the statute applies
6 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

only during declared national emergencies involving
“threat[s]” to the “national security, foreign policy, or econ-
omy of the United States.” §1701(a). And it tasks the Pres-
ident personally with responding to those emergencies, a
responsibility surely more in his “lane” or “wheelhouse”
than that of any other executive official. See West Virginia,
 597 U. S., at 765 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). Notably, too,
IEEPA grants the President the power to impose even
“greater restrictions” than tariffs, Alabama Assn. of Real-
tors, 594 U. S., at 769 (Breyer, J., dissenting), because the
statute also permits him to “nullify,” “prevent,” and “void”
imports, §1702(a)(1)(B); see also Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 539
(KAGAN, J., dissenting).
 Why do my concurring colleagues read IEEPA so much
more narrowly than they have other broad statutory terms
found in other major legislation addressing other emergen-
cies? They say contextual clues justify a narrowing con-
struction here. See post, at 3–7. But what the concurrence
calls “context” looks remarkably like the major questions
doctrine’s rule that, when executive branch officials claim
Congress has granted them an extraordinary power, they
must identify clear statutory authority for it. See ante, at
13 (reciting the rule).
 Take some examples. The concurrence points to the “un-
paralleled authority” the President asserts “to impose a tar-
iff of any amount, for any time, on only his own say-so.”
Post, at 6. In other words, the President claims an
“[e]xtraordinary” power. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723
(majority opinion). The concurrence observes that no “Pres-
ident until now understood IEEPA to authorize imposing
tariffs.” Post, at 6. In other words, the power is an “unher-
alded” one. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 722 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Along the way, the concurrence also
adds “a modicum of common sense about how Congress typ-
ically delegates” and “consideration of whether Congress
ever has before, or likely would, delegate the power the
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

Executive asserts.” Post, at 2 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In other words, the statutory text must be read
in light of “separation of powers principles.” West Virginia,
 597 U. S., at 723 .
 Having borrowed all those concepts from the major ques-
tions doctrine, the concurrence then turns to the key statu-
tory terms before us—“regulate . . . importation”—and ob-
serves that they “sa[y] nothing” (at least not expressly)
“about imposing tariffs.” Post, at 3. And why is that fatal
to the President’s case? Because the President is attempt-
ing to exercise the “ ‘core congressional power’ ” over taxes
and tariffs, a power Article I of the Constitution vests in
Congress alone. Post, at 5 (quoting ante, at 8); see also West
Virginia, 597 U. S., at 737 (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (ex-
plaining that the major questions doctrine “protect[s] the
Constitution’s separation of powers,” and particularly Arti-
cle I, which vests “all federal legislative . . . [p]owers in . . .
Congress” (internal quotation marks and alteration omit-
ted)).
 If my colleagues all but apply the major questions doc-
trine today, maybe they are simply recognizing what they
have in other separation of powers cases involving the del-
egation of legislative power: that “[t]he guidance needed is
greater” when the executive branch seeks to take “action[s]
[that] will affect the entire national economy.” FCC v. Con-
sumers’ Research, 606 U. S. 656, 673 (2025) (opinion for the
Court by KAGAN, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Or
maybe my colleagues believe the power the President as-
serts here outstrips even those powers executive officials
asserted in our past major questions cases. But whatever
the case, my concurring colleagues’ course today suggests
that skeptics owe the major questions doctrine a second
look.
 All of which leads me to take up the challenges they have
posed to it in the past. Is the doctrine really some “special
cano[n]” that has only recently “magically appear[ed]”?
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 779 (KAGAN, J., dissenting).
And is it really grounded in an “anti-administrative-state
stance” that prevents Congress from using executive
branch officials to perform “important work”? Id., at 780 .
 B
 The major questions doctrine teaches that, to sustain a
claim that Congress has granted them an extraordinary
power, executive officials must identify clear authority for
that power. Far from a novelty, much the same principle
has long applied to those who claim extraordinary dele-
gated authority, whether in private or public law.
 1
 Examples stretch across many fields. Consider first the
common law of corporations. In early modern England, cor-
porations could be formed only with “an explicit, ex ante
and direct authorization.” R. Harris, Industrializing Eng-
lish Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization,
1720–1844, p. 17 (2000). That authorization could be given
by the Crown, an Act of Parliament, or a combination of the
two. Ibid.; see also id., at 19. Some of these corporations
exercised regulatory functions not unlike those performed
by modern administrative agencies. M. Bilder, The Corpo-
rate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 Yale L. J. 502, 516–
517, 519–520 (2006). Indeed, the “[i]nitial settlements in
Virginia and Massachusetts Bay, among others, were struc-
tured as corporations.” Id., at 535.
 English law treated these corporations as having author-
ity to issue bylaws. But that authority was subject to re-
strictions, one of which was that corporations could not reg-
ulate on major subjects without express authorization.
Take Kirk v. Nowill, 1 T. R. 118, 99 Eng. Rep. 1006 (K. B.
1786). That case involved the Company of Cutlers, a corpo-
ration for makers of knives and other cutlery. See id., at
118–119, 99 Eng. Rep., at 1006. An Act of Parliament gave
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

the company broad authority to regulate its members. Id.,
at 118–121, 99 Eng. Rep., at 1006–1007. The company used
that authority to adopt a bylaw allowing its officials to enter
its members’ “workshops and warehouses” and search for
“deceitful and unworkmanly” cutlery. Id., at 121–122, 99
Eng. Rep., at 1007. After the company seized supposedly
unworkmanly forks, the aggrieved owner challenged the
company’s actions in court, arguing that the bylaw under
which it acted was “bad in point of law” because the power
to incur a forfeiture was not “expressly given to [the com-
pany] by Act of Parliament.” Id., at 118, 122–123, 99 Eng.
Rep., at 1008. Applying a clear-statement rule, the King’s
Bench declared the bylaw, and therefore the seizure, un-
lawful. Lord Mansfield explained that the “power of mak-
ing bye-laws to incur a forfeiture” was an “extraordinary
power” over and above the default powers of corporations
“created by charter.” Id., at 124, 99 Eng. Rep., at 1009. For
this reason, the power needed to be “expressly given” by the
company’s progenitor, Parliament. Ibid. Since no such
power had been clearly conferred, the seizure was unlawful.
See ibid.
 The same principle applied in American law. In In re
Election of Directors of Long Island R. Co., 19 Wend. 37, 40
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1837), a New York court addressed a case
involving 2,700 shares of stock in the Long Island Railroad
Company that the company had declared forfeited. Ibid.
All agreed that the company had broad power to regulate
its shares. See id., at 41–42. Still, the court called the for-
feiture an “extraordinary penalty,” and held that no such
power had been “expressly conferred” on the corporation by
its charter. Ibid. In fact, the court borrowed the clear-
statement rule from Nowill: If “extraordinary authority . . .
is intended to be given, it must be by express words to that
effect.” Id., at 43 (describing Nowill in detail).
 The court in Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461 (1857), pro-
ceeded similarly. That case involved the incorporated town
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

of Cahaba, Alabama. See id., at 464 . The town set the price
of a liquor license at $1,000, fined James Burnett for failing
to obtain one, and eventually imprisoned him for not paying
the fine. See ibid. Burnett sought a writ of habeas corpus
and argued that Cahaba had acted beyond the scope of its
corporate authority. Ibid.
 Without a clear-statement rule, Burnett’s argument
would have stood little chance. That’s because the town’s
charter granted it the authority “to make and establish all
such rules, by-laws, and ordinances, respecting the streets,
markets, buildings, . . . and police of said town, that shall
appear to them requisite and necessary for the security,
welfare, and convenience of said town, or for preserving
health, peace, order, and good government within the
same.” Id., at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
charter even specifically gave the town the “privileg[e] of
granting licenses for retailing of spirituous and other liq-
uors.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Semanti-
cally, the town’s power was broad indeed and encompassed
liquor licensing. But the court sided with Burnett anyway.
Reasoning that the town’s exorbitant licensing fee effec-
tively banned the sale of liquor, the court held that Cahaba
did not enjoy such extraordinary “prohibitory” power be-
cause it was “not authorized by any express grant of power”
in the town’s charter. Id., at 469 ; see also id., at 466 .
 These cases are not outliers. Treatises confirm that the
extraordinary power principle was fundamental to munici-
pal corporations. A statute could “not by implication invest
[a] body with any extraordinary authority.” J. Willcock,
The Law of Municipal Corporations ¶226, p. 99 (1827). Ex-
traordinary powers required “express words to that effect.”
 Ibid. And “[a]ny fair, reasonable doubt concerning the ex-
istence of power [was] resolved by the courts against the
corporation, and the power [was] denied.” 1 J. Dillon, Com-
mentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations 145 (4th
ed. 1890).
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

 The takeaway is simple enough. Early corporations often
functioned much like today’s executive branch, exercising
delegated regulatory authority. And, when interpreting the
scope of that authority, the common law had a clear-state-
ment rule that looked strikingly like the major questions
doctrine.
 Historically, a similar precept applied in agency law. As
the leading early American treatise put it, instruments con-
ferring powers of attorney were “ordinarily subjected to a
strict interpretation.” J. Story, Commentaries on the Law
of Agency 80–81 (2d ed. 1844). So, for example, in Attwood
v. Munnings, 7 Barn. & Cress. 278, 108 Eng. Rep. 727 (K.
B. 1827), a principal had delegated broad power to an agent
to act “generally for him and in his name,” including in all
things “as should be requisite, expedient, and advisable to
be done in . . . his affairs and concerns, and as he might or
could do if personally acting therein.” Id., at 279–280, 108
Eng. Rep., at 728 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
agent then accepted certain debts on behalf of the principal.
Id., at 280, 108 Eng. Rep., at 728. The question for the court
was whether this action was within the scope of the agent’s
authority. Id., at 281, 108 Eng. Rep., at 728. The court said
no. Powers of attorney are “instruments to be construed
strictly.” Id., at 283, 108 Eng. Rep., at 729. And the power
of attorney contained “no express power” to accept debts, so
no such power had been given. Ibid.
 Other examples abound. A power to sell casks of whiskey
did not include the “unusual and extraordinary” power to
offer a warranty against future seizures of the casks, unless
granted by “express authority.” Palmer v. Hatch, 46 Mo.
585, 587 (1870). Under a power of attorney, authority to
enter contracts for a principal was subject to “strict inter-
pretation” and generally did not authorize “contracts of an
extraordinary character” outside those “connected with [the
principal’s] ordinary business.” Reynolds v. Rowley, 4 La.
Ann. 396 , 398–399 (1849). And a power to manage a mine
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

did not authorize an agent to borrow money for the mine’s
operations on the principal’s credit because there was no
“express authority” for such a departure from the “usual
manner” of running a mine. Hawtayne v. Bourne, 7 M. &
W. 595, 599, 151 Eng. Rep. 905, 906 (Ex. 1841). This was
true even “in cases of necessity,” id., at 599, 151 Eng. Rep.,
at 907, where the manager borrowed funds to address an
“emergency suddenly arising,” id., at 600, 151 Eng. Rep., at
907.
 Much the same principle applied to executive officials.
Often, “[t]he legality of an executive action depended on the
relationship between the size of the asserted power and the
clarity of the underlying legal authority.” T. Arvind & C.
Burset, Partisan Legal Traditions in the Age of Camden
and Mansfield, 44 Oxford J. Legal Studies 376, 388 (2024).
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C. P. 1765), of-
fers an illustration. There, as part of an investigation for
seditious libel, the English Secretary of State claimed au-
thority to issue a warrant for the seizure of an author’s pa-
pers. Lord Camden declared the seizure unlawful, reason-
ing that power asserted by the executive “ought to be as
clear as it is extensive.” T. Arvind & C. Burset, A New Re-
port of Entick v. Carrington (1765), 110 Ky. L. J. 265, 324
(2022) (Arvind & Burset). Or, as another reporter described
Camden’s decision, “one should naturally expect that the
law to warrant [the exercise of power] should be clear in
proportion as the power is exorbitant.” 19 How. St. Tr., at
1065–1066. The seizure represented an extraordinary ex-
ercise of power, Lord Camden found, and no legal authority
clearly authorized it. See Arvind & Burset 324. Accord-
ingly, the warrant was unlawful and the seizure could not
stand. Id., at 332.
 2
 Perhaps unsurprisingly given this history, American
courts applied the extraordinary power principle when
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

Congress and the States started delegating new regulatory
powers to executive agencies in the late 19th century. Take
railroad commissions. After the Civil War, governments
worried about the increasing power of railroad companies
responded by creating new agencies and imbuing them with
broad regulatory authority. These bodies were among the
first modern administrative agencies. See West Virginia,
 597 U. S., at 740 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). And when they
claimed some extraordinary delegated power, both state
and federal courts enforced a clear-statement rule. See,
e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 ,
193–194 (1909) (declaring, in the course of interpreting a
state statute, that an “enormous power” “must be conferred
in plain language” “free from doubt”); Board of R. Comm’rs
of Ore. v. Oregon R. & Navigation Co., 17 Ore. 65, 77 , 19 P.
702 , 707–708 (1888) (When an agency exercises “powers
delegated to [it] by the legislature” to carry out “important
functions,” the text must “define and specify the authority
given it so clearly that no doubt can reasonably arise”); ICC
v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 505 (1897)
(holding a delegation of legislative power of “supreme deli-
cacy and importance” must be “clear and direct”); Gulf &
Ship Island R. Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 94 Miss. 124 , 134–
135, 49 So. 118 (1908) (“It is universally held that a railroad
commission . . . must be able to point to its grant of power
. . . in clear and express terms, and nothing will be had by
inference”).
 The railroad commissions may have been the first, but
they were not the last. Whether executive officials claimed
the power to criminally punish noncompliance with regula-
tions, force employers to retain employees regardless of
their unlawful conduct, or regulate intrastate candy sales,
this Court held them to much the same standard. Because
their claimed powers were so substantial, executive officials
had to identify a “distinc[t]” authority for them, United
States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 688 (1892), a “clear
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

legislative basis,” United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 22
(1913), a “definite and unmistakable expression,” NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 255 (1939), or
a “clea[r] mandate,” FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S.
349, 351, 355 (1941). Cf. Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO
v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 645 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (“In the absence of a clear mandate . . .
it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give
the Secretary [of Labor ] the unprecedented power over
American industry” he claimed).
 It is no mystery why the Court proceeded this way when
interpreting legislative directions to the executive branch.
Article I of the Constitution vests all federal legislative
power in Congress, and Article II charges the executive
branch with seeing that Congress’s laws are faithfully exe-
cuted. In a very real sense, then, when it comes to legisla-
tive power, Congress is the principal and executive officials
are the agents. See generally G. Lawson & G. Seidman, “A
Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the Fiduciary
Constitution (2017).
 So what is the basis for the charge that the major ques-
tions doctrine represents some “magica[l]” innovation? See
West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 779 (KAGAN, J., dissenting).
Part of the answer may have to do with the fact that, in the
latter half of the 20th century, this Court began experi-
menting with a very different approach. The Court pushed
aside its long-held skepticism of claims to extraordinary
delegated powers and began affirmatively encouraging
them. Chevron deference is just one example of this phe-
nomenon, though a stark one. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837
(1984). That case established a presumption that was
nearly the opposite of the major questions doctrine: When
Congress failed to speak clearly, courts put a thumb on the
scale in favor of delegated power. Id., at 843–844. Given
that development, the longstanding principles animating
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

the major questions doctrine may have receded from view
for a time. After all, the two doctrines often applied in the
same places and counseled opposite results. But with Chev-
ron gone, so is the conflict. This Court’s application of the
major questions doctrine is not invention so much as return
to form.
 C
 Now turn to my concurring colleagues’ other charge: that
the major questions doctrine is premised on an “anti-admin-
istrative-state stance.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 780
(KAGAN, J., dissenting). It is important, they argue, to al-
low Congress to delegate expansive powers. Members of
Congress unfortunately “often don’t know enough—and
know they don’t know enough—to regulate sensibly on an
issue.” Id., at 781 . Nor can Congress easily “anticipate
changing circumstances.” Ibid. For these reasons, Mem-
bers of Congress must rely on more adept and less con-
strained “people . . . found in agencies.” Ibid. Indeed, my
colleagues say, “administrative delegations . . . have helped
to build a modern Nation.” Id., at 782 . And the major ques-
tions doctrine, they worry, could jeopardize all that “aston-
ish[ing] . . . progress.” Ibid.
 This policy complaint, of course, is no reason to disregard
our precedents or longstanding legal principles. But, even
taken on its own terms, it is a bit perplexing. The major
questions doctrine is not “anti-administrative state.” It is
pro-Congress. Common-law courts understood that few
written instruments can anticipate every eventuality, and
that principals sometimes draft broad delegation language
to account for this. At the same time, courts appreciated
the corresponding risk that delegees could easily exploit
loose language in their commissions for their own benefit
and to the detriment of those they purported to serve. So
common-law courts often strictly construed delegated
16 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

powers, not because they were anti-delegee, but because
they were pro-principal.
 The major questions doctrine performs a similar function.
Article I vests all federal legislative power in Congress. But
like any written instrument, federal legislation cannot an-
ticipate every eventuality, a point my concurring colleagues
have observed in the past. Id., at 781–782. And highly re-
sourceful members of the executive branch have strong in-
centives to exploit any doubt in Congress’s past work to as-
sume new power for themselves. The major questions
doctrine helps prevent that kind of exploitation. Our found-
ers understood that men are not angels, and we disregard
that insight at our peril when we allow the few (or the one)
to aggrandize their power based on loose or uncertain au-
thority. We delude ourselves, too, if we think that power
will accumulate safely and only in the hands of dispassion-
ate “people . . . found in agencies.” Id., at 781 . Even if un-
elected agency officials were uniquely immune to the desire
for more power (an unserious assumption), they report to
elected Presidents who can claim no such modesty. See My-
ers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
 Another feature of our separation of powers makes the
major questions doctrine especially salient. When a private
agent oversteps, a principal may fix that problem prospec-
tively by withdrawing the agent’s authority. Under our
Constitution, the remedy is not so simple. Once this Court
reads a doubtful statute as granting the executive branch a
given power, that power may prove almost impossible for
Congress to retrieve. Any President keen on his own au-
thority (and, again, what President isn’t?) will have a
strong incentive to veto legislation aimed at returning the
power to Congress. Perhaps Congress can use other tools,
including its appropriation authority, to influence how the
President exercises his new power. Maybe Congress can
sometimes even leverage those tools to induce the President
to withhold a veto. But retrieving a lost power is no easy
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 17

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

business in our constitutional order. And without doctrines
like major questions, our system of separated powers and
checks-and-balances threatens to give way to the continual
and permanent accretion of power in the hands of one man.
That is no recipe for a republic.
 This case offers an example of the problem. Article I
grants Congress, not the President, the power to impose
tariffs. Still, the President claims, Congress passed that
power on to him in IEEPA, permitting him to impose tariffs
on nearly any goods he wishes, in any amount he wishes,
based on emergencies he himself has declared. He insists,
as well, that his emergency declarations are unreviewable.
A ruling for him here, the President acknowledges, would
afford future Presidents the same latitude he asserts for
himself. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 69. So another President
might impose tariffs on gas-powered automobiles to re-
spond to climate change. Ibid. Or, really, on virtually any
imports for any emergency any President might perceive.
And all of these emergency declarations would be unreview-
able. Just ask yourself: What President would willingly
give up that kind of power?
 I recognize the concerns about the major questions doc-
trine. But it is not so novel as some have supposed. And it
serves Article I values we all share. My concurring col-
leagues all but endorse it today. I hope past skeptics will
give it another look.
 II
 Turn now to the second camp. If some have criticized the
major questions doctrine, others have responded by seeking
to soften its blow. Though joining today’s principal opinion
holding that “clear” statutory authority is required to sus-
tain the exercise of an “extraordinary” power, ante, at 13,
20, JUSTICE BARRETT has suggested that the major ques-
tions doctrine might be reconceived. On her view, the doc-
trine need not be understood as a “substantive canon
18 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

designed to enforce Article I’s Vesting Clause”—a “valu[e]
external to a statute.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508, 510
(concurring opinion). Instead, the doctrine might be
thought of as a “commonsense principl[e] of communica-
tion” that counsels “skepticism” when executive officials
claim extraordinary powers derived from Congress. Id., at
514, 516 ; see also post, at 1–4 (concurring opinion).
 It is a thoughtful effort, but I harbor doubts. For one
thing, there is no need to reconceive our doctrine; past crit-
ics all but apply the doctrine today and their previous criti-
cisms fall flat. See Part I, supra. For another, this gloss on
our major questions doctrine presents problems. Com-
monsense principles of communication do not explain many
of our major questions cases—this one included. And if
common sense really does go so far as to embrace a rule
counseling “skepticism” of claims by executive officials that
Congress has granted them extraordinary powers, that is
common sense in name only. The reason for such skepti-
cism must be Article I, a “substantive” source “external” to
any statute.
 A
 Introducing her view that “commonsense principles of
communication” can sometimes help resolve disputes over
the meaning of statutory terms, JUSTICE BARRETT points to
an old chestnut. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512, 514 (concur-
ring opinion). Suppose a legislature used the phrase “ who-
ever drew blood in the streets ” in a criminal statute impos-
ing punishment. As a matter of “common sense,” JUSTICE
BARRETT says, it would “ ‘g[o] without saying’ ” that the law
doesn’t apply to a surgeon accessing a patient’s vein to save
his life. Ibid. That is because the phrase “drew blood” is
susceptible to two conventional idiomatic meanings: one
“applicable to violent encounters with man or beast” and
the other “to medical procedures,” A. Scalia & B. Garner,
Reading Law 357 (2012) (Scalia & Garner). And any
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 19

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

ordinary person faced with that phrase in a penal law would
find it obvious which meaning applies. Ibid.; see also Ne-
braska, 600 U. S., at 512 (BARRETT, J., concurring).
 The difficulty is, our major questions cases are different.
Often, little about them “ ‘goes without saying.’ ” Ibid. Take
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120
(2000). There, the question was whether the FDA could
regulate tobacco products. Id., at 125 . Looking only to com-
mon sense, the answer would have been yes. Congress au-
thorized the FDA to regulate “drugs,” which Congress de-
fined expressly and broadly as “ ‘articles (other than food)
intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body.’ ” Id., at 126 . As a matter of common sense, nicotine
qualifies as a “drug” based on this statutory definition, as it
might even as a matter of everyday speech. West Virginia,
597 U. S., at 721–722 (noting the “colorable textual basis”
for the executive branch’s interpretation in Brown & Wil-
liamson). Still, we held the FDA could not regulate tobacco
products. Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160.
 Other cases follow suit. We have ruled that the term “air
pollutant” does not include greenhouse gases, even though
greenhouse gases pollute the air. Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302 , 316, 323–324 (2014). We have
held that the phrase “ ‘[r]egulations . . . necessary to pre-
vent the . . . spread of communicable diseases’ ” does not in-
clude eviction moratoriums, even without questioning that
eviction moratoriums were necessary to prevent the spread
of COVID–19, a communicable disease. Alabama Assn. of
Realtors, 594 U. S., at 761, 764 . And we have said that clos-
ing coal power plants is not the “ ‘best system of emission
reduction,’ ” even while acknowledging that closing them
would reduce emissions. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721 ,
732–735.
 None of these cases can be readily explained by “com-
monsense principles of communication.” Nebraska, 600
U. S., at 514 (BARRETT, J., concurring). None involved a
20 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

phrase like “drew blood” susceptible to two conventional id-
iomatic meanings, one of which any English speaker faced
with the law at issue might quickly rule out. Quite the op-
posite; in each case the agency had a strong argument that
the statutory language, commonsensically read, granted
the power it claimed. Meanwhile, all our major questions
cases can be easily explained by reference to a rule requir-
ing the executive branch to identify clear statutory author-
ity when it claims Congress has granted it an extraordinary
power. And that is a “dice-loading” rule, plain and simple,
one designed to protect Article I, a “[s]ubstantive . . . valu[e]
external” to the statutory terms at hand. Id., at 508 .
 Common sense not only fails to explain many of our major
questions cases. It doesn’t explain even some of the cases
JUSTICE BARRETT has held up as examples of commonsense
cases. In Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844 (2014), for
example, the Court confronted a statute that defined
“chemical weapon” to include “ ‘any chemical which through
its chemical action on life processes can cause death, tem-
porary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or an-
imals.’ ” Id., at 851 ; see also Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512–
513 (BARRETT, J., concurring) (discussing Bond). Despite
that broad definition, the Court held that “an arsenic-based
compound” didn’t fit the bill. Bond, 572 U. S., at 852, 866 .
To reach that result, we did not use common sense alone.
How could we have? It hardly goes without saying that ar-
senic doesn’t qualify as a “chemical” which can cause “ ‘per-
manent harm to humans or animals.’ ” Id., at 851 ; see also
 id., at 867 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (calling it
“beyond doubt” that the ordinary meaning of the relevant
statutory terms embraced the chemicals at issue). Instead,
we relied on a clear-statement rule grounded in the sub-
stance of the Constitution—namely, the federalism canon.
 Id., at 860 (majority opinion) (“[W]e can insist on a clear
indication that Congress meant to reach purely local
crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 21

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the
States”). So Bond may well be like our major questions
cases, but that is only because it applied a clear-statement
rule grounded in another substantive feature of the Consti-
tution.
 Consider as well the babysitter hypothetical JUSTICE
BARRETT has posed. Imagine a parent of young children
who hands a babysitter a credit card and says, “ ‘[m]ake
sure the kids have fun.’ ” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 513 (con-
curring opinion). Now suppose the babysitter takes the
kids on a road trip to an amusement park, “where they
spend two days on rollercoasters and one night in a hotel.”
 Ibid. “Was the babysitter’s trip consistent with the parent’s
instruction?” Ibid. JUSTICE BARRETT believes the answer
is likely “no” as a matter of common sense. See id., at 513–
514.
 Really, though, unless one is to believe children do not
“have fun” on rollercoasters and at hotels, the babysitter
hypothetical can be explained only with reference to some
“external” and “substantive” norm. Id., at 508, 513 . And,
in fact, just such a norm is baked into the babysitter hypo-
thetical—one we encountered in Part I–B, supra. The
babysitter is exercising authority the parents have dele-
gated to her. She is acting as their agent. As a result, one
might expect a clear statement from the parents before the
babysitter may do something extraordinary, like take the
kids on a road trip.
 This substantive norm about delegated powers not only
lurks beneath the surface of the babysitter hypothetical, it
“ ‘loads the dice’ ” against her. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 510
(BARRETT, J., concurring). Doubtless, she would see it that
way. The babysitter would argue that a trip to an amuse-
ment park is “fun.” And she would be right under a com-
monsense understanding of the word. But because the
babysitter is exercising delegated authority, she cannot
22 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

exercise such an extraordinary power without clear author-
ization for it.
 Notice, too, the same outcome is no longer guaranteed
when we remove the delegated power feature. If one parent
leaves the children with the other parent, the trip to the
amusement park might well be fine. No other contextual
clues are needed. See id., at 516 (agreeing with this). So if
the answer to the babysitter hypothetical seems a matter of
common sense to many Americans, that is only because the
substantive norms associated with parental delegations to
babysitter agents are so deeply rooted in our society. Say
the same instruction were given to a babysitter in a com-
munity where children are raised collectively, like a kib-
butz. Same answer? Hardly obvious.1
 B
 To be sure, in places JUSTICE BARRETT concedes that her
gloss on the major questions doctrine requires resort to
something more than “common sense” instincts about what
would “ ‘g[o] without saying’ ” to an ordinary English
speaker. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512 (concurring opinion);
see also post, at 2. Sometimes, she suggests, common sense
doesn’t just help illuminate the “most natural” meaning of
an idiomatic term like “drew blood” based on its presence in
a penal law. 600 U. S., at 508 . Sometimes, she says, “com-
monsense principles of communication” go much further.
 Id., at 514 . So much so that they wind up dictating a rule
——————
 1 Today, JUSTICE BARRETT protests that the foregoing discussion “takes

down a straw man.” Post, at 1 (concurring opinion). But it was JUSTICE
BARRETT who previously wrote that the major questions doctrine “grows
out of . . . commonsense principles of communication.” Biden v. Ne-
braska, 600 U. S. 477 , 514 (2023) (same). And it was JUSTICE BARRETT
who used the various illustrations recounted above to suggest that our
major questions decisions can be explained by reference to the kind of
“common sense . . . that ‘goes without saying.’ ” Id., at 512. If JUSTICE
BARRETT now means to put all that to the flame, the major questions doc-
trine is better for it.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 23

