Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1

 Syllabus

 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
 being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
 The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
 prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
 See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 Syllabus

 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC., ET AL. v. PAXTON,
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
 THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 No. 23–1122. Argued January 15, 2025—Decided June 27, 2025

Texas, like many States, prohibits distributing sexually explicit content
 to children. In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, requiring certain com-
 mercial websites publishing sexually explicit content that is obscene to
 minors to verify that visitors are 18 or older. Knowing violations sub-
 ject covered entities to injunctions and civil penalties.
 Petitioners—representatives of the pornography industry—sued the
 Texas attorney general to enjoin enforcement of H. B. 1181 as facially
 unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
 They alleged that adults have a right to access the covered speech, and
 that the statute impermissibly hinders them. The Fifth Circuit held
 that an injunction was not warranted because petitioners were un-
 likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. The court viewed
 H. B. 1181 as a “regulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials
 obscene for minors.” 95 F. 4th 263 , 269, 271. It therefore determined
 that the law is not subject to any heightened scrutiny under the First
 Amendment.
Held: H. B. 1181 triggers, and survives, review under intermediate scru-
 tiny because it only incidentally burdens the protected speech of
 adults. Pp. 5–36.
 (a) H. B. 1181 is subject to intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 5–32.
 (1) To determine whether a law that regulates speech violates the
 First Amendment, the Court considers both the nature of the burden
 imposed by the law and the nature of the speech at issue. Laws that
 target protected speech “based on its communicative content” are pre-
 sumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if ” they satisfy
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 Syllabus

 strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155 , 163. Laws that
 only incidentally burden protected speech are subject to intermediate
 scrutiny. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 .
 And laws that restrict only unprotected speech, such as obscenity, re-
 ceive rational-basis review. United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460,
 468 . History, tradition, and precedent establish that sexual content
 that is obscene to minors but not to adults is protected in part and
 unprotected in part. States may prevent minors from accessing such
 content, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 , 637–638, but may not
 prevent adults from doing the same, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380,
 383 . Pp. 6–13.
 (2) H. B. 1181 has only an incidental effect on protected speech,
 and is therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny. The First Amend-
 ment leaves undisturbed States’ traditional power to prevent minors
 from accessing speech that is obscene from their perspective. That
 power includes the power to require proof of age before an individual
 can access such speech. It follows that no person—adult or child—has
 a First Amendment right to access such speech without first submit-
 ting proof of age.
 The power to verify age is part of the power to prevent children from
 accessing speech that is obscene to them. Where the Constitution re-
 serves a power to the States, that power includes “the ordinary and
 appropriate means” of exercising it. 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the
 Constitution of the United States §430, pp. 412–413. Requiring proof
 of age is an ordinary and appropriate means of enforcing an age-based
 limit on obscenity to minors. Age verification is common when laws
 draw age-based lines, e.g., obtaining alcohol, a firearm, or a driver’s
 license. Obscenity is no exception. Most States require age verifica-
 tion for in-person purchases of sexual material, and petitioners con-
 cede that in-person requirements of this kind are “traditional” and “al-
 most surely” constitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. And as a practical
 matter, age-verification is necessary for an effective prohibition on mi-
 nors accessing age-inappropriate sexual content, especially on the in-
 ternet.
 Because H. B. 1181 simply requires proof of age to access content
 that is obscene to minors, it does not directly regulate adults’ protected
 speech. Adults have the right to access speech obscene only to minors,
 see Butler, 352 U. S., at 383–384, and submitting to age verification
 burdens the exercise of that right. But adults have no First Amend-
 ment right to avoid age verification. Any burden on adults is therefore
 incidental to regulating activity not protected by the First Amend-
 ment. This makes intermediate scrutiny the appropriate standard un-
 der the Court’s precedents. Pp. 13–19.
 (3) Applying the more demanding standard of strict scrutiny
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would call into question all age-verification requirements, even
longstanding in-person requirements. Although petitioners insist that
traditional in-person requirements would survive strict scrutiny, the
Court cannot share their confidence. Strict scrutiny is designed to en-
force the First Amendment’s prohibition on content-based laws, and it
succeeds in that purpose only if, as a practical matter, it is almost al-
ways fatal in fact. Strict scrutiny is not the appropriate standard for
laws that are traditional and widely accepted as legitimate. Pp. 19–
21.
 (4) Precedent does not call for the application of strict scrutiny.
The Court’s decisions applying strict scrutiny in this context all in-
volved laws that banned both minors and adults from accessing speech
that was at most obscene only to minors. See Sable Communications
of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 118, 126 ; United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 808, 811, 814 ; Reno v. Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 868, 876 ; Ashcroft v. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 665 . The Court has never
before considered whether the more modest burden of an age-verifica-
tion requirement triggers strict scrutiny. Pp. 21–28.
 (5) Texas contends that only rational-basis review applies. This
position fails to account for the incidental burden that age verification
necessarily has on an adult’s First Amendment right to access speech
obscene only to minors. Although deferential, intermediate scrutiny
plays an important role in ensuring that legislatures do not use osten-
sibly legitimate purposes to disguise efforts to suppress fundamental
rights. Pp. 31–32.
 (b) H. B. 1181 survives intermediate scrutiny because it “advances
important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free
speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary
to further those interests.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,
 520 U. S. 180, 189 . Pp. 32–36.
 (1) H. B. 1181 furthers Texas’s important interest in shielding
children from sexual content and is adequately tailored to that inter-
est. States have long used age-verification requirements to reconcile
their interest in protecting children from sexual material with adults’
right to avail themselves of such material. H. B. 1181 simply adapts
this traditional approach to the digital age. The specific verification
methods that H. B. 1181 permits—government-issued identification
and transactional data—are also plainly legitimate. Both are estab-
lished methods of verifying age already in use by many pornographic
websites and other industries with age-restricted services. Pp. 32–34.
 (2) Petitioners’ counterarguments are unpersuasive. Petitioners
object that other means of protecting children are more effective and
that children are likely to encounter sexually explicit content on other
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 Syllabus

 websites subject to H. B. 1181’s requirements. But intermediate scru-
 tiny does not require States to adopt the least restrictive means of pur-
 suing their interests, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 800 ,
 or avoid all underinclusiveness, TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U. S. ___ ,
 ___. Pp. 34–35.
 95 F. 4th 263 , affirmed.

 THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

 Opinion of the Court

 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
 United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
 Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
 pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 No. 23–1122
 _________________

 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC., ET AL.,
 PETITIONERS v. KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY
 GENERAL OF TEXAS
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 [June 27, 2025]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
 Texas, like many States, prohibits the distribution of sex-
ually explicit content to children. Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§43.24 (b) (West 2016). But, although that prohibition may
be effective against brick-and-mortar stores, it has proved
challenging to enforce against online content. In an effort
to address this problem, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §129B.001 et seq. (West Cum.
Supp. 2024), which requires certain commercial websites
that publish sexually explicit content to verify the ages of
their visitors. This requirement furthers the lawful end of
preventing children from accessing sexually explicit con-
tent. But, it also burdens adult visitors of these websites,
who all agree have a First Amendment right to access at
least some of the content that the websites publish. We
granted certiorari to decide whether these burdens likely
render H. B. 1181 unconstitutional under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. We hold that they do not.
The power to require age verification is within a State’s au-
thority to prevent children from accessing sexually explicit
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 Opinion of the Court

content. H. B. 1181 is a constitutionally permissible exer-
cise of that authority.
 I
 A
 In 2023, Texas enacted H. B. 1181, a law requiring por-
nographic websites to verify that their users are adults.
H. B. 1181’s sponsors proposed the law to address their con-
cern that the internet makes too accessible to minors “hard-
core pornographic content and videos,” many of which de-
pict “sexual violence, incest, physical aggression, sexual
assault, non-consent, and teens.” App. 254–255. According
to the sponsors, such pornography is “addictive,” has harm-
ful “developmental effects on the brain,” and leads to “risky
sexual behaviors.” Ibid. The Texas Legislature passed the
Act with only a single opposing vote, and the Governor
signed it into law.
 The statute applies to any “commercial entity that know-
ingly and intentionally publishes or distributes material on
an Internet website, . . . more than one-third of which is
sexual material harmful to minors.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. §129B.002(a). The statute defines “ ‘[s]exual ma-
terial harmful to minors’ ” as material that: (1) “is designed
to appeal to or pander to the prurient interest” when taken
“as a whole and with respect to minors”; (2) describes, dis-
plays, or depicts “in a manner patently offensive with re-
spect to minors” various sex acts and portions of the human
anatomy, including depictions of “sexual intercourse, mas-
turbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation,
[and] excretory functions”; and (3) “lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”
§129B.001(6).
 H. B. 1181 requires a covered entity to “use reasonable
age verification methods . . . to verify that an individual at-
tempting to access the material is 18 years of age or older.”
§129B.002(a). To verify age, a covered entity must require
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 Opinion of the Court

visitors to “comply with a commercial age verification sys-
tem” that uses “government-issued identification” or “a
commercially reasonable method that relies on public or
private transactional data.” §129B.003(b)(2).1 The entity
may perform verification itself or through a third-party ser-
vice. §129B.003(b).
 If a commercial entity knowingly violates H. B. 1181, the
Texas attorney general may sue to enjoin the violation.
§129B.006(a). The attorney general may also recover a civil
penalty of up to $10,000 per day that the website is non-
compliant, as well as an additional penalty of up to
$250,000 if any minors access covered sexual material as a
result of the violation. §129B.006(b).
 H. B. 1181 is not the only law of its kind. At least 21 other
States have imposed materially similar age-verification re-
quirements to access sexual material that is harmful to mi-
nors online.2
——————
 1 An entity may also verify age by requiring users to “provide digital

identification,” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §129B.003(b)(1), which
is defined as “information stored on a digital network that may be ac-
cessed by a commercial entity and that serves as proof of the identity of
an individual,” §129B.003(a). The State concedes that “Texas does not
yet have a state issued digital identification card or app.” App. 189. Pe-
titioners maintain that no other identification could qualify as “digital
ID” under this definition. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37. We assume without
deciding that petitioners are correct.
 2 See Ala. Code §8–19G–3(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024); 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws

ch. 193 (to be codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18–701(A)); Ark. Code
Ann. §4–88–1304(a) (2023); 2024 Fla. Laws ch. 42, §2 (to be codified at
 Fla. Stat. §501.1737 (2)); 2024 Ga. Laws p. 316 (to be codified at Ga. Code
Ann. §39–5–5(b)); Idaho Code Ann. §6–3803(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Ind.
Code §24–4–23–10 (Cum. Supp. 2024); 2024 Kan. Sess. Laws p. 451 (to
be codified at Kan. Stat. Ann. §50–6146(a)); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§436.002 (1) (West Cum. Supp. 2024); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §51:2121(A)(1)
(West 2025); Miss. Code Ann. §11–77–5(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024); Mont.
Code Ann. §30–14–159(1) (2023); Neb. Rev. Stat. §87–1003(1) (2024);
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §66–501(a) (Supp. 2024); H. B. 1561, 69th Leg.
Assem., Reg. Sess., §1 (N. D. 2025) (to be codified at N. D. Cent. Code
Ann. §51–07(2)); S. C. Code Ann. §37–1–310(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024);
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 Opinion of the Court