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

counseling “skepticism” of executive claims to extraordi-
nary delegated powers. Id., at 516. Why? Because,
JUSTICE BARRETT says, a “reasonable observer” consults
“our constitutional structure.” Id., at 515, 520. But if that’s
true, this version of common sense does require us to ac-
count for “values” entirely “external to a statute,” including
specifically the “substan[ce]” of Article I. Id., at 508. And
in so doing, this expanded version of common sense just be-
comes the substantive major questions doctrine by another
name.
 Today’s decision illustrates the point. The principal opin-
ion gestures at “common sense.” Ante, at 8. But through-
out, this “common sense” is linked to “ ‘constitutional struc-
ture’ ” and “ ‘separation of powers principles.’ ” Ibid. The
principal opinion begins with the Constitution, observing
that Article I vests the tariff power in Congress, not the ex-
ecutive branch. Ante, at 5–6. The principal opinion re-
counts the President’s claim that Congress has “delegated”
an “extraordinary” amount of its tariff power to him in
IEEPA. Ante, at 8–9. And from there, the principal opinion
proceeds to apply a clear-statement rule. It acknowledges
that the ordinary meaning of the key statutory term in
IEEPA—the word “regulate”—is capacious, so much so that
it could be understood to “captur[e] much of what a govern-
ment does.” Ante, at 14. Still, the principal opinion rea-
sons, that is not enough to sustain the President’s claim be-
cause the statute does not “clear[ly]” grant him the
“extraordinary” delegated power he seeks. Ante, at 13, 20.
When it comes down to it, common sense serves as little
more than a segue to Article I’s Vesting Clause.
 That is as it must be. The statutory terms contain no
ambiguity we could use (or need) “commonsense principles
of communication” to resolve. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514
(BARRETT, J., concurring). This case is nothing like the
“ ‘drew blood’ ” illustration, where it might “ ‘g[o] without
saying’ ” that any ordinary person would immediately
24 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

understand which of two idiomatic meanings a penal stat-
ute employed. Id., at 512 . Indeed, today’s principal opinion
does not even “attempt to set forth the metes and bounds”
of IEEPA’s key phrase “ ‘regulate . . . importation,’ ” ante, at
16, much less find the “best” or “most natural” meaning of
those words, Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508, 521 (BARRETT, J.,
concurring); post, at 1. Instead, we need go no further than
to recognize that IEEPA fails to “clear[ly]” authorize tariffs.
Ante, at 13, 20. And the only reason we can stop there is
because Article I—a “[s]ubstantive . . . valu[e] external to a
statute,” 600 U. S., at 508 (BARRETT, J., concurring)—im-
poses a clear-statement rule when executive officials claim
Congress has afforded them an extraordinary authority.
 There’s another problem too. The equivocation on
whether “commonsense principles of communication” in-
clude only those things that might “go without saying,” or
also include “external” and “substantive” Article I “values,”
leads to a further equivocation on how much “skepticism”
common sense might dictate when assessing an executive
official’s claim to an extraordinary delegated power. Com-
mon sense, we are told, does not impose a “ ‘clarity tax,’ ” but
it does add an “expectation of clarity.” Id., at 508, 514 .
Common sense does not “ ‘loa[d] the dice,’ ” but it does coun-
sel “skepticism.” Id., at 510–511, 516. Common sense
means never “forgo[ing] the most natural reading of a stat-
ute,” post, at 3, but it always means “expect[ing that] Con-
gress [will] make the big-time policy calls,” post, at 2 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). I am uncertain what to make
of this, except that it seems to toggle between a clear-state-
ment rule and nothing at all.2
——————
 2 To the extent JUSTICE BARRETT suggests any skepticism “com-

monsense principles of communication” might (or might not) advise de-
rives from a “ ‘practical understanding of legislative intent,’ ” rather than
“external” and “substantive” Article I “values,” that poses still further
(and familiar) problems. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508, 515 (concurring
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 25

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

 I am certain of one thing: Our cases hold a clear state-
ment is required to support a claim to an extraordinary del-
egated power. We required Congress to “speak clearly” in
Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324. We demanded “clear congres-
sional authorization” in NFIB, 595 U. S., at 118 . We did the
same in Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 506 , and in West Virginia,
 597 U. S., at 732 , and we do so again today, ante, at 13. Nor
do I see cause for being quite so reluctant about acknowl-
edging this. The common law recognized many clear-state-
ment rules. See, e.g., Part I–B, supra. Our own cases have
applied a host of Constitution-enforcing clear-statement
rules as well. We just encountered the federalism clear-
statement rule in Bond. Add to the list clear-statement
rules against laws that might apply retroactively, waive or
abrogate sovereign immunity, or create enforceable rights
under the Taxing Clause—to name just a few. See, e.g.,
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244 , 265–268
(1994); Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for P. R.
v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc., 598 U. S. 339 ,
346–347 (2023); Medina v. Planned Parenthood South At-
lantic, 606 U. S. 357 , 383–384, n. 8 (2025). Maybe all these
rules could be recast as “common sense”—at least if com-
mon sense means taking account of the “external” and
——————
opinion) (quoting West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022)). Down
that road lie all the pitfalls associated with reliance on legislative his-
tory and those associated with conflating unenacted legislative intent
with the law. Scalia & Garner 397; post, p. 1 (JACKSON, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment). Similar problems attend the notion
that the appropriate degree of skepticism due a delegation might turn on
what people “expect.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514, 520 (BARRETT, J., con-
curring); see also post, at 2 (same). JUSTICE BARRETT has offered no evi-
dence about what people “expect” when confronted with different con-
gressional delegations. And to the extent she believes their
“expectations” would reflect an appropriate consideration of the whole
“ ‘corpus juris,’ including the Constitution,” post, at 2, n. 1, that just cir-
cles us right back to the “external” and “substantive” Article I “values”
she strives so hard to sideline, see Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508 (BARRETT,
J., concurring).
26 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

“substantive” “values” found in “our constitutional struc-
ture.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508, 515 (BARRETT, J., con-
curring). But whatever the label, it hardly requires some
“judicial flex,” post, at 4, to recognize that the “external”
constitutional “values” at stake in our major questions
cases are no less weighty than those at play in other set-
tings where we routinely apply a clear-statement rule.3
 III
 That brings us to the third camp. My dissenting col-
leagues have defended the major questions doctrine in the
past, and they do so again today. Post, at 31–33 (opinion of
KAVANAUGH, J.). They agree that the doctrine is grounded
in the Constitution. Post, at 32. They agree that the doc-
trine requires us to deviate from “ ‘routine’ ” statutory inter-
pretation principles and instead place a “thumb on the
scale,” one requiring executive officials to identify “ ‘clear’ ”
congressional authorization when they seek to exercise
some “major” power. Post, at 33. But, my colleagues say,
IEEPA provides the clear statement needed to sustain the
President’s tariffs. Post, at 38–45. Alternatively, they sub-
mit, we shouldn’t apply the major questions doctrine to any
statute, like IEEPA, that implicates “foreign affairs.” Post,
at 45–49. And this exception, they add, is particularly war-
ranted here because Congress has historically granted the

——————
 3 Notably, past critics of the major questions doctrine have not hesi-

tated to apply many of these clear-statement rules. See Financial Over-
sight and Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investiga-
tivo, Inc., 598 U. S. 339 , 346–347 (2023) (opinion for the Court by KAGAN,
J.); Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369 , 455–456, n. 1
(2024) (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (collecting examples); West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 751, n. 7 (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (same). Nor have they hesi-
tated to adopt and apply other clear-statement rules with far less
grounding in the Constitution than the major questions doctrine. See,
e.g., Bowe v. United States, 607 U. S. ___ , ___–___ (2026) (slip op., at 9–
10); id., at ___–___ (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 12–15); Boechler
v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 208 (2022).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 27

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

President large discretion in setting tariffs. Post, at 49–53.
Once again, the points are thoughtful and merit careful con-
sideration.
 A
 My dissenting colleagues begin by taking the major ques-
tions doctrine as they find it. They accept that the Presi-
dent’s challenged actions are “of major economic and politi-
cal significance.” Post, at 33. They accept as well that he
must identify “clear” congressional authorization to sustain
those actions. Ibid. Still, the dissent maintains, IEEPA
clearly grants the President the tariff power he asserts.
 To arrive at that conclusion, the dissent consults four
clues we have sometimes employed in our major questions
cases to help assess whether a statute clearly authorizes an
asserted power. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 746
(GORSUCH, J., concurring). The dissent formulates these
clues largely as I would. See post, at 35–38. But, to my
eyes, the dissent engages in a little grade inflation when
applying them.
 First, is the President seeking to exercise an “unher-
alded” or “newfound” power based on a “long-extant” stat-
ute? Post, at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
dissent insists that is not the case here because President
Nixon imposed a 10 percent tariff on most imports in 1971,
and then defended that action in lower courts under a pre-
decessor to IEEPA, the Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA). Ibid. But the words “regulate . . . importation”
were added to TWEA in 1941. §301(1)(B), 55 Stat. 839 .
Congress used the same language in IEEPA in 1977.
§203(a)(1)(B), 91 Stat. 1626 . And in the 85 years of TWEA’s
existence with that language (and the 49 years of IEEPA’s),
that is the only time either statute has been invoked to im-
pose tariffs. Ante, at 10–11, 17–18. A single time, and one
never tested in this Court. Nor are these statutes seldom
used. “Each year since 1990, Presidents have issued
28 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

roughly 4.5 executive orders . . . and declared 1.5 new na-
tional emergencies citing IEEPA.” Congressional Research
Service, The International Emergency Economics Powers
Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use 20 (Sept. 1, 2025). That is
pretty strong evidence the President here seeks to “deploy
an old statute” in a novel way. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
747 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).
 Second, how has the executive branch interpreted IEEPA
in the past? Post, at 40–41. The dissent says Presidents
have long understood IEEPA to permit them to impose tar-
iffs. Ibid. But for support, the dissent again relies on iso-
lated evidence about other statutes. It points to the mone-
tary exactions President Ford ordered under the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. Post, at 17, 40. And, once more, it
points to President Nixon’s invocation of TWEA to support
his 1971 tariffs during lower court proceedings (though the
dissent brushes aside the fact that President Nixon initially
rejected the idea of relying on TWEA, see Brief for Carla
Hills et al. as Amici Curiae 12–14). Whatever one makes of
this history, it hardly reveals the kind of contemporaneous
and consistent executive interpretation that might advance
the dissent’s cause. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 747
(GORSUCH, J., concurring). To the contrary, the fact that no
President until now has invoked IEEPA to impose a duty—
even one percent on one product from one country—is tell-
ing. Id., at 748 .
 Third, is there a “mismatch” between the action the exec-
utive official seeks to take and his expertise? Post, at 41.
On this one, I agree with the dissent. If tariffs fall in any
executive official’s “wheelhouse” (and not Congress’s), it’s
the President’s. Ibid.; see also supra, at 6.
 Fourth, is the President “relying on oblique, elliptical, or
cryptic language”? Post, at 41–42. The dissent says no be-
cause “[t]his case does not involve elephants in mouse-
holes.” Post, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put
another way, the dissent insists, the provisions of IEEPA
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 29

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

before us are not “ancillary” ones, but are designed to con-
vey significant powers. Post, at 43 (internal quotation
marks omitted). It’s a fair enough point as far as it goes.
But our cases ask not just whether a provision is a “mouse-
hole” or “ancillary.” They also caution against reading ex-
traordinary powers into “broad or general” statutory lan-
guage. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 746 (GORSUCH, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 291 (2011) (“[C]lear
statement rules ensure Congress does not, by broad or gen-
eral language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or
without due deliberation” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Indeed, and as we have seen, many of our major ques-
tions cases have found broad or general terms in significant
statutes insufficient to support a claim to an extraordinary
or unusual power. See Part I–A, supra. And here, the word
“regulate” is broad as can be. So broad that it could be read
to “captur[e] much of what a government does.” Ante, at 14.
 As I see it, then, three of the four clues the dissent relies
on cut against it. It is important to add, as well, that as
helpful as these clues can be in helping courts spot when a
claimed power is not supported by clear statutory authority,
they do not represent some exhaustive checklist, nor does
satisfying one guarantee a claim will succeed. So, for ex-
ample, even if an asserted power is in the agency’s “wheel-
house,” we might rule (and have ruled) against the agency
if the power is “unheralded” because the statute has stood
for decades without being interpreted to convey the power
claimed. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 144 ,
159–160.
 Ultimately, the central question in any major questions
case remains whether the executive branch’s claim to an
extraordinary power is supported by clear statutory author-
ity. And, as the principal opinion explains at length, many
additional clues beyond those the dissent addresses confirm
that the President cannot meet that standard in this case.
30 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

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These additional clues include the way the key statutory
term “regulate” is used elsewhere in the U. S. Code, how
Congress has delegated tariff authority in the past, and
other neighboring language in IEEPA itself. Ante, at 14–
15.
 Contrary to the dissent’s charge, too, the principal opin-
ion’s application of the major questions doctrine today in no
way amounts to a “magic-words test.” Post, at 44. Of
course, if IEEPA included terms like “tariff ” or “duty,” that
would have sufficed. But, to borrow a phrase from the dis-
sent, “monetary exactions on foreign imports” would have
worked just as well. Post, at 17. Same goes for “tax on im-
ported goods.” Or any similarly clear term or phrase. But
IEEPA includes no such language, just a broad term that
could cover almost anything a government does. And re-
quiring specific rather than general language is just how
clear-statement rules work. See, e.g., Sossamon, 563 U. S.,
at 291 .
 B
 If the President’s claim fails under our usual major ques-
tions test, the dissent says we should respond by carving
out an exception to it for cases (like this one) touching on
“foreign affairs.” Post, at 45.
 On this score, I share a limited point of agreement with
the dissent. Like the nondelegation doctrine, the major
questions doctrine protects Article I’s Vesting Clause and,
for that reason, the doctrine does not apply where the Pres-
ident is exercising only his own inherent Article II powers.
Like the nondelegation doctrine, too, the major questions
doctrine may speak with less force where the President and
Congress enjoy “overlap[ping] . . . authority.” See Gundy v.
United States, 588 U. S. 128, 159 (2019) (GORSUCH, J., dis-
senting); see also C. Bradley & J. Goldsmith, Foreign Af-
fairs, Nondelegation, and the Major Questions Doctrine,
 172 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1743 , 1747 (2024) (Bradley & Goldsmith)
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 31

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

(explaining the “supposed foreign affairs exception” to the
nondelegation doctrine “is better understood as a qualifica-
tion that concerns situations in which a statutory authori-
zation relates to an independent presidential power”).
 Doubtless, cases implicating overlapping powers can
arise in the field of foreign affairs. The Constitution, for
example, vests in Congress the power to raise and regulate
armies, but it also vests in the President the commander-
in-chief power. Compare Art. I, §8, cls. 12–14, with Art. II,
§2, cl. 1. Similarly, Congress enjoys the power to regulate
foreign commerce, but the President has power to negotiate
treaties and nominate ambassadors. Compare Art. I, §8,
cl. 3, with Art. II, §2, cl. 2. The President may even enjoy
some “residual” powers pertaining to foreign affairs under
Article II’s Vesting Clause endowing him with the “execu-
tive Power.” See S. Prakash & M. Ramsey, The Executive
Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L. J. 231, 234 (2001)
(Prakash & Ramsey); but see C. Bradley & M. Flaherty, Ex-
ecutive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich.
L. Rev. 545 , 551–552 (2004). Given all this, it is easy
enough to imagine statutes and disputes under them that
implicate both congressional and presidential powers
where we might have reason to question whether the major
questions doctrine applies with its usual force.
 The problem for the dissent is that none of this is relevant
here. Before us, the President concedes that he does not
enjoy independent Article II authority to impose tariffs in
peacetime. Ante, at 18–19. Nor does the President claim
“ ‘concurrent’ ” constitutional authority to issue his tariffs.
Ante, at 13 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71). Instead, and to
his credit, the President admits the power to authorize tar-
iffs in peacetime is constitutionally vested in “Congress
alone.” Ante, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, the President relies entirely on power derived
from Congress, and that means the major questions doc-
trine applies in the normal way. See Bradley & Goldsmith
32 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

1796 (“IEEPA [is] not [an] authorizatio[n] that obviously
connect[s] to independent presidential power in ways that
would warrant the independent powers qualification”).
 Because of this problem, the dissent must argue for a
much broader “foreign affairs” qualification to the major
questions doctrine. Rather than ask whether an independ-
ent, constitutionally vested presidential power is impli-
cated, the dissent would have us ask instead whether the
President seeks to use the statute in question for a foreign
affairs purpose—for example, as a “too[l]” to “incentivize a
change in behavior by allies . . . or enemies.” Post, at 50.
When he does, the dissent submits, the major questions doc-
trine should not apply. And that’s true, the dissent contin-
ues, even if the power the President asserts has “significant
domestic ramifications.” Post, at 51.
 This new exception to the major questions doctrine would
have (enormous) consequences hard to reconcile with the
Constitution. Article I, §8, vests in Congress many powers
that touch on “foreign affairs.” Some of those powers were
expected to be (and are) the “principal objects of federal leg-
islation.” The Federalist No. 53, p. 333 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (J. Madison). They include not only the power to im-
pose tariffs, cl. 1, but also the power to establish uniform
rules of naturalization, cl. 4, appropriate money for armies,
cl. 12, and define and punish offenses against the law of na-
tions, cl. 10. Under the dissent’s view, all these legislative
powers and more could be passed wholesale to the executive
branch in a few loose statutory terms, no matter what do-
mestic ramifications might follow. And, as we have seen,
Congress would often find these powers nearly impossible
to retrieve. See Part I–C, supra.
 Consider an example. Imagine Congress adopted a law
that arguably could be read to let the President borrow and
spend money during peacetime as he sees fit. A law like
that would represent an extraordinary delegation of Con-
gress’s power both to borrow “on the credit of the United
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

States,” Art. I, §8, cl. 2, and to spend money in support of
the “general Welfare,” §8, cl. 1, and would carry with it “sig-
nificant domestic ramifications,” post, at 51. But if an en-
terprising executive could also use the law as a “tool” for
affecting the behavior of “allies . . . or enemies,” the dissent
seemingly would have us exempt it from scrutiny under the
major questions doctrine.
 The dissent’s exception is so broad it’s hard not to wonder
how it fits with some of our existing major questions prece-
dents. In West Virginia, the Court applied the major ques-
tions doctrine over a dissent expressing concern that doing
so would deny the EPA (and therefore the President) the
power to respond to “the most pressing environmental chal-
lenge of our time”—“[c]limate chang[e].” 597 U. S., at 753
(KAGAN, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A challenge, the dissent continued, that threatened conse-
quences global in scope, including “mass migration events[,]
political crises, civil unrest, and even state failure.” Id., at
754 (internal quotation marks omitted). Was West Virginia
a “foreign affairs” case? How about our major questions
cases addressing efforts to combat the global pandemic that
was COVID–19? See, e.g., NFIB, 595 U. S., at 114 .4

——————
 4 The dissent suggests that trying to identify when an independent Ar-

ticle II authority is in play would prove “jurisprudentially chaotic.” Post,
at 53, n. 23. But as the foregoing discussion illustrates, the dissent’s al-
ternative “foreign affairs” test poses its own challenges. And it seems to
me only one is firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution. See Bradley
& Goldsmith 1747; see also Prakash & Ramsey 233 (“[O]ne would think
that the Constitution’s text ought to play the preeminent role in discern-
ing the Constitution’s allocation of foreign affairs powers”). In this case,
too, only one test promises any manner of “chao[s]” because all parties
before us readily agree that the Constitution affords the President no
independent power to impose peacetime tariffs. See H. Powell, The Pres-
ident’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspec-
tive, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527 , 549 (1999) (“The President has no inde-
pendent power directly to regulate [or] tax . . . foreign commerce”).
34 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

 Seeking support for its sweeping new exception, the dis-
sent points to three main precedents. Post, at 46–48, 53–
57. I do not see how any of them might sustain its view.
The first, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 (2004), con-
cerned the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), legislation which authorized the President to use
“all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons” responsible for the September
11, 2001, attacks. Id., at 510 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The dissent highlights the principal opinion’s
conclusion that the AUMF allowed the President to detain
enemy combatants even though the law did not mention
that power expressly. Id., at 510 , 516–517 (opinion of
O’Connor, J.). And from this, the dissent draws the infer-
ence that any statute addressing foreign affairs should be
exempt from scrutiny under the major questions doctrine.
Post, at 54–55. But the dissent overlooks the fact that the
principal opinion reached the conclusion it did only because
it found detention of enemy combatants to be a traditional
“incident to war.” 542 U. S., at 518 . And once Congress
declares war (or, likewise, authorizes the use of military
force abroad), that implicates the President’s commander-
in-chief powers. Put simply, Hamdi was a case of overlap-
ping powers. Ours is not.
 Second, the dissent invokes Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U. S. 654 (1981). See post, at 55–56. At its heart, that case
involved an executive order by President Reagan suspend-
ing certain claims by U. S. citizens against Iran as part of a
settlement involving the release of American hostages held
there. 453 U. S., at 675 . Just as we do today, Dames &
Moore held that the “terms of the IEEPA . . . d[id] not au-
thorize” the President’s actions. Ibid. Even so, the Court
proceeded to uphold those actions anyway, and did so based
in part on its view (right or wrong) that the President en-
joyed some “ ‘independent’ ” power to “enter into executive
agreements” suspending certain claims. Id., at 678 , 682–
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 35

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

683. So unlike our case, Dames & Moore again involved
overlapping powers. Along the way, too, the Court empha-
sized (repeatedly) the “narrowness” of its decision and that
it should not be taken to “lay down” any “general ‘guide-
lines’ covering other situations not involved here.” Id., at
661; see also id., at 660, 688. To derive from Dames &
Moore a new general guideline exempting “foreign affairs”
cases from the major questions doctrine’s reach would thus
require us to disregard its own cautionary direction.
 Third, the dissent cites United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936). See post, at 46–48.
There, the Court did suggest that nondelegation rules in the
field of “domestic or internal affairs” should differ from
those in the realm of “foreign or external affairs.” Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U. S., at 315 . But what should we make of that
language? If it means that the nondelegation doctrine (and
perhaps, by extension, the major questions doctrine) must
account for the President’s independent Article II powers, I
agree.
 But I would hesitate to read more into the decision than
that. Consider what was really at issue there. A statute
permitted the President to ban the transfer of one class of
goods (armaments). Id., at 312 . It did so with respect to
two countries then engaged in a war (Bolivia and Para-
guay). Ibid. The President’s authority was conditioned on
a finding that a ban “ ‘may contribute to the reestablish-
ment of peace between those countries.’ ” Ibid. Before mak-
ing that finding, too, Congress directed him to consult
“ ‘with the governments of other American Republics.’ ”
 Ibid. All told, then, the statute set forth the policy for the
President to pursue. It bounded his authority by limiting
his options with respect to a limited class of goods and coun-
tries. The statute further conditioned his exercise of those
options on a factual finding reached after consultation with
other nations. So whatever else might be said about
Curtiss-Wright, one thing is apparent: In upholding the
36 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

President’s actions under the law in question, the Court
hardly allowed Congress to hand off all of its enumerated
powers touching on foreign affairs to the President, the tar-
iff power included.5
 C
 If its effort to secure a broad foreign affairs exception to
the major questions doctrine won’t work, the dissent hints
at a more limited one specific to tariffs. Such an exception
makes sense, the dissent says, because “Presidents have
long been granted substantial discretion over tariffs.” Post,
at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the dis-
sent contends, this tradition traces “back to near the Found-
ing.” Post, at 59. If the dissent were right about that, one
might hesitate before accepting the President’s concession
that this case does not implicate any inherent Article II au-
thority. But, at least as I read it, history offers the dissent
little to work with.
 Americans fought the Revolution in no small part be-
cause they believed that only their elected representatives
(not the King, not even Parliament) possessed authority to
tax them. Declaration of Independence ¶19. And, they be-
lieved, that held true not just for direct taxes like those in
the Stamp Act, but also for many duties on imports, like
those found in the Sugar Act. E. Morgan & H. Morgan, The
Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution 72–74 (1995 ed.);
see 1 E. Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the
Nineteenth Century 60 (1903) (Stanwood); C. Van Tyne,
——————
 5 In places, the dissent also argues that the President’s inherent Article

II authority includes a wartime tariff power. See post, at 22–24; see also
Brief for Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 3. But this only
highlights the dissent’s bind. Whatever the full scope of the President’s
Article II war powers may be (and the briefs before us reveal a healthy
debate whether they include the power to impose tariffs), those powers
are not implicated here. IEEPA is not a wartime statute, nor does the
President claim we are at war with the countries whose goods are subject
to the tariffs.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 37

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

The Causes of the War of Independence 126–136 (1922); J.
Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and
Proved (1764), in The Collected Political Writings of James
Otis 119, 161–162 (2015); see also id., at xii (Introduction).
 Americans later codified these beliefs in the Constitution.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national govern-
ment was laden with debt and enjoyed few ways to repay it.
To address that problem, the framers afforded the federal
government new taxing powers in the Constitution. Art. I,
§8, cl. 1. Many thought these powers among “the most im-
portant” features of the new federal charter. See, e.g., The
Federalist No. 33, at 202–203 (A. Hamilton). But, con-
sistent with their view that only the people’s elected repre-
sentatives could constitutionally tax them, the framers
gave Congress alone “access to the pockets of the people.”
Id., No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison). And to cement that role,
the Constitution required that “All Bills for raising Reve-
nue shall originate in the House of Representatives,” the
body most responsive to the people. Art. I, §7, cl. 1.
 For much of the Nation’s history, this taxing power was
essentially a tariff power. The framers even considered
(and eventually rejected) the possibility of giving the fed-
eral government the power to tax only through tariffs. The
Federalist No. 35, at 211 (A. Hamilton). No surprise, then,
that Congress’s first exercise of its taxing power was a tariff
law. P. Ashley, Modern Tariff History 170–171 (2d ed.
1910). And until the 20th century, tariffs “accounted for
between 50 and 90 percent” of the federal government’s rev-
enue. J. Dobson, Two Centuries of Tariffs: The Background
and Emergence of the United States International Trade
Commission 1 (1976).
 How did Congress exercise its all-important tariff power?
It debated every detail of the first tariff Act. Stanwood 39–
71. Ultimately, Congress said, imported malt would incur
a charge of 10 cents a bushel. Brown sugar one cent. Loaf
sugar three cents. And so on. Id., at 59. The first tariff Act
38 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

was set to last for seven years. Id., at 72. It lasted barely
one. Ibid. Soon, Congress was at it again, laying out an-
other exacting schedule of duties. Id., at 75–76. Through-
out much of the 19th century, Congress proceeded simi-
larly, enacting highly detailed tariff schedules one after
another. See F. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United
States 68–170 (8th ed. 1931).
 An early debate over executive involvement in setting
tariffs demonstrates just how strongly Congress felt that
tariffs were a legislative business. In December 1791, Pres-
ident Washington told Congress that General St. Clair had
been defeated in the Northwest Indian War, and the coun-
try would have to increase the size of the army. Stanwood
104. That meant the government needed more money. In
response, a resolution was offered in the House of Repre-
sentatives to solicit advice from the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, Alexander Hamilton, on the best way to raise the addi-
tional revenue—including through new tariffs. 3 Annals of
Congress 437 (1792); Stanwood 105–106. Ultimately, Ham-
ilton’s advice was sought, but only after a debate over the
constitutionality of even asking a member of the executive
branch for advice on raising revenue. Ibid.; 3 Annals of
Congress 447.
 To be sure, on later occasions Congress turned to the ex-
ecutive branch for more help still. But it usually did so to
address changing trade practices in foreign countries. And
in doing so, Congress set the important policies, with the
executive branch responsible for finding facts—like what
other countries’ trade policies were at any given moment—
or filling in the details. So, for example, Congress passed a
statute in 1815 to repeal any “discriminating duty of ton-
nage . . . whenever the President” was “satisfied” that other
countries’ “discriminating or countervailing duties” had
“been abolished.” Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224 ;
see also, e.g., Act of Jan. 7, 1824, 4 Stat. 2–3.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 39

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

 Given this history, it’s no surprise that the dissent relies
mostly on statutes and cases after 1890. Post, at 59. But
even they do little to support its claim. J. W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928), for example,
involved a law instructing the President to “investigat[e]”
the costs of production for American firms and their foreign
counterparts and issue tariffs to “equalize” those costs. Id.,
at 401, 409 (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute
the Court faced in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S.
649, 681 (1892), spoke similarly. Even when Federal En-
ergy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 ,
came along in 1976, the Court upheld President Ford’s im-
position of monetary exactions on a single class of products
under a statute that provided at least some guidance about
how he should implement the law. Id., at 559 . And whether
correctly decided or not, that case lies a far step from this
one.
 Before us, the President insists he may use IEEPA to
equalize foreign and domestic duties—or not. He may use
it to negotiate with foreign countries—or not. He may set
tariffs at 1 percent or 1,000,000 percent. He may target one
nation and one product or every nation and nearly every
product. And he may change his mind at any time for
nearly any reason. At least as I see it, history dating “back
to near the Founding,” post, at 59, does not support the no-
tion that Presidents have traditionally enjoyed so much
power. More nearly, history refutes it.6
——————
 6 Beyond the major questions hurdle, the dissent faces another, related

one: the nondelegation doctrine. There the problems are just as acute.
In recent decades, this Court has employed a relatively lax “intelligible
principle” test to police delegations. See FCC v. Consumers’ Research,
 606 U. S. 656, 673 (2025); cf. Gundy v. United States, 588 U. S. 128 , 157–
159 (2019) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (arguing for a more traditional test).
But recognizing that even the intelligible principle test poses challenges
for it, the dissent contends for an even laxer test yet in cases involving
“foreign affairs” and tariffs. Post, at 57–61. It’s an effort that fails for
40 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

 IV
 That leaves one final camp to consider. JUSTICE THOMAS
suggests that Congress may hand over most of its constitu-
tionally vested powers to the President completely and for-
ever. Post, at 2–3 (dissenting opinion). On his view, the
only powers Congress may not delegate are those that in-
volve “rules setting the conditions for deprivations of life,
liberty, or property.” Ibid. From this rule, it follows that
Congress may give all its tariff powers to the President be-
cause “[i]mporting is a matter of privilege.” Post, at 10–11.
And, as a result, this case does not implicate any “ ‘ “separa-
tion of powers” ’ ” concerns at all. Post, at 3 (quoting ante,
at 8).
 It’s a sweeping theory. One that would require us to
reimagine much of our case law addressing Article I’s Vest-
ing Clause. And one that presents difficulties of its own.
 First, I do not see how JUSTICE THOMAS’s theory resolves
all “ ‘ “separation of powers” ’ ” concerns in this case. Post, at
3 (quoting ante, at 8). Suppose for argument’s sake that
Congress can delegate its tariff powers to the President as
completely as JUSTICE THOMAS suggests. Even then, the
question remains whether Congress has given the Presi-
dent the tariff authority he claims in this case—or whether
the President is seeking to exploit questionable statutory
language to aggrandize his own power. See Part I–C, su-
pra. Put another way, JUSTICE THOMAS’s nondelegation so-
lution does not automatically solve the major questions
problem. As we have seen, when an executive official
claims Congress has delegated to him some extraordinary
power, the major questions doctrine requires him to identify
clear statutory authority for its exercise—a standard he
——————
reasons we have just seen. Even if the nondelegation doctrine should
apply differently when congressional legislation and executive actions
implicate inherent Article II powers, Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159 , none of
that means it should do so where (as here) the President derives what-
ever authority he has only from Congress.
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 GORSUCH, J., concurring

must satisfy even if Congress is free to pass to him the
power he seeks. Post, at 2–3. In fact, this Court has previ-
ously applied, with our colleague’s assent, the major ques-
tions doctrine in a case that appears, under his present
view, to involve a power that Congress could delegate
wholesale to the President. See Nebraska, 600 U. S., at
486–488 (involving the power to cancel federal student loan
debts, which on JUSTICE THOMAS’s account presumably
qualifies as a benefit or privilege, not a right to life, liberty,
or property). And, just as the major questions doctrine pre-
cluded the executive branch’s assertion of power in that
case, it does so here.
 Second, even when it comes to the nondelegation doc-
trine, JUSTICE THOMAS’s theory raises many questions. I
appreciate that the doctrine may apply with less force in
certain areas, such as when Congress legislates in a way
that implicates one of the President’s inherent powers. See
Part III–B, supra; Gundy, 588 U. S., at 159 (GORSUCH, J.,
dissenting). But JUSTICE THOMAS would go much further.
On his telling, the doctrine applies only to Congress’s true
legislative powers, which he says include only those powers
addressing the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. As
it turns out, only a small subset of Congress’s enumerated
powers in Article I, §8, fit that bill. See post, at 5–6 (listing
the powers to punish counterfeiters, tax “internal[ly],” and
regulate interstate commerce). Only those few powers are
exclusively vested in Congress and subject to review of any
kind under the nondelegation doctrine. All “other kinds of
power[s]” enumerated in Article I, §8—including the pow-
ers to borrow and spend money, declare war, and regulate
foreign trade—are not truly legislative and may be dele-
gated at will. Post, at 2. So Congress may hand them off to
the President completely and he has no need to worry about
legal challenges under even this Court’s (relatively lax)
nondelegation doctrine. No matter, too, that Congress
42 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

might find itself permanently unable to retrieve these pow-
ers. See Part I–C, supra.
 But if all that’s true, what do we make of the Constitu-
tion’s text? Section 1 of Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Pow-
ers herein granted” in Congress and no one else. Section 8
proceeds to list those powers in detail and without differen-
tiation. Neither provision speaks of some divide between
true legislative powers touching on “life, liberty, or prop-
erty” that are permanently vested in Congress alone and
“other kinds of power[s]” that may be given away and pos-
sibly lost forever to the President. Post, at 2.
 What do we make, too, of what the founders said about
Article I both before and after the Constitution’s ratifica-
tion? They regularly referred to powers in Article I, §8—
even those that do not touch on life, liberty, or property—
as legislative in nature. At the Constitutional Convention,
early drafts described the powers to regulate “foreign” com-
merce, “raise armies,” “equip Fleets,” “coi[n] . . . money,”
and “establish post-offices” as “legislative powers.” 2 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 142–144 (M.
Farrand ed. 1966) (Farrand). James Madison wrote to Con-
gress in 1817 that “[t]he legislative powers vested in Con-
gress are specified and enumerated in the eighth section of
the first article of the Constitution.” 8 The Writings of
James Madison 386 (G. Hunt ed. 1908); see also 1 id., at
112, 133, 381 (noting, before the Constitutional Convention,
the “legislative power over captures,” and arguing borrow-
ing money is an “exclusive power of Legislation”).
 Alexander Hamilton spoke similarly. 3 The Works of Al-
exander Hamilton 479 (H. Lodge ed. 1904) (Lodge) (discuss-
ing “[t]he legislative power of borrowing money”); 6 id., at
182 (describing “the legislative power of regulating trade
with foreign nations”); 2 id., at 197, 198 (calling of “the leg-
islative kind” and “of a legislative nature” the powers to
raise money and troops, “establish rules in all cases of cap-
ture by sea or land,” “regulate the alloy and value of coin,”
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 43

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

and “make all laws for the government of the army and
navy”). So did James Wilson. 1 Collected Works of James
Wilson 268 (K. Hall & D. Hall eds. 2007) (describing all the
Senate’s powers as “legislative powers,” with the exception
of the powers to try impeachments, concur in treaties, and
consent to the appointment of officers, matters addressed
outside Art. I, §8).
 What do we make as well of early congressional debates?
In the Second Congress, for example, the House of Repre-
sentatives rejected on nondelegation grounds a proposal to
give the President a largely unfettered power to establish
postal routes, even though doing so hardly would have
touched on life, liberty, or property. 3 Annals of Congress
229–242. In the Fifth Congress, four Representatives like-
wise objected on nondelegation grounds to a bill that au-
thorized the President to raise an army of up to 10,000 men.
8 id., at 1525–1527, 1532, 1535 (remarks of Reps. Nicholas,
Gallatin, Baldwin, and McDowell). Though the bill ulti-
mately passed, see Act of May 28, 1798, 1 Stat. 558 , it did
so apparently because it was deemed not to violate Article
I’s nondelegation principle—no Member of Congress re-
sponded that the principle was wholly inapplicable because
the delegated power was not one that involved setting con-
ditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. See 8
Annals of Congress 1525–1542.
 What are we to do, too, with this Court’s nondelegation
precedents, which have never turned on JUSTICE THOMAS’s
view of life, liberty, or property? See J. W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co., 276 U. S., at 403, 409 (scrutinizing a delegation to ex-
ecutive officials to set customs duties); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 , 405–406, 422, 433 (1935) (hold-
ing unconstitutional a delegation to executive officials to
prohibit the transportation of petroleum products in inter-
state and foreign commerce); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U. S. 190, 196 , 214–215, 225–226 (1943)
(scrutinizing the delegation of authority to regulate the
44 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

granting of broadcasting licenses); see also Sessions v. Di-
maya, 584 U. S. 148 , 217 (2018) (THOMAS, J., dissenting)
(“[I]mpermissible delegations of legislative power violate
[the nondelegation] principle, not just delegations that de-
prive individuals of ‘life, liberty, or property’”).
 Third, even if a distinction between true legislative pow-
ers and “other kinds of power[s]” were proper, post, at 2, I
do not see why the tariff power would fall in the latter cat-
egory and thus be something Congress could delegate away
wholesale, without scrutiny, and forever. JUSTICE THOMAS
suggests all that is possible because, at the founding, the
tariff power was considered a “ ‘prerogative right’ ” of the
British King. Post, at 11 (quoting N. Gras, Early English
Customs System 21 (1918)).
 That seems doubtful. Tariffs may have been among the
King’s prerogative powers during the reign of Edward I.
See id., at 20–21; see also post, at 11, n. 3 (citing P. Einzig,
The Control of the Purse: Progress and Decline of Parlia-
ment’s Financial Control 65 (1959) (discussing the practices
“during the Middle Ages”)). But even before the year 1400,
Parliament had achieved some “victory over the King in the
matter of imposing import duties.” Id., at 108–109. And
after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, as this Court has put
it, Parliament “secured supremacy in fiscal matters.” Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Finan-
cial Services Assn. of America, Ltd., 601 U. S. 416, 428
(2024) (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 306, 333 (1771)). “By the time of the American
Revolution, trade regulation was thus a prime topic of leg-
islative concern” in Britain. M. McConnell, The President
Who Would Not Be King 217 (2020) (emphasis added); see
also J. Chitty, Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown 163
(1820) (“[T]he King does not possess any general common
law prerogative with respect to foreign commerce”).
 More importantly still, whatever the views in Britain
may have been, American revolutionaries hardly shared
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 45

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

some universal conviction that all manner of tariffs were a
matter of the King’s prerogative, or even something Parlia-
ment, lacking colonial representatives, could freely impose
on them. Though in the mid-1760s some colonists distin-
guished between “ ‘internal’ ” and “ ‘external’ taxation” and
“conceded [Parliament’s] right to raise revenue through du-
ties on trade,” “the inadequacy of [that] much overstrained
distinction” soon “became obvious.” B. Bailyn, The Ideolog-
ical Origins of the American Revolution 212–213, 215
(1967). Illustrative of the point, John Dickinson came to
“repudiat[e]” the distinction “flatly and formally” in his Let-
ters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, id., at 215, contending
instead that laws aimed at raising revenue, but enacted
without representation, were objectionable without “dis-
tinction . . . between internal and external taxes,” Letters
From a Farmer in Pennsylvania 39 (1774). See also supra,
at 36–37 (recounting colonial objections to the Sugar Act);
H. Unger, American Tempest 101 (2011) (observing that the
“import duties” in the Townshend Acts helped “incite Amer-
icans to rebel”). And, of course, it was duties on foreign tea
that triggered the Boston Tea Party. J. Ellis, The Cause
17–18 (2021). Are we really to believe that the patriots that
night in Boston Harbor considered the whole of the tariff
power some kingly prerogative?
 As we have already seen, too, the growing American con-
viction that the peacetime tariff power is legislative and be-
longs only to the people’s elected representatives was later
reflected in both the Constitution and early congressional
practice. See Part III–C, supra. To that discussion, I would
add just this. The Articles of Confederation granted the
Confederation Congress authority to make commercial
treaties, but no authority to restrain “the legislative power
of the respective states” to impose “imposts and duties on
foreigners.” Art. IX (emphasis added). At the Constitu-
tional Convention that followed, where the tariff power was
transferred to the federal government, delegates likewise
46 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 GORSUCH, J., concurring

referred to it as a “legislative power.” See, e.g., 3 Farrand
615; 2 id., at 142–143. And, during debates over the Jay
Treaty, Hamilton explained that he held no doubt that reg-
ulating foreign trade and raising money from it was a “leg-
islative power,” if one that could be constrained by treaty.
6 Lodge 182, 189–190, 196. Reflecting the same sentiment
that helped fuel the Revolution, he asked: “[W]hat legisla-
tive power can be more sacred?” Id., at 196.
 *
 For those who think it important for the Nation to impose
more tariffs, I understand that today’s decision will be dis-
appointing. All I can offer them is that most major deci-
sions affecting the rights and responsibilities of the Ameri-
can people (including the duty to pay taxes and tariffs) are
funneled through the legislative process for a reason. Yes,
legislating can be hard and take time. And, yes, it can be
tempting to bypass Congress when some pressing problem
arises. But the deliberative nature of the legislative process
was the whole point of its design. Through that process, the
Nation can tap the combined wisdom of the people’s elected
representatives, not just that of one faction or man. There,
deliberation tempers impulse, and compromise hammers
disagreements into workable solutions. And because laws
must earn such broad support to survive the legislative pro-
cess, they tend to endure, allowing ordinary people to plan
their lives in ways they cannot when the rules shift from
day to day. In all, the legislative process helps ensure each
of us has a stake in the laws that govern us and in the Na-
tion’s future. For some today, the weight of those virtues is
apparent. For others, it may not seem so obvious. But if
history is any guide, the tables will turn and the day will
come when those disappointed by today’s result will appre-
ciate the legislative process for the bulwark of liberty it is.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

 BARRETT, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 Nos. 24–1287 and 25–250
 _________________

 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
24–1287 v.
 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 CIRCUIT

 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–250 v.
 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 [February 20, 2026]

 JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring.
 As the principal opinion demonstrates, the most natural
reading of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act does not encompass the power to impose tariffs. I write
only to address JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence regarding
the major questions doctrine.
 To the extent that JUSTICE GORSUCH attacks the view
that “common sense” alone can explain all our major ques-
tions decisions, ante, at 18–22, he takes down a straw man.
I have never espoused that view. Rather, as I explained in
my concurrence in Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 507
(2023), the major questions doctrine “situates text in con-
text” and is therefore best understood as an ordinary appli-
cation of textualism. Id., at 511 . Textualists—like all those
2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 BARRETT, J., concurring

who use language to communicate—do not interpret words
in a vacuum. Instead, we use context, including “[b]ack-
ground legal conventions,” “common sense,” and “constitu-
tional structure,” to ascertain a text’s “most natural mean-
ing.” Id., at 511–512, 515, 509.
 Part of this context, as I have explained, is Article I of the
Constitution, which vests Congress with “ ‘[a]ll legislative
Powers.’ ” Id., at 515 (quoting Art. I, §1). Obviously, the
Constitution bears on the meaning of a statute enacted pur-
suant to it. Because Article I grants all legislative powers
to Congress, the reasonable interpreter would expect Con-
gress “to make the big-time policy calls itself, rather than
pawning them off to another branch.” Nebraska, 600 U. S.,
at 515 (BARRETT, J., concurring).1
 To the extent that JUSTICE GORSUCH also thinks that
background legal conventions and constitutional structure
inform the most natural reading of a statute, then we may
not be very far apart. See ante, at 8–12, 14 (concurring
opinion). Our only disagreement may be over the level of
clarity required before a particular interpretation can be
deemed the most natural one. I understand JUSTICE
GORSUCH to require Congress always to speak precisely to
any major power that it intends to give away. See ante, at
12–14, 25–26 (concurring opinion). As I have said before, I
think that other, “less obvious” clues can do the trick. See
Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514 (BARRETT, J., concurring). I do
not see any such clues here; in fact, as the Court explains,
the clues we have point in the opposite direction. See, e.g.,
ante, at 8–9 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (detailing how
——————
 1 Contrary to JUSTICE GORSUCH’s suggestion, this approach to the ma-

jor questions doctrine does not risk “conflating unenacted legislative in-
tent with the law.” Ante, at 24, n. 2 (concurring opinion). Rather, like
textualism more generally, it looks for “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the
intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law,
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris,” including the Con-
stitution. A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 17 (1997).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

 BARRETT, J., concurring

Congress has elsewhere delegated the power to impose tar-
iffs); ante, at 14–15 (majority opinion) (stressing that the
Government “cannot identify any statute in which the
power to regulate includes the power to tax”).
 At times, though, JUSTICE GORSUCH suggests that the
purpose of the major questions doctrine is something other
than to ascertain the most natural reading of a statute. For
example, he writes that the doctrine serves to prevent
“highly resourceful members of the executive branch” from
“assum[ing] new power for themselves” because “men are
not angels.” Ante, at 16 (concurring opinion); see West Vir-
ginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 735 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., con-
curring) (describing doctrine as a “clear-statement rul[e]”
that “operates to protect foundational constitutional guar-
antees”); National Federation of Independent Business v.
OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 , 124–126 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., con-
curring) (similar). But if the Constitution permits Congress
to give the Executive a particular power, who are we to get
in the way? Does the Judiciary really protect the Constitu-
tion by impeding the constitutional action of another
branch? If JUSTICE GORSUCH thinks that we should forgo
the most natural reading of a statute because it is prefera-
ble for Congress, rather than the President, to make big de-
cisions, that way lies “a lot of trouble” for the textualist. A.
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 28 (1997) (Scalia).
 Strong-form substantive canons—canons instructing a
judge to adopt “an inferior-but-tenable reading”—veer be-
yond interpretation and into policymaking. Nebraska, 600
U. S., at 509 (BARRETT, J., concurring). And while the pol-
icy may be desirable or even constitutionally inspired,
judges should hesitate to impose disciplining rules on Con-
gress. See ibid., n. 2 (explaining that such “prophylactic
constraints” are “in tension with the Constitution’s struc-
ture”). As Justice Scalia lamented, “whether these dice-
loading rules are bad or good, there is also the question of
where the courts get the authority to impose them. Can we
4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 BARRETT, J., concurring

really just decree that we will interpret the laws that Con-
gress passes to mean less or more than what they fairly
say?” Scalia 28–29.
 Granted, strong-form canons exist elsewhere in the law.
See Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 508–509 (BARRETT, J., concur-
ring). I do not propose to abandon these canons, nor have I
taken the position that adopting them necessarily exceeds
the judicial power. Id., at 509, n. 2 . But I am skeptical
about adding new ones to the mix. Ibid. And while the
major questions doctrine has an impressive pedigree as an
interpretive principle, this Court has not (yet, anyway) em-
braced it as a strong-form rule that imposes a “ ‘clarity tax’ ”
on Congress. Id., at 508 .
 JUSTICE GORSUCH seems to disagree, pointing to a few
late 19th- and early 20th-century cases.2 See ante, at 12–
14 (concurring opinion). But these cases, like our modern
ones, are consistent with my context-based approach: They
focus on ascertaining, not shaping, what the statute in dis-
pute communicates. See, e.g., ICC v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T.
P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 511 (1897) (concluding that Con-
gress “did not intend” to give interstate commission power
to set railroad rates); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
 213 U. S. 175, 196 (1909) (reasoning that “the legislature
never intended to and did not in fact” give a state commis-
sion power to set maximum railroad rates). I would not
treat this evidence as precedent for a judicial flex. JUSTICE
GORSUCH proposes to do something new. The innovation is
in significant tension with textualism, so I do not support
the project.

——————
 2 He also points to state cases and longstanding corporate law princi-

ples. Ante, at 8–13 (concurring opinion). While those sources support
the existence of a background legal convention that informs a statute’s
most natural meaning, they are not evidence that this Court—which is
bound by the constraints of Article III—has adopted a true clear-state-
ment rule.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

 Opinion of KAGAN, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 Nos. 24–1287 and 25–250
 _________________

 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
24–1287 v.
 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–250 v.
 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 [February 20, 2026]

 JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
 The Court holds today that the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the Pres-
ident to impose tariffs. I agree with that conclusion, as I do
with the bulk of the principal opinion’s reasoning. But be-
cause I think the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation
amply support today’s result, I do not join the part of that
opinion invoking the so-called major-questions doctrine.
 The question that part asks, similar to the one posed in
other “ ‘major questions’ cases,” is whether the President
can identify “clear congressional authorization” for his ac-
tion—here, to impose tariffs under IEEPA. Ante, at 7, 13,
20. The demand is for a clear statement—something more
2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of KAGAN, J.

explicit or specific than the statutory basis that would ordi-
narily suffice to support executive action. See, e.g., West
Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697 , 721–724, 732 (2022); Biden
v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 , 505–506 (2023). The reason for
that requirement, according to today’s opinion, is that the
Executive has claimed an “extraordinary” power—one
never asserted before and having large-scale “economic and
political significance.” Ante, at 7, 11; see ante, at 7–11.
 I objected, in the principal cases cited, to the demand for
a special brand of legislative clarity. See West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 764–784 (KAGAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska, 600
U. S., at 542–550 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). In my view, the
Court used its clear-authorization rule in those cases to ne-
gate expansive delegations Congress had approved. I ex-
plained there that the proper way to interpret a delegation
provision is through the standard rules of statutory con-
struction. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 765–766 (KAGAN,
J., dissenting). That means, most concisely stated, reading
text in context. More expansively put, it means examining
a delegation provision’s language, assessing that provi-
sion’s place in the broader statutory scheme, and applying
a “modicum of common sense” about how Congress typically
delegates. Id., at 764 (KAGAN, J., dissenting); see FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133
(2000). The last of those inquiries includes consideration of
whether Congress ever has before, or likely would, delegate
the power the Executive asserts—a matter also of import in
applying the major-questions doctrine. See ante, at 8–10;
Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512–514, 517–519 (BARRETT, J.,
concurring); id., at 546, n. 3 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). In the
past, though, I have thought that the Court used that doc-
trine to override—rather than help discover—the best read-
ing of delegation statutes. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
756 (KAGAN, J., dissenting); Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 543
(KAGAN, J., dissenting).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

 Opinion of KAGAN, J.