 B
 Soon after Texas enacted H. B. 1181, a trade association
for the pornography industry, a group of companies that op-
erate pornographic websites, and a pornography performer
sued the Texas attorney general. These plaintiffs, petition-
ers here, sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute as fa-
cially unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment. They alleged that adults have a right to
access the speech covered by H. B. 1181, and that the stat-
ute impermissibly hinders them from doing so.
 The District Court granted petitioners a preliminary in-
junction after concluding that they were likely to succeed
on their claim. The court held that because H. B. 1181 “re-
stricts access to speech” that is constitutionally protected
for adults “based on the material’s content,” it is subject to
“strict scrutiny”—the onerous standard of scrutiny applica-
ble to direct invasions of First Amendment rights. Free
Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Colmenero, 689 F. Supp. 3d 373 ,
391 (WD Tex. 2023). Under that standard, the law would
be constitutional only if Texas could show that it
“(1) serve[s] a compelling governmental interest, (2) [is]
narrowly tailored to achieve it, and (3) [is] the least restric-
tive means of advancing it.” Id., at 392 . The District Court
acknowledged Texas’s compelling interest in preventing “a
minor’s access to pornography.” Ibid. But, it found that
Texas had failed to “show that H. B. 1181 is narrowly tai-
lored and the least restrictive means of advancing that in-
terest.” Id., at 393 . In the District Court’s opinion, for ex-
ample, encouraging parents to install content-filtering
software on their children’s devices would be a less restric-
tive means of accomplishing the State’s objective. Id., at
——————
H. B. 1053, 100th Leg. Sess., §4 (S. D. 2025) (to be codified in S. D. Cod-
ified Laws ch. 22–24); Tenn. Code Ann. §39–17–912(c) (Supp. 2024);
Utah Code §78B–3–1002(1) (Supp. 2024); Va. Code Ann. §8 .01–40.5(B)
(2024); 2025 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 139, §1 (to be codified at Wyo. Stat.
Ann. §14–3–502(a)).
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 Opinion of the Court

401–404.
 The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated
the injunction, holding that petitioners were unlikely to
succeed on the merits. The Fifth Circuit viewed H. B. 1181
as a “regulatio[n] of the distribution to minors of materials
obscene for minors,” which only incidentally implicates “the
privacy of those adults” seeking to access the regulated con-
tent. 95 F. 4th 263 , 269, 271 (2024). And, because minors
have no First Amendment right to access such materials,
the court held that the law was “subject only to rational-
basis review”—the exceedingly deferential standard appli-
cable to laws that do not implicate fundamental rights. Id.,
at 269 . Applying that standard, the court concluded that
H. B. 1181 survived petitioners’ challenge because its “age-
verification requirement is rationally related to the govern-
ment’s legitimate interest in preventing minors’ access to
pornography.” Id., at 267 .
 Judge Higginbotham dissented in relevant part. Like the
District Court, he would have applied strict scrutiny and
found that Texas had failed to meet its burden under that
standard. Id., at 299 , 303–304 (opinion dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
 Petitioners sought a stay of the Fifth Circuit’s judgment,
which this Court denied. 601 U. S. ___ (2024). We granted
certiorari to determine whether H. B. 1181’s age-
verification requirement is likely constitutional on its face.
 603 U. S. ___ (2024).
 II
 To determine which standard of First Amendment scru-
tiny applies to Texas’s age-verification law, we must first
review some background principles about the First Amend-
ment. Specifically, we must focus on what the First Amend-
ment generally protects, the extent to which it permits
States to restrict minors’ access to sexually explicit speech,
and how this Court has addressed earlier laws that aimed
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 Opinion of the Court

to prevent children from viewing sexually explicit speech
online.
 A
 The First Amendment, which applies to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws
“abridging the freedom of speech.” As “a general matter,”
this provision “means that government has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its sub-
ject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Lib-
erties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). But, this principle “is not absolute.” Ibid.
 To determine whether a law that regulates speech vio-
lates the First Amendment, we must consider both the na-
ture of the burden imposed by the law and the nature of the
speech at issue. Our precedents distinguish between two
types of restrictions on protected speech: content-based
laws and content-neutral laws. “Content-based laws—
those that target speech based on its communicative con-
tent—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be jus-
tified only if ” they satisfy strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155 , 163 (2015). That standard requires
that a law be “the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state interest.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U. S.
464 , 478 (2014).
 Content-neutral laws, on the other hand, “are subject to
an intermediate level of scrutiny because in most cases they
pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or view-
points from the public dialogue.” Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994) (citation omit-
ted). Under that standard, a law will survive review “if it
advances important governmental interests unrelated to
the suppression of free speech and does not burden substan-
tially more speech than necessary to further those inter-
ests.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S.
180, 189 (1997) (Turner II ).
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 Opinion of the Court

 At the same time, not all speech is protected. “ ‘From
1791 to the present,’ ” certain “ ‘historic and traditional cat-
egories’ ” of speech—such as “obscenity, defamation, fraud,
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct”—have
been understood to fall outside the scope of the First
Amendment. United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468
(2010) (citations omitted). States generally may prohibit
speech of this kind without “rais[ing] any Constitutional
problem.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 ,
571–572 (1942). Such prohibitions are subject only to
rational-basis review, the minimum constitutional stand-
ard that all legislation must satisfy. See District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 628, n. 27 (2008). Under that
standard, a law will be upheld “if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational ba-
sis” for its enactment. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993).
 B
 History, tradition, and precedent recognize that States
have two distinct powers to address obscenity: They may
proscribe outright speech that is obscene to the public at
large, and they may prevent children from accessing speech
that is obscene to children.
 By the 18th century, English common law recognized
publishing obscenity as an indictable offense. See Rex v.
Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (K. B. 1770); Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange
789, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K. B. 1727). So too did early Ameri-
can decisions. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 ,
336–337 (1821); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. &
Rawle 91 , 100–102 (Pa. 1815); Knowles v. State, 3 Day 103,
108 (Conn. 1808). By the end of the Civil War, most States
had prohibited obscenity by statute, and Congress had pro-
hibited sending obscene materials by mail. See An Act Re-
lating to the Postal Laws §16, 13 Stat. 507 ; E. Hovey,
Stamping Out Smut: The Enforcement of Obscenity Laws,
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1872–1915, p. 36 (1998). And, from the late 19th century
onward, this Court has consistently recognized the govern-
ment’s power to proscribe obscenity. See, e.g., Counterman
v. Colorado, 600 U. S. 66, 77 (2023); Roth v. United States,
 354 U. S. 476, 483 (1957); Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S.
29 , 42–43 (1896).
 Our precedents hold that speech is obscene to the public
at large—and thus proscribable—if (a) “the average person,
applying contemporary community standards[,] would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient in-
terest”; (b) “the work depicts or describes, in a patently of-
fensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the ap-
plicable state law”; and (c) “the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Our precedents refer to this standard
as “the Miller test.”
 Miller does not define the totality of States’ power to reg-
ulate sexually explicit speech, however. In addition to their
general interest in protecting the public at large, States
have a specific interest in protecting children from sexually
explicit speech. The earliest obscenity decisions recognized
that restricting obscenity served two distinct interests—
curbing the “corruption of the public mind in general,” and
protecting “the manners of youth in particular.” Sharpless,
2 Serge & Rawle, at 103 (opinion of Yeates, J.); see also
Holmes, 17 Mass., at 336–337 (upholding an indictment for
publishing an obscene book tending to “ ‘the manifest cor-
ruption and subversion of the youth and other good citizens
of [this] Commonwealth’ ”). Similarly, many early obscenity
statutes targeted for special regulation works “manifestly
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.” E.g., Me.
Rev. Stat., ch. 160, §19 (1840); Mass. Rev. Stat. ch. 130, §10
(1836); Mich. Rev. Stat., Pt. 4, Tit. 1, ch. 8, §10 (1838); 1838
Terr. of Wis. Stat. §10 , p. 366; Vt. Rev. Stat., ch. 99, §10
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 9

 Opinion of the Court

(1840). This trend continued through the time of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s ratification, with States routinely en-
forcing statutes that punished indecent publications on the
ground that they corrupted “the morals of youth.” E.g.,
Fuller v. People, 92 Ill. 182, 184 (1879); Commonwealth v.
Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46 , 46–47 (1878); Barker v. Common-
wealth, 19 Pa. 412, 413 (1852); State v. Hanson, 23 Tex. 233 ,
233–234 (1859).
 Consistent with this history, our precedents recognize
that States can impose greater limits on children’s access to
sexually explicit speech than they can on adults’ access.
When regulating adult access, a State must define obscen-
ity from the perspective of “the average” adult, Roth, 354
U. S., at 489 , and so may not prohibit adults from accessing
speech that is inappropriate only for children, Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957). Minors, however, have
long been thought to be more susceptible to the harmful ef-
fects of sexually explicit content, and less able to appreciate
the role it might play within a larger expressive work. See
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 , 641–643 (1968);
United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1105 (No. 14,571)
(CC SDNY 1879). They therefore possess “a more restricted
right . . . to judge and determine for themselves what sex
material they may read or see.” Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 637 .
 When regulating minors’ access to sexual content, the
State may broaden Miller’s “definition of obscenity” to cover
that which is obscene from a child’s perspective. Ginsberg,
 390 U. S., at 638 . To be more precise, a State may prevent
minors from accessing works that (a) taken as a whole, and
under contemporary community standards, appeal to the
prurient interest of minors; (b) depict or describe specifi-
cally defined sexual conduct in a way that is patently offen-
sive for minors; and (c) taken as a whole, lack serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. See
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Miller, 413 U. S., at 24 ; Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 635, 638 .3
Restrictions of this kind trigger no heightened First
Amendment scrutiny and are subject only to rational-basis
review, even though they encompass speech that is “not ob-
scene for adults.” Id., at 634, 639 .
 In sum, two basic principles govern legislation aimed at
shielding children from sexually explicit content. A State
may not prohibit adults from accessing content that is ob-
scene only to minors. Butler, 352 U. S., at 383 . But, it may
enact laws to prevent minors from accessing such content.
Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 637–638.
 C
 This Court has applied these principles to regulations of
internet-based speech on two prior occasions, both at the
dawn of the internet age. First, in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844 (1997), we addressed the con-
stitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA), 110 Stat. 133 . The CDA criminalized using the in-
ternet to knowingly transmit “obscene or indecent mes-
sages” to a minor, or to knowingly send or display “patently
offensive messages in a manner that is available to” a mi-
nor. 521 U. S., at 859–860. It provided an affirmative de-
fense to “those who restrict access to covered material by
requiring certain designated forms of age proof.” Id., at
860–861.
 We held that the CDA violated the First Amendment be-
cause it “effectively suppresses a large amount of speech
that adults have a constitutional right to receive.” Id., at
874. The CDA’s age-verification defense was illusory be-
cause, in many cases, “existing technology did not include
——————
 3 H. B. 1181 covers only depictions of activity that would qualify as

“sexual conduct” in an adult obscenity statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. §129B.001(6)(B). We therefore need not decide whether
a statute addressing obscenity to minors can define a broader range of
activity as “sexual conduct” than an adult obscenity statute.
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 11

 Opinion of the Court

any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from
obtaining access to its communications on the Internet
without also denying access to adults.” Id., at 876.4 And,
even as to minors, the CDA swept far beyond obscenity.
Fairly read, the terms “ ‘indecent’ ” and “ ‘patently offen-
sive’ ” encompassed “large amounts of nonpornographic ma-
terial with serious educational or other value.” Id., at 877.
The Act was thus a “content-based restriction” of protected
speech that could not survive strict scrutiny. Id., at 879.
 After Reno, Congress passed the Children’s Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPA), 112 Stat. 2681–728,
which we addressed in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 542 U. S. 656 (2004) (Ashcroft II ). COPA criminal-
ized posting “content that is ‘harmful to minors’ ” online for
——————
 4 Elsewhere in the CDA, Congress recognized that content filtering was

still an emerging technology and that companies attempting to use it
faced serious risks. A year before the CDA’s enactment, a New York
court had held that an online service provider could be held liable as a
publisher for defamatory posts by third-party users because the provider
had “held itself out as” “a family oriented computer network” that
screened out inappropriate content. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 , *2 (Sup. Ct. N. Y., May 24, 1995). In re-
sponse, the CDA added a new §230 to the Communications Act of 1934.
§509, 110 Stat. 137–139 (codified as amended at 47 U. S. C. §230 ). Sec-
tion 230 provides that computer service providers (1) shall not “be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by” a
third party, and (2) shall not “be held liable” for good-faith actions to re-
strict access to material that they consider to be “obscene, lewd, lascivi-
ous, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,” or
to enable others (such as users) to restrict access to such material.
§230(c). Congress thereby aimed to spur the development and use of fil-
tering technology so that parents could prevent their children from ac-
cessing sexually explicit content online. See §509, 110 Stat. 137 (title)
(“Online Family Empowerment”); 47 U. S. C. §230 (title) (“Protection for
private blocking and screening of offensive material”); §230(c) (title)
(“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive ma-
terial”); 141 Cong. Rec. 22045 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Cox) (“We want to
encourage” computer service providers “to help us control . . . what our
children see” using filtering “technology” that “is very quickly becoming
available”).
12 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

“ ‘commercial purposes.’ ” Id., at 661 (quoting 47 U. S. C.
§231 (a)(1)). The Act defined such content as material that
is obscene under the Miller test, as adjusted to minors. 542
U. S., at 661–662 (citing §231(e)(6)). It also provided “an
affirmative defense to those who employ specified means to
prevent minors from gaining access to the prohibited mate-
rials on their Web site,” such as requiring the use of a credit
card or a digital certificate that verifies age. Id., at 662 (cit-
ing §231(c)(1)). Soon after COPA’s passage, a District Court
preliminarily enjoined its enforcement, holding that the Act
likely violated the First Amendment. Id., at 663.
 This Court held that the injunction was not an abuse of
discretion. Id., at 664–665. The parties agreed that COPA
was subject to strict scrutiny. So too did this Court, which
briefly noted that this was so because COPA “ ‘effectively
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a con-
stitutional right to receive and to address to one another.’ ”
Id., at 665 (quoting Reno, 521 U. S., at 874 ). We then fo-
cused our analysis on whether the Government had shown
that it was likely to satisfy its burden under strict scrutiny.
542 U. S., at 666–670. We held that it had not, because the
Government had not ruled out that it could protect children
just as well through the less restrictive means of encourag-
ing parents to install blocking and filtering software on
their computers. Ibid. We also noted that age verification
was “only an affirmative defense,” meaning that even
speakers adopting an approved verification method might
be forced to “risk the perils of trial.” Id., at 670–671; accord,
id., at 674 (Stevens, J., concurring). And, we leaned heavily
on the abuse-of-discretion standard, observing that “sub-
stantial factual disputes remain[ed] in the case,” and that
“the factual record does not reflect current technological re-
ality” because it was “over five years” old. Id., at 671 (ma-
jority opinion).
 For the past two decades, Ashcroft II has been our last
word on the government’s power to protect children from
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 13

 Opinion of the Court

sexually explicit content online. During this period, the
“technology of the Internet” has continued to “evolv[e] at a
rapid pace.” Ibid. With the rise of the smartphone and in-
stant streaming, many adolescents can now access vast li-
braries of video content—both benign and obscene—at al-
most any time and place, with an ease that would have been
unimaginable at the time of Reno and Ashcroft II.
 III
 With that background in mind, we turn now to the level
of scrutiny that applies to H. B. 1181. Petitioners contend
that the law must survive strict scrutiny because it imposes
a content-based regulation on protected speech. The State,
on the other hand, argues that the statute is subject only to
rational-basis review because it does not burden any pro-
tected speech. We think neither party has it right. Apply-
ing our precedents, we hold that intermediate scrutiny ap-
plies.
 A
 H. B. 1181 is an exercise of Texas’s traditional power to
prevent minors from accessing speech that is obscene from
their perspective. To the extent that it burdens adults’
rights to access such speech, it has “only an incidental effect
on protected speech,” making it subject to intermediate
scrutiny. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 659
(2000).
 1
 Age-verification laws like H. B. 1181 fall within States’
authority to shield children from sexually explicit content.
The First Amendment leaves undisturbed States’ tradi-
tional power to prevent minors from accessing speech that
is obscene from their perspective. Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at
641 . That power necessarily includes the power to require
proof of age before an individual can access such speech. It
14 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

follows that no person—adult or child—has a First Amend-
ment right to access speech that is obscene to minors with-
out first submitting proof of age.
 The power to verify age is a necessary component of the
power to prevent children’s access to content that is obscene
from their perspective. “No axiom is more clearly estab-
lished in law, or in reason, than that . . . wherever a general
power to do a thing is given, every particular power neces-
sary for doing it is included.” The Federalist No. 44, p. 285
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); accord, T. Cooley, Con-
stitutional Limitations 63 (1868); A. Scalia & B. Garner,
Reading Law 192–193 (2012). Hence, where the Constitu-
tion reserves a power to the States, it also reserves “the or-
dinary and appropriate means” of exercising that power. 1
J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States §430, pp. 412–413 (1833). For example, in the
Eighth Amendment context we have explained that, be-
cause “capital punishment is constitutional, . . . ‘there must
be a constitutional means of carrying it out.’ ” Glossip v.
Gross, 576 U. S. 863 , 869 (2015) (alteration omitted). Sim-
ilarly, because the First Amendment permits States to pro-
hibit minors from accessing speech that is obscene to them,
it likewise permits States to employ the ordinary and ap-
propriate means of enforcing such a prohibition. Requiring
proof of age to access that speech is one such means.
 Requiring age verification is common when a law draws
lines based on age. For example, Texas, like many States,
requires proof of age to obtain alcohol, Tex. Alco. Bev. Code
Ann. §106.03 (b) (2020); tobacco, Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. §§161.082 (d), (e) (Cum. Supp. 2024); a lottery ticket;5
a tattoo, 25 Tex. Admin. Code §§229.406 (a), (b) (2024); a
body piercing, ibid.; fireworks, Tex. Occ. Code Ann.
§2154.252 (c) (2019); and a driver’s license, Tex. Transp.
——————
 5 See Tex. Lottery Comm’n, News Release, Texas Lottery Adds Age

Verification to Self-Service Vending Machines (Jan. 7, 2025).
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 15

 Opinion of the Court

Code Ann. §521.142(a) (2018). Federal law similarly man-
dates age verification to obtain certain medications from a
pharmacist, 21 CFR §§1306.26 (c), (d) (2024), or to obtain
employment as a minor, 29 CFR §570.5 (2024). Fundamen-
tal rights that turn on age are no different. Texas, again
like many States, requires proof of age to obtain a handgun
license, Tex. Govt. Code Ann. §411.174 (a)(3) (2019); to reg-
ister to vote, Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§13.002 (c)(2), (8) (2020);
and to marry, Tex. Fam. Code §2.005(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024).
In none of these contexts is the constitutionality of a rea-
sonable, bona fide age-verification requirement disputed.
See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597
U. S. 1 , 38–39, n. 9 (2022); Crawford v. Marion County Elec-
tion Bd., 553 U. S. 181 , 202–203 (2008) (opinion of Stevens,
J.); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 , 386–387 (1978).
 Obscenity is no exception to the widespread practice of
requiring proof of age to exercise age-restricted rights. The
New York statute upheld in Ginsberg required age verifica-
tion: It permitted a seller who sold sexual material to a mi-
nor to raise “ ‘honest mistake’ ” as to age as an affirmative
defense, but only if the seller had made “ ‘a reasonable bona
fide attempt to ascertain the true age of [the] minor.’ ” 390
U. S., at 644 . Most States to this day also require age veri-
fication for in-person purchases of sexual material.6 And,
——————
 6 See, e.g., Ala. Code §§13A–12–200.5(1), 13A–12–200.5(3)(a) (2015);

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§13–3501(3)(b), 13–3506(A) (2018); Ark. Code Ann.
§§5–68–501(3)(B), 5–68–502(a)(2) (2024); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §313.1(a)
(West 2024); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§18–7–501(3)(b), 18–7–502(1) (2024);
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a–196 (2025); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§1365(a)(2),
(i)(1) (2015); D. C. Code §§22–2201(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(F)(ii) (2001–2024); Fla.
Stat. §§847.012 (1)(b), (3) (2023); Ga. Code Ann. §§16–12–102(2)(B), 16–
12–103(a) (2024); Idaho Code Ann. §§18–1514(10), 18–1515(1) (2016); Ill.
Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §§5/11–21(b), (c)(1) (West 2023); Ind. Code §§35–
49–3–3(a)(1), 35–49–3–4(a)(3) (2024); Iowa Code §§728.2 , 728.10 (2023);
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§21–6401(b), (h)(1) (2023); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§14:91.11(A)(1), (D) (West 2018); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§617.292 , subd. 8(2),
617.293, subd. 1 (West 2018); Mont. Code Ann. §§45–8–206(1), (2)(a)
16 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

petitioners concede that an in-person age verification re-
quirement is a “traditional sort of law” that is “almost
surely” constitutional. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17.
 The facts of Ginsberg illustrate why age verification, as a
practical matter, is necessary for an effective prohibition on
minors accessing age-inappropriate sexual content. The
statute in that case prohibited the knowing sale of sexual
content to a minor under the age of 17. 390 U. S., at 633 .
The defendant was convicted of knowingly selling a porno-
graphic magazine to a 16-year-old. Id., at 631 . But, most
of the time, it is almost impossible to distinguish a 16-year-
old from a 17-year-old by sight alone. Thus, had the seller
in Ginsberg not had an obligation to verify the age of the
purchaser, he likely could have avoided liability simply by
asserting ignorance as to the purchaser’s age. Only an age-
verification requirement can ensure compliance with an
age-based restriction.
 The need for age verification online is even greater. Un-
like a store clerk, a website operator cannot look at its visi-
tors and estimate their ages. Without a requirement to sub-
mit proof of age, even clearly underage minors would be
able to access sexual content undetected. “ ‘[T]he basic prin-
ciples of freedom of speech . . . do not vary’ when a new and
different medium for communication appears.” Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U. S. 786, 790 (2011);
——————
(2023); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§28–808(1), 28–810(1) (2016); N. H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§571–B:1(II)(b), 571–B:2(I) (2021); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§30–37–
1(G)(2), 30–37–2 (Lexis Nexis 2014); N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §§235.21(1),
235.23(2) (West 2024); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§14–190.15(a), 14–
19.15(c)(3) (2023); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2907.31 (A)(1), (B)(3) (West
2020); Okla. Stat., tit. 21, §§1040.75(13)(b), 1040.76(2) (2011); 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. §§5903 (c), (e)(7)(ii) (Cum Supp. 2022); S. C. Code Ann. §§16–
15–385(A), (C)(3) (2023); S. D. Codified Laws §§22–24–28, 22–24–31(1)
(2017); Utah Code Ann. §76–10–1206(1)(a) (Lexis Nexis 2017); Vt. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 13, §§2802a(a), 2805(b)(1) (2018); Va. Code Ann. §§18 .2–
390(7)(b), 18.2–391(A), (E) (2021); Wis. Stat. Ann. §948.11 (2) (West
2023).
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 17

 Opinion of the Court

accord, Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U. S. 707, 733 (2024).
Because proof of age performs the same critical function
online that it does in person, requiring age verification re-
mains an ordinary and appropriate means of shielding mi-
nors in the digital age from material that is obscene to
them.
 H. B. 1181 imposes an age-verification requirement for
online speech that is obscene to minors. The statute defines
covered “ ‘[s]exual material harmful to minors’ ” as material
that qualifies as obscene under the Miller test, as adjusted
to the perspective of a minor. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. §129B.001(6); see supra, at 2, 8. And, the statute does
not ban adults from accessing this material; it simply re-
quires them to verify their age before accessing it on a cov-
ered website. §129B.002(a).7 H. B. 1181 thus falls within
——————
 7 The parties dispute whether H. B. 1181’s definition of “ ‘[s]exual ma-

terial harmful to minors’ ” requires covered speech to be obscene to all
minors (including 17-year-olds) or only to a minor (including a toddler).
We need not resolve that question here. Whatever obscenity to minors
can mean, the Texas Legislature plainly meant to tie H. B. 1181’s defini-
tion to that category of speech. We also doubt that this dispute is as
significant as it first may seem. Because the statute only covers explicit
portrayals of nudity or sex acts that predominantly appeal to the prurient
interest, it cannot conceivably be read to cover, say, a PG–13- or R-rated
movie. We further question whether it is coherent to speak of the “ ‘pru-
rient interest’ ” of a very young child with no concept of sexuality, so any
reading of the statute may well call for assessing obscenity from the per-
spective of an adolescent. See Ashcroft II, 542 U. S. 656, 679 (2004)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
 The parties also dispute whether H. B. 1181 permits a covered website
to require age verification for its sexual material harmful to minors but
not for its other content. We need not resolve this disagreement either.
Even if the statute requires covered websites to demand age verification
for all their content, and even if such a requirement would be unconsti-
tutional, petitioners still have not shown that H. B. 1181 is facially inva-
lid. Under our precedents, a statute is facially invalid under the First
Amendment only if its “unconstitutional applications” are “substantially
disproportionate to the statute’s lawful sweep.” United States v. Hansen,
 599 U. S. 762, 770 (2023). Here, petitioners have not even attempted to
18 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