 This case presents more nearly the opposite situation:
The use of a clear-statement rule here is unnecessary be-
cause ordinary principles of statutory interpretation lead to
the same result.1 It is not just that the Government’s argu-
ments fail to satisfy an especially strict test; it is that they
fail to satisfy the normal one. Even without a clear-state-
ment rule in the picture, the conclusion follows: IEEPA does
not authorize the President to impose tariffs. And indeed,
the principal opinion’s reasoning well explains why. The
rest of this opinion draws on that analysis (I hope without
too much rehashing) to demonstrate what I view as the fun-
damental point: Usual text-in-context interpretation dooms
the tariffs the President has imposed. The crucial provision
of IEEPA, when viewed in light of the broader statutory
scheme and with a practical awareness of how Congress
delegates tariff authority, does not give the President the
power he wants.
 Most important, IEEPA’s key phrase—the one the Gov-
ernment relies on—says nothing about imposing tariffs or

——————
 1 JUSTICE GORSUCH claims not to understand this statement, insisting

that I now must be applying the major-questions doctrine, and his own
version of it to boot. See ante, at 17 (concurring opinion) (“My concurring
colleagues all but endorse it today”); ante, at 2, 7, 18 (similar). Given
how strong his apparent desire for converts, see ante, at 2–26, I almost
regret to inform him that I am not one. But that is the fact of the matter.
I proceed in this case just as I did in West Virginia and Nebraska: I con-
sider a delegation provision’s language, broaden the scope to take in the
statutory setting, and apply some common sense about how Congress
normally delegates. See West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697 , 756–766
(2022) (KAGAN, J., dissenting); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 , 534–
542 (2023) (KAGAN, J., dissenting). Contrary to JUSTICE GORSUCH’s sug-
gestion, see ante, at 3–7, that conventional method of interpretation will
not always favor (or always disfavor) executive officials, given the variety
of delegation schemes Congress adopts. I’ll let JUSTICE GORSUCH reliti-
gate on his own our old debates about other statutes, unrelated to the
one before us. What matters here is only that IEEPA’s delegation refutes
the Executive’s assertion of authority to levy tariffs, without any help
from the major-questions doctrine.
4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of KAGAN, J.

taxes. That text authorizes the President, upon finding a
foreign threat and declaring an emergency, to “regulate”
the “importation” of foreign goods. 50 U. S. C.
§1702 (a)(1)(B). And the meaning of “regulate,” both in com-
mon parlance and as Congress uses the word, does not en-
compass taxing. See ante, at 14–15. To “regulate,” accord-
ing to the Government’s preferred definition, means to “fix,
establish or control; to adjust by rule, method, or estab-
lished mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to
governing principles or laws.” Brief for Federal Parties 24
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979)). Noth-
ing in that definition naturally refers to levying taxes. Nor
does Congress ever use the word “regulate” in that way.
Hundreds of provisions in the U. S. Code give agencies the
authority to “regulate” one thing or another. Yet the Gov-
ernment cannot identify a single one that is understood to
grant taxing power. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. When Con-
gress wants to delegate that power, it uses a whole different
vocabulary—terms like “duty,” “tariff,” or “surcharge,”
which do not appear in IEEPA. See ante, at 8 (citing repre-
sentative statutes); see also ante, at 19 (discussing, in par-
ticular, 19 U. S. C. §1862 (1970 ed.)). And likewise, when
Congress means to cover both regulatory and taxing pow-
ers, it refers to each separately. See ante, at 15 (also citing
statutes). Of course, Congress knows that taxes can be used
for regulatory ends: They can be a means of controlling or
adjusting behavior. But Congress still follows the path this
Court long ago marked out, and the one most consonant
with ordinary meaning, of treating the power to “regulate”
trade as “entirely distinct” from the power to “levy taxes.”
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 , 201–202 (1824); see ante, at
15. So in granting only the former, IEEPA excludes the lat-
ter: The President has the ability to regulate, but not to im-
pose taxes on, imports.
 The surrounding statutory language confirms the point.
As the principal opinion explains, “regulate” is one of 9
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

 Opinion of KAGAN, J.

verbs listed in IEEPA’s delegation provision. See ante, at
15. (The others are “investigate,” “block,” “direct,” “compel,”
“nullify,” “void,” “prevent,” and “prohibit.” §1702(a)(1)(B).)
Those verbs are followed by 11 objects, each describing a
distinct sort of transaction involving foreign property—not
just “importation,” but also “acquisition,” “use,” “transfer,”
and so forth. Ibid. Combine the verbs and objects in all
possible ways, and the statute authorizes 99 actions a Pres-
ident can take to address a foreign threat. And exactly none
of the other 98 involves raising revenues. Rather, each en-
ables the President to impose penalties, restrictions, or con-
trols on foreign commerce. See ante, at 15. So when the
phrase “regulate . . . importation” is invoked to impose
quantity or quality limits on bringing foreign goods into the
country—for example, by setting quotas or requiring quar-
antines—the phrase fits well with its 98 neighbors. Just
like the rest, it provides a way to constrain or alter various
foreign transactions. But when that phrase is invoked to
impose tariffs? Then it becomes the odd man out—the only
one of 99 permission slips to involve “the core congressional
power of the purse.” Ante, at 8; see ante, at 5–6. So even if
(contra both conventional and congressional usage) the
word “regulate” might refer to taxation in some other (hith-
erto undiscovered) statutory context, it would not do so in
IEEPA.2
 Likewise, Congress’s consistent practice in delegating
tariff power refutes the Government’s position. As the
——————
 2 The legislative history of IEEPA offers yet more proof that Congress

did not authorize taxation. The Senate Report, in its description of the
statute, reduces the 99 authorized actions to the following: the power “to
control or freeze property transactions where a foreign interest is in-
volved.” S. Rep. No. 95–466, p. 5 (1977). The House Report similarly
describes the delegation provision as “authoriz[ing] the President” to
“regulate or freeze any property in which any foreign country or a na-
tional thereof has any interest.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, p. 15 (1977).
Neither of those descriptions at all suggests that Congress intended to
cede its taxing power.
6 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of KAGAN, J.

principal opinion details, Title 19 of the U. S. Code includes
multiple provisions granting the President authority to levy
tariffs. See ante, at 8–9. But in each and every instance,
Congress has not only used specific language (e.g., “duty” or
“surcharge”), see supra, at 4, but also imposed tight re-
straints on the power given. It has capped the tariff ’s rate
(e.g., 15%); or limited the tariff ’s duration (e.g., 150 days);
or established strict procedural conditions before the tariff
can take effect (e.g., investigations, public hearings, and re-
ports); or all of the above. See ante, at 8–9. What Congress
has never done in a tariff provision is what the Government
claims it did here—conferred power on the President to im-
pose a tariff of any amount, for any time, on only his own
say-so. And construing IEEPA to give that unparalleled au-
thority would effectively erase all the carefully confined tar-
iff provisions in Title 19. For any President could then es-
cape the rigors of those laws—could put in place, say, a non-
time-limited 100% tariff on all foreign products—by the
simple expedient of identifying a foreign threat. That gut-
ting of Title 19’s tariff scheme is not what Congress, when
delegating power to “regulate” imports, could have meant
to accomplish.
 Nor has any President until now understood IEEPA to
authorize imposing tariffs. Between 1977 (when IEEPA
was enacted) and 2024, eight Presidents had the chance to
make use of IEEPA’s delegation of power. And all chose the
same course. They invoked the statute’s “regulate importa-
tion” provision for a variety of non-tariff purposes. See ante,
at 10. But they looked elsewhere—to Title 19’s provisions—
for tariff authority. See ante, at 10–11. In other words,
each President read the statutes as Congress wrote them,
with IEEPA enabling him to regulate imports and Title 19
enabling him—in confined situations—to tax those foreign
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7

 Opinion of KAGAN, J.

goods. None, as far as anyone has suggested, even consid-
ered doing otherwise.3
 For all those reasons, straight-up statutory construction
resolves this case for me; I need no major-questions thumb
on the interpretive scales. IEEPA gives the President sig-
nificant authority over transactions involving foreign prop-
erty, including the importation of goods. But in that gener-
ous delegation, one power is conspicuously missing.
Nothing in IEEPA’s text, nor anything in its context, ena-
bles the President to unilaterally impose tariffs. And need-
less to say, without statutory authority, the President’s tar-
iffs cannot stand. See ante, at 5–6.

——————
 3 Presidents followed the same practice, with one quasi-exception, un-

der IEEPA’s predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA). Beginning in 1941, TWEA authorized the President, as IEEPA
does now, to “regulate . . . importation.” 12 U. S. C. §95a(1)(B) (1940 ed.,
Supp. I). During the next three decades, six Presidents used that dele-
gation for only non-tariff ends, while relying on Title 19 to levy tariffs.
In 1971, when President Nixon imposed tariffs in response to a balance-
of-payments deficit, he continued in that tradition by invoking two stat-
utes (the Tariff Act of 1930 and Trade Expansion Act of 1962) found in
Title 19. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3 CFR 60 (1971–1975
Comp.). But in defending his act against a legal challenge, the Depart-
ment of Justice argued that even if the two cited statutes did not author-
ize the tariffs, TWEA would do so. That after-the-fact claim of authority
was upheld in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. See United
States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572 , 577–578 (CCPA 1975);
ante, at 17. The principal opinion well explains why that single lower
court decision about TWEA has no bearing on IEEPA’s meaning. See
ante, at 17–18, and n. 5.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

 Opinion of JACKSON, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 Nos. 24–1287 and 25–250
 _________________

 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
24–1287 v.
 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 CIRCUIT

 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–250 v.
 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 [February 20, 2026]

 JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
 I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not provide
the President with the power to tariff. Three of my col-
leagues have reached this result via the major questions
doctrine, see ante, at 7–13 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.)—a
framing that asks, in essence, whether Congress “would
likely have intended” to delegate the authority to tariff to
the President through IEEPA. West Virginia v. EPA, 597
U. S. 697, 730 (2022) (emphasis added); see also id., at 722–
723. While probing Congress’s intent is the right inquiry,
my colleagues speculate needlessly. In my view, the Court
2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of JACKSON, J.

can, and should, consult a statute’s legislative history to de-
termine what Congress actually intended the statute to do.
 As Congress undertakes the legislative process, congres-
sional committees in the Senate and House often generate
official reports that describe Congress’s aims for the legis-
lation. See R. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 19–20 (2014)
(Katzmann). Indeed, there is evidence that lawmakers
themselves pay more attention to these reports than a stat-
ute’s text to understand the statute’s purpose and meaning.
A. Gluck & L. Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901 ,
965–966, 968–969 (2013); see also Katzmann 37–38. Thus,
in contrast to the principal dissent’s rejection of Committee
Reports as a means of ascertaining a statute’s meaning,
post, at 16, n. 11 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.), I think these
Senate and House Reports are among the best evidence of
what Congress sought to accomplish with its enactments.
See Gluck, 65 Stan. L. Rev., at 965, 977–978, 989.
 In the cases now before us, that evidence shows that Con-
gress did not intend for IEEPA to authorize the Executive
to impose tariffs. Accord, ante, at 5, n. 2 (KAGAN, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment). Instead, Con-
gress intended to delegate to the President the power to
freeze and control foreign property transactions.
 Four pieces of the relevant legislative record support this
conclusion. The first two are the House and Senate Reports
that accompanied the 1941 amendment to IEEPA’s prede-
cessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).
First enacted in 1917, TWEA authorized the President to
control foreign property during wartime. But some of
TWEA’s sections delegating this authority had lapsed, and
“there [was] doubt as to the effectiveness of other sections.”
H. R. Rep. No. 1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1941). Accord-
ingly, Congress amended TWEA in 1941, adding the sub-
section that includes the “regulate . . . importation”
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

 Opinion of JACKSON, J.

language on which the President relies today. First War
Powers Act, 55 Stat. 839–840. The Reports explained Con-
gress’s primary purpose for the 1941 amendment: shoring
up the President’s ability to control foreign-owned property
by maintaining and strengthening the “existing system of
foreign property control (commonly known as freezing con-
trol).” H. R. Rep. No. 1507, at 2–3; see also S. Rep. No. 911,
77th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1941).1
 When Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977, limiting the cir-
cumstances under which the President could exercise his
emergency authorities, it kept the “regulate . . . importa-
tion” language from TWEA. §203(a)(1)(B), 91 Stat. 1626 .
The other two relevant pieces of legislative history—the
Senate and House Reports that accompanied IEEPA—
demonstrate that Congress’s intent regarding the scope of
this statutory language remained the same. As the Senate
Report explained, Congress’s sole objective for the “regulate
. . . importation” subsection was to grant the President the
emergency authority “to control or freeze property transac-
tions where a foreign interest is involved.” S. Rep. No. 95–
466, p. 5 (1977). The House Report likewise described
IEEPA as empowering the President to “regulate or freeze
any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, p. 15
(1977).
 With this evidence of Congress’s objective, interpreting
the text of IEEPA becomes an easy task. Each of the listed
verbs—“investigate, block during the pendency of an inves-
tigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent
——————
 1 In addition to maintaining the President’s “freezing control” author-

ity, Congress also sought to authorize the President to seize foreign prop-
erty and use it to serve the interests of the United States. H. R. Rep.
No. 1507, at 3. To this end, the 1941 amendment provided that foreign-
owned property “shall vest . . . in such agency or person as may be desig-
nated . . . by the President.” 55 Stat. 840 . Congress did not include this
vesting language in IEEPA.
4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 Opinion of JACKSON, J.

or prohibit,” 50 U. S. C. §1702 (a)(1)(B)—provides a means
by which the President can freeze or control foreign prop-
erty transactions. See ante, at 4–5, and n. 2 (opinion of
KAGAN, J.). Tariffs are different in kind. They are a tax on
imports; a means of generating revenue from transactions
between private parties. See ante, at 6 (majority opinion).
Because tariffs are not a means by which the President can
freeze or control foreign assets, interpreting IEEPA to au-
thorize tariffs would require the Court to override Con-
gress’s expressed purpose for including the “regulate . . .
importation” language in the statute.
 ** *
 Like THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion, the principal dissent
declines the help of legislative history. See post, at 16, n. 11
(opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). The dissent concludes that
IEEPA and TWEA are “best understood” as authorizing tar-
iffs, and that any other interpretation would “not make
much sense.” Post, at 24–25, 29.2 But why would it matter
which interpretation we think is “best” when Congress has
already told us? The legislative history here plainly estab-
lishes that Congress understood and intended IEEPA and
TWEA to authorize a wholly different type of power: the
power to freeze foreign-owned property. And the proper
role of the Court is to give effect to Congress’s intent, not
our own instincts. See United States v. American Trucking
Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940).
 In short, in these cases, the legislative history provides
helpful evidence of “what Congress was trying to do” in
IEEPA. Katzmann 38. Given that evidence, we need not
speculate or, worse, step into Congress’s shoes and
——————
 2 This reasoning appears to follow the Court’s relatively recent practice

of picking what it deems the best reading of a statute without consider-
ation of Congress’s intent. See, e.g., Stanley v. City of Sanford, 606 U. S.
46 , 51–54 (2025); accord, id., at 96–97, and n. 12 (JACKSON, J., dissent-
ing).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

 Opinion of JACKSON, J.

formulate our own views about what powers would be best
to delegate to the President for use during an emergency.
See ibid.; J. Hurst, Dealing With Statutes 33 (1982). When
Congress tells us why it has included certain language in a
statute, the limited role of the courts in our democratic sys-
tem of government—as interpreters, not lawmakers—de-
mands that we give effect to the will of the people.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 Nos. 24–1287 and 25–250
 _________________

 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
24–1287 v.
 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–250 v.
 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 [February 20, 2026]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
 I join JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’s principal dissent in full. As
he explains, the Court’s decision today cannot be justified
as a matter of statutory interpretation. Congress author-
ized the President to “regulate . . . importation.” 50 U. S. C.
§1702 (a)(1)(B). Throughout American history, the author-
ity to “regulate importation” has been understood to include
the authority to impose duties on imports. Post, at 9–13,
22–29 (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting). The meaning of that
phrase was beyond doubt by the time that Congress enacted
this statute, shortly after President Nixon’s highly publi-
cized duties on imports were upheld based on identical lan-
guage. Post, at 14–22. The statute that the President relied
on therefore authorized him to impose the duties on imports
2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

at issue in these cases. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH makes clear
that the Court errs in concluding otherwise.
 I write separately to explain why the statute at issue here
is consistent with the separation of powers as an original
matter. The Constitution’s separation of powers forbids
Congress from delegating core legislative power to the Pres-
ident. This principle, known as the nondelegation doctrine,
is rooted in the Constitution’s Legislative Vesting Clause
and Due Process Clause. Art. I, §1; Amdt. 5. Both Clauses
forbid Congress from delegating core legislative power,
which is the power to make substantive rules setting the
conditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Nei-
ther Clause prohibits Congress from delegating other kinds
of power. Because the Constitution assigns Congress many
powers that do not implicate the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress may delegate the exercise of many powers to the
President. Congress has done so repeatedly since the
founding, with this Court’s blessing.
 The power to impose duties on imports can be delegated.1
At the founding, that power was regarded as one of many
——————
 1 I refer to charges on imported goods as “duties,” not “tariffs” or

“taxes.” When the government charged money for importing goods, that
charge was historically called a custom or impost, each of which was a
kind of “duty.” See N. Webster, A Compendious Dictionary of the English
Language 75, 152 (1806); Art. I, §10, cl. 2. The word “tariff ” primarily
referred to the schedule or table listing such duties, not the duties them-
selves. Webster, Compendious Dictionary, at 305. The word “tax,” alt-
hough sometimes used loosely to refer to all kinds of monetary charges,
more often “exclude[d]” duties on imports. R. Natelson, What the Con-
stitution Means by “Duties, Imposts, and Excises”—and “Taxes” (Direct
or Otherwise), 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 297 , 306 (2015).
 In fact, although Colonial Americans “staunchly contested efforts by
Parliament to ‘tax’ them,” they often “conceded the authority of the Brit-
ish government to regulate commerce through financial exactions,” in-
cluding “prohibitory tariffs.” Ibid. In the most “widely read” and “uni-
versally approved” response to the Stamp Act, E. Morgan & H. Morgan,
The Stamp Act Crisis 71 (1953), Daniel Dulany wrote: “A Right to impose
an internal Tax on the Colonies, without their Consent for the single
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

powers over foreign commerce that could be delegated to
the President. Power over foreign commerce was not within
the core legislative power, and engaging in foreign com-
merce was regarded as a privilege rather than a right.
Early Congresses often delegated to the President power to
regulate foreign commerce, including through duties on im-
ports. As I suggested over a decade ago, the nondelegation
doctrine does not apply to “a delegation of power to make
rules governing private conduct in the area of foreign
trade,” including rules imposing duties on imports. Depart-
ment of Transportation v. Association of American Rail-
roads, 575 U. S. 43 , 80–81, n. 5 (2015) (opinion concurring
in judgment). Therefore, to the extent that the Court relies
on “ ‘separation of powers principles’ ” to rule against the
President, ante, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), it is mis-
taken.
 I
 The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in both the Legisla-
tive Vesting Clause and the Due Process Clause. The doc-
trine ensures that “[t]he Legislative [Branch] cannot trans-
fer the Power of Making Laws to any other hands.” J.
Locke, Two Treatises of Government §141, p. 380 (P. Laslett
ed. 1964) (Locke) (emphasis deleted). Importantly,

——————
Purpose of Revenue, is denied; a Right to regulate their Trade without
their Consent is admitted. The Imposition of a Duty, may, in some In-
stances, be the proper Regulation.” Considerations on the Propriety of
Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies 34 (2d ed. 1765) (emphasis de-
leted). Likewise, Benjamin Franklin famously conceded Britain’s “right
‘of laying duties to regulate commerce,’ ” but rejected its power to “ ‘lay
internal taxes.’ ” B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Rev-
olution 214 (1967); see also id., at 212 (explaining that colonists denied
Britain “all right to tax the colonies,” but “conceded to it the right to raise
revenue through duties on trade”); E. Nelson, The Royalist Revolution
32 (2014); C. Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the
History of Political Ideas 90 (1922).
4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

however, the nondelegation doctrine applies only to Con-
gress’s core legislative power, not to all of its powers.
 A
 The Legislative Vesting Clause grants Congress alone
the federal legislative power. It requires that “[a]ll legisla-
tive Powers” granted to the Federal Government “shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States.” Art. I, §1. It
follows that those federal legislative powers cannot be exer-
cised by anyone else, including the President. See Associa-
tion of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 74 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.).
 “Legislative power” for purposes of the Vesting Clause
means the power to make substantive rules setting the con-
ditions for deprivations of life, liberty, or property. I have
described this power as the “core legislative power” to dis-
tinguish it from other powers that the Constitution grants
Congress. Id., at 80 . Core legislative power includes only
the power to make “law” in the “Blackstonian sense of gen-
erally applicable rules of private conduct,” the violation of
which results in the deprivation of “core private rights.” Id.,
at 73, 76 . These core private rights are the natural rights
to life, liberty, and property. See 1 W. Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England 123–136 (1765) (Black-
stone); C. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches,
 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559 , 566–567 (2007).
 The nondelegation doctrine is also rooted in the Due Pro-
cess Clause. That Clause prohibits the Federal Govern-
ment from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” Amdt. 5. The Founders mod-
eled it on chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, which prohibited
the deprivation of a free man’s private rights “except by the
lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.” A.
Howard, Magna Carta: Text and Commentary 45 (rev. ed.
1998); see Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 723 (2015)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). By the founding, the Magna
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

Carta was understood to mean that “no subject would be
deprived of a private right—that is, a right of life, liberty,
or property—except in accordance with ‘the law of the land,’
which consisted only of statutory and common law.” Asso-
ciation of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 72 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.) (citing N. Chapman & M. McConnell, Due Pro-
cess as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1688
(2012)).
 A rule made by someone other than the legislature, such
as the King, was not “ ‘the law of the land.’ ” Association of
American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 72 (opinion of THOMAS,
J.). Chief Justice Coke famously held invalid the King’s
proclamation prohibiting new buildings in London because
the King could not “create any offence” “without Parlia-
ment.” Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 74, 74–75, 77
Eng. Rep. 1352, 1353 (K. B. 1611); see Association of Amer-
ican Railroads, 575 U. S., at 72 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (ex-
plaining that this principle was associated with chapter 39
of the Magna Carta). When the Founders transplanted the
same principle into the Due Process Clause, they ensured
that when the government wanted to deprive people of the
familiar core private rights of “life, liberty, and property,” it
could not do so “on the basis of a rule (or a will) not enacted
by the legislature.” Id., at 75–76.
 B
 Neither the Legislative Vesting Clause nor the Due Pro-
cess Clause forbids Congress from delegating its other pow-
ers. As this Court put it two centuries ago, although Con-
gress cannot delegate powers that are “strictly and
exclusively legislative,” it can “certainly delegate” others.
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 , 42–43 (1825) (opinion
for the Court by Marshall, C. J.).
 Many of Congress’s powers fall within the core legislative
power subject to the nondelegation doctrine. For example,
the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate
6 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

commerce among the States. Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Congress can
thus make substantive rules for interstate trade—such as
by restricting drug shipments across state lines—punisha-
ble with fines or imprisonment. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U. S. 1, 58 (2005) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Likewise, the
Constitution gives Congress many other powers that impli-
cate life, liberty, and property, including the power to pro-
vide for the punishment of counterfeiting, Art. I, §8, cl. 6;
the power to provide for the punishment of treason, Art. III,
§3, cl. 2; and the power to impose internal taxes, Art. I, §8,
cl. 1; Amdt. 16. These powers cannot be delegated, as I have
repeatedly explained. See, e.g., Association of American
Railroads, 575 U. S., at 77 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); Whit-
man v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 487
(2001) (THOMAS, J., concurring). They cannot be delegated
even if Congress delegates them unambiguously. Cf. ante,
at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).
 Congress also has many powers that are not subject to
the nondelegation doctrine. “We now think of the powers
listed in Article I, Section 8 as quintessentially legislative
powers, but many of them were actual, former, or asserted
powers of the Crown, which the drafters decided to allocate
to the legislative branch.” M. McConnell, The President
Who Would Not Be King 274 (2020) (McConnell); accord,
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 36 (2015) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). These
include the powers to raise and support armies, to fix the
standards of weights and measures, to grant copyrights, to
dispose of federal property, and, as discussed below, to reg-
ulate foreign commerce. Art. I, §8; Art. IV, §3. None of
these powers involves setting the rules for the deprivation
of core private rights. Blackstone called them “prerogative”
powers, and sometimes “executive.” See 1 Blackstone 242,
245, 255–262, 264–265, 276, 279; 2 id., at 407, 410 (1766);
1 W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History
of the United States 416, 421–425 (1953); McConnell 274–
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

275. By one count, 13 of the 29 powers given to Congress in
Article I were powers that “Blackstone described as ‘execu-
tive’ powers.” 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution, at
428.
 For most of American history, the nondelegation doctrine
was understood not to apply to these powers. Contra, ante,
at 42–46 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). “The early congresses
felt free to delegate certain powers to President Washington
in broad terms.” McConnell 333. Thus, the Constitution
gives Congress the power to support armies, Art. I, §8, cl.
12, but Congress in 1789 delegated to the President the
power to establish regulations for benefits to veterans
wounded in the Revolutionary War. See Act of Sept. 29,
1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 . The Constitution gives Congress
the power to grant patents, Art. I, §8, cl. 8, but Congress in
1790 delegated to executive officials the power to grant pa-
tents in their discretion. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §1,
1 Stat. 109–110. The Constitution gives Congress the
power to borrow money, Art. I, §8, cl. 2, but Congress in
1790 delegated to the President the power to borrow up to
$12 million on behalf of the United States in his discretion.
See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §2, 1 Stat. 139 . The Constitution
gives Congress the power to raise armies, Art. I, §8, cl. 12,
but Congress in 1791 delegated to the President the power
to raise an army of 2,000 troops in his discretion. See Act
of Mar. 3, 1791, §8, 1 Stat. 223 . And, as I explain further
below, see infra, at 13–15, the Constitution gives Congress
the power to regulate foreign commerce, Art. I, §8, cl. 3, but
early Congresses often delegated to the President the power
to regulate foreign commerce. See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1790,
ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 ; Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372 .
 These early delegations had one thing in common: They
did not implicate the Legislative Vesting Clause or the Due
Process Clause. “None of these statutes disturbed natural
rights or intruded into the core of the legislative power.”
McConnell 333; cf. A. Bamzai, Comment, Delegation and
8 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation
and Future of Administrative Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 164 ,
178 (2019). They therefore did not violate the nondelega-
tion doctrine.
 The Constitutional Convention seemed to agree with this
understanding of delegation. Contra, ante, at 42
(GORSUCH, J., concurring). James Madison proposed an
amendment clarifying that the President had the power “ ‘to
execute such other powers’ ” as were “ ‘delegated by the na-
tional Legislature,’ ” so long as the delegated powers were
“ ‘ “not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature.” ’ ” 1 Rec-
ords of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 67 (M. Farrand
ed. 1966). Thus, in Madison’s view, some of Congress’s pow-
ers were “not Legislative” and could be “delegated” to the
President. Ibid. Madison’s proposal was rejected after oth-
ers argued that it was unnecessary. Ibid. Madison agreed
that the purpose of the proposed amendment was only to
“prevent doubts and misconstructions.” Ibid. Nobody dis-
puted that Madison stated the correct scope of the nondele-
gation doctrine. Ibid.; see also McConnell 332 (“[W]e can
infer [from Madison’s motion] that the framers understood
that Congress would be able to delegate its royal preroga-
tive powers back to the President”).2

——————
 2 Thus, although many used the word “legislative” in the broader sense

to describe powers that should initially belong to the legislature, ante, at
42–43 (GORSUCH, J., concurring), the Founders likely understood the
Legislative Vesting Clause to refer more narrowly to “core legislative
power,” Department of Transportation v. Association of American Rail-
roads, 575 U. S. 43, 80 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). That
understanding accorded with the views of separation-of-powers theorists
of the time, who distinguished the three core functions of government
from the institutions that would exercise them in any given polity. S.
Prakash & M. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive,
89 Minn. L. Rev 1591, 1612–1617 (2005); see 1 B. de Montesquieu, The
Spirit of Laws 151–153 (T. Nugent transl., rev. ed. 1899). For nondele-
gation purposes, therefore, “[t]he key is to distinguish between strictly
legislative authority—the power to make rules binding on persons or
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

 II
 As a matter of original understanding, historical practice,
and judicial precedent, the power to impose duties on im-
ports is not within the core legislative power. Congress can
therefore delegate the exercise of this power to the Presi-
dent.
 A
 Neither of the two constitutional foundations for the non-
delegation doctrine forbids Congress from delegating to the
President the power to impose duties on imports.
 1
 The Legislative Vesting Clause provides no basis for ap-
plying the nondelegation doctrine to the power to impose
duties on imports.
 “The ‘power over external affairs [is] in origin and essen-
tial character different from that over internal affairs.’ ”
Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U. S. 255, 356 (2023) (THOMAS,
J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319 (1936)). Although internal
affairs are governed by the domestic law of one sovereign,
external affairs implicate the relationship between sover-
eigns, which is subject to the law of nations. See Locke
§§145–148, at 383–384; 1 Blackstone 264; 4 id., at 66–68
(1769); E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations 161–163, 281–289
(J. Chitty ed. 1852) (Vattel). External affairs, then, are not
susceptible to being “directed by antecedent, standing, pos-
itive Laws” made by one nation. Locke §147, at 384. When
a person goes abroad, he must resort to the political
branches (and ultimately the military)—rather than the ju-
diciary—for protection, can indebt the executive to foreign
nations for his personal misconduct, and can trigger a for-
eign conflict. See Vattel 161–163, 281–289; 2 F. Wharton,
——————
property within the nation—and other powers assigned to Congress.”
McConnell 327.
10 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

Digest of International Law §222, pp. 575–576 (2d ed.
1887); see also id., §§189, 213–221, at 432–445, 539–575.
 The power to regulate external affairs was accordingly
not viewed as within the core legislative power at the found-
ing. See Zivotofsky, 576 U. S., at 35–37 (opinion of THOMAS,
J.). Blackstone described powers over “intercourse with for-
eign nations” as “prerogative” powers naturally belonging
to the King. 1 Blackstone 245; see id., at 232. Locke agreed
that this power “must be lodged” with the “executive.” Zi-
votofsky, 576 U. S., at 35 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (citing
Locke §148). Baron de Montesquieu classified all powers
“in respect to things dependent on the law of nations” as
part of “the executive power.” 1 The Spirit of Laws 151 (T.
Nugent transl., rev. ed. 1899). The “legislative” power, by
contrast, “applied only within the realm.” McConnell 214.
 The power to regulate external affairs included power
over foreign commerce. At the founding, the “external ex-
ecutive power” included “ ‘the transactions of the state with
any other independent state.’ ” Zivotofsky, 576 U. S., at 36
(opinion of THOMAS, J.). In Great Britain, the King had no
unilateral legislative power, McConnell 107, but he had
much unilateral power over foreign commerce. His power
over foreign commerce included the power to “govern for-
eign trade,” id., at 216, and to “prohibit any of his subjects
from leaving the realm,” 1 Blackstone 261; accord, East In-
dia Co. v. Sandys, Skin. 223, 223–224, 90 Eng. Rep. 103
(K. B. 1684) (describing the “inherent prerogative in the
Crown, that none should trade with foreigners without the
King’s licence”). Thomas Rutherforth’s Institutes of Natu-
ral Law—“a treatise routinely cited by the Founders,” Zivo-
tofsky, 576 U. S., at 36 (opinion of THOMAS, J.)—explained
that the “external executive power” included “the power of
adjusting the rights of a nation in respect of . . . trade.” 2
Institutes of Natural Law 55–56 (1756); accord, Locke §146,
at 383. The power to impose duties on imports was a con-
ventional method for governing foreign trade. It originated
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

as a “prerogative right” of the King, N. Gras, Early English
Customs System 21 (1918).3
 2
 The Due Process Clause likewise provides no basis for ap-
plying the nondelegation doctrine to the power to impose
duties on imports. The Due Process Clause protects
“rights,” not “privileges.” Gutierrez v. Saenz, 606 U. S. 305,
331 (2025) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Importing is a matter
of privilege.
 The government can charge money for privileges without
depriving a person of property for due-process purposes.
The government charges people money every day for a wide
range of activities, such as to enter a government park, mail
an envelope, apply for a copyright, or file a lawsuit. Be-
cause a person has no core private right to engage in these
activities, the government is not subject to due-process re-
straints in setting such charges. The due-process question
is not whether a government action “ ‘raise[s] revenue,’ ”
ante, at 6 (majority opinion), but whether it implicates core
private rights. Supra, at 3–4. Thus, when Congress dele-
gates power to make “regulations” on federal land, the Sec-
retary of Agriculture can set a “charge” for the “privilege of
grazing sheep” on that land without thereby “exercis[ing]
the legislative power.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S.
506 , 522–523 (1911); see also Bamzai, 133 Harv. L. Rev., at
180–182; contra, ante, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). Con-
gress has, consistent with due process, delegated the power
to set charges for a wide range of privileges. See 16 U. S. C.
§6802 (delegating the power to set fees for entrance to and
——————
 3 See also P. Einzig, The Control of the Purse: Progress and Decline of