Texas’s traditional power to protect minors from speech
that is obscene from their perspective.
 2
 Because H. B. 1181 simply requires proof of age to access
content that is obscene to minors, it does not directly regu-
late the protected speech of adults. A law can regulate the
content of protected speech, and thereby trigger strict scru-
tiny, either “on its face” or in its justification. Reed, 576
U. S., at 163–164 (internal quotation marks omitted). H. B.
1181 does not regulate the content of protected speech in
either sense. On its face, the statute regulates only speech
that is obscene to minors. That speech is unprotected to the
extent the State seeks only to verify age. And, the statute
can easily “be justified without reference to the [protected]
content of the regulated speech,” because its apparent pur-
pose is simply to prevent minors, who have no First Amend-
ment right to access speech that is obscene to them, from
doing so. Id., at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 That is not to say, however, that H. B. 1181 escapes all
First Amendment scrutiny. Adults have the right to access
speech that is obscene only to minors. Butler, 352 U. S., at
383–384. And, submitting to age verification is a burden on
the exercise of that right. But, adults have no First Amend-
ment right to avoid age verification, and the statute can
readily be understood as an effort to restrict minors’ access.
Any burden experienced by adults is therefore only inci-
dental to the statute’s regulation of activity that is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. That fact makes interme-
diate scrutiny the appropriate standard under our
precedents. Dale, 530 U. S., at 659 .
 In this respect, H. B. 1181 is analogous to the prohibition
against destroying draft cards that this Court upheld in

——————
show that the covered websites that would segregate their content if
given the choice substantially outnumber those that would not.
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 19

 Opinion of the Court

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). The prohi-
bition may have had the effect of making it unlawful to pro-
test the draft by burning one’s draft card. See id., at 369 .
But, the “destruction” of a draft card is not itself “constitu-
tionally protected activity,” because the card is a Govern-
ment document that, among other functions, serves as proof
of registration. Id., at 376, 378 . The prohibition on destroy-
ing draft cards thus placed only an incidental burden on
First Amendment expression, making it subject to interme-
diate scrutiny. Id., at 376–377. So too here, because ac-
cessing material obscene to minors without verifying one’s
age is not constitutionally protected, any burden H. B. 1181
imposes on protected activity is only incidental, and the
statute triggers only intermediate scrutiny.
 B
 Applying the more demanding strict-scrutiny standard
would call into question the validity of all age-verification
requirements, even longstanding requirements for brick-
and-mortar stores. But, as petitioners acknowledge, after
Ginsberg, no serious question about the constitutionality of
in-person age-verification requirements for obscenity to mi-
nors has arisen. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (acknowledging
that they “don’t know of any . . . challenge being brought”
to an age-verification requirement for “brick-and-mortar
stores”). Petitioners insist that their proposed rule would
not call into question these “traditional” requirements, be-
cause such requirements would “almost surely satisfy”
strict scrutiny. Id., at 17. They also contend that a suffi-
ciently tailored online age-verification requirement (alt-
hough not Texas’s) could satisfy strict scrutiny too. Id., at
6–8. But, if we are not to compromise “ ‘[t]he “starch” in our
constitutional standards,’ ” we cannot share petitioners’
confidence. Ashcroft II, 542 U. S., at 670 (quoting United
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803,
830 (2000) (THOMAS, J., concurring)).
20 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

 Strict scrutiny—which requires a restriction to be the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling govern-
mental interest—is “the most demanding test known to con-
stitutional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 534
(1997). In the First Amendment context, we have held only
once that a law triggered but satisfied strict scrutiny—to
uphold a federal statute that prohibited knowingly provid-
ing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. See
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1 , 27–39
(2010). That case involved an unusual application of strict
scrutiny, since our analysis relied on the “deference” due to
the Executive’s “evaluation of the facts” in the context of
“national security and foreign affairs.” Id., at 33–34.8
 Strict scrutiny is unforgiving because it is the standard
for reviewing the direct targeting of fully protected speech.
Reed, 576 U. S., at 163. Strict scrutiny is designed to en-
force “the fundamental principle that governments have no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” National Institute
of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U. S. 755 , 766
(2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). It succeeds in
that purpose if and only if, as a practical matter, it is fatal
in fact absent truly extraordinary circumstances. Strict
scrutiny therefore cannot apply to laws, such as in-person
age-verification requirements, which are traditional, wide-
spread, and not thought to raise a significant First Amend-
ment issue.
 Once again, we need look no further than Ginsberg.
——————
 8 In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U. S. 433 (2015), a bare major-

ity held that a ban on the personal solicitation of campaign donations by
candidates for judicial office survived strict scrutiny. Id., at 444–456.
But, only four Members of the majority thought that the statute trig-
gered strict scrutiny to begin with. Id., at 442–444 (plurality opinion).
The fifth Member, Justice Ginsburg, concluded that strict scrutiny did
not apply and that States enjoy “substantial latitude . . . to enact
campaign-finance rules geared to judicial elections.” Id., at 457–458
(opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 21

 Opinion of the Court

There, this Court observed that it “is very doubtful” that
New York’s “legislative finding” about the harmful effects
of the speech its statute restricted “expresses an accepted
scientific fact.” 390 U. S., at 641 . Nonetheless, because ob-
scenity to minors is not fully protected speech, this Court
readily upheld the statute. Id., at 641–643. Had the Court
applied strict scrutiny, it could not have so easily cast that
doubt aside. Cf. Brown, 564 U. S., at 799–800 (declining to
defer to a legislature’s view of “competing psychological
studies” when applying strict scrutiny to a law restricting
minors from purchasing violent video games).
 Petitioners would like to invalidate H. B. 1181 without
upsetting traditional in-person age-verification require-
ments and perhaps narrower online requirements. But,
strict scrutiny is ill suited for such nuanced work. The only
principled way to give due consideration to both the First
Amendment and States’ legitimate interests in protecting
minors is to employ a less exacting standard.
 C
 We also reject petitioners’ contention that, regardless of
first principles, our precedents require us to apply strict
scrutiny to H. B. 1181. Every case that petitioners cite in-
volved a law that banned both adults and minors from ac-
cessing speech. But, this Court has never held that every
content-based burden on adults’ access to speech that is ob-
scene to minors always triggers strict scrutiny.
 1
 Start with Butler, our earliest relevant precedent. There,
this Court implicitly recognized that States may impose
some burdens on adults in the course of protecting children
from sexual material. The Court held that Michigan’s le-
gitimate interest in “shield[ing] juvenile innocence” could
not justify a categorical ban on distributing sexually
themed books “ ‘tending to the corruption of the morals of
22 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

youth.’ ” 352 U. S., at 381, 383 . In so holding, the Court
admonished the State for overlooking its other statutes “de-
signed to protect its children” that did not impose an out-
right ban. Id., at 383 . One of these laws was a prohibition
on exhibiting sexual material “ ‘tending to the corruption of
the morals of youth’ ” “ ‘in any . . . place within the view of
children passing on any public street or highway.’ ” Ibid.,
n. This law imposed a content-based restriction on where
adults could view such material. Yet, the Court implicitly
suggested that it was a permissible alternative to an out-
right prohibition.
 Similarly, Ginsberg upheld a law that required sellers to
verify age if they wished to raise “honest mistake” of age as
a defense. See 390 U. S., at 644 ; supra, at 15. In the wake
of that decision, the constitutionality of laws like New
York’s that impose in-person age-verification requirements
has been taken as a given. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. And,
although Ginsberg did not explicitly address the burden
that age verification imposes on adults, in the almost six
decades since it was decided, no one has thought to subject
such requirements to strict scrutiny.
 Petitioners invoke two pre-internet cases in which this
Court applied strict scrutiny. In the first, the Court did so
to invalidate “a blanket prohibition” on “dial-a-porn” phone
messages that were “indecent but not obscene.” Sable Com-
munications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 118, 126
(1989). In the second, we did so to invalidate “a blanket
ban” on broadcasting “indecent” but “not . . . obscene” cable
television channels between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.
Playboy, 529 U. S., at 808, 811, 814 .9 In contrast, H. B.
——————
 9 Playboy held that the statute at issue triggered strict scrutiny be-

cause it banned “ ‘30 to 50% of all adult programming.’ ” 529 U. S., at
812 ; see ibid. (“To prohibit this much speech is a significant restriction
. . . ” (emphasis added)). Any discussion in that opinion of whether lesser
burdens would also trigger strict scrutiny, see post, at 19–20 (KAGAN, J.,
dissenting), was dicta. In any event, Playboy at a minimum cannot speak
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 23

 Opinion of the Court

1181 is not a blanket prohibition. Adults remain free to ac-
cess pornography on covered websites, so long as they verify
their ages first. Neither Sable nor Playboy addresses the
First Amendment consequences of that more modest bur-
den.
 Reno and Ashcroft II—our two decisions addressing at-
tempts to restrict children’s access to pornography online—
likewise provide no support for petitioners’ position that
strict scrutiny applies. Reno applied strict scrutiny to the
CDA because it operated as a ban on speech to adults. The
CDA made it a crime for any person to post content that is
“ ‘indecent’ ” or “ ‘patently offensive’ ” anywhere in “the en-
tire universe of cyberspace” where the person knew a child
would be among the recipients. 521 U. S., at 868, 876. And,
although the CDA had an age-verification affirmative de-
fense, that defense was illusory. In many cases, “existing
technology did not include any effective method . . . to pre-
vent minors from obtaining access . . . without also denying
access to adults.” Id., at 876. The CDA thus triggered—
and failed—strict scrutiny because it “effectively sup-
presse[d] a large amount of speech that adults have a con-
stitutional right to receive” and to share. Id., at 874 (em-
phasis added).10 This kind of ban is categorically different
——————
to when burdens on obscenity to minors trigger strict scrutiny. Playboy
addressed a statute restricting “ ‘indecent’ ” speech, 529 U. S., at 811 ,
which is a broader category than obscenity to minors and so is entitled
to greater First Amendment protection, see Reno v. American Civil Lib-
erties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 877 (1997) (holding that indecent speech en-
compasses “large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious ed-
ucational or other value”). Thus, a burden on obscenity to minors may
not trigger strict scrutiny even if a comparable burden on indecent
speech would.
 10 The dissent contends that Reno imposed a regulation “similar to

Texas’s law,” not a ban. Post, at 19. But, at the same time, the dissent
acknowledges that the statute at issue in Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989), was a ban. See ibid. And, Reno held
that “the CDA effectively resembles the ban on ‘dial-a-porn’ invalidated
in Sable.” 521 U. S., at 875. The dissent’s characterization of Reno is at
24 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

from H. B. 1181’s age-verification requirement.
 Ashcroft II likewise characterized COPA as a ban. COPA
criminally prohibited posting “content that is ‘harmful to
minors’ ” online for “ ‘commercial purposes,’ ” subject to an
age-verification affirmative defense. 542 U. S., at 661–662.
We thus applied strict scrutiny, because, as in Reno, the
statute “ ‘effectively suppresse[d] a large amount of speech
that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to ad-
dress to one another.’ ” 542 U. S., at 665 (quoting Reno, 521
U. S., at 874 ). Because the parties agreed that strict scru-
tiny applied, the Court’s discussion of the applicable stand-
ard was brief. See 542 U. S., at 665 . But, its wording was
careful. The Government in Ashcroft II conceded that
COPA triggered strict scrutiny because it “regulates ex-
pression . . . that is constitutionally protected for adults . . .
on the basis of its content.” Brief for Petitioner in Ashcroft
v. American Civil Liberties Union, O. T. 2003, No. 03–218,
p. 18. Petitioners make essentially that same argument
here. Yet, the Court did not endorse this sweeping proposi-
tion; instead, it invoked the narrower ground that COPA
outright “ ‘suppresse[d]’ ” speech between adults. Ashcroft
II, 542 U. S., at 665 .
 To be sure, COPA established an age-verification defense.
 Id., at 662 . But, because it did so only as an affirmative
defense, COPA still operated as a ban on the public posting
of material that is obscene to minors. See id., at 661–662
(citing 47 U. S. C. §§231 (a)(1), (c)(1)). This was so because
an indictment need only “alleg[e] the necessary elements of
an offense”; it need not “anticipate affirmative defenses.”
United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 , 287–288 (1970). Un-
der COPA, the Government thus remained free to bring
criminal charges against any covered person who publicly
posted speech that was obscene to minors, even if he had
fully implemented compliant age-verification procedures.
——————
war with Reno’s description of itself.
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 25