Parliament’s Financial Control 65 (1959) (“[T]he origin of the term ‘cus-
toms’ is that it had been the ancient customary practice of the Crown to
levy charges on imports and exports on its own authority”). Parliament
took some of that prerogative power away, but delegated it back in broad
terms to the King, see id., at 65–70, who was still agreed to have no leg-
islative power, McConnell 107–110.
12 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

use of federal recreation areas); 17 U. S. C. §1316 (delegat-
ing the power to “by regulation set reasonable fees” for ap-
plications); 39 U. S. C. §3622 (delegating the power to set
postal rates); 28 U. S. C. §1911 (“The Supreme Court may
fix the fees to be charged by its clerk”).
 A person had no core private right to import goods at the
founding. On the Founders’ understanding, statutes allow-
ing “importation of goods from abroad were thought to cre-
ate mere privileges rather than core private rights.” Nel-
son, 107 Colum. L. Rev., at 580. Foreign commerce was
governed by the law of nations, which is a law of “sover-
eigns,” not of “private individuals.” Vattel 285. “[A]ny at-
tempt to introduce foreign goods” without the “expressed al-
lowances” of the sovereign was “a violation of its
sovereignty.” Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 196 (1854).
“Every state” had “a right to prohibit the entrance of foreign
merchandises,” including through the imposition of duties
on imports. Vattel §§90, 99, at 38, 43. Because “no one had
a vested right to import” any “goods from abroad,” the im-
position of “tariffs” as a condition for importing those goods
did not implicate the Due Process Clause any more than
when the government charges money for other privileges.
Nelson, 107 Colum. L. Rev., at 580.
 * * *
 The power to impose duties on imports thus does not im-
plicate either of the constitutional foundations for the non-
delegation doctrine. Hence, even the strongest critics of del-
egation, myself included, have recognized that regulations
of foreign commerce might not be subject to ordinary non-
delegation limitations. See FCC v. Consumers’ Research,
 606 U. S. 656, 742, n. 19 (2025) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting)
(“[I]t may be . . . that tariffs and domestic taxes present dif-
ferent contexts when it comes to the problem of delega-
tion”); accord, Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S.,
at 80 , and n. 5 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). So long as Congress
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

complies with other constitutional limitations, it can dele-
gate this power.
 B
 Historical practice and precedent confirm that Congress
can delegate the power to impose duties on imports.
 1
 Since the 1790s, Congress has consistently delegated to
the President power over foreign commerce, including the
power to impose duties on imports. “ ‘Practically every vol-
ume of the United States Statutes’ ” contains broad delega-
tions to the President in the area of foreign commerce. Id.,
at 80, n. 5 (quoting Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S.,
at 324 ).
 The First Congress gave the President the power to “pre-
scribe” “rules and regulations” that would “gover[n]” any
person licensed to trade with Indians. 1 Stat. 137 . Trade
with Indians was regarded as “a matter of external rela-
tions.” McConnell 333. In delegating this power, Congress
did not specify or limit what kinds of regulations the Presi-
dent could impose. Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137–138.
Pursuant to that broad delegation, the President restricted
trading “[d]istilled [s]pirits,” required each trader to “give
intelligence” to the Government, and subdelegated to his
superintendents the power to “assign the limits within
which each trader shall trade.” 61 Timothy Pickering Pa-
pers, Massachusetts Historical Society 4 (Aug. 28, 1790);
see also Letter from G. Washington to H. Knox (Aug. 13,
1790), in 6 Papers of George Washington 244–245 (D.
Twohig ed. 1996). Any person who violated the President’s
regulations would owe $1,000 “payable to the President.” 1
Stat. 137 .
 Succeeding early Congresses delegated many more pow-
ers over foreign commerce to the President. In 1794, Con-
gress delegated to the President the power to “lay an
14 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports of the United
States,” including ships belonging to Americans, unless
Congress was in session. Act of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372 .
It authorized the President to make “such regulations as
the circumstances of the case may require” in exercising
that delegated power. Ibid. Congress allowed the Presi-
dent to impose the embargo as “in his opinion, the public
safety shall so require.” Ibid. In 1795, Congress delegated
to the President the power to “permit the exportation of
arms, cannon and military stores, the law prohibiting the
exportation of the same to the contrary notwithstanding.”
Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 53, 1 Stat. 444 . In 1798, Congress
delegated to the President the power to discontinue “prohi-
bitions and restraints” on commerce with France. Act of
June 13, 1798, 1 Stat. 565–566; see also, e.g., Act of Mar. 3,
1817, ch. 39, 3 Stat. 361–362 (delegating to the President
the power to discontinue a ban on importation of plaster of
Paris). In 1799, Congress delegated to the President the
authority to discontinue and to reimpose “restraints and
prohibitions” on commerce with France when he “deem[ed]
it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United
States.” Act of Feb. 9, 1799, 1 Stat. 615 . And, in 1800, Con-
gress delegated to the President the power to remove a ban
on trade with France, and to “re-establish” certain “re-
straints and prohibitions” when he “deem[ed] it expedient.”
Act of Feb. 27, 1800, 2 Stat. 9–10.4
 Congress likewise delegated to the President the power
to set duties on imports. In 1815, Congress delegated to the
President the power to lower reciprocal duties when he was
“satisfied” that other nations’ trade practices no longer op-
erated “to the disadvantage of the United States.” Act of
Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 77, 3 Stat. 224 . In 1824, Congress

——————
 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH’s interpretation of two “early congressional de-

bates,” ante, at 43 (concurring opinion), is thus difficult to reconcile with
what early Congresses actually did.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 15

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

delegated to the President the power to lower and to reim-
pose duties in response to foreign nations’ trade practices.
See Act of Jan. 7, 1824, 4 Stat. 2–3. Throughout the early
decades of the Republic, Congress continued to delegate to
the President similar powers over duties on imports on a
regular basis. See, e.g., Act of May 24, 1828, ch. 111, 4 Stat.
308 ; Act of May 31, 1830, ch. 219, 4 Stat. 425 ; Act of July
13, 1832, ch. 207, 4 Stat. 578–579. Presidents frequently
changed the rates of duties on imports as to various foreign
nations pursuant to these delegations.5
 2
 This Court has consistently upheld Congress’s delegation
of power over foreign commerce, including the power to im-
pose duties on imports.
 The Court has long conveyed to Congress that it may “in-
vest the President with large discretion in matters arising
out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and com-
merce with other nations.” Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,
 143 U. S. 649, 691 (1892). Since shortly after the founding,
the Court has rejected challenges to delegations of power
over foreign commerce. See Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United
——————
 5 See, e.g., July 24, 1818, Proclamation of President J. Monroe, in 2

Messages and Papers of the Presidents 606–607 (J. Richardson ed. 1897)
(eliminating duties on “goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the
United States” as to the Free Hanseatic city of Bremen); see also, e.g.,
Aug. 1, 1818, Proclamation of President J. Monroe, in 2 id., at 607; May
4, 1820, Proclamation of President J. Monroe, in 2 id., at 642; Aug. 20,
1821, Proclamation of President J. Monroe, in 2 id., at 665–666; Nov. 22,
1821, Proclamation of President J. Monroe, in 2 id., at 666–667; June 7,
1827, Proclamation of President J. Quincy Adams, in 2 id., at 942–943;
July 1, 1828, Proclamation of President J. Quincy Adams, in 2 id., at
970–971; May 11, 1829, Proclamation of President A. Jackson, in 3 id.,
at 1003; June 3, 1829, Proclamation of President A. Jackson, in 3 id., at
1004–1005; Apr. 28, 1835, Proclamation of President A. Jackson, in 3 id.,
at 1365–1366; Sept. 1, 1836, Proclamation of President A. Jackson, in 3
id., at 1452–1453; June 14, 1837, Proclamation of President M. Van Bu-
ren, in 4 id., at 1539.
16 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

States, 7 Cranch 382, 386 , 387–389 (1813). Even when a
“challenged delegation, if it were confined to internal af-
fairs, would be invalid,” the Court has upheld the delega-
tion. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at 315, 322 .
There is a “fundamental” difference, the Court has ex-
plained, between “foreign or external affairs” and “domestic
or internal affairs.” Id., at 315 . Thus, “Congress may of
course delegate very large grants of its power over foreign
commerce to the President,” Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 109 (1948), in-
cluding when it comes to imposing “duties” on imports,
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at 325, n. 2 .
 When Congress has delegated to the President the power
to impose duties on imports, this Court has upheld those
delegations. In Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , the Court upheld Con-
gress’s delegation to the President of the power to impose
duties on nations whose importation policies “he may deem
to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.” Id., at 680 .
It explained that Congress had “frequently, from the organ-
ization of the government to the present time,” conferred
powers over “trade and commerce” to “the President.” Id.,
at 683 . In J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394 (1928), the Court upheld a delegation to the Pres-
ident to impose duties as necessary up to statutorily limited
rates to make them reciprocal. Id., at 401, 409 . And, in
Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426
U. S. 548 (1976), the Court upheld a delegation of the power
to impose a universal duty on imported oil. Id., at 555 , 558–
560.6
——————
 6 The Court has even suggested that the President has inherent peace-

time authority to impose duties on imports. After the Mexican-American
War ended, executive officials imposed duties on imports at a California
port within the United States before Congress had “passed an act to ex-
tend the collection of tonnage and import duties to the ports of Califor-
nia.” Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 190 (1854); see also id., at 192 ,
194–196. The executive officials unilaterally extended Congress’s earlier
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 17

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

 Although these cases involved duties on imports, the
Court nowhere suggested that a different nondelegation
rule applied because the duty was a “tax” or “raise[d] reve-
nue.” Ante, at 6 (majority opinion) (internal quotation
marks omitted).7
 III
 Congress’s delegation here was constitutional. The stat-
ute at issue in these cases, the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, delegates to the President a wide
range of powers over foreign commerce. IEEPA gives the
President, on conditions satisfied here, the power to “regu-
late” foreign commerce, including “importation” of foreign
property. 50 U. S. C. §1702 (a)(1)(B).
 IEEPA’s delegation of power to impose duties on imports
complies with the nondelegation doctrine. Congress dele-
gated to the President a version of the same power that it
has delegated to him in many statutes since the early days
of the Republic. See supra, at 13–17. Congress limited that
delegation to foreign commerce. See §1702(a)(1)(B); see
also §1701. In delegating the power to impose duties on
imports, it gave the President no core legislative power to
make substantive rules setting the conditions for depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property. Its delegation therefore
complied with the constitutional separation of powers and
is consistent with centuries of practice and precedent. It
did not need to exercise that power itself and did not need
to delegate it “unambiguously”—even though, as JUSTICE

——————
authorized duties to new ports. Id., at 193. Although the Court’s rea-
soning was somewhat opaque, the Court upheld the executive officials’
unilateral peacetime duties in part because nobody has a right to “intro-
duce foreign goods” except with the sovereign’s “expressed allowances.”
Id., at 196–197.
 7 In fact, less than a year ago, the Court explicitly rejected “a special

nondelegation rule for revenue-raising legislation.” FCC v. Consumers’
Research, 606 U. S. 656, 674 (2025).
18 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 THOMAS, J., dissenting

KAVANAUGH explains, it did. See post, at 38–45 (dissenting
opinion).
 The principal opinion bases its decision on the major
questions doctrine. Ante, at 7–13 (opinion of ROBERTS,
C. J.). In some cases, the Court has used the major ques-
tions doctrine as a canon of statutory interpretation be-
cause delegations of major powers are unlikely to be subtle.
See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U. S., at 468 ; see ante, at 8 (opinion
of ROBERTS, C. J.); see also Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S.
477 , 501–503 (2023). In other cases, the Court has used it
to avoid what would have been originally understood as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See, e.g.,
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022); ante, at 8
(opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). In today’s cases, neither the
statutory text nor the Constitution provide a basis for rul-
ing against the President. I respectfully dissent.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 Nos. 24–1287 and 25–250
 _________________

 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
24–1287 v.
 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

 DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
 STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
25–250 v.
 V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
 [February 20, 2026]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and
JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.
 Acting pursuant to his statutory authority to “regulate
. . . importation” under the 1977 International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, the President has imposed
tariffs on imports of foreign goods from various countries.
The tariffs have generated vigorous policy debates. Those
policy debates are not for the Federal Judiciary to resolve.
Rather, the Judiciary’s more limited role is to neutrally
interpret and apply the law. The sole legal question here is
whether, under IEEPA, tariffs are a means to “regulate . . .
importation.” Statutory text, history, and precedent
demonstrate that the answer is clearly yes: Like quotas
and embargoes, tariffs are a traditional and common tool to
regulate importation.
2 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 Since early in U. S. history, Congress has regularly
authorized the President to impose tariffs on imports of
foreign goods. Presidents have often used that authority to
obtain leverage with foreign nations, help American
manufacturers and workers compete on a more level
playing field, and generate revenue for the United States.
Numerous laws such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
and the Trade Act of 1974 continue to authorize the
President to place tariffs on foreign imports in a variety of
circumstances, and Presidents have often done so. In
recent years, Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and
Biden have all imposed tariffs on foreign imports under
those statutory authorities.
 President Trump has similarly imposed tariffs, and has
done so here under IEEPA. During declared national
emergencies, IEEPA broadly authorizes the President to
regulate international economic transactions. Most
relevant for this case, during those national emergencies,
IEEPA grants the President the power to “regulate . . .
importation” of foreign goods.
 In early 2025, President Trump declared two national
emergencies pursuant to the National Emergencies Act.
See 50 U. S. C. §1621 (a). One emergency concerned drug
trafficking into the United States. The other emergency
involved trade imbalances with foreign nations that have
harmed American manufacturers and workers.
 To help address those emergencies, the President drew
upon his authority in IEEPA to “regulate . . . importation,”
and he imposed tariffs on imports from various countries.
 The plaintiffs argue and the Court concludes that the
President lacks authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs. I
disagree. In accord with Judge Taranto’s careful and
persuasive opinion in the Federal Circuit, I would conclude
that the President’s power under IEEPA to “regulate . . .
importation” encompasses tariffs. As a matter of ordinary
meaning, including dictionary definitions and historical
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

usage, the broad power to “regulate . . . importation”
includes the traditional and common means to do so—in
particular, quotas, embargoes, and tariffs.
 History and precedent confirm that conclusion. In 1971,
President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs on almost all
foreign imports. He levied the tariffs under IEEPA’s
predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act,
which similarly authorized the President to “regulate
. . . importation.” The Nixon tariffs were upheld in court.
 Moreover, in 1976, a year before IEEPA was enacted, this
Court unanimously ruled that a similarly worded statute
authorizing the President to “adjust the imports” permitted
President Ford to impose monetary exactions on foreign oil
imports. See Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin
SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976) (Algonquin).
 For both the Nixon tariffs and the Ford tariffs upheld by
this Court in Algonquin, the relevant statutory provisions
did not specifically refer to “tariffs” or “duties,” but instead
more broadly authorized the President to “regulate . . .
importation” or to “adjust the imports.” Therefore, when
IEEPA was enacted in 1977 in the wake of the Nixon and
Ford tariffs and the Algonquin decision, Congress and the
public plainly would have understood that the power to
“regulate . . . importation” included tariffs. If Congress
wanted to exclude tariffs from IEEPA, it surely would not
have enacted the same broad “regulate . . . importation”
language that had just been used to justify major American
tariffs on foreign imports.
 Importantly, IEEPA’s authorization for the President to
impose tariffs did not grant the President any new
substantive power. Since the Founding, numerous statutes
have authorized—and still do authorize—the President to
impose tariffs and other foreign import restrictions. IEEPA
merely allows the President to impose tariffs somewhat
more efficiently to deal with foreign threats during national
emergencies.
4 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 Context and common sense buttress that interpretation
of IEEPA. The plaintiffs and the Court acknowledge that
IEEPA authorizes the President to impose quotas or
embargoes on foreign imports—meaning that a President
could completely block some or all imports. But they say
that IEEPA does not authorize the President to employ the
lesser power of tariffs, which simply condition imports on a
payment. As they interpret the statute, the President
could, for example, block all imports from China but cannot
order even a $1 tariff on goods imported from China.
 That approach does not make much sense. Properly read,
IEEPA does not draw such an odd distinction between
quotas and embargoes on the one hand and tariffs on the
other. Rather, it empowers the President to regulate
imports during national emergencies with the tools
Presidents have traditionally and commonly used,
including quotas, embargoes, and tariffs.
 The Court today nonetheless concludes otherwise and
holds that IEEPA does not authorize the President to
impose tariffs to deal with the declared drug trafficking and
trade deficit emergencies. But the Court’s decision is
splintered. In today’s six-Justice majority, three Justices
(JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE
JACKSON) interpret IEEPA not to authorize tariffs as a
matter of ordinary statutory interpretation. I disagree for
the reasons noted above and elaborated on at length in this
opinion.
 Three other Justices (THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
GORSUCH, and JUSTICE BARRETT) lean on the major
questions canon of statutory interpretation to resolve this
case. That important canon requires “clear congressional
authorization” for an executive action of major economic
and political significance, particularly when the Executive
exercises an “unheralded” power. West Virginia v. EPA,
 597 U. S. 697 , 722–723 (2022) (quotation marks omitted).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 In my view, as I will explain, the major questions canon
does not control here for two alternative and independent
reasons.
 First, the statutory text, history, and precedent
constitute “clear congressional authorization” for the
President to impose tariffs under IEEPA. In particular,
throughout American history, Presidents have commonly
imposed tariffs as a means to “regulate . . . importation.” So
tariffs were not an “unheralded” power when Congress
enacted IEEPA in 1977 and authorized the President to
“regulate . . . importation” of foreign goods. Therefore, the
major questions doctrine is satisfied here. Cf. Biden v.
Missouri, 595 U. S. 87 (2022) (per curiam).
 Second, in any event, the Court has never before applied
the major questions doctrine in the foreign affairs context,
including foreign trade. Rather, as Justice Robert Jackson
summarized and remains true, this Court has always
recognized the “ ‘unwisdom of requiring Congress in this
field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite
standards by which the President is to be governed.’ ”
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 636,
n. 2 (1952) (concurring opinion) (quoting United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 , 321–322
(1936)). In foreign affairs cases, courts read the statute as
written and do not employ the major questions doctrine as
a thumb on the scale against the President.
 Although I firmly disagree with the Court’s holding
today, the decision might not substantially constrain a
President’s ability to order tariffs going forward. That is
because numerous other federal statutes authorize the
President to impose tariffs and might justify most (if not
all) of the tariffs at issue in this case—albeit perhaps with
a few additional procedural steps that IEEPA, as an
emergency statute, does not require. Those statutes
include, for example, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
(Section 232); the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 122, 201, and
6 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

301); and the Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 338). In essence,
the Court today concludes that the President checked the
wrong statutory box by relying on IEEPA rather than
another statute to impose these tariffs.
 In the meantime, however, the interim effects of the
Court’s decision could be substantial. The United States
may be required to refund billions of dollars to importers
who paid the IEEPA tariffs, even though some importers
may have already passed on costs to consumers or others.
As was acknowledged at oral argument, the refund process
is likely to be a “mess.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 153–155. In
addition, according to the Government, the IEEPA tariffs
have helped facilitate trade deals worth trillions of
dollars—including with foreign nations from China to the
United Kingdom to Japan, and more. The Court’s decision
could generate uncertainty regarding those trade
arrangements.
 In any event, the only issue before the Court today is one
of law. In light of the statutory text, longstanding historical
practice, and relevant Supreme Court precedents, I would
conclude that IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate
. . . importation” by imposing tariffs on foreign imports
during declared national emergencies. I therefore
respectfully dissent.1
 I
 Before turning to the specifics of IEEPA’s text, history,
and precedent, I briefly review several fundamental
constitutional principles about the roles of the three
branches of the U. S. Government with respect to this case.
 First, the plaintiffs and their amici, echoed by the Court,
rhetorically emphasize that Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution assigns Congress, not the President, authority
——————
 1 In this dissent, when I refer to “THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion,” I am

referring to the parts of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion that speak for only
three Justices—namely, Parts II–A–2 and III.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

over tariffs. Ante, at 5. That rhetoric is a red herring in
this case because no one disputes the point. Everyone,
including the President, agrees that Congress possesses
constitutional authority over tariffs.
 The important principle here, as everyone also
acknowledges, is that Congress may in turn authorize the
President to impose tariffs. Cf. FCC v. Consumers’
Research, 606 U. S. 656 , 673–675 (2025); J. W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 , 409–410 (1928).
Indeed, since the beginning of the Republic, Congress has
regularly empowered the President to order tariffs and
other foreign import restrictions under various
circumstances. As noted above, many current federal laws
continue to grant the President expansive tariff authority,
including the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232);
the Trade Act of 1974 (Sections 122, 201, and 301); and the
Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 338). Neither the plaintiffs nor
the Court has suggested that the numerous laws granting
tariff power to the President violate the Constitution’s
separation of powers.
 Second, and relatedly, the President does not claim
unilateral authority to impose IEEPA tariffs without
congressional authorization or over a congressional
prohibition. On the contrary, the President’s argument
recognizes that, in exercising his statutory tariff power
under IEEPA, he must act within the scope of Congress’s
authorizations and abide by Congress’s limitations. And
the Executive has further acknowledged that the Judiciary
maintains the final word in justiciable cases on whether
Congress has authorized the President to impose those
tariffs under IEEPA. See Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U. S.
831 , 859–860, n. 18 (2025); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 , 177–178 (1803).
 The President here contends only that Congress, by
enacting IEEPA in 1977, authorized the President to
impose tariffs on foreign imports in declared national
8 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

emergencies. To use the familiar vernacular of Justice
Robert Jackson in Youngstown, the President argues that
this case falls into category one, where the President is
acting “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion). The President
has not here asserted authority to impose IEEPA tariffs in
a peacetime emergency in a Youngstown category two or
three scenario. Id., at 637–638.2
 Third, Congress possesses a variety of tools to limit the
President’s tariffs—directly via new legislation or, perhaps
more readily, by not approving annual appropriations
necessary for the Executive Branch to continue to
implement the tariffs. See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S.
477, 505 (2023) (“Among Congress’s most important
authorities is its control of the purse”).
 Importantly, the House, the Senate, and the President
annually approve most appropriations. As a result, each
House of Congress and the President independently
possesses de facto veto power over particular
appropriations.3
 Of course, many different appropriations items are
usually considered and packaged together, so the
negotiations can be complex. But the point stands:
Congress is not a helpless bystander when it comes to the
President’s exercise of tariff authority under IEEPA. Cf.
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2011, 124 Stat. 4351–4352 (barring Executive from
——————
 2 Category two applies when “the President acts in absence of either a

congressional grant or denial of authority.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at
637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Category three occurs when “the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress.” Ibid.
 3 Two technical points for clarity: Given current Senate filibuster
rules, a determined minority of the Senate could block an appropriation.
Also, even over a Presidential veto, two-thirds of both Houses could
together approve certain appropriations.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

using funds to transfer detainees from Guantanamo into
United States); Boland Amendment, 98 Stat. 1935–1936
(1984) (barring certain Executive Branch agencies from
providing aid to Contras in Nicaragua).
 In Congress, moreover, everything is related to
everything else, as the saying goes. Members and
Committees of Congress possess substantial tools of
leverage over the Executive Branch. Cf. The Federalist No.
51, p. 322 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Congress
could, for example, wield its authority over oversight,
legislation, confirmations, or appropriations to pressure the
President to reduce or eliminate some or all of the IEEPA
tariffs.
 In light of Congress’s appropriations authority and its
other robust powers, it is not correct to suggest—as THE
CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion today elliptically does, ante, at 9—
that two-thirds majorities of both Houses of Congress would
need to pass new legislation over a Presidential veto in
order to limit these IEEPA tariffs or, more generally, to
restrict the President’s use of IEEPA to impose tariffs.
 II
 This case presents one straightforward question of
statutory interpretation: Does Congress’s explicit grant of
authority in IEEPA for the President to “regulate . . .
importation” of foreign goods in declared national
emergencies authorize the President to impose tariffs? The
answer is a clear yes.4
——————
 4 The relevant statutory provision provides in full:

 “At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title,
the President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means
of instructions, licenses, or otherwise—
 . . . . .
 “(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation,
regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
10 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 A
 I begin as always with the statutory text.
 In 1941, a few days after Pearl Harbor, Congress first
enacted the relevant language, “regulate . . . importation,”
in an amendment to the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act,
known as TWEA. 55 Stat. 839 ; 40 Stat. 411 . After that
1941 amendment, TWEA authorized the President to
“regulate . . . importation” both during wartime and during
peacetime national emergencies.
 Then, in 1977, Congress split TWEA into two separate
statutes. As relevant here, Congress amended TWEA to
authorize the President to “regulate . . . importation”
during wartime only. 91 Stat. 1625 . And Congress enacted
a separate statute, IEEPA, that granted the President the
power to “regulate . . . importation” during peacetime
national emergencies. Id., at 1626.
 The relevant IEEPA text authorized the President to
“regulate . . . importation” “by means of instructions,
licenses, or otherwise.” Ibid.; 50 U. S. C. §1702 (a)(1)
(emphasis added). As the term “otherwise” indicates, the
broadly worded statute did not exclude tariffs or dictate any
specific means of regulating importation.5
 At the time of TWEA’s amendment in 1941 and IEEPA’s
enactment in 1977, the ordinary dictionary meaning of
“regulate” was to “control,” to “adjust by rule,” or to “subject
——————
acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U. S. C. §1702 (a)(1) (emphasis
added).
 5 Congress no doubt appreciated that quotas, embargoes, tariffs, and

the like can be powerful tools for regulating foreign commerce. Congress
calibrated the statute by exempting various categories of goods, meaning
that those categories of goods are not subject to tariffs under IEEPA.
§1702(b).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

to governing principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1156 (5th ed. 1979); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1519
(3d ed. 1933) (same); Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1913 (1976) (defining “regulate” as “to govern or
direct according to rule” and “to bring under the control of
law or constituted authority”); American Heritage
Dictionary 1096 (1969) (“[t]o control or direct according to a
rule”; “[t]o adjust in conformity to a specification or
requirement”).
 Imposing tariffs on imports is clearly a way of controlling
imports (Black’s); governing or directing imports according
to rule (Webster’s, American Heritage); adjusting imports
by rule, method, or established mode (Black’s, American
Heritage); or more generally subjecting imports to
governing principles or laws (Black’s). So the dictionary
definitions amply demonstrate that tariffs are a means to
“regulate . . . importation” of foreign imports.6
 Consistent with those dictionary definitions and
statutory references, tariffs historically have been—and
still are—a common means for the United States to
regulate importation of foreign goods. See, e.g., Section 338
of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 704–706 ( 19 U. S. C.
§1338 ); Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76
Stat. 877 ( 19 U. S. C. §1862 ); Title II of the Trade Act of
1974, 88 Stat. 2011 ( 19 U. S. C. §2251 et seq.); Title III of
the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 2041 ( 19 U. S. C. §2411
et seq.).7

——————
 6 As other statutory authorities textually confirm, moreover, Congress

has long understood tariffs to be a tool for regulating imports. For
example, Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 refers to “duties and other
import restrictions.” 19 U. S. C. §§1351 (a)(1)(B), (c). And Section 122 of
the Trade Act of 1974 uses the phrase “restrict imports” to cover duties.
§2132(a). Both statutes take it as a given, therefore, that tariffs are a
means of regulating imports.
 7 As the parties and the Court use the terms, “tariffs” and “duties” are

synonymous.
12 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 In determining the ordinary meaning of “regulate
. . . importation,” the meaning of the related phrase
“regulate commerce” is also instructive. That phrase has
long been interpreted to encompass tariffs. Since the
Founding, the Constitution’s assignment to Congress of the
broad power to “regulate” foreign commerce has been
understood to include tariffs on foreign imports. See Art. I,
§8. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, the “right to
regulate commerce, even by the imposition of duties, was not
controverted.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 202 (1824)
(emphasis added). So too Justice Story: The “power to
regulate commerce includes the power of laying duties to
countervail the regulations and restrictions of foreign
nations.” 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States 530 (1833) (emphasis added). And still
more Story: To “lay duties” is a “common means of
executing the power” to “regulate commerce.” Id., at 531
(emphasis added). James Madison likewise stated that it
cannot “be inferred” that the “power to regulate trade does
not involve a power to tax it.” Letter from J. Madison to J.
Cabell, Sept. 18, 1828, in 9 Writings of James Madison 326
(G. Hunt ed. 1910) (emphasis added).
 Marshall, Story, and Madison make for a formidable trio.
And this Court has long echoed the Marshall-Story-
Madison understanding that tariffs “regulate” foreign
commerce. The “laying of a duty on imports, although an
exercise of the taxing power, is also an exercise of the power
to regulate foreign commerce.” McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 309 U. S. 414, 428 (1940) (emphasis added). And
again: Even though “the taxing power is a distinct power
and embraces the power to lay duties, it does not follow that
duties may not be imposed in the exercise of the power to
regulate commerce. The contrary is well established.”
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S.
48, 58 (1933) (emphasis added).8
 The plaintiffs and the Court today seize on the word
“regulate” in isolation, and say that it does not encompass
the power to tariff. Ante, at 14–16. But the relevant
statutory phrase is “regulate . . . importation.” And we
must look to the meaning of the phrase as a whole, as our
precedents dictate. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397,
406 (2011) (“[T]wo words together may assume a more
particular meaning than those words in isolation”). As I
have explained, since the Founding, tariffs on foreign
imports have been a common means of regulating foreign
commerce, including imports. Notably, under the Court’s
reading of the word “regulate,” Marshall, Story, and
Madison all erred by concluding that the power to
“regulate” foreign commerce includes the power to impose
tariffs on foreign imports. That seems dubious.
 If the Federal Government’s constitutional power to
“regulate” foreign commerce includes tariffs (as this Court
has repeatedly said), and if the power to “regulate . . .
importation” is the power to regulate foreign commerce
with respect to imports (as it plainly is), then IEEPA’s
authorization for the President to “regulate . . .
importation” clearly encompasses tariffs. Historical usage
and that textual syllogism further buttress the dictionary
definitions and help establish that tariffs are a means to
regulate importation.9
——————
 8 Importantly, those historical sources also fully demonstrate that the

Foreign Commerce Clause, not just the Taxing Clause, authorizes tariffs
on foreign imports. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 289 U. S., at
58 .
 9 The plaintiffs and the Court offer a double-bankshot argument that

“regulate . . . importation” cannot include monetary exactions because
IEEPA also authorizes the President to “regulate . . . exportation,” and
imposing duties on exports would violate the Constitution. Ante, at 15.
But as the Government thoroughly explains, when a statute contains a
14 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 B
 Perhaps even more significantly, when IEEPA was
enacted in 1977, Congress and the public clearly would
have understood that the phrase “regulate . . . importation”
encompassed tariffs. We know as much not only because of
the dictionary definitions and the traditional
understanding of tariffs as a tool to regulate foreign
imports. We also know as much because of tariffs imposed
by two Presidents and approved by federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, in the years shortly before IEEPA’s
1977 enactment.
 First, in 1971, President Nixon imposed 10 percent tariffs
across the board on virtually all imports from every country
in the world. Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3 CFR
60–61 (1971–1975 Comp.). Those tariffs were justified
under IEEPA’s predecessor statute, the Trading with the
Enemy Act, or TWEA.10 Like IEEPA now, TWEA at that
time authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation”
during national emergencies, as well as wartime. And like
IEEPA now, TWEA did not specifically use the words
“tariff ” or “duty.”

——————
long string of verbs and nouns, each term should be understood in
context. The relevant section of IEEPA contains 9 verbs and 11 objects,
for a total of 99 combinations. We do not need to construe each word of
the statute to ensure that it is perfectly aligned in all 99 pairings. See
Reply Brief 17; Robers v. United States, 572 U. S. 639 , 643–644 (2014);
Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v.
Kirtz, 601 U. S. 42, 61 (2024) (We may not “disregard the statute’s clear
terms” simply because there may be “a valid constitutional defense” to
some applications).
 10 President Nixon did not explicitly cite the “regulate . . . importation”

language of TWEA when imposing those worldwide tariffs. But that
merely reflected a diplomatic nicety given the title of the “Trading with
the Enemy Act” and the desire to avoid publicly suggesting that allies
were enemies. Once in court, the President openly invoked the “regulate
. . . importation” language of TWEA as justification for the tariffs. See
United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560 , 569–571 (CCPA 1975).
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 15

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 The Nixon tariffs did not fly below the radar. On the
contrary, President Nixon announced the worldwide 10
percent tariffs in a primetime address to the Nation on
August 15, 1971. He imposed the tariffs as a tool “to make
certain that American products will not be at a
disadvantage” and that “the product of American labor will
be more competitive.” Public Papers of the Presidents,
Richard Nixon, Aug. 15, 1971, p. 889. President Nixon
sought to remove “the unfair edge that some of our foreign
competition has,” and he declared that when “the unfair
treatment is ended, the import tax will end.” Ibid.
 The Nixon tariffs applied to almost all imports of foreign
goods into the United States. And the tariffs had no time
limit. To be sure, they did not end up lasting forever. But
President Nixon terminated them only because the tariffs
(as intended) induced major American trading partners to
negotiate new agreements. Presidential Proclamation No.
4098, 3 CFR 94 (1971–1975 Comp.).
 The Nixon tariffs garnered substantial national and
international attention, and were generally popular in
Congress. Predictably, however, the tariffs sparked
litigation challenges. In 1975, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, the predecessor to the Federal Circuit,
upheld the Nixon tariffs as a lawful exercise of the
President’s authority to “regulate . . . importation” under
TWEA. United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560,
576 , 583–584. The losing plaintiffs did not seek further
review in this Court.
 Two years later in 1977, when Congress divided TWEA
into two, Congress retained that same “regulate . . .
importation” language in both laws—in TWEA for wartime
and in IEEPA for peacetime national emergencies. In doing
so, Members of Congress were plainly aware—after all, how
could they not be—that the “regulate . . . importation”
language had recently been invoked by the President and
interpreted by the courts to encompass tariffs. Indeed, the
16 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

House Committee Report noted that the relevant “regulate
. . . importation” provision in TWEA “came into play when,
on August 15, 1971, President Nixon declared a national
emergency with respect to the balance-of-payments crisis
and under that emergency imposed a surcharge on
imports.” H. R. Rep. No. 95–459, p. 5 (1977). The Report
further referenced the appeals court’s holding in Yoshida
that TWEA “authorized imposition of duties” because of
“the existence of the national emergency.” H. R. Rep. No.
95–459, at 5.11
 The Nixon tariffs persuasively demonstrate that
Members of Congress and the public would have
understood the phrase “regulate . . . importation” to include
tariffs when IEEPA was enacted in 1977. If Congress
wanted to exclude tariffs from IEEPA’s scope, why would it
enact the exact statutory language from TWEA that had
just been invoked by the President and interpreted by the
courts to cover tariffs? Neither the plaintiffs nor the Court
today offers a good answer to that question.
Understandably so, because there is no good answer.
 The Court tries to dodge the force of the Nixon tariffs by
observing that one appeals court’s interpretation of
“regulate . . . importation” to uphold President Nixon’s
tariffs does not suffice to describe that interpretation as
“well-settled” when IEEPA was enacted in 1977. Ante, at
17–18. Fair enough. But that is not the right question. The
question is what Members of Congress and the public would
have understood “regulate . . . importation” to mean when
Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977. See New Prime Inc. v.
Oliveira, 586 U. S. 105, 113 (2019). Given the significant
and well-known Nixon tariffs, it is entirely implausible to
——————
 11 I cite the Committee Report not for determining the meaning of

IEEPA, but rather to help show as an historical and factual matter that
Members of Congress were aware of both the Nixon tariffs and the
appeals court decision upholding those tariffs as a tool to “regulate . . .
importation.”
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 17

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

think that Congress’s 1977 re-enactment of the phrase
“regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA was somehow meant
or understood to exclude tariffs.12
 Second, if one holds any lingering doubts about
Congress’s and the public’s understanding of the power to
“regulate . . . importation” as of 1977, a second episode
shortly before IEEPA’s enactment should answer them.
 In 1975, President Ford imposed significant monetary
exactions on foreign imports of oil. Presidential
Proclamation No. 4341, 3 CFR 433 (1971–1975 Comp.). He
acted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
Like TWEA and IEEPA, the relevant provision of Section
232 did not use the word “tariff ” or “duty.” Rather, Section
232 broadly authorized the President to “adjust the
imports” of a product, 19 U. S. C. §1862 (b) (1970 ed.)—
language akin to the “regulate . . . importation” language in
IEEPA and TWEA.
 In contrast to the Nixon tariffs, the Ford tariffs on oil
imports generated some pushback in Congress. And a
group of utility companies and States quickly sued, arguing
that the relevant statutory phrase “adjust the imports” did
not authorize monetary exactions such as tariffs.
 Over a dissent, the D. C. Circuit agreed with the
plaintiffs challenging the Ford tariffs. Much like the
Court’s decision today, the D. C. Circuit in the Ford matter
concluded that Congress must explicitly authorize
monetary exactions and that the applicable statutory
phrase, “adjust the imports,” did not do so. Algonquin SNG,

——————
 12 THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion also tries to dismiss President Nixon’s

tariffs as being of “limited amount, duration, and scope.” Ante, at 10, n.
3. That claim appears incorrect on all three points, as Judge Taranto
carefully explained in his Federal Circuit opinion. 149 F. 4th 1312 ,
1367–1369 (2025) (dissenting opinion). President Nixon imposed 10
percent tariffs on virtually all imports from every country in the world
for an unspecified duration. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4074, 3
CFR 60–61 (1971–1975 Comp.).
18 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 518 F. 2d 1051 , 1055 (CADC
1975).
 In 1976, the Ford tariffs case came to the Supreme Court.
In this Court, the plaintiffs pressed nearly identical
arguments (and rhetorical flourishes) as those advanced by
the plaintiffs and repeated by the Court in today’s case.
 The plaintiffs argued that the Ford-imposed monetary
exactions involved “the broadest exercise of the tariff power
in the history of the American Republic,” reminiscent of
“George III’s stamp tax.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in Federal Energy
Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., O. T. 1975, No. 75–
382, p. 26. They contended that the statute’s authorization
for the President to “adjust the imports” did not allow for
such monetary exactions because the statute did “not
mention the tariff on its face.” Ibid. They asserted that this
Court had “never implied a tax, never in the history of this
Court from language which does not explicitly provide for
tax, and here there is no such language, there is no
language that mentions a measure of tax nor a method of
calculation of tax. There is no such thing.” Id., at 33. They
echoed the D. C. Circuit’s holding that reading the phrase
“adjust the imports” to encompass tariffs would be “an
anomalous departure” from “the consistently explicit, well-
defined manner in which Congress has delegated control
over foreign trade and tariffs.” Algonquin, 518 F. 2d, at
1055. And they claimed that interpreting the statute to
include fees “undermines the whole tariff structure of the
United States.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in Algonquin, at 26.
 Importantly, the Algonquin plaintiffs acknowledged (as
do the plaintiffs and the Court in today’s case) that the
statutory language “adjust the imports” would allow the
President to impose quotas and embargoes on foreign
imports. See Brief for Respondents in Algonquin, No. 75–
382, pp. 26–27, and n. 30. So a President could completely
block all imports or limit their quantity. But according to
the plaintiffs, Congress’s “adjust the imports” language
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 19

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

precluded the President from exercising the lesser power of
imposing monetary exactions such as tariffs.
 The Supreme Court decided the Ford tariffs case in 1976.
The Court unanimously reversed the D. C. Circuit and
flatly rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments. The Court held
that the statutory phrase “adjust the imports”—even
though it did not include terms such as “tariff,” “tax,”
“duty,” or “fee”—granted President Ford the authority to
impose not only quotas and embargoes, but also monetary
exactions on foreign imports. Federal Energy
Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 561
(1976).
 The Court analyzed the statutory text and found “no
support in the language of the statute” for the plaintiffs’
argument that “adjust the imports” should “be read to
encompass only quantitative methods—i.e., quotas—as
opposed to monetary methods—i.e., license fees—of
effecting such adjustments.” Ibid. The Court further
explained: “Unless one assumes, and we do not, that quotas
will always be a feasible method of dealing directly with
national security threats posed by the circumstances under
which imports are entering the country, limiting the
President to the use of quotas would effectively and
artificially prohibit him from directly dealing with some of
the very problems against which §232(b) is directed.” Id.,
at 561–562 (quotation marks omitted).
 In short, according to the unanimous Algonquin Court,
the statutory text, structure, and logic of Section 232
definitively established that the President’s authority to
“adjust the imports” encompassed not only quotas and
embargoes, but also monetary exactions such as tariffs and
fees.
 Today’s case should follow a fortiori from Algonquin. No
meaningful daylight exists between the statutory phrase
“adjust the imports” in Section 232 at issue in Algonquin
and the phrase “regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA at
20 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

issue here. The plaintiffs and the Court in this case do not
even try to distinguish “adjust the imports” from “regulate
. . . importation.” Nor could they. Recall that the dictionary
definition of “regulate” includes “adjust by rule.” Black’s
Law Dictionary, at 1156 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
To adjust imports is to regulate imports. Indeed, if
anything, the phrase “regulate . . . importation” is broader
in scope than the phrase “adjust the imports.”
 So if Section 232’s “adjust the imports” includes tariffs—
as this Court unanimously concluded in Algonquin in 1976
just a year before IEEPA—how can IEEPA’s “regulate . . .
importation” not include tariffs?
 Algonquin’s importance for today’s case rests not merely
on its status as a unanimous on-point Supreme Court
statutory precedent—although it is surely significant for
that reason as well. The case is especially consequential for
present purposes because it helps show the ordinary public
and congressional understanding of “regulate . . .
importation” in 1977 when Congress enacted IEEPA.
 To be clear, the question here is not what individual
Members of Congress might have subjectively intended in
1977. The question is the ordinary meaning and
understanding of the words that Congress used. Given that
the phrase “adjust the imports”—again, in a statutory
provision that did not use specific words such as “tariff ” or
“duty”—was unanimously held by this Court in 1976 to
include tariffs, and given that President Nixon had
similarly relied on his statutory authority to “regulate . . .
importation” to impose 10 percent tariffs on virtually all
imports from all countries, could a rational citizen or
Member of Congress in 1977 have understood “regulate . . .
importation” in IEEPA not to encompass tariffs? I think
not. Any citizens or Members of Congress in 1977 who
somehow thought that the “regulate . . . importation”
language in IEEPA excluded tariffs would have had their
heads in the sand.
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 The Court today tries its best to distinguish Algonquin on
the ground that Section 232 included “sweeping” language
authorizing the President to take “such action” that “he
deems necessary,” whereas IEEPA does not. Ante, at 19.
But the Algonquin Court did not rely on that language and
instead focused on whether the phrase “adjust the imports”
included monetary exactions. See 426 U. S., at 561 .
Moreover, IEEPA itself broadly authorizes the President to
“regulate . . . importation” “by means of instructions,
licenses, or otherwise” in order to “deal with” an “unusual
and extraordinary” foreign “threat” to the “national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”
 50 U. S. C. §§1701 (a), 1702(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). That
language is similarly expansive, authorizing the President
to employ various tools to “regulate . . . importation.” In
short, just as the phrase “adjust the imports” includes
tariffs, as Algonquin held, so too the phrase “regulate . . .
importation” includes tariffs.13
 The Court also attempts to brush aside Algonquin by
citing an entirely different provision of the Trade
Expansion Act—one that was not at issue in Algonquin—
that expressly refers to a “duty.” Ante, at 19. But the
Algonquin Court did not rely on—or even mention—that
provision when concluding that the statutory phrase
“adjust the imports” includes tariffs. For good reason. That
provision, which states that “[n]o action shall be taken” to
“decrease or eliminate” an existing “duty or other import
restriction,” 19 U. S. C. §1862 (a) (1970 ed.), concerns only
the power to reduce existing tariffs and plainly does not
bear on a President’s power to impose tariffs under Section
232.

——————
 13 In addition, IEEPA expressly authorizes the President to require

licenses. And to obtain a license, a business may need to pay license fees
that can be equivalent to tariffs. See §1702(a)(1).
22 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 To sum up on the Nixon and Ford tariffs: When enacting
IEEPA in 1977, Congress employed the exact language
recently invoked by President Nixon to justify 10 percent
worldwide tariffs. And IEEPA came fast on the heels of this
Court’s unanimous 1976 decision in Algonquin, which held
that substantially similar “adjust the imports” language
authorized President Ford’s tariffs on oil imports.
Importantly, moreover, the statutory provisions
authorizing the Nixon and Ford tariffs did not use specific
words such as “tariff ” or “duty.”
 The Nixon and Ford tariffs, this Court’s decision in
Algonquin, and the ordinary and historical understanding
of tariffs as a means of regulating imports together render
it all but impossible to conclude that Congress in 1977
implicitly excluded tariffs when retaining TWEA’s
“regulate . . . importation” language in IEEPA. If Congress
in 1977 wanted to exclude tariffs from the President’s
IEEPA toolkit, either it would have not retained the phrase
“regulate . . . importation,” or it would otherwise have made
clear in IEEPA that the power to impose tariffs was
excluded. Congress did neither.
 C
 Two additional historical points strongly reinforce that
analysis of text and precedent and further demonstrate
that “regulate . . . importation” in IEEPA encompasses
tariffs.
 First, U. S. history from the 1800s through IEEPA’s 1977
enactment illustrates how the statute came to incorporate
the President’s long-recognized authority to impose tariffs
during wartime and then also during peacetime national
emergencies.
 Long before the initial 1917 enactment of the Trading
with the Enemy Act, which was IEEPA’s predecessor, the
President possessed inherent wartime authority to prohibit
commercial relations with enemy nations. That inherent
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 23

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

authority included the power to impose tariffs on foreign
imports.
 For example, during the Mexican-American War in the
1840s, President Polk permitted only limited trade with
Mexico, subject to tariffs. Some Members of Congress
publicly questioned whether the President possessed that
tariff authority. In response, President Polk justified the
tariffs on the ground that “the military right to exclude
commerce altogether from the ports of the enemy in our
military occupation included the minor right of admitting it
under prescribed conditions.” J. Polk, To the House of
Representatives of the United States (Jan. 2, 1849), in 6
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents
2522, 2523 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
 In 1854, the Supreme Court agreed with President Polk’s
view, stating: “No one can doubt” that the President, as
“commander-in-chief of our naval force,” possessed the
authority to “regulate import duties.” Cross v. Harrison, 16
How. 164 , 189–190.
 In 1862, President Lincoln partially lifted an existing
blockade against the Confederate States during the Civil
War. Like President Polk, he then permitted limited trade,
subject to a monetary fee. A group of cotton sellers later
sued, arguing that the fee “was essentially a tax and not
authorized by any act of Congress, which alone had the
power to impose taxes.” Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 73, 81
(1875). The Supreme Court rejected that argument,
holding that there was “no question” that requiring a
monetary fee to trade with the Confederate States was part
of “the war power of the United States government.” Id., at
86–87. The existence of war meant “a suspension of
commercial intercourse between the opposing sections of
the country,” so if “such a course of dealing were to be
permitted at all, it would necessarily be upon such
conditions as the government chose to prescribe.” Id., at 87 .
24 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 And in 1898, during the Spanish-American War,
President McKinley imposed duties “upon the occupation of
any forts and places in the Philippine Islands.” Lincoln v.
United States, 197 U. S. 419, 428 (1905) (quotation marks
omitted). This Court subsequently recognized those
McKinley duties as a lawful wartime measure. Id., at 427–
428.
 Why does that wartime history matter? Because when
Congress first enacted the Trading with the Enemy Act in
1917 during World War I, it statutorily codified some of the
President’s longstanding inherent wartime powers over
foreign trade, which included the power to tariff. See
Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 ; see also
Brief for Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 16–19,
26–27. For the duration of World War I, TWEA authorized
the President, when he found “the public safety so
requires,” to make it unlawful “to import into the United
States” from any “named” country certain goods “except at
such time or times, and under such regulations or orders,
and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the
President shall prescribe.” §11, 40 Stat. 422–423.
 In 1933, during the Great Depression and five days after
President Franklin Roosevelt took office, Congress
expanded TWEA to apply not only in wartime, but also
during a “national emergency” declared by the President.
 48 Stat. 1 .
 Eight years later, in 1941, a few days after Pearl Harbor,
Congress again amended TWEA’s language by more
succinctly providing that the President may “regulate”
certain transactions, including “importation,” under TWEA
during war or “any other period of national emergency
declared by the President.” 55 Stat. 839 .
 So as of 1941—and from then to 1977—TWEA expressly
authorized the President to “regulate . . . importation” both
during wartime and during peacetime national
emergencies. Historically, Presidents had regulated
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 25

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

importation by imposing tariffs, as the Polk, Lincoln, and
McKinley tariffs illustrated. So TWEA from 1941 to 1977
was best understood to authorize tariffs. See Brief for
Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 27–28.
 During that period, as I have discussed at length above,
President Nixon in 1971 imposed 10 percent tariffs on
almost all imports of foreign goods and relied on TWEA’s
“regulate . . . importation” language to justify them. Those
tariffs were upheld in court.
 Then, in 1977, Congress amended TWEA and divided it
into two statutes. TWEA retained the President’s power to
“regulate . . . importation,” but only during wartime. The
newly enacted second law, IEEPA, also retained the power
to “regulate . . . importation,” and it would apply during
periods of declared national emergencies. As this Court has
previously recognized, IEEPA was “directly drawn” from
TWEA, and the relevant authorities are essentially the
same. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 671 , 672–
673 (1981).
 Therefore, IEEPA’s specific language—“regulate . . .
importation”—was not new statutory text when Congress
enacted IEEPA in 1977. Far from it. Beginning in 1941,
TWEA had already authorized the President to “regulate
. . . importation” of foreign goods in wartime and national
emergencies. And the earlier Polk, Lincoln, and McKinley
examples, as well as the later Nixon example,
demonstrated that the power to “regulate . . . importation”
historically encompassed tariffs as well as quotas and
embargoes.
 The plaintiffs and the Court today assert that wartime
precedents do not govern peacetime. But Congress modeled
IEEPA on TWEA precisely so that the President could
continue to exercise certain wartime authorities such as
quotas, embargoes, and tariffs during peacetime national
emergencies as well. Congress first explicitly extended that
wartime power to national emergencies in 1933, during the
26 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Franklin Roosevelt Administration. Cf. New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 306 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (The Great Depression was “an emergency more
serious than war”). And Congress has continued to
authorize the President to exercise that power in both
wartime and peacetime emergencies.
 In short, Congress in 1977 enacted the same “regulate . . .
importation” language that had long been understood to
encompass tariffs.
 Second, contrary to the tenor of the plaintiffs’ and the
Court’s arguments here, it would not have been at all
unusual or surprising for Congress, when enacting IEEPA
in 1977, to authorize the President to impose tariffs. Since
the early days of the Republic, Congress has regularly
granted the President the power to regulate foreign trade,
including via tariffs.
 A few examples: In 1810, Congress authorized the
President to prohibit imports from Great Britain or France
if either nation violated the neutral commerce of the United
States. Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch
382 , 382–384, 388 (1813); 2 Stat. 606 .
 In 1890, Congress granted the President the power to
impose import duties in response to duties imposed by other
countries on American exports. Marshall Field & Co. v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , 680–681 (1892); 26 Stat. 612 .
 In 1922, Congress empowered the President to levy
import duties under certain conditions. J. W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 , 400–402 (1928); 42
Stat. 941 .
 In 1930, Congress enacted Section 338 of the Tariff Act,
which authorizes the President to impose tariffs when he
finds that “any foreign country places any burden or
disadvantage upon the commerce of the United States.” 19
U. S. C. §1338 (d); 46 Stat. 705 .
 In 1962, Congress authorized the President in Section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act to “adjust the imports” of a
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 27

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

foreign good that threatens to impair national security.
§1862(c)(1)(A); 76 Stat. 877 .
 In 1974, under Section 201 of the Trade Act, Congress
granted the President the power to “take all appropriate
and feasible action within his power,” including imposing a
“duty” on imports that, according to the U. S. International
Trade Commission, have caused or threatened “serious
injury” to a domestic industry. §§2251(a), 2253(a)(1)(A),
(3)(A); 88 Stat. 2014–2015.
 So too, Section 301 authorizes the President to direct the
U. S. Trade Representative to “impose duties” on countries
engaging in unfair trade practices. §§2411(a), (c)(1)(B); 88
Stat. 2041–2042.
 And Section 122 of the Act grants the President the power
to impose a “temporary import surcharge” to “deal with
large and serious United States balance-of-payment
deficits.” §2132(a)(1)(A); 88 Stat. 1987–1988.
 Those many statutes definitively establish that Congress,
since near the Founding, has delegated to the President
broad power to impose tariffs on foreign imports. See also
ante, at 13–15 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). So it would hardly
have been unusual or surprising for Congress to have
granted tariff power to the President during wartime and
peacetime national emergencies, as it did in TWEA and
IEEPA.
 To be sure, given those other statutes that authorize the
President to impose tariffs on foreign imports, one might
reasonably ask: Why did the President need distinct tariff
authority under IEEPA during peacetime emergencies—or,
for that matter, under TWEA during wartime?
 The basic answer is that IEEPA is an emergency statute
that allows the President to impose tariffs somewhat more
quickly, as would be expected in a declared national
emergency. Similarly, in wartime, TWEA allows the
President to impose tariffs more rapidly.
28 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