 Opinion of the Court

See Ashcroft II, 542 U. S., at 670–671; id., at 674 (Stevens,
J., concurring). The same is not true under H. B. 1181,
which makes the lack of age verification an element that
the State must plead and prove. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. §129B.002(a).
 2
 Petitioners read Reno and Ashcroft II to establish a com-
prehensive framework to govern all future attempts to re-
strict children’s access to online pornography. As we have
just explained, that view cannot be squared with those
cases, which addressed only outright bans on material that
was obscene to minors but not to adults. Petitioners also
fail to appreciate the context in which those cases were de-
cided. This Court decided both cases when the internet was
“still more of a prototype than a finished product”—Reno in
1997 and Ashcroft II in 2004, with factual findings made in
1999. A. Kennedy, The Rough Guide to the Internet 493
(8th ed. 2002) (Kennedy). We were mindful that “judicial
answers” to “the totally new problems” presented by new
technology are necessarily “truncated,” and that in such cir-
cumstances “we ought not to anticipate” questions beyond
those immediately presented. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944); accord, TikTok Inc. v.
Garland, 604 U. S. ___ , ___–___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip
op., at 1–2). We did not purport to decide more than the
specific circumstances of the cases that were before us.
 The Court in Reno was quite concerned about the unique
threat that the CDA posed to the development of the then-
nascent internet. Reno was this Court’s first decision about
the internet. In describing the background of the case, we
“felt the need to explain . . . that the ‘Internet is an interna-
tional network of interconnected computers,’ ” NetChoice,
603 U. S., at 713–714 (quoting Reno, 521 U. S., at 849 ), and
we marveled that the internet had grown to 40 million us-
ers worldwide, id., at 850 . In resolving the case, the Court
26 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

was keenly aware that the “wholly unprecedented”
“breadth of the CDA’s coverage” “threaten[ed] to torch a
large segment” of this emerging medium of communication.
 Id., at 877, 882 . In these uncharted waters, the Court was
cautious not to definitively establish when regulations on
internet pornography triggered strict scrutiny.
 Similarly, Ashcroft II was a self-consciously narrow and
factbound decision. There, the Court reviewed a prelimi-
nary injunction based on a record that was “over five years”
old, all while the “technology of the Internet” continued to
“evolv[e] at a rapid pace.” 542 U. S., at 671 . As a result, we
emphasized the abuse-of-discretion standard and made
clear that we did not mean to rule definitively on COPA’s
constitutionality. Id., at 673 . Moreover, we could not have
meant to offer a comprehensive discussion on the appropri-
ate standard of scrutiny for laws protecting children from
sexual content online, given that the appropriate standard
was not even a contested issue in the case.
 In the quarter century since the factual record closed in
Ashcroft II, the internet has expanded exponentially. In
1999, only two out of five American households had home
internet access. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Home
Computers and Internet Use in the United States: Aug.
2000, p. 2 (2001). Nearly all those households used a desk-
top computer or laptop to connect to the internet, and most
used a dial-up connection. Dept. of Commerce, Economics
and Statistics Admin., A Nation Online: Entering the
Broadband Age 1, 5 (2004). Connecting through dial-up
came with significant limitations: Dial-up is much slower
than a modern broadband connection, and because dial-up
relied on the home’s phone line, many households could not
use the internet and make or receive phone calls at the
same time. See Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time
Warner Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 307, 311 (Del. 2004). And,
“video-on-demand” was largely just a notion that figures
like “Bill Gates and Al Gore rhapsodize[d] about”; “most
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 27

 Opinion of the Court

Netizens would [have] be[en] happy with a system fast
enough to view static photos without waiting an age.” Ken-
nedy 493–494.
 In contrast, in 2024, 95 percent of American teens had
access to a smartphone, allowing many to access the inter-
net at almost any time and place. M. Faverio & O. Sidoti,
Pew Research Center, Teens, Social Media and Technology
2024, p. 19. Ninety-three percent of teens reported using
the internet several times per day, and watching videos is
among their most common activities online. Id., at 4–5, 20.
The content easily accessible to adolescents online includes
massive libraries of pornographic videos. For instance, in
2019, Pornhub, one of the websites involved in this case,
published 1.36 million hours—or over 150 years—of new
content. App. 177. Many of these readily accessible videos
portray men raping and physically assaulting women—a
far cry from the still images that made up the bulk of online
pornography in the 1990s. See N. Kristof, The Children of
Pornhub, N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2020, p. SR4. The Court in
Reno and Ashcroft II could not have conceived of these de-
velopments, much less conclusively resolve how States
could address them.
 Of course, Reno and Ashcroft II do not cease to be prece-
dential simply because technology has changed so dramat-
ically. See NetChoice, 603 U. S., at 733–734. “But respect
for past judgments also means respecting their limits.”
Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118 , 141 (2022). It is mis-
leading in the extreme to assume that Reno and Ashcroft II
spoke to the circumstances of this case simply because they
both dealt with “the internet” as it existed in the 1990s. The
appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply in this case is a
difficult question that no prior decision of this Court has
squarely addressed. For the reasons we have explained, we
hold today that H. B. 1181 triggers only intermediate scru-
tiny.
28 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

 D
 The dissent’s arguments for strict scrutiny are no more
persuasive than petitioners’. The dissent claims that strict
scrutiny applies because H. B. 1181 is “a quintessential con-
tent-based law.” Post, at 6 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). We agree
that H. B. 1181 targets speech that is obscene for minors
based on its communicative content. But, where the speech
in question is unprotected, States may impose “restrictions”
based on “content” without triggering strict scrutiny. Ste-
vens, 559 U. S., at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because speech that is obscene to minors is unprotected to
the extent that the State imposes only an age-verification
requirement, H. B. 1181’s content-based restriction does
not require strict scrutiny. The law is content based in the
same way that prohibitions of “defamation,” “fraud,” and
“incitement” are. Ibid.
 The dissent’s attempt to distinguish O’Brien and its prog-
eny fails for the same reason. See post, at 16–19. The dis-
sent protests that H. B. 1181 cannot trigger intermediate
scrutiny under O’Brien because it is “a direct regulation of
speech,” not “a regulation of conduct” that incidentally bur-
dens “expressive activity.” Post, at 17. When speech has
both protected and unprotected features, however, “the un-
protected features of the [speech] are, despite their [com-
municative] character, essentially a ‘nonspeech’ element”
for purposes of the First Amendment. R. A. V. v. St. Paul,
 505 U. S. 377, 386 (1992). With that principle in hand,
H. B. 1181 fits comfortably within the O’Brien framework:
The law directly regulates unprotected activity (accessing
material that is obscene to minors without submitting to age
verification) while only incidentally burdening protected ac-
tivity (ultimately accessing that material).11
——————
 11 The dissent complains that Sable, Playboy, Reno, and Ashcroft II

never “proposed an analogy to O’Brien.” Post, at 18; United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803 (2000). That fact is
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 29

 Opinion of the Court

 The dissent’s real point of disagreement is whether an
age-verification requirement regulates the protected speech
of adults. On this point, the dissent has nothing to offer
aside from the bald assertion that our precedents have held
as much. See post, at 5–10. But, our precedents have held
no such thing. Because our previous decisions concerned
only outright bans, see supra, at 22–25, this Court has
never before considered whether lesser burdens aimed at
distinguishing children from adults directly regulate any
free speech right of adults.12
 Instead, as we have explained, the First Amendment
leaves undisturbed States’ power to impose age limits on
speech that is obscene to minors. That power, according to
both “common sense” and centuries of legal tradition, in-
cludes the ordinary and appropriate means of exercising it.
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 192. And, an age-verifi-
cation requirement is an ordinary and appropriate means
of enforcing an age limit, as is evident both from all other
contexts where the law draws lines based on age and from
the long, widespread, and unchallenged practice of requir-
ing age verification for in-person sales of material that is
obscene to minors. Supra, at 14–17. Beyond misreading
precedent, the dissent’s only other response to our reason-
ing is to assert that age verification is not necessarily in-
cluded in the power to draw an age-based line because “an
age verification mandate burdens an adult’s First Amend-
ment” rights. Post, at 13. That response simply assumes
——————
unsurprising. Because all four cases involved outright bans on speech
that is at most obscene only to minors, see supra, at 22–25, the statutes
at issue directly (and not merely incidentally) regulated adults’ protected
speech.
 12 The dissent is correct that, for fully protected speech, “the distinction

between bans and burdens makes no difference to the level of scrutiny.”
Post, at 20. But, when the First Amendment partially protects speech,
such that the government may impose certain content-based restrictions
on it but may not proscribe it outright, the distinction between a ban and
lesser burdens is meaningful.
30 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

what the dissent sets out to prove.
 The dissent expresses surprise that obscenity for minors
is “only partially” protected speech for adults. Post, at 15
(internal quotation marks omitted). But, it does not truly
deny that this is the case. The defendant in Ginsberg, after
all, was an adult vendor of pornography, not an underage
purchaser. 390 U. S., at 631 . It would be difficult, practi-
cally speaking, for States to restrict children’s access to por-
nography without regulating adult vendors. And, Ginsberg
accordingly held that New York’s content-based restriction
on the rights of adult vendors triggered only rational-basis
review. Id., at 641 . Thus, so long as the dissent accepts
Ginsberg, it cannot deny that the question before us is
which content-based regulations States may impose on
adults without triggering strict scrutiny, not whether they
may do so.
 Finally, the dissent claims that we engage in “back-
wards,” results-oriented reasoning because we are unwill-
ing to adopt a position that would call into question the con-
stitutionality of longstanding in-person age-verification
requirements. Post, at 11–12. Not so. We appeal to these
requirements because they embody a constitutional judg-
ment—made by generations of legislators and by the Amer-
ican people as a whole—that commands our respect. A de-
cision “contrary to long and unchallenged practice . . .
should be approached with great caution,” “no less than an
explicit overruling” of a precedent. Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U. S. 808, 835 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). It would be
perverse if we showed less regard for in-person age-verifi-
cation requirements simply because their legitimacy is so
uncontroversial that the need for a judicial decision uphold-
ing them has never arisen.13
——————
 13 Even the dissent recognizes the force of this point to some extent,

which is why it insists that in-person age-verification requirements
would have “a real chance of surviving” under its approach. Post, at 12.
But, the dissent has no way to make good on this assurance other than
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 31

 Opinion of the Court

 E
 Texas, like the Fifth Circuit, contends that intermediate
scrutiny is too demanding and that only rational-basis re-
view applies. This position fails to account for the inci-
dental burden that age verification necessarily has on an
adult’s First Amendment right to access speech that is ob-
scene only to minors. Rational basis is the appropriate
standard for laws that do not implicate “fundamental con-
stitutional rights” at all. Beach Communications, 508 U. S.,
at 313 . Intermediate scrutiny, which is deferential but not
toothless, plays an important role in ensuring that legisla-
tures do not use ostensibly legitimate purposes to disguise
efforts to suppress fundamental rights.
 Despite advocating for rational-basis review, Texas itself
has acknowledged the need for more searching review. The
State concedes, for instance, that it could not require as
proof of age an “affidavit” from the individual’s “biological
parent.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. That example is precisely the
sort of manipulation of a legitimate kind of regulation that
intermediate scrutiny can weed out but that rational-basis
review cannot.
 Texas argues that Ginsberg establishes that age-
verification requirements receive only rational-basis re-
view. But, although Ginsberg applied that standard to a
statute with an age-verification requirement, the Court did
not squarely address the incidental effect that the law had
on adults’ First Amendment rights. See 390 U. S., at 637–
643. Moreover, Ginsberg was decided before this Court first
articulated the intermediate-scrutiny standard for inci-
dental burdens on free speech. See O’Brien, 391 U. S., at
376–377. In a two-tiered framework, where the only op-