 But critically, TWEA and IEEPA do not authorize the
President to exercise some new substantive power. Rather,
they authorize the President to exercise a commonly
granted power—tariffs—more efficiently than under the
many ordinary tariff statutes.
 The plaintiffs and the Court assert that interpreting
IEEPA to authorize tariffs would in effect evade specific
limits on tariffs in certain other tariff statutes. But as
Judge Taranto explained in the Federal Circuit, Congress
in IEEPA understandably afforded the President more
flexibility to act during declared emergencies, just as
Congress had done in TWEA for wartime since 1917. See
 149 F. 4th 1312 , 1363–1366 (2025) (dissenting opinion).
 Moreover, IEEPA is not a blank check. IEEPA contains
its own limits, including the requirement that the tariffs
deal with an unusual and extraordinary foreign threat, 50
U. S. C. §1701 (b); a default 1-year limit on emergencies,
§1622(d); an enumerated list of exceptions, §1702(b); and
comprehensive congressional reporting requirements,
§1703. And as noted above, each House of Congress
possesses a variety of tools to revoke, limit, or influence a
President’s IEEPA or TWEA tariffs.
 Relatedly, it is also not surprising that the many ordinary
tariff statutes expressly refer to “tariffs,” “duties,” and the
like, while IEEPA and TWEA do not. As Judge Taranto
astutely explained, “Congress in those statutes was
overwhelmingly focused on tariff issues,” whereas
“Congress in IEEPA (as in TWEA) was focused on the
subject of emergencies and giving plainly broad emergency
authority regarding foreign property.” 149 F. 4th, at 1364
(dissenting opinion).
 In sum, in authorizing the President to “regulate . . .
importation,” IEEPA embodies an “eyes-open congressional
grant of broad emergency authority in this foreign-affairs
realm, which unsurprisingly extends beyond authorities
available under non-emergency laws, and Congress
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 29

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

confirmed the understood breadth by tying IEEPA’s
authority to particularly demanding procedural
requirements for keeping Congress informed.” Id., at 1348.
 D
 Finally, all of that text, history, and precedent is further
reinforced by two compelling pieces of context.
 First, interpreting IEEPA to exclude tariffs creates
nonsensical textual and practical anomalies. The plaintiffs
and the Court do not dispute that the President can act in
declared emergencies under IEEPA to impose quotas or
even total embargoes on all imports from a given country.
But the President supposedly cannot take the far more
modest step of conditioning those imports on payment of a
tariff or duty.
 Textually, however, if quotas and embargoes are a means
to regulate importation, how are tariffs not a means to
regulate importation? Nothing in the text supports such an
illogical distinction.
 And it does not make much sense to think that IEEPA
allows the President in a declared national emergency to,
for example, shut off all or most imports from China, but
not to impose even a $1 tariff on imports from China. As
Judge Taranto forcefully pointed out in the Federal Circuit,
tariffs are “just a less extreme, more flexible tool for
pursuing the same objective of controlling the amount or
price of imports that, after all, could be barred altogether.”
149 F. 4th, at 1363 (dissenting opinion). All of that explains
why this Court in Algonquin definitively rejected such a
strange slice-and-dice approach to the President’s statutory
power to “adjust” imports. If quotas and embargoes are
authorized, so are tariffs.
 In short, whether through prohibiting imports via
embargoes or regulating the quantity of imports through
quotas or regulating the price of imports with tariffs,
Congress granted the President flexibility in declared
30 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

national emergencies to take various actions affecting
imports of foreign goods. The plaintiffs and the Court have
no coherent textual or commonsensical explanation for why
a rational Congress would, in such a momentous and
carefully considered statute as IEEPA, grant the President
the power to impose quotas and embargoes, but not tariffs,
on foreign imports during emergencies.
 Second, IEEPA was not debated and passed in a vacuum
in 1977—it was enacted around the same time that
Congress significantly constrained executive power in
multiple ways in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam. The
list of major new statutory restrictions on Presidential
power enacted in the 1970s is long and extraordinary, with
lasting effects to the present day.14
 And Congress, during that comprehensive examination
and recalibration of government power, did not overlook
TWEA and the President’s emergency authorities. Led by
Senators Church and Mathias, Congress carefully studied
the President’s emergency authorities, including TWEA.
Then, in 1976 and 1977, Congress enacted a variety of
legislation to tighten up the President’s emergency powers,
including by passing a new National Emergencies Act that
cabined the President’s authority to declare emergencies by
setting forth various procedural requirements.
 Yet when enacting IEEPA in 1977, Congress continued to
grant the President the power to “regulate . . . importation”
——————
 14 See, e.g., Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1824 , reenacted

at 5 U. S. C. §13101 et seq.; Inspector General Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1101 ,
reenacted at 5 U. S. C. §401 et seq.; Presidential Records Act of 1978, 92
Stat. 2523 , as amended, 44 U. S. C. §2201 et seq.; Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 86 Stat. 770 , as amended, 5 U. S. C. §1001 et seq.;
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1783 , as amended,
 50 U. S. C. §1801 et seq.; Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 297 , as amended, 2 U. S. C. §621 et seq.;
1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, 88 Stat. 1561 , as
amended, 5 U. S. C. §552 ; War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555 , 50
U. S. C. §1541 et seq.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 31

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

in declared national emergencies—a power that the
President had possessed since 1941 under TWEA and that
had recently been invoked by President Nixon to justify his
1971 tariffs. In IEEPA (and TWEA) in 1977, Congress
consciously balanced concerns about expansive exercises of
emergency powers against the necessity of equipping the
President with tools to address exigencies that are difficult
if not impossible to foresee. That broader congressional
context—general skepticism and scaling back of executive
power combined with re-enactment of the familiar “regulate
. . . importation” language in IEEPA—strongly indicates
that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said
when it enacted IEEPA and continued to authorize the
President to “regulate . . . importation” during national
emergencies.
 III
 In an ordinary statutory interpretation case, I am
confident that a majority of this Court would flatly reject
the plaintiffs’ exceedingly weak statutory arguments and
would hold that IEEPA’s authorization for the President to
“regulate . . . importation” during national emergencies
includes the power to impose tariffs.
 Notably, the Court today does not claim that the phrase
“regulate . . . importation” on its own excludes tariffs as a
matter of ordinary statutory meaning. Only three Members
of the Court, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and
JUSTICE JACKSON, do so.
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion in Part II–A–2, which is
joined only by JUSTICE GORSUCH and JUSTICE BARRETT,
instead relies on the major questions doctrine. The major
questions doctrine is an important canon of statutory
interpretation that the Court has applied in a number of
significant cases over the last 45 years. See Industrial
Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,
 448 U. S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality opinion).
32 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

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 Justice Scalia articulated the canonical statement of the
major questions doctrine: “We expect Congress to speak
clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast
‘economic and political significance.’ ” Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302 , 324 (2014)
(quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U. S. 120, 160 (2000)); see also Alabama Assn. of Realtors
v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758,
764 (2021) (per curiam); National Federation of
Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109, 117 (2022)
(per curiam); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477, 507 (2023);
cf. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022).
 Stated otherwise, in cases where the Executive Branch
takes an action of major economic and political significance,
it must “point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the
power it claims.” Ibid. (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at
324).
 The requirement of “clear congressional authorization”
for executive actions of major economic and political
significance is “grounded in two overlapping and
reinforcing presumptions: (i) a separation of powers-based
presumption against the delegation of major lawmaking
authority from Congress to the Executive Branch, and (ii) a
presumption that Congress intends to make major policy
decisions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies.”
United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC, 855 F. 3d 381, 419
(CADC 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (citation omitted). As this Court later
recounted in West Virginia, “both separation of powers
principles and a practical understanding of legislative
intent make us reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory
text the delegation claimed to be lurking there.” 597 U. S.,
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 33

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

at 723 (quotation marks omitted).15 The doctrine guards
“against unintentional, oblique, or otherwise unlikely
delegations of the legislative power.” NFIB, 595 U. S., at
125 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).16
 I agree that this case involves an executive action of
major economic and political significance—which is
typically the trigger for requiring “clear congressional
authorization.” But in my respectful view, THE CHIEF
JUSTICE’s opinion’s application of the major questions
doctrine in this case is incorrect for two alternative and
independent reasons. First, the statutory text, history, and
precedent constitute “clear congressional authorization” for
the President to impose tariffs as a means to “regulate . . .
importation.” Second, and in the alternative, the major
questions doctrine does not apply in the foreign affairs
context. In the foreign affairs realm, courts recognize that
Congress often deliberately grants flexibility and discretion
to the President to pursue America’s interests. In that
context, courts therefore engage in “routine” textualist
statutory interpretation—reading the text as written—and
do not employ the major questions doctrine as a thumb on
the scale against the President. West Virginia, 597 U. S.,
at 724 .

——————
 15 The major questions doctrine has also been analogized to, among

other things, the mischief rule, the absurdity doctrine, common sense,
and context. See, e.g., S. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 Geo. L. J. 967,
1011 (2021) (doctrine “has an essential similarity with the mischief
rule”); Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 , 511 (2023) (BARRETT, J.,
concurring) (context, common sense).
 16 I have long been, and fully remain, a strong proponent of the major

questions doctrine. See United States Telecom, 855 F. 3d, at 418–426
(opinion of Kavanaugh, J.); Loving v. IRS, 742 F. 3d 1013, 1021 (CADC
2014); Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 9–1322
(CADC, Dec. 20, 2012), pp. 9–10 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
34 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

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 A
 1
 Because the major questions doctrine demands “clear
congressional authorization,” this Court has repeatedly
recognized that the doctrine is “distinct” from “routine
statutory interpretation.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724
(quotation marks omitted). Importantly, therefore, the
doctrine applies—and makes a meaningful difference—only
in cases where the Executive’s “reading of a statute”
“would, under more ordinary circumstances, be upheld.”
 Ibid. (quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 740, 742,
n. 3 (GORSUCH, J., concurring); M. Sohoni, The Major
Questions Quartet, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 262 , 272–276 (2022).
 To properly set up the inquiry: A major questions issue
arises when: (i) the Executive relies on the text of a
generally worded statute to exercise a specific power of
major economic and political significance; (ii) the generally
worded statute does not explicitly mention the specific
major power, but (iii) the asserted major power falls within
the generally worded text of the statute such that the
Executive’s assertion of that power “would, under more
ordinary circumstances, be upheld,” West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 724 (majority opinion) (quotation marks omitted).17
 The question then is whether the generally worded
statute supplies “clear congressional authorization” for the
Executive to exercise that specific—but not explicitly
mentioned—major power. Here, for example, does the
generally worded statutory authorization for the President
to “regulate . . . importation” clearly authorize the
President to impose tariffs?

——————
 17 Of course, if the major power does not fall within the generally

worded text as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation, the major
questions doctrine is not implicated or necessary to apply because the
Government’s statutory argument fails to begin with.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 35

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 The requirement of “clear congressional authorization” is
easy enough to state. But how do we apply it? How do we
decide in a particular case whether a generally worded
statute actually constitutes “clear congressional
authorization” for a major power that otherwise falls within
the general terms?
 For starters, and critically, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the major questions doctrine is not a
magic words requirement. In other words, the doctrine does
not require an explicit reference to the specific major power
itself. As the Court’s cases amply demonstrate, the major
questions doctrine does not “forc[e] Congress to delegate in
highly specific terms.” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 516
(BARRETT, J., concurring) (quotation marks omitted).
 Rather than require magic words (such as the words
“tariff ” or “duty” here), the Court’s cases have focused on
four somewhat overlapping factors or considerations in
order to assess whether a generally worded statute
constitutes “clear congressional authorization” for the
specific major power.18
 First, the major questions doctrine’s most prominent
work has been to ensure that the Executive cannot
suddenly seize on an old and generally worded statute to
exercise a power of great economic and political significance
when that power would not reasonably have been
understood at the time of enactment to fall within that
generally worded statute. See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at
720–735; Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–161. As
the Court has said: “When an agency claims to discover in
a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a
——————
 18 Both JUSTICE GORSUCH and JUSTICE BARRETT have likewise read the

Court’s precedents to identify those same four factors, as they explained
in their incisive separate opinions in West Virginia v. EPA and Biden v.
Nebraska, respectively. See 597 U. S. 697 , 746–749 (2022) (GORSUCH, J.,
concurring) (referring to the four “telling clues”); 600 U. S., at 517–520
(BARRETT, J., concurring); see also ante, at 27 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).
36 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

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significant portion of the American economy, we typically
greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism.”
Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324 (citation and quotation marks
omitted); West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 748 (GORSUCH, J.,
concurring).
 The doctrine thus precludes an agency’s attempt to
effectuate “a fundamental revision of the statute.” MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231 (1994). Stated otherwise,
an “agency’s attempt to deploy an old statute focused on one
problem to solve a new and different problem” may be “a
warning sign that it is acting without clear congressional
authority.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 747 (GORSUCH, J.,
concurring). The Court’s skepticism about major executive
action in those scenarios has been heightened when
Congress has “conspicuously and repeatedly declined to
enact” legislation that would have authorized the executive
action in question. Id., at 724 (majority opinion).
 A prototypical example occurred when OSHA, in order to
justify a nationwide COVID–19 vaccine mandate for
workers, relied “on a statutory provision that was adopted
40 years before the pandemic and that focused on
conditions specific to the workplace.” Id., at 747 (GORSUCH,
J., concurring). Another example arose when EPA invoked
“newfound authority to regulate” emissions from “millions
of small sources—including retail stores, offices, apartment
buildings, shopping centers, schools, and churches.” Utility
Air, 573 U. S., at 328. Yet another happened when the CDC
tried to impose an eviction moratorium for rental housing
through an “unprecedented” assertion of its authority to
regulate public health. Alabama Assn. of Realtors, 594
U. S., at 765 .
 Second, courts examine the “agency’s past
interpretations of the relevant statute.” West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 747 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). The Executive’s
“track record can be particularly probative” in the major
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

questions context. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 519
(BARRETT, J., concurring).
 A “contemporaneous and long-held Executive Branch
interpretation of a statute is entitled to some weight.” West
Virginia, 597 U. S., at 747 (GORSUCH, J., concurring)
(quotation marks omitted). Just “as established practice
may shed light on the extent of power conveyed by general
statutory language, so the want of assertion of power by
those who presumably would be alert to exercise it, is
equally significant in determining whether such power was
actually conferred.” Id., at 725 (majority opinion)
(quotation marks omitted).
 The NFIB Court therefore found it critical that “OSHA,
in its half century of existence, has never before adopted a
broad public health regulation of this kind” under the
statute that the agency sought to invoke as authority for
the vaccine mandate. 595 U. S., at 119. Likewise, in Brown
& Williamson, the FDA had “repeatedly and consistently
assert[ed] that it lacks jurisdiction under the FDCA to
regulate tobacco products.” 529 U. S., at 156 . And in West
Virginia, EPA had not “previously interpreted the relevant
provision to confer on it such vast authority” to transform
American industry. 597 U. S., at 749 (GORSUCH, J.,
concurring).
 Third, courts assess whether “there is a mismatch
between an agency’s challenged action and its
congressionally assigned mission and expertise,” id., at 748
(GORSUCH, J., concurring)—in other words, whether an
agency is trying to regulate “outside its wheelhouse,” Biden
v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 518 (BARRETT, J., concurring).
 In the NFIB case, OSHA, which is empowered to “set
workplace safety standards, not broad public health
measures,” mandated COVID–19 vaccines. 595 U. S., at
117. In Alabama Assn. of Realtors, the CDC—a public
health agency—attempted to regulate housing. 594 U. S.,
at 763–765. In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Attorney General
38 LEARNING RESOURCES, INC. v. TRUMP

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

sought to assert authority over the drugs used in physician-
assisted suicide. 546 U. S. 243 , 267–268 (2006).
 All of those cases involved serious mismatches between
the agency’s usual regulatory activities and its asserted
major power.
 Fourth, the Court looks at whether the relevant statutory
language used to justify the Executive’s exercise of a major
power is “oblique,” “elliptical,” or “cryptic.” West Virginia,
597 U. S., at 746–747 (GORSUCH, J., concurring)
(alterations and quotation marks omitted). As the Court
has often said, Congress does not “hide elephants” in
statutory “mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking
Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001).
 In MCI Telecommunications Corp., for example, the
Court refused to allow the FCC to eliminate rate regulation
and fundamentally overhaul the telecommunications
industry based on a “subtle” provision that merely
permitted the FCC to “modify” rate-filing requirements.
 512 U. S., at 231 (quotation marks omitted). In Brown &
Williamson, the Court rejected the FDA’s attempt to
regulate the tobacco industry based on a “cryptic” statutory
provision that referred to “safety.” 529 U. S., at 160
(quotation marks omitted). In Gonzales, the Court said that
Congress would not have granted the Attorney General the
power to regulate physician-assisted suicide through
“oblique” statutory language. 546 U. S., at 267 . And in
West Virginia, the Court found it unlikely that Congress
would have granted major power to reshape the energy
industry in a “previously little-used backwater” of the
statute. 597 U. S., at 730 .
 2
 So in this case we must apply those four factors in order
to determine whether Congress, when it afforded the
President the power to “regulate . . . importation,” clearly
authorized the President to impose tariffs. As I see it, those
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factors show that Congress clearly authorized tariffs in
IEEPA when it empowered the President to “regulate . . .
importation.”
 First, unlike the OSHA vaccine mandate in NFIB or the
greenhouse gas regulation in Utility Air, for example, the
President here is not exercising an “unheralded” or
“newfound authority” based on a “long-extant” statute—
that is, exercising a power that was unanticipated or
unforeseen when Congress enacted IEEPA’s “regulate . . .
importation” language in 1977.
 On the contrary, as was fully explained above, the tariff
authority exercised here is not remotely “unheralded.” To
recap: Any citizen or Member of Congress who paid the
least bit of attention in 1977 would have readily understood
that the President’s authority to “regulate . . . importation”
encompassed the power to tariff. There are the dictionary
definitions and the historical usage and practice. And
among other things, just a few years before IEEPA, that
“regulate . . . importation” language was invoked by
President Nixon and judicially approved to sustain his 10
percent worldwide tariffs. President Ford then
implemented significant tariffs using substantially similar
“adjust the imports” statutory language, and this Court
unanimously upheld President Ford’s tariffs in Algonquin.
 So IEEPA’s grant of authority to the President to impose
tariffs in order to regulate importation is not “unheralded”
or “newfound.” That authority was plain as day in 1977.19
——————
 19 The Court downplays the significance of the prominent Nixon and

Ford tariffs. Ante, at 17–19 (majority opinion); ante, at 27–28, 39
(GORSUCH, J., concurring). But the Nixon and Ford examples, as well as
Algonquin, are critical for a proper and full understanding of the
meaning of “regulate . . . importation” when Congress enacted IEEPA in
1977. We cannot ignore or diminish that history. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s
opinion and JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence also say that no President
since 1977 has invoked IEEPA to impose tariffs. Ante, at 10 (opinion of
ROBERTS, C. J.); ante, at 27–28 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). But since
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 Second, the President is not interpreting the “regulate . . .
importation” language in IEEPA differently from how past
Presidents have interpreted it. At least as far as the
briefing and arguments in this case have disclosed, no
Presidential Administration since the enactment of the
“regulate . . . importation” language in TWEA in 1941 or
since its re-enactment in IEEPA in 1977 has interpreted
the statute to exclude the power to impose tariffs.
Moreover, before IEEPA’s enactment, President Nixon
imposed tariffs based on the same “regulate . . .
importation” language. And in 1975, President Ford
invoked authority to “adjust the imports” in order to
similarly impose monetary exactions. In addition—if more
is needed—Marshall, Story, Madison, and this Court have
all long recognized that the power to regulate foreign
commerce includes tariffs.
 The current President’s reading of IEEPA follows from
and is entirely consistent with those past interpretations—
making his position nothing like, for example, FDA’s when
it changed its longstanding position that it lacked the
authority to regulate cigarettes, Brown & Williamson, 529
U. S., at 159–160, or OSHA’s when it implemented a
vaccine requirement even though it had “never before
adopted a broad public health regulation of this kind,”
NFIB, 595 U. S., at 119 .
 When, as here, “established practice,” West Virginia, 597
U. S., at 725 (quotation marks omitted), and the Executive’s
“track record,” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 519

——————
1977, Presidents have imposed numerous tariffs under non-emergency
tariff statutes—including Section 232, which like IEEPA also does not
explicitly reference tariffs or taxes. The fact that recent Presidents have
not often had occasion under the National Emergencies Act to declare
national emergencies in which tariffs would help “deal with” the specific
emergency at issue does not mean that Presidents have now lost the
authority exercised by President Nixon to impose tariffs. IEEPA was not
designed as a use-it-or-lose-it source of emergency authority.
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(BARRETT, J., concurring), convincingly show that the
general statutory language has long been understood to
cover the specific power asserted by the Executive, that
record should all but resolve the matter for major questions
purposes.
 Third, there is no mismatch: The power to tariff falls
squarely within the President’s wheelhouse. From the
Founding, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion today
acknowledges, numerous other statutes have afforded—
and still do afford—the President broad power to impose
tariffs. Ante, at 8–9. This case is entirely different,
therefore, from our prior major questions cases, where, for
example, the CDC attempted to impose an eviction
moratorium, Alabama Assn. of Realtors, 594 U. S., at 763–
765; OSHA sought to implement a nationwide vaccine
mandate, NFIB, 595 U. S., at 117–120; the FDA tried to
regulate cigarettes, Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–
161; and the Attorney General attempted to regulate
physician-assisted suicide, Gonzales, 546 U. S., at 267–268.
 Presidents imposing tariffs—whether pursuant to
inherent wartime authority, pursuant to TWEA and
IEEPA’s “regulate . . . importation” language, pursuant to
Section 232’s “adjust the imports” text, or pursuant to the
many other tariff statutory authorities—is hardly an
unusual occurrence in our Nation’s history or in recent
times. For example, Presidents George W. Bush, Obama,
and Biden all imposed tariffs pursuant to congressional
authorization. There is no mismatch between the tariff
power and the President’s “mission and expertise.” West
Virginia, 597 U. S., at 748 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).
 Fourth, the President is not relying on oblique, elliptical,
or cryptic language. This case does not involve “elephants
in mouseholes.” Whitman, 531 U. S., at 468 . This case
instead involves an elephant (tariffs) in a statutory
elephant hole (the power to “regulate . . . importation” to
deal with foreign threats in national emergencies). IEEPA
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

was a major and thoroughly studied statute carefully
crafted to grant the President a suite of powerful tools,
including to “regulate . . . importation,” and thereby allow
him to respond swiftly to national emergencies and to help
America respond to crises. Since its enactment, Presidents
have invoked IEEPA more than 70 times to deal with
emergencies and threats from the September 11, 2001, al
Qaeda attacks to Iran to North Korea, and many others.
See Congressional Research Service, The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and
Use 18–32 (2025).
 By 1977, moreover, it was well-known that tariffs on
foreign imports—along with even more powerful tools such
as quotas and embargoes—were a common way to “regulate
. . . importation.” IEEPA thus bears zero resemblance to
the paradigmatic “previously little-used backwater”
statutory provision that cannot support significant
executive actions. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 730 .
 All of that makes this case dramatically different from—
really, the opposite of—the major questions cases where the
Court has ruled against the Government. The text, the
history, the context, and the precedent all point strongly to
the conclusion that as of 1977, tariffs were a well-
recognized means of regulating importation, like quotas
and embargoes.
 As Judge Taranto persuasively summarized, this case
bears none of the hallmarks of past major questions cases
where the Court found a lack of clear congressional
authorization for the Government’s asserted major power.
IEEPA’s “facial breadth in an emergency context makes the
straightforward application of the statute’s words hardly
unheralded, and if a more specific herald is needed, it is
present in the [Nixon] 1971 proclamation, Yoshida CCPA,
and subsequent congressional adoption of the relevant
language in 1977.” 149 F. 4th 1312 , 1376 (CA Fed. 2025)
(dissenting opinion) (citations omitted). IEEPA seeks “to
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

provide flexibility in the tools available to the President to
address the unusual and extraordinary threats specified in
a declared national emergency. This is not an ‘ancillary,’
‘little used backwater’ provision, or a delegation outside the
recipient’s wheelhouse.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
 This Court’s recent decision in Biden v. Missouri, 595
U. S. 87 (2022) (per curiam), strongly supports the
President’s position here. That case involved a challenge to
President Biden’s COVID–19 vaccine requirement for
millions of healthcare workers. The executive action there,
too, was undoubtedly major. But the Court upheld the
Government’s vaccine mandate based on a general
statutory authorization for HHS to impose safety
requirements for healthcare facilities—notwithstanding
the lack of explicit statutory reference to vaccines. Id., at
90–96. In doing so, the Court emphasized that state
vaccination requirements were common for healthcare
workers and that the Federal Government regularly
required healthcare workers to take various safety
precautions. Id., at 94–95. Notably, the Court upheld the
vaccine mandate even though (as the dissenters pointed
out) the Federal Government had not traditionally imposed
such vaccine requirements on healthcare workers. See id.,
at 104 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
 The clarity of the congressional authorization in today’s
case is far stronger than in Biden v. Missouri. The Nixon
and Ford tariffs, the Algonquin decision, and the
President’s longstanding authority to regulate trade and
impose tariffs establish—much more comprehensively and
clearly than in Biden v. Missouri—that the President is not
claiming some “unheralded power” that represents a
“transformative expansion” of his authority. Utility Air,
573 U. S., at 324.
 Because the Court upheld the Executive’s exercise of a
major power in Biden v. Missouri, it follows that the Court
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today should likewise uphold the President’s assertion of a
major power here. Like cases should be treated alike.
 In response to all of that, THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion
clings to its primary argument in this case—that a statute
must use the word “tariff ” or “duty” or “tax” or the like to
authorize tariffs on foreign imports. But this Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the major questions doctrine is
not a magic words requirement. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s
opinion identifies no case that has demanded such
specificity. And in Algonquin, this Court unanimously and
squarely rejected the same argument that the statutory
provision must specifically mention “tariffs” or “duties” or
“taxes” for the President to impose tariffs on foreign
imports. Under THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion, the Nixon
and Ford tariffs would also have been unlawful. So too
might other tariffs imposed under the longstanding Section
232 tariff statute, which broadly authorizes the President
to “adjust the imports” of a foreign good without mentioning
“tariffs” or “taxes.” And so would tariffs imposed in
wartime under TWEA’s authority to “regulate . . .
importation.”20
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion’s approach to the major
questions doctrine is a magic-words test under another
name—in contravention of our precedents that make clear
that Congress need not use magic words or “highly specific”
——————
 20 Under the Court’s decision today, the President’s authority to impose

tariffs under TWEA during wartime is presumably now gone given that
TWEA has the same “regulate . . . importation” language, 50 U. S. C.
§4305 (b)(1)(B)—unless the Court thinks that the statutory text somehow
means one thing in TWEA and another in IEEPA, which would be
historically inaccurate and textually unsupportable. One might think
that the Court’s opinion would also mean that tariffs cannot be imposed
under Section 232, which authorizes the President to “adjust the
imports.” After all, that statutory provision likewise does not refer to
“tariffs,” duties,” “taxes,” “fees,” or the like. But in Algonquin, the Court
read Section 232 to authorize tariffs. I assume that the Court today does
not intend to overrule Algonquin.
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terms. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 516 (BARRETT, J.,
concurring) (quotation marks omitted).21
 In previous cases, the Court has looked at the four factors
to determine whether there is “clear congressional
authorization” precisely because the major questions canon
has no magic words requirement. If magic words or the
equivalent were necessary, that would be the only factor.
And the Court would not need the four factors that the
Court has consistently applied.22
 In sum, under the major questions doctrine as the Court
has applied it, this should be a straightforward case.
Congress supplied clear authorization for the President to
impose tariffs under IEEPA.
 B
 1
 Second, there is an alternative and independent reason
why the major questions doctrine does not apply here: This
is a foreign affairs case.
 A plethora of statutes in the U. S. Code grant the
Executive the power to act in foreign affairs. And most of
the important actions that “presidents take today,
including in foreign affairs, rest at least in part on statutory
——————
 21 Taken at face value, moreover, the Court’s major questions analysis

would presumably also preclude Presidents from imposing quotas under
IEEPA. Quotas are justified under the same “regulate . . . importation”
language. How could the Court distinguish quotas from tariffs for major
questions purposes? After all, quotas can be of even greater economic
and political significance than tariffs.
 22 In his concurrence, JUSTICE GORSUCH opines that the phrase