——————
to say that strict scrutiny need not be a “horror show” for States—or, in
other words, that the First Amendment is not really as great an obstacle
to suppressing fully protected speech as it might seem. Post, at 11.
32 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

tions were strict scrutiny and rational-basis review, the lat-
ter was the better standard for an age-verification require-
ment.
 IV
 A statute survives intermediate scrutiny if it “advances
important governmental interests unrelated to the sup-
pression of free speech and does not burden substantially
more speech than necessary to further those interests.”
Turner II, 520 U. S., at 189 . H. B. 1181 readily satisfies
these requirements.
 A
 H. B. 1181 undoubtedly advances an important govern-
mental interest. Texas’s interest in shielding children from
sexual content is important, even “compelling.” Reno, 521
U. S., at 869 ; Sable, 492 U. S., at 126 . H. B. 1181 furthers
that interest by preventing minors from easily circumvent-
ing a prohibition on their accessing sexual content.
 H. B. 1181 is also sufficiently tailored to Texas’s interest.
Under intermediate scrutiny, a regulation is adequately
tailored so long as the government’s interest “would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation” and the reg-
ulation “does not burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further that interest.” TikTok, 604 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 16) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
regulation “need not be the least restrictive . . . means of ”
serving the State’s interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
 491 U. S. 781, 798 (1989). And, the regulation’s validity
“ ‘does not turn on [our] agreement with the [legislature]
concerning the most appropriate method for promoting sig-
nificant government interests’ or the degree to which those
interests should be promoted.” Id., at 800 .
 Under this standard, requiring age verification online
is plainly a legitimate legislative choice. Since at least
the days of Ginsberg, States have commonly used age-
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 33

 Opinion of the Court

verification requirements, in the case of in-person access to
sexual materials, to reconcile their interest in protecting
children with adults’ right to avail themselves of such ma-
terials. This approach ensures that an age-based ban is not
ineffectual, while at the same time allowing adults full ac-
cess to the content in question after the modest burden of
providing proof of age. H. B. 1181 simply adapts this tradi-
tional approach to the digital age.
 The specific verification methods that H. B. 1181 permits
are also plainly legitimate. At present, H. B. 1181 allows
for verification using government-issued identification or
transactional data. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§129B.003(b)(2). Verification can take place on the covered
website itself or through a third-party service.
§129B.003(b). Other age-restricted services, such as online
gambling, alcohol and tobacco sales, and car rentals, rely on
the same methods. App. 188–190, 194, 198. And, much of
the online pornography industry has used analogous meth-
ods for decades. In Reno, this Court observed that age ver-
ification through credit-card transactions “is not only tech-
nologically available but actually is used by commercial
providers of sexually explicit material,” who (unlike many
of the noncommercial sites covered by the CDA) “ ‘would re-
main relatively unaffected’ ” were such verification re-
quired. 521 U. S., at 856, 863, 881. The District Court in
Ashcroft II found that the users of tens of thousands of por-
nographic websites verified their ages by submitting “a copy
of a passport or driver’s license” to a third-party verification
service. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 31
F. Supp. 2d 473, 490 (ED Pa. 1999) (findings 51–52). H. B.
1181 simply requires established verification methods al-
ready in use by pornographic sites and other industries.
That choice is well within the State’s discretion under in-
termediate scrutiny.
34 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

 B
 Petitioners’ counterarguments are unpersuasive. Peti-
tioners contend that Texas could adopt less restrictive
means of protecting children, such as encouraging parents
to install content-filtering software on their children’s de-
vices or requiring internet service providers to block adult
content unless a household opts in to receiving it. But, even
assuming these approaches are equally or more effective,
under intermediate scrutiny a “regulation will not be inva-
lid simply because a court concludes that the government’s
interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-
restrictive alternative.” Ward, 491 U. S., at 800 . Texas’s
interest in shielding children from sexual content “ ‘would
be achieved less effectively absent’ ” H. B. 1181, and it can-
not be said that “a substantial portion of the burden” that
H. B. 1181 imposes fails “to advance [Texas’s] goals.” Id.,
at 799 . That is enough to show that the Texas Legislature
adequately tailored H. B. 1181, regardless of whether some
other approach might be superior.14
 Petitioners further argue that H. B. 1181 is not appropri-
ately tailored, because it does not require age verification
on other sites, such as search engines and social-media web-
sites, where children are likely to find sexually explicit
content. But, under intermediate scrutiny, “ ‘the First
Amendment imposes no freestanding underinclusiveness
limitation,’ ” and Texas “ ‘need not address all aspects of a
problem in one fell swoop.’ ” TikTok, 604 U. S., at ___ (slip

——————
 14 Petitioners contend that H. B. 1181 does not allow covered websites

to use newer biometric methods of age verification, like face scans, that
they claim are less likely to give rise to privacy concerns. Texas disa-
grees, maintaining that H. B. 1181 does allow such methods. We need
not resolve this disagreement because Texas is not required to adopt the
least restrictive means of advancing its interests to pass intermediate
scrutiny. Ward, 491 U. S., at 800 . It is sufficient that verifying age by
government identification and transactional data is a legitimate legisla-
tive choice that does not impose excessive burdens on users.
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 35

 Opinion of the Court

op., at 15). Further, Texas has a reasonable basis for ex-
cluding these sites from H. B. 1181’s coverage. The statute
does not contain any special exception for social-media
sites. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §129B.002(a).
Rather, such sites fall outside the statute to the extent that
less than a third of their content is obscene to minors. And,
it is reasonable for Texas to conclude that websites with a
higher proportion of sexual content are more inappropriate
for children to visit than those with a lower proportion. The
statute, on the other hand, does explicitly exempt search
engines. §129B.005(b). But, search engines do not exercise
the same degree of control over the websites to which they
link, so the State could reasonably conclude that it makes
less sense to regulate them.
 Petitioners next assert that privacy concerns and the
unique stigma surrounding pornography will make age
verification too chilling for adults. But, users only have to
submit verification to the covered website itself or the third-
party service with which the website contracts. See
§129B.003(b). Both those entities have every incentive to
assure users of their privacy. In any event, the use of por-
nography has always been the subject of social stigma. This
social reality has never been a reason to exempt the pornog-
raphy industry from otherwise valid regulation. Cf. United
States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U. S. 194, 209
(2003) (plurality opinion) (holding that the “risk of embar-
rassment” involved in asking a librarian to unblock a web-
site wrongly blocked as obscene did not impose a cognizable
burden on a library patron’s access to speech). And, the
decades-long history of some pornographic websites requir-
ing age verification refutes any argument that the chill of
verification is an insurmountable obstacle for users.
 * * *
 H. B. 1181 simply requires adults to verify their age be-
fore they can access speech that is obscene to children. It is
36 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 Opinion of the Court

therefore subject only to intermediate scrutiny, which it
readily survives. The statute advances the State’s im-
portant interest in shielding children from sexually explicit
content. And, it is appropriately tailored because it permits
users to verify their ages through the established methods
of providing government-issued identification and sharing
transactional data. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed.
 It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 No. 23–1122
 _________________

 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC., ET AL.,
 PETITIONERS v. KEN PAXTON, ATTORNEY
 GENERAL OF TEXAS
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 [June 27, 2025]

 JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
 No one doubts that the distribution of sexually explicit
speech to children, of the sort involved here, can cause great
harm. Or to say the same thing in legal terms, no one
doubts that States have a compelling interest in shielding
children from speech of that kind. What is more, children
have no constitutional right to view it. The Texas statute
before us (H. B. 1181) addresses speech understood in First
Amendment law as “obscene for minors.” That label means
the First Amendment does not protect the speech for mi-
nors. The State can restrict their access without fear of col-
liding with the Constitution.
 The trouble comes in the last two sentences’ italics.
Speech that is obscene for minors is often not so for adults.
For them, the category of obscene—and therefore unpro-
tected speech—is narrower. See ante, at 8–10. So adults
have a constitutional right to view the very same speech
that a State may prohibit for children. And it is a fact of
life—and also of law—that adults and children do not live
in hermetically sealed boxes. In preventing children from
gaining access to “obscene for children” speech, States
sometimes take measures impeding adults from viewing it
too—even though, for adults, it is constitutionally protected
2 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

expression. What, then, to do?
 Cases raising that question have reached this Court on
no fewer than four prior occasions—and we have given the
same answer, consistent with general free speech princi-
ples, each and every time. Under those principles, we apply
strict scrutiny, a highly rigorous but not fatal form of con-
stitutional review, to laws regulating protected speech
based on its content. See ante, at 6. And laws like H. B.
1181 fit that description: They impede adults from viewing
a class of speech protected for them (even though not for
children) and defined by its content. So when we have con-
fronted those laws before, we have always asked the strict-
scrutiny question: Is the law the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling state interest? See ibid. There is
no reason to change course.
 A law like H. B. 1181 might well pass the strict-scrutiny
test, hard as it usually is to do so. As just noted, everyone
agrees that shielding children from exposure to the sexually
explicit speech H. B. 1181 targets is a compelling state in-
terest. And Texas might be right in arguing that it has no
less restrictive way to achieve that goal: It is difficult, as
everyone also agrees, to limit minors’ access to things ap-
pearing on the internet. If H. B. 1181 is the best Texas can
do—meaning, the means of achieving the State’s objective
while restricting adults’ speech rights the least—then the
statute should pass First Amendment review.
 But what if Texas could do better—what if Texas could
achieve its interest without so interfering with adults’ con-
stitutionally protected rights in viewing the speech H. B.
1181 covers? That is the ultimate question on which the
Court and I disagree. The majority says that Texas may
enforce its statute regardless, because only intermediate
scrutiny applies and that test does not ask whether a State
has adopted the least speech-restrictive means available. I
disagree, based on conventional First Amendment rules
and the way we have consistently applied them in this very
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

context. The State should be foreclosed from restricting
adults’ access to protected speech if that is not in fact nec-
essary.
 The majority’s opinion concluding to the contrary is, to be
frank, confused. The opinion, to start with, is at war with
itself. Parts suggest that the First Amendment plays no
role here—that because Texas’s law works through age ver-
ification mandates, the First Amendment is beside the
point. See ante, at 13–18. But even the majority eventually
gives up that ghost. As, really, it must. H. B. 1181’s re-
quirements interfere with—or, in First Amendment jargon,
burden—the access adults have to protected speech: Some
individuals will forgo that speech because of the need to
identify themselves to a website (and maybe, from there, to
the world) as a consumer of sexually explicit expression.
But still, the majority proposes, that burden demands only
intermediate scrutiny because it arises from an “incidental”
restriction, given that Texas’s statute uses age verification
to prevent minors from viewing the speech. See ante, at 13,
18–19. Except that is wrong—nothing like what we have
ever understood as an incidental restraint for First Amend-
ment purposes. Texas’s law defines speech by content and
tells people entitled to view that speech that they must in-
cur a cost to do so. That is, under our First Amendment
law, a direct (not incidental) regulation of speech based on
its content—which demands strict scrutiny.
 The majority’s attempt to distinguish our four precedents
saying just that rounds out the list of its errors. According
to the majority, all of those decisions involved prohibiting
rather than merely burdening adults’ access to obscene-for-
children speech. See ante, at 21. But that is not true. And
in any event it would not matter: The First Amendment
prevents making speech hard, as well as banning it out-
right. So on all accounts the majority’s rationale craters.
 The majority is not shy about why it has adopted these
special-for-the-occasion, difficult-to-decipher rules. It
4 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

thinks they are needed to get to what it considers the right
result: giving Texas permission to enforce its statute. See
ante, at 19–21. But Texas should not receive that permis-
sion if it can achieve its goal as to minors while interfering
less with the speech choices of adults. And if it cannot, then
Texas’s statute would survive strict scrutiny, given the ob-
vious importance of its goal. For that reason, the majority’s
analysis is as unnecessary as it is unfaithful to the law.
 I
 Under ordinary First Amendment doctrine, this Court
should subject H. B. 1181 to strict scrutiny. That is because
H. B. 1181 covers speech constitutionally protected for
adults; impedes adults’ ability to view that speech; and im-
poses that burden based on the speech’s content. Case
closed. And making the right answer yet more obvious, we
have said as much four times before, when reviewing stat-
utes imposing similar content-based burdens on protected
sexually explicit speech. So the case is closed even tighter:
The standard should be strict scrutiny. The only open ques-
tion here should be whether H. B. 1181 can satisfy that test.
 A
 No one (not even Texas, not even the majority) disputes
that H. B. 1181 covers a substantial amount of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. We have, of course, often
held that obscene speech, as defined in Miller v. California,
 413 U. S. 15 (1973), is not so protected. But H. B. 1181 does
not use the ordinary Miller test (relating to prurience, of-
fensiveness, and value) as the trigger for regulation. In-
stead, it adapts each part of that test “for minors,” thus cov-
ering speech that is “obscene from a child’s perspective.”
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §129B.002(a) (West Cum.
Supp. 2024); ante, at 9 (emphasis deleted). And that child-
centric category of speech extends wider than the tradi-
tional obscenity category. See ante, at 9–10. In the gap
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

between the two is much sexually explicit speech that
adults have every right to view. For adults cannot be lim-
ited to “only what is fit for children.” Butler v. Michigan,
 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957). Their right to view “[s]exual ex-
pression,” outside the traditional obscenity category, is
“protected by the First Amendment.” Sable Communica-
tions of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989).
 And H. B. 1181 impedes the exercise of that right. Recall
how the statute works. To enter a covered website—with
all the protected speech just described—an individual must
verify his age by using either a “government-issued identi-
fication” like a driver’s license or “transactional data” asso-
ciated with things like a job or mortgage. §§129B.001(7),
129B.003(b)(2); see ante, at 2–3. For the would-be con-
sumer of sexually explicit materials, that requirement is a
deterrent: It imposes what our First Amendment decisions
often call a “chilling effect.” E.g., Americans for Prosperity
Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U. S. 595 , 606 (2021). It is not,
contra the majority, like having to flash ID to enter a club.
See ante, at 14–15. It is turning over information about
yourself and your viewing habits—respecting speech many
find repulsive—to a website operator, and then to . . . who
knows? The operator might sell the information; the oper-
ator might be hacked or subpoenaed. We recognized the
problem in a case involving sexual material on cable TV:
Similar demands, we decided, would “restrict viewing by
subscribers who fear for their reputations should the oper-
ator, advertently or inadvertently, disclose the list of those
who wish to watch the ‘patently offensive’ channel.” Denver
Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U. S. 727, 754 (1996). The internet context can only in-
crease the fear. And the Texas law imposes costs not just
on potential users, but on website operators too. They must
either implement a system costing (the District Court
found) at least $40,000 for every 100,000 verifications, or
else pay penalties of $10,000 per day. See §129B.006(b);
6 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Colmenero, 689 F. Supp. 3d
373 , 385–386 (WD Tex. 2023). Those expenses, Texas
boasts, have already caused one major operator to exit the
State’s market. See Brief for Respondent 21. So in multiple
ways, H. B. 1181 burdens expression.
 Finally, H. B. 1181 imposes those burdens on protected
speech based on the speech’s “communicative content,”
making it a quintessential content-based law. Reed v. Town
of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155 , 163 (2015). A statute, we have
often said, is content-based on its face when it “draws dis-
tinctions” based on the “topic,” “subject matter,” “idea,” or
“message expressed.” E.g., ibid. H. B. 1181 does just that.
It applies when more than a third of the expression on a
website is “sexual material” of a certain kind (prurient, of-
fensive, and valueless for minors). §§129B.001(6),
129B.002(a). And whether expression qualifies as such ma-
terial depends entirely on what it depicts. If the website
has the requisite sexually explicit content, the regulation
kicks in. Alternatively, if that content is absent (if, say, the
website focuses on politics or sports), the regulation does
not. “That is about as content-based as it gets.” Barr v.
American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc., 591 U. S. 610 ,
619 (2020) (plurality opinion). Not even the majority dis-
putes the point. See ante, at 28.
 All of that leads, under well-settled law, to just one con-
clusion: H. B. 1181 is subject to strict scrutiny. Take a law
burdening protected speech based on its content—as H. B.
1181 does for every adult—and the standard of review fol-
lows in its wake. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994) (We “apply the most exact-
ing scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its con-
tent”). It does not matter whether we are persuaded in a
given case that the State, in passing the regulation, had
laudable, even compelling aims. See Reed, 576 U. S., at 166
(A good “justification cannot transform a facially content-
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 7

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

based law into” the opposite). Those interests are consid-
ered only in applying strict scrutiny, not in deciding
whether that is the right standard to be applied. Over the
years, we have recited the governing rule almost like a
mantra: If a law burdens protected speech based on what
that speech says or depicts—as H. B. 1181 does—the law
has to clear the strict-scrutiny bar.
 B
 What is more, our precedents have applied that rule in
four cases similar to this one—when a statute has limited
adults’ access to sexually explicit materials in order to pre-
vent those materials from getting to minors. The laws at
issue pertained to diverse media—the telephone, cable, and
(twice, as here) the internet. But the analysis about the
level of scrutiny was in each case the same. To show the
Court’s (previous) consistency—and its relevance today—it
is worth reviewing them one by one by one by one.
 In Sable Communications v. FCC, the Court considered a
statute directed at dial-a-porn services that prohibited sex-
ually “indecent” telephone messages, extending beyond
those obscene for adults under Miller. 492 U. S., at 122–
123. The Government defended the law as an effort to pro-
tect children from exposure to the speech. See id., at 128.
We recognized that interest as compelling. See id., at 126.
But we also understood that adults had a “protected” First
Amendment right to listen to the non-obscene indecent
speech that the law covered. Ibid. And so the Court applied
strict scrutiny—thus requiring the Government to show
that the statute did not “unnecessarily interfer[e] with
[adults’] First Amendment freedoms.” Ibid.
 Then, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521
U. S. 844 , 859–861 (1997), the Court addressed a statute
barring internet transmissions of obscene, indecent, or “pa-
tently offensive” messages to those under 18, with an af-
firmative defense available to anyone making use of age
8 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

verification measures. Although the statute encompassed
only communications to minors and excused from penalties
those using a “reasonable” method to verify age, the Court
recognized the “burden” that the statute would impose “on
adult speech.” Id., at 860, 874 . Because of that “inter-
fere[nce] with adult-to-adult communication”—and despite
the significance of the Government interest “in protecting
children”—the Court again insisted on applying strict scru-
tiny. Id., at 875–876. So once more the key issue was
whether “less restrictive alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving” the Government’s goals. Id., at 874 .
 Next, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 806 (2000), the Court evaluated a law
requiring that “sexually-oriented” cable channels “limit
their transmission to hours when children are unlikely to
be viewing.” “[W]hat standard [must] the Government”
meet, the Court asked, for the law to survive? Id., at 814 .
We did not think the question close. “As we consider a con-
tent-based regulation” of “protected speech,” we said, “the
answer should be clear: The standard is strict scrutiny.”
Ibid.; see id., at 812–813. So “if a less restrictive means”
would serve the Government’s goals, “the Government
must use it.” Id., at 815 . Otherwise, the Court explained,
the Government could, contrary to the First Amendment,
“restrict speech without an adequate justification.” Id., at
813 .
 And the denouement: The statute the Court addressed in
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656
(2004), was a near-twin of Texas’s. The Child Online Pro-
tection Act (COPA) prohibited commercial entities from
posting on the internet content “harmful to minors.” Id., at
661 (quoting 47 U. S. C. §231 (a)(1)). And just like H. B.
1181, that statute defined the covered material by adapting
the Miller obscenity test for children—thus creating a cate-
gory of obscene-for-children speech. See 542 U. S., at 661–
662; supra, at 4. So too, COPA made the adoption of an age
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

verification system crucial. It did so by providing an affirm-
ative defense to any entity that verified age through an
“adult personal identification number” or similar mecha-
nism before granting access to the posted materials. Ash-
croft, 542 U. S., at 662 . So, as in H. B. 1181, if the poster
verified age, no liability could attach. How, then, to analyze
such a statute? The Court viewed the problem as it had in
prior cases: COPA, though directed at keeping sexually ex-
plicit materials from children, “was likely to burden some
speech that is protected for adults.” Id., at 665 . And be-
cause of that “content-based restriction[ ],” the Court
needed to apply strict scrutiny. Id., at 660, 665, 670 . The
Government thus had to show that “the proposed alterna-
tives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.” Id.,
at 665 . In short, Ashcroft adhered to the view that “ ‘the
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials’ does not ‘justify an unnecessarily broad suppres-
sion of speech addressed to adults.’ ” Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 581 (2001) (THOMAS, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Reno, 521
U. S., at 875 ).1
 Four times, one result. Which is not surprising, because

——————
 1 The majority does—and then does not—accept this simple fact. It

first acknowledges that Ashcroft decided “COPA was subject to strict
scrutiny.” Ante, at 12. But later, it tries to take part of its concession
back. The Ashcroft Court, it says, could not have “comprehensive[ly]”
addressed the “appropriate standard of scrutiny for laws protecting chil-
dren from sexual content online, given that the appropriate standard was
not even a contested issue in the case.” Ante, at 26. The second half of
that sentence is right, but it does not support the first. Having argued
in Sable, Reno, and Playboy for a less rigorous standard of review—and
been rebuffed each time—the Government in Ashcroft finally gave up.
Or otherwise said, it recognized reality. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 64. Three
times before, the Court had said something like, “[T]he answer should be
clear: The standard is strict scrutiny.” United States v. Playboy Enter-
tainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 814 (2000). The Court did so again,
and just as firmly, in Ashcroft.
10 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

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it is the result that basic First Amendment principles com-
mand. A statute tries to cut off children’s access to sexually
explicit speech, in line with the most worthy objectives. But
the statute as well impedes adults’ access to that speech,
which the First Amendment protects. And the statute does
so by drawing content-based lines: Sexually explicit speech
is burdened, other speech is not. It follows, as the night the
day, that strict scrutiny applies—that the statute, in addi-
tion to serving a compelling purpose, can restrict only as
much adult speech as is needed to achieve the State’s goal.
That is true in the four cases above, and it is true in this
case too.
 C
 Applying strict scrutiny in this context, however, need
not be a death sentence. To the contrary, a State exercising
care should be able to devise a regulatory means of achiev-
ing its objective consistent with the First Amendment.
 The first part of the strict-scrutiny test is here easy to
meet. The majority is right that a State has a compelling
interest in shielding children from the obscene-for-children
materials that H. B. 1181 covers. See ante, at 32. This
Court has said as much before. See Sable, 492 U. S., at 126
(recognizing a “compelling interest in protecting the physi-
cal and psychological well-being of minors,” which “extends
to shielding” them from materials “not obscene by adult
standards”); Denver Area, 518 U. S., at 743 (plurality opin-
ion) (noting that the interest in “protect[ing] children from
exposure to patently offensive sex-related material” is “one
that this Court has often found compelling”). And a State
is entitled to think that the need has become only more ur-
gent over the years, given the time children now spend
online and the materials they can find there. See ante, at
27.
 The critical question, then, is whether the State can show
that it has limited no more adult speech than is necessary
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

to achieve its goal. Or said another way (in fact, Ashcroft’s
way), whether the State can show that “the proposed alter-
natives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.”
 542 U. S., at 665 . If the State cannot, the statute should
not take effect, because it would limit protected speech un-
necessarily. There would be every reason to make the State
switch to a less-speech-restrictive, equally-or-more-effec-
tive regulatory mechanism. But a State that has closely
attended to the speech consequences of its regulation might
well make the required showing in this sphere. Given how
the internet works, no court should expect that a law effec-
tively shielding children from sexually explicit expression
could leave adults wholly unaffected. To the contrary, such
a law will almost necessarily impose corollary burdens.
And Texas may be right that the commonly proposed alter-
natives to laws like H. B. 1181—such as content filtering
technology—cannot equal, or even approach, age verifica-
tion systems in effectiveness. See Brief for Respondent 37–
38. In that event, those alternatives will be irrelevant to
the inquiry, and a court will explore only whether another,
equally effective age verification mechanism will place a
lesser burden on protected speech. Review of that kind
should not be the horror show for Texas and other States
that the majority maintains. See ante, at 19–21. It is just
what they should have to pass before implementing a con-
tent-based burden on protected expression.
 II
 How does the majority reach a different result?
 The analytic path of today’s opinion is winding, but I take
the majority to begin with a conviction about where it must
not end—with strict scrutiny. The majority is not so coy
about this backwards reasoning. To the contrary, it defends
it. See ante, at 30. The “legitimacy” of age verification
schemes for sexually explicit speech, the majority tells us,
is “uncontroversial” (despite Reno and Ashcroft). Ante, at
12 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