“monetary exactions on foreign imports” would constitute clear
congressional authorization, but that the phrase “regulate . . .
importation” does not. Ante, at 30. But if the phrase “regulate . . .
importation” has historically and commonly encompassed “monetary
exactions on foreign imports”—as it has—and if the four major questions
factors taken together support the Executive—as they do—then I cannot
agree with the line that JUSTICE GORSUCH is drawing between those two
formulations.
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authorization.” C. Bradley & J. Goldsmith, Foreign Affairs,
Nondelegation, and the Major Questions Doctrine, 172 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1743 , 1745 (2024).
 Yet this Court has never before applied the major
questions doctrine—or anything resembling it—to a foreign
affairs statute. I would not make this case the first.
 Rather, in the foreign affairs context, this Court has
interpreted statutes as written, with respect for the
primacy of Congress’s and the President’s roles in foreign
affairs and without using the major questions doctrine as a
thumb on the scale against the President. See, e.g.,
Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518 , 529–530 (1988).
That deeply rooted textualist approach to interpreting
foreign affairs statutes is nothing new. What is new and
rather extraordinary is the approach embodied in THE
CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion for three Justices, which would
extend the major questions doctrine into the foreign affairs
realm for the first time.
 Recall that the major questions doctrine is based on two
overlapping foundations: “separation of powers principles
and a practical understanding of legislative intent.” West
Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723 .
 With respect to separation of powers, the major questions
doctrine serves to reinforce the nondelegation doctrine. But
in the foreign affairs realm, the Court has recognized that
Congress often broadly delegates authority to the
Executive. From the Founding, numerous foreign affairs
statutes “authorizing action by the President in respect of
subjects affecting foreign relations” either “leave the
exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or
provide a standard far more general than that which has
always been considered requisite with regard to domestic
affairs.” United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U. S. 304, 324 (1936); Department of Transportation v.
Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 80, n. 5
(2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). The reason
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 47

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

for those broad delegations is simple and obvious: If
“success” for America’s foreign affairs “aims” is to be
“achieved, congressional legislation . . . must often accord to
the President a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.” Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S.,
at 320 . Stated otherwise, “Congress—in giving the
Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs—must
of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it
customarily wields in domestic areas.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U. S. 1, 17 (1965).
 As Justice Robert Jackson summarized, the Court’s
nondelegation cases—consistent with the “unbroken
legislative practice which has prevailed almost from the
inception of the national government,” Curtiss-Wright, 299
U. S., at 322—have “recognized internal and external
affairs as being in separate categories, and held that the
strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power to
the President over internal affairs does not apply with
respect to delegations of power in external affairs.”
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 636,
n. 2 (1952) (concurring opinion); see Curtiss-Wright, 299
U. S., at 319–322; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S.
388, 422 (1935).
 As Justice Jackson further noted, the Court’s precedents
recognize the “ ‘unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field
of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite
standards by which the President is to be governed.’ ”
Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 636, n. 2 (concurring opinion)
(quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 321–322).
 If the major questions doctrine is designed in part to
protect nondelegation principles, but the nondelegation
doctrine does not play a substantial role in foreign affairs
cases (as the Court has held), then it follows that courts
should not employ the major questions doctrine to put a
thumb on the scale against the President when interpreting
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

foreign affairs statutes. Rather, as Justice Robert Jackson
stated, courts should interpret those statutes as written.
 Relatedly, to the extent that the major questions doctrine
is designed to reflect a “practical understanding of
legislative intent,” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723 , the
doctrine appropriately plays no role in “national security or
foreign policy contexts, because the canon does not reflect
ordinary congressional intent in those areas.” FCC v.
Consumers’ Research, 606 U. S. 656, 706 (2025)
(KAVANAUGH, J., concurring). In the foreign affairs realm,
Congress “has good reason to—and intends to—authorize
many executive branch actions related to foreign affairs in
broad or general terms.” Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa.
L. Rev., at 1793.
 Congress ordinarily seeks “to give the President
substantial authority and flexibility to protect America and
the American people.” Consumers’ Research, 606 U. S., at
706–707 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring). After all, the
President exercises the “vast share of responsibility for the
conduct of our foreign relations.” American Ins. Assn. v.
Garamendi, 539 U. S. 396, 414 (2003) (quotation marks
omitted). So Congress “often” gives the President “a degree
of discretion.” Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 320 . That
“unbroken legislative practice” from the Founding means
that courts interpreting statutes in the foreign affairs field
should assume that Congress meant what it said. Id., at
322 .
 Stated otherwise, “if the major questions doctrine turns
on a contextual inquiry into likely congressional intent, it
is likely for a variety of reasons to have less purchase in the
foreign affairs area.” Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa. L.
Rev., at 1790.
 To be clear, Congress of course maintains the ultimate
power over how broadly or narrowly to write statutes in the
foreign policy and national security contexts. For example,
Congress can write foreign affairs statutes narrowly.
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 49

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

Indeed, even for wartime powers, Congress rarely gives the
President a “blank check.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S.
507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion). And when Congress
writes a narrow foreign affairs statute, this Court has
enforced those statutory limits as written. Cf. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557 , 593–595 (2006); id., at 638–639
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
 Moreover, when it does legislate more broadly, Congress
sometimes claws back the statutory authorization by
rescinding or amending overbroad statutes, or by
restricting previously granted Presidential power through
the leverage it possesses over appropriations, new
legislation, or confirmations. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1783 ; Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600 , as amended, 10
U. S. C. §948a et seq.; Case-Church Amendment, Pub. L.
93–50, §307, 87 Stat. 129 . Either House of Congress alone,
through the appropriations process, can insist on certain
limits as a condition of approving funding. At the end of the
day, given the appropriations power, Congress holds the
cards.
 In short, in the foreign affairs context, this Court has
never before super-imposed the major questions doctrine (or
any similar canon or principle) onto ordinary statutory
interpretation to place a thumb on the scale against the
President. Rather, the Court interprets the relevant
statutes according to their text, with respect for Congress’s
and the President’s central roles in the foreign policy and
national security fields.
 2
 This tariffs case plainly falls into the foreign affairs
category. IEEPA “directly and expressly relate[s] to foreign
affairs.” Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1796.
And like quotas and embargoes, tariffs regulate the goods
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that are imported into the country from foreign nations.
The tariffs do not apply to goods produced in America.
 Moreover, tariffs on foreign imports are significant tools
of foreign policy and national security, whether imposed
under IEEPA, TWEA, Section 232, Section 122, Section
201, Section 301, or Section 338. They are often used to
“advance foreign policy goals, or as negotiating leverage in
trade negotiations.” Congressional Research Service, U. S.
Tariff Policy: Overview 1 (2025). Like other economic tools,
tariffs can “serve as a ‘bargaining chip’ to be used by the
President when dealing with a hostile country,” Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 673 (1981)—or to incentivize
a change in behavior by allies, partners, or enemies. Cf.
Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80 (opinion
of THOMAS, J.) (embargo statute “involved the external
relations of the United States”); Gundy v. United States,
 588 U. S. 128 , 170–171 (2019) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting).
 With respect to foreign trade specifically, Congress often
“invest[s] the President with large discretion in matters
arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade and
commerce with other nations.” Marshall Field & Co. v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 691 (1892). Since the Founding, that
longstanding practice has included tariff statutes:
Congress has granted the President expansive power over
tariffs and foreign trade. Ante, at 13–17 (THOMAS, J.,
dissenting). And this Court has uniformly rejected
challenges to tariffs imposed by Presidents under those
statutory authorities. E.g., Federal Energy Administration
v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 , 558–560 (1976); J.
W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409
(1928); Marshall Field, 143 U. S., at 690–694; Cargo of Brig
Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382 , 386–388 (1813).
 As Professors Bradley and Goldsmith well summarized,
there is a “settled practice of about a century of the
executive branch exercising emergency powers in many
important contexts pursuant to the broadly worded IEEPA
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

and its predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act. And
there is an even longer practice, dating to the Founding, of
presidents exercising trade-related sanctions authority
pursuant to broadly worded statutes. Notably, the Court
has already suggested in both of these contexts that one
should expect Congress to, in effect, paint with a broad
brush.” 172 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1796–1797.
 As with tariffs on foreign imports historically, the IEEPA
tariffs on foreign imports at issue in this case implicate
foreign affairs. According to the Government, the President
has leveraged the IEEPA tariffs into trade deals with major
trading partners including China, the United Kingdom, and
Japan, among other countries. The Government says that
the tariffs have helped make certain foreign markets more
accessible to American businesses and have contributed to
trade deals with foreign nations worth trillions of dollars.
 Moreover, consistent with history and the traditional
uses of tariffs, the President “is exercising his IEEPA
authority in connection with highly sensitive negotiations
he is conducting to end the conflict between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine.” Decl. of M. Rubio in No. 25–1812
(CA Fed., Aug. 29, 2025), p. 3. To that end, on August 6,
2025, the President imposed tariffs on India for “directly or
indirectly importing Russian Federation oil.” Exec. Order
No. 14329, 90 Fed. Reg. 38701 (2025). And on February 6,
2026, the President reduced the tariffs on India because,
according to the Government, India had “committed to stop
directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil.”
Exec. Order No. 14384, 91 Fed. Reg. 6501 (2026).
 To be sure, most foreign affairs and national security
actions—whether war, international agreements, trade
deals, or tariffs—lead to significant domestic ramifications
within the United States. And this case is no exception.
Nonetheless, in the foreign affairs field, courts interpret
statutes as written, with appropriate respect to Congress
and the President and without a major questions doctrine
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weight on the scale against the President. See Youngstown,
 343 U. S., at 636, n. 2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
 Lest there be any remaining doubt that the major
questions doctrine does not apply to tariffs on foreign
imports, recall again this Court’s decision in Algonquin.
That case involved significant tariffs imposed by President
Ford on oil imports. The relevant statute granted the
President the authority to “adjust the imports.” 19 U. S. C.
§1862 (b) (1970 ed.). The Court upheld the tariffs by
interpreting the statute as written. Neither the major
questions doctrine—nor anything resembling that
doctrine—played a role in that case.
 In short, “Presidential actions pursuant to broad
congressional authorizations related to foreign affairs often
have long historical pedigrees that can in various ways
inform congressional intent to approve the actions in
question. To the extent that this is so in particular
instances, the major questions doctrine’s clear authorization
requirement does not apply.” Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U.
Pa. L. Rev., at 1794 (emphasis added).
 So it is here: Presidents “have long been granted
substantial discretion over tariffs.” Id., at 1759, n. 90. This
Court has never before applied the major questions doctrine
to a statute authorizing the President to take action with
respect to foreign affairs in general or tariffs in particular.
And it should not do so today.
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion’s reliance on the major
questions doctrine in this foreign affairs case is a first—a
novel and unprecedented use of the major questions
doctrine to invalidate Presidential action taken pursuant to
congressional authorization in the foreign affairs area. I
firmly disagree with that use of the major questions
doctrine here. In the foreign affairs context, including
tariffs, the longstanding rule is simple: Interpret the
 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 53

 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

statute as written, not with a thumb on the scale against
the President.23
 3
 Related precedent further demonstrates that the major
questions doctrine has not traditionally applied in the
national security or foreign policy contexts. Consider two
prominent examples.
 First, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 , this Court
considered the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force, which Congress passed and President George W.
Bush signed on September 18, 2001, in the wake of the al
Qaeda attacks on the United States. The law broadly
——————
 23 In his thoughtful concurrence, JUSTICE GORSUCH agrees that the

major questions doctrine often does not apply to foreign affairs statutes,
but in his view it does not apply only when the President also has
inherent or independent Article II power. Ante, at 30–31. THE CHIEF
JUSTICE’s opinion for three Justices also gestures at that position. See
ante, at 12–13. I see some analytical and practical problems with that
approach.
 First, as JUSTICE GORSUCH elsewhere notes, the major questions
doctrine serves in part to reinforce nondelegation principles. Yet as I
have explained, the Court’s nondelegation cases from the Founding to
the present—including numerous cases involving tariffs—have
“recognized internal and external affairs as being in separate categories,
and held that the strict limitation upon congressional delegations of
power to the President over internal affairs does not apply with respect
to delegations of power in external affairs.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 636, n. 2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring);
see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 ,
319–322 (1936); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 422 (1935).
In those cases, the Court has not further subdivided the foreign affairs
power in the manner that JUSTICE GORSUCH now suggests.
 Second, terms such as “inherent” or “independent” in this context
continue to be “used, often interchangeably and without fixed or
ascertainable meanings.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 647 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also id., at 637 . So it would be both novel and
jurisprudentially chaotic to try to now create a new approach tying the
applicability of the major questions canon in the foreign affairs context
to such uncertain triggers.
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empowered the President to use “all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks” that occurred on September 11,
2001. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224
(Sept. 18, 2001).
 In Hamdi, the Government militarily detained in the
United States an American citizen who had taken up arms
with the Taliban. 542 U. S., at 510–511. The plaintiff
Hamdi argued, among other things, that the AUMF
generally authorized the use of force but did not specifically
authorize military detention, at least detention of
American-citizen enemy combatants in the United States.
See id., at 515–517. He contended that his military
detention was therefore illegal.
 In the principal opinion by Justice O’Connor, the Court
rejected Hamdi’s statutory argument, explaining that it
was “of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific
language of detention.” Id., at 519. Rather, because
“detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield
is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the
use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has
clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the
narrow circumstances considered here.” Ibid.
 Consider the similarities between Hamdi and this case.
Both involve major questions of foreign affairs. Hamdi
involved U. S. military detention of an American citizen in
America, pursuant to a generally worded authorization for
use of military force. This case involves tariffs on foreign
goods imported into America pursuant to a generally
worded authorization to regulate importation. Detention is
a traditional incident of the President’s delegated power to
wage war. See id., at 518. Tariffs are a traditional incident
of the President’s delegated power to regulate imports and
foreign commerce. In Hamdi, the Court said that as a
matter of history, practice, and precedent, the AUMF’s
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general authorization for the use of military force clearly
encompassed detention of enemy combatants. Id., at 518–
522. Here, as a matter of history, practice, and precedent,
IEEPA’s general authorization for regulation of
importation likewise clearly encompasses tariffs on foreign
imports.
 Second, in 1981 in Dames & Moore, 453 U. S. 654 , the
Court did not apply the major questions doctrine, even
though the Court had recently applied that principle in a
significant domestic policy case. Cf. Industrial Union Dept.,
AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607
(1980) (plurality opinion).
 The Dames & Moore case arose in the wake of the Iran
hostage crisis where Iran held more than 50 American
hostages at the U. S. Embassy in Iran for more than 14
months. As one part of the ultimate settlement of the
hostage crisis with Iran, President Reagan suspended
claims by U. S. nationals against Iran that were pending in
American courts. Dames & Moore, 453 U. S., at 666 . The
President did so under IEEPA and the Hostage Act. Id., at
675 .
 There can be little doubt that the question of suspending
American citizens’ claims against Iran was one of major
economic and political significance. And the Court further
recognized that the case touched “fundamentally upon the
manner in which our Republic is to be governed.” Id., at
659 . Yet the Court did not require “clear congressional
authorization” for the President’s exercise of that authority
to suspend the Americans’ claims against Iran.
 On the contrary, the Court openly acknowledged that the
relevant statutes—IEEPA and the Hostage Act—did not
provide clear or “specific authorization” for the President to
suspend those claims. Id., at 677 . The Court nonetheless
concluded that the “general tenor of Congress’ legislation in
this area”—combined with Congress’s longstanding
acquiescence to the President’s practice of settling claims—
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supported the President’s suspension of those claims. Id.,
at 678 . Congress’s “general tenor” and acquiescence are of
course far less than the “clear congressional authorization”
that THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion today newly demands for
the President’s tariffs.
 Again, consider the similarities between Dames & Moore
and this case. Dames & Moore involved complicated
questions of foreign policy and national security. The
statutes in Dames & Moore were generally worded and did
not specifically authorize suspension of claims. But
Presidents had historically exercised a similar power. See
 id., at 677–682. Here, we likewise have a generally worded
statutory authorization to “regulate . . . importation.” And
Presidents have historically imposed tariffs.
 If IEEPA permitted the President to lawfully suspend
claims in Dames & Moore—despite the Court’s transparent
acknowledgment that the actual statutory text did not
clearly authorize the President’s actions—then surely
IEEPA’s authorization to “regulate . . . importation” easily
justifies these tariffs.
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion would chart a new course
for the major questions doctrine, extending it for the first
time deep into the foreign affairs sphere. If the Court had
applied the major questions doctrine in Hamdi and Dames
& Moore, those two landmark cases almost certainly would
have been decided differently. So today’s opinion marks a
significant change. Will the Court apply the major
questions doctrine in the foreign affairs context again in the
future? Or is this a ticket good for one day and one train
only? Time will tell. But in the meantime, the decision
could engender significant uncertainty over the Executive’s
exercise of statutory authority in the foreign affairs realm.
 As the Hamdi and Dames & Moore examples
demonstrate, applying the major questions doctrine in the
foreign policy and national security contexts in the past
would have seriously hindered the President’s ability to
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

exercise power granted by Congress to achieve important
foreign policy and national security objectives for America.
And if applied in the foreign affairs context in the future, it
could impair Presidents’ vital statutory authorities with
respect to foreign policy and national security.24
 * * *
 Having said all of that on foreign affairs, I reiterate that
the major questions doctrine—even if it applies in this
foreign affairs context—does not defeat major executive
actions that are clearly authorized by Congress. See
Bradley & Goldsmith, 172 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1790–1791.
And as explained in Part III–A above, in IEEPA Congress
clearly authorized the President to impose tariffs to
“regulate . . . importation” in national emergencies. In
other words, even if the major questions doctrine applies in
the foreign affairs context exactly as it does in domestic
affairs, the President should still prevail in this case.
 IV
 Finally, no Member of the Court today relies on the
nondelegation doctrine. But the plaintiffs briefly raise such
an argument, and I will therefore briefly address it. The
——————
 24 What is the status going forward of the major questions doctrine in

foreign affairs cases? Only three Justices (at most) today suggest that
the major questions doctrine should apply in the foreign affairs context—
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE GORSUCH, and JUSTICE BARRETT. I doubt
that the major questions doctrine analysis in THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s
opinion for those three Justices is controlling for future cases as a matter
of precedent under the Marks rule. See Marks v. United States, 430 U. S.
188, 193 (1977). That is because three Justices (JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR,
JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON) do not recognize the major
questions doctrine at all. Ante, at 1–2 (KAGAN, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). And this dissent would not apply it in the
foreign affairs context. So it appears that six Justices would not apply it
in the foreign affairs context. In my view, the question of whether or how
the major questions doctrine applies in foreign affairs cases remains at
least an open question.
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argument is unavailing for many of the reasons already
noted in the major questions analysis above. This Court
has repeatedly rejected constitutional challenges to
congressional delegations to the President in the foreign
affairs area, including delegations of tariff authority.
 For matters of foreign affairs and national security, the
Court has traditionally recognized that Congress “must of
necessity paint with a brush broader than that it
customarily wields in domestic areas.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U. S. 1, 17 (1965). And to reiterate, numerous statutes
“ ‘authorizing action by the President in respect of subjects
affecting foreign relations’ ” “ ‘either leave the exercise of the
power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard
far more general than that which has always been
considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs.’ ”
Department of Transportation v. Association of American
Railroads, 575 U. S. 43, 80, n. 5 (2015) (THOMAS, J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 324 (1936)). Therefore,
as JUSTICE THOMAS has explained, the Court’s precedents
establish that “the Constitution grants the President a
greater measure of discretion in the realm of foreign
relations.” Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at
80, n. 5 ; see Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at 319–
322; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 422
(1935).
 Justice Robert Jackson likewise noted the “ ‘unwisdom of
requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to
lay down narrowly definite standards by which the
President is to be governed.’ ” Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 636, n. 2 (1952) (concurring
opinion) (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 321–322).
As such, the “strict limitation upon congressional
delegations of power to the President over internal affairs
does not apply with respect to delegations of power in
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

external affairs.” Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 636, n. 2
(concurring opinion).
 Because statutes that “involv[e] the external relations of
the United States” do not trigger the same kind of
delegation concerns as purely domestic ones, Association of
American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80 (opinion of THOMAS,
J.), the Court has regularly upheld delegations of power to
the President in the national security and foreign policy
realms. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 319–322;
Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. 748 , 771–774 (1996).
Indeed, if a strict nondelegation doctrine applied in those
areas, numerous statutes—including many authorizations
for use of military force in the Nation’s history—would have
been unconstitutional delegations of authority to the
President. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115
Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (“[T]he President is authorized to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001”).
 As to tariffs in particular: Broad delegations of tariff
authority to the President have been in the heartland of
permissible delegations upheld by this Court. Congress
may, without running afoul of the Constitution, “invest the
President with large discretion in matters arising out of the
execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with
other nations.” Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S.
649, 691 (1892). Congressional delegations of tariffs and
other foreign trade authorities to the President date back
to near the Founding. And this Court has uniformly
rejected nondelegation challenges to statutes delegating
that authority to the President. E.g., Federal Energy
Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 , 558–
560 (1976); J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394, 409 (1928); Marshall Field, 143 U. S., at 690–694;
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Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382 , 386–
388 (1813).
 This Court’s decision in Algonquin is again instructive.
There, the Court held that Section 232 did not constitute an
unconstitutional delegation. 426 U. S., at 558–560. The
Court found it sufficient that the President could act “only”
to the extent “he deems necessary to adjust the imports” of
an article such that it “will not threaten to impair the
national security.” Id., at 559 (quotation marks omitted).
 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is no
nondelegation doctrine in the foreign affairs realm. But the
Court has consistently recognized that the doctrine affords
more flexibility to Congress and the President in that area
to deal with the complex foreign relations issues and
national security threats facing America. See Association
of American Railroads, 575 U. S., at 80, n. 5 (opinion of
THOMAS, J.); Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 636, n. 2 (Jackson,
J., concurring); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 319–322;
Panama Refining, 293 U. S., at 422 .
 In all events, for purposes of this Court’s nondelegation
precedents, IEEPA sufficiently constrains the President’s
authority to declare an emergency and impose tariffs. See
J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 409 ; FCC v. Consumers’
Research, 606 U. S. 656 , 673–675, 681–691 (2025). The
President may exercise the authorities in IEEPA “only” “to
deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat” that “has
its source in whole or substantial part outside the United
States” and “with respect to which a national emergency
has been declared.” 50 U. S. C. §1701 . Congress placed
numerous limits on IEEPA, including a default 1-year time
limit, an enumerated list of exceptions, and comprehensive
congressional reporting requirements. See §§1622(d),
1702(b), 1703.
 It is also useful to underscore the extraordinary nature of
the plaintiffs’ nondelegation argument here. The plaintiffs’
submission would mean that these tariffs would be
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

unlawful even if IEEPA explicitly authorized tariffs. Unlike
their statutory and major questions doctrine arguments,
their nondelegation argument is not based on a lack of an
explicit reference to “tariffs” or “duties” or the like. Their
nondelegation argument instead goes much further and
would require very specific congressional directions to the
President on when and under what circumstances he could
impose tariffs and how high those tariffs could be. The
plaintiffs’ theory would have dramatic consequences and
likely wipe out many of the existing tariff statutes that have
long been upheld by this Court, as well as TWEA. And if
the tariff authority here is unlawful, so too are most if not
all IEEPA authorities such as asset freezes, embargoes, and
quotas. And it would not stop there. The plaintiffs’
nondelegation theory would threaten various other
national security and foreign affairs statutes that similarly
grant substantial discretion to the President. The Court
today thankfully does not go down that road.25
 V
 The overarching theme of the Court’s opinion is that
tariffs are not a clear means to “regulate . . . importation”
and that Congress was therefore required to use the word
“tariff,” “duty,” or the like in IEEPA in 1977 if it wanted to
authorize tariffs on foreign imports. But that conclusion

——————
 25 Some last points for completeness: The plaintiffs also raise two other

arguments that the Court today does not address or rely on. First, they
argue that Section 122, a non-emergency tariff statute that addresses
trade deficits, implicitly displaces IEEPA’s tariff authority. Second, they
argue that the tariffs here do not deal with an “unusual and
extraordinary threat” as to which a national emergency has been
declared. In my view, those arguments are insubstantial, as Judge
Taranto persuasively explained in the Federal Circuit. See 149 F. 4th
1312 , 1359–1361, 1371–1375 (2025) (dissenting opinion). Because the
Court today does not address or rely on them, I will not discuss them
further here. Finally, I agree with footnote 1 of the Court’s opinion
regarding jurisdiction. Ante, at 5, n. 1.
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contravenes text, history, and precedent. To summarize:
Algonquin in 1976 unanimously held the opposite. The
Nixon and Ford tariffs were based on statutory provisions
that did not use the word “tariff ” or “duty.” There is a long
tradition of Presidents imposing tariffs as a means of
regulating importation and commerce. The predecessor
Trading with the Enemy Act has long been understood to
authorize tariffs during wartime as a means to “regulate . . .
importation,” even though it does not use the word “tariff ”
or “duty.” The history of the Polk, Lincoln, and McKinley
tariffs shows that tariffs are a means of regulating
importation. Marshall, Story, and Madison stated that
tariffs are a means of regulating foreign commerce. The
dictionary definitions and ordinary usage establish that
tariffs are a means of regulating importation.
 All of that and much more, in my view, overwhelmingly
establish that IEEPA clearly authorizes the President to
impose tariffs.
 That said, with respect to tariffs in particular, the Court’s
decision might not prevent Presidents from imposing most
if not all of these same sorts of tariffs under other statutory
authorities. For example, Section 122 of the Trade Act of
1974 permits the President to impose a “temporary import
surcharge” to “deal with large and serious United States
balance-of-payments deficits.” 19 U. S. C. §2132 (a).
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides that, if the
International Trade Commission determines an article is
being imported in such quantities that it is “a substantial
cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the
domestic industry producing an article like or directly
competitive with the imported article,” the President may
take “appropriate and feasible action,” including imposing
a “duty.” §§2251(a), 2253(a)(3)(A). Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974 authorizes the President through a subordinate
officer to “impose duties” if he determines that “an act,
policy, or practice of a foreign country” is “unjustifiable and
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 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

burdens or restricts United States commerce.” §§2411(a)–
(c). Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 permits the
President to impose tariffs when he finds that “any foreign
country places any burden or disadvantage upon the
commerce of the United States.” §1338(d). And Section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes the
President to, after receiving a report from the Secretary of
Commerce, “adjust the imports of [an] article and its
derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair
the national security.” §1862(c)(1)(a).
 So the Court’s decision is not likely to greatly restrict
Presidential tariff authority going forward. But the Court’s
decision is likely to generate other serious practical
consequences in the near term. One issue will be refunds.
Refunds of billions of dollars would have significant
consequences for the U. S. Treasury. The Court says
nothing today about whether, and if so how, the
Government should go about returning the billions of
dollars that it has collected from importers. But that
process is likely to be a “mess,” as was acknowledged at oral
argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 153–155. A second issue is the
decision’s effect on the current trade deals. Because IEEPA
tariffs have helped facilitate trade deals worth trillions of
dollars—including with foreign nations from China to the
United Kingdom to Japan, the Court’s decision could
generate uncertainty regarding various trade agreements.
That process, too, could be difficult.
 * * *
 The tariffs at issue here may or may not be wise policy.
But as a matter of text, history, and precedent, they are
clearly lawful. I respectfully dissent.