30. And “[a]pplying the more demanding strict-scrutiny
standard would call” those schemes “into question.” Ante,
at 19. Ergo, its conclusion. I have just explained why the
majority’s fear is overblown—why in fact carefully drawn
age verification laws stand a real chance of surviving strict
scrutiny. But suppose I am wrong. Suppose there are both
less speech-restrictive and equally effective ways to accom-
plish the State’s goal of protecting children from sexually
explicit materials. In that event, strict scrutiny tells us, the
State should use those constitutionally superior alterna-
tives. And why argue with that? The usual way constitu-
tional review works is to figure out the right standard (here,
strict scrutiny because H. B. 1181 is content-based), and let
that standard work to a conclusion. It is not to assume the
conclusion (approve H. B. 1181 and similar age verification
laws) and pick the standard sure to arrive there. But that
is what the majority does. To answer what standard of
scrutiny applies, the majority first spends four pages laud-
ing age verification schemes as “common,” “traditional,”
“appropriate,” and “necessary.” Ante, at 13–18. In other
words, all over the place, and a good thing too. No wonder
the majority doesn’t land on strict scrutiny.
 The more puzzling question is how the majority’s reason-
ing fits with the idea that the First Amendment plays any
role at all. For quite some time in today’s opinion, speech
rights are pushed to the sidelines, or entirely off the field.
Age verification schemes are just age verification
schemes—again, “common,” “traditional,” “appropriate,”
and “necessary.” Ibid. States use them to regulate pur-
chases of liquor and lottery tickets and fireworks. And so,
the majority says, States can also use them to regulate ac-
cess to speech that is obscene for children. The power to
prevent minors from gaining access to that speech “neces-
sarily includes” the power to require proof of age. Ante, at
13. And that means, the majority concludes, that “access-
ing material obscene to minors without verifying one’s age
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 13

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

is not constitutionally protected,” even for adults. Ante, at
19 (emphasis deleted). It would seem the analysis is com-
plete. If the First Amendment does not protect adults in
viewing obscene-for-children materials unimpeded by age
verification, as the majority argues, then how could there
be any constitutional objection to age verification laws like
H. B. 1181? Or said otherwise, why would those laws have
to satisfy any heightened constitutional standard, whether
strict or intermediate? We have apparently arrived at a
place where States can act free of all constitutional scru-
tiny.
 But that cannot be, for reasons that by now should sound
familiar. As discussed earlier, speech that is obscene for
children is often not obscene for adults. See supra, at 4–5.
When that is so, the First Amendment protects adults’ ac-
cess to obscene-for-children speech (unlike to liquor, lottery
tickets, or fireworks). Or otherwise said, the First Amend-
ment gives them a right in that expression. And because of
that protected right, different rules apply. Without a spe-
cial justification, a State cannot prohibit, tax, impede, or
otherwise burden an adult’s access to obscene-for-children
speech. And an age verification requirement is a kind of
burden. It may be smaller or larger—compare flashing ID
in a store with (in the majority’s own example) having to
produce “an affidavit from [a] biological parent.” Ante, at
31. It may be a simple inconvenience or it may, as sug-
gested earlier, prevent individuals from exercising the
right. See supra, at 5–6. And those differences may well
matter to the conclusion when a court gets around to apply-
ing the appropriate constitutional standard. But regard-
less, an age verification mandate burdens an adult’s First
Amendment protected right in viewing obscene-for-children
expression. So a State’s power to prohibit that speech for
minors does not “necessarily include[ ],” as the majority con-
tends, the power to mandate age verification. Ante, at 13.
It might or might not, depending on whether the mandate
14 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

satisfies the constitutional scrutiny that its burden on pro-
tected speech requires.
 And in the end, the majority has to accept some version
of that argument. For page upon page, the majority ex-
plains that the First Amendment has nothing to say about
age verification schemes attached to obscene-for-children
speech. See ante, at 13–18. Again, that speech may as well
be liquor, lottery tickets, or fireworks, for all it matters to
the “States’ authority.” Ante, at 13. And then, in the space
of one brief paragraph, the idea falls apart. Yes, the major-
ity at last concedes, “[a]dults have the right to access speech
that is obscene only to minors.” Ante, at 18. And yes, the
majority admits, “submitting to age verification is a burden
on the exercise of that right.” Ibid. So sure, the majority
acknowledges, a really onerous age verification scheme—
like its parental affidavit requirement—would flunk consti-
tutional review. See ante, at 31. And so too, the majority
says, even the least onerous mandate, like the one in Gins-
berg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 633 , 643–644 (1968), to
show ID in a store, has to satisfy some form of heightened
constitutional scrutiny. See ante, at 22, 31–32.2 There is
no getting around the fact: Obscene-for-children speech is
constitutionally protected speech for adults. See ante, at
18. And age verification schemes “burden[ing]” adults’
“right[s] to access [that] speech” are in fact not the kind of
everyday, “appropriate,” and “necessary” regulation courts
can wave on by. Ante, at 13–18. The Constitution, contrary
to what the majority at first assured us, is now very much

——————
 2 The majority acknowledges that Ginsberg itself never addressed

whether, or what kind of, constitutional scrutiny is appropriate for age
verification laws applying to speech. See ante, at 22, 31–32. The many
cites to Ginsberg in the majority opinion function mainly as atmosphere,
to remind the reader that age verification mandates may impose only a
trivial burden on speech rights. See ante, at 15–16, 19–22, 30. Which of
course is true—just as it is true that they may impose a significant one.
See ante, at 31; supra, at 5–6.
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

in the picture.
 At that point, one might think, the right approach—as
the Court once said—“should be clear: The standard is strict
scrutiny.” Playboy, 529 U. S., at 814 . Forgive a brief recap.
H. B. 1181 regulates the communicative content of web-
sites, imposing an age verification mandate on those exhib-
iting a specified amount of sexually explicit speech that,
while obscene for children, is protected for adults. So the
law directly burdens adults’ right to view speech based on
its sexual content. As the Court four times before found,
that means strict scrutiny applies—even though the State
is attempting to prevent the speech from reaching minors.
See supra, at 4–10.
 The majority tries to escape that conclusion with a ma-
neuver found nowhere in the world of First Amendment
doctrine. It turns out, the majority says, that the First
Amendment only “partially protects” the speech in ques-
tion: The “speech is unprotected to the extent the State
seeks only to verify age.” Ante, at 18, 29, n. 12 (emphasis
deleted); see ante, at 28 (the speech is “unprotected to the
extent that the State imposes only an age-verification re-
quirement”). Meaning, the speech is unprotected to the ex-
tent that the State is imposing the very burden under re-
view. Or said another way, the right of adults to view the
speech has the burden of age verification built right in.
That is convenient, if altogether circular. In the end, the
majority’s analysis reduces to this: Requiring age verifica-
tion does not directly burden adults’ speech rights because
adults have no right to be free from the burden of age veri-
fication. Gerrymander the right to incorporate the burden,
and the critical conclusion follows. If only other First
Amendment cases were so easy!
 Still, the majority must make one more move to square
the circle of all it has said. Recall that notwithstanding the
above, the majority has conceded that “[a]dults have the
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

right to access” obscene-for-children speech and age verifi-
cation schemes are “a burden on the exercise of that right.”
Ante, at 18; see supra, at 14–15. To account for that conces-
sion in its analysis—and yet avoid strict scrutiny, as it
wishes—the majority relies on a well-known distinction in
First Amendment law between direct and incidental re-
strictions on speech. See (sorry) E. Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413 , 491–505
(1996). Says the majority: The “burden experienced by
adults” as a result of H. B. 1181 is “only incidental to the
statute’s regulation of activity that is not protected by the
First Amendment.” Ante, at 18. Or more fully (prepare for
a mouthful): “The law directly regulates unprotected activ-
ity (accessing material that is obscene to minors without
submitting to age verification) while only incidentally bur-
dening protected activity (ultimately accessing that mate-
rial).” Ante, at 28 (emphasis in original). And because the
burden imposed on adults’ right to access the materials is
only incidental, the majority concludes, only intermediate
scrutiny need apply. To back up that view, the majority
relies (exclusively) on United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S.
367 (1968). See ante, at 18–19, 28.
 O’Brien actually seems a good place to start in explaining
why H. B. 1181 is not an incidental restriction under our
law. In that case, a war protester who burned his draft card
was charged with violating a statute that made it a crime
for anyone to “knowingly destroy[ ],” “mutilate[ ],” or
“change[ ]” draft registration documents. 391 U. S., at 370
(emphasis deleted). The Court assumed that O’Brien him-
self had engaged in expressive conduct: By burning his
draft card on the steps of a government building, he was
communicating opposition to the Vietnam War. See id., at
369–370, 376. But the law O’Brien broke was not about
speech; it was about conduct. That law, the Court ex-
plained, prohibited all alterations of draft cards, indifferent
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 17

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

to whether they were “public [or] private,” expressive or
non-expressive. Id., at 375 . So the “limitation[ ] on
[O’Brien’s] First Amendment freedoms” was purely “inci-
dental.” Id., at 376 . And because that was so—because the
statute at issue addressed only the “noncommunicative as-
pect” of what O’Brien did—the Court decided to apply in-
termediate scrutiny. Id., at 381–382.
 In the years since, this Court has used the O’Brien view
of incidental restrictions in several analytically identical
cases—when a limitation on conduct, “having no connection
with speech,” happens to sweep in a person’s expressive act.
 Id., at 375 . In one, the National Park Service invoked a
regulation that banned camping (defined to include sleep-
ing) in designated parks to prevent a sleep-in demonstra-
tion about homelessness. Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288 , 289–291 (1984). The Court ap-
plied the O’Brien standard and approved the Park Service’s
action. In another, a law against “reenter[ing] a military
base after having been barred by the commanding officer”
was used to charge a person who had reentered a base to
participate in a political demonstration. United States v.
Albertini, 472 U. S. 675 , 677–678 (1985). We upheld the
conviction under O’Brien. And in a third, the question was
whether a law banning public nudity could be applied to an
establishment featuring “expressive” nude dancing. Erie v.
Pap’s A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion).
Once again, we understood the case as in the O’Brien line,
because a prohibition of conduct had an “incidental” effect
on an expressive act. 529 U. S., at 294–295, 301. So we
used the O’Brien standard, and approved the nudity ban’s
application.
 None of this has any bearing on H. B. 1181. That statute
is not a regulation of conduct that just so happens, on occa-
sion, to impinge on expressive activity. It is instead a direct
regulation of speech, triggered by the amount of sexually
explicit expression on a commercial website. Or said a bit
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

differently: Rather than address the “noncommunicative”
aspects of an activity—as all the laws described above did—
H. B. 1181 regulates (and regulates only) what no one here
disputes are communicative messages. O’Brien, 391 U. S.,
at 382 . Consider: a law about altering draft certificates; a
law about sleeping in parks; a law about reentering military
bases; a law about public nudity; a law about sexually ex-
plicit postings on websites. Which one of those laws is not
like the others? As to the first four laws, the regulation is
of conduct, and the burden on expression a rare knock-on
effect. As to the fifth, the regulation is of speech, and the
burden on that speech the very thing the statute does. See
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 27 (2010)
(noting that O’Brien applies only when the “thing actually
at issue” is “conduct”). The burden H. B. 1181 imposes, of
course, raises constitutional concerns only for adults. But
that fact does not make the law any less a direct, not inci-
dental, restriction on protected expression. H. B. 1181 tar-
gets communicative content, and that alone—restricting
adults’ access to speech because of what it portrays, rather
than because of any non-communicative element that it
possesses.
 And this Court, in four prior cases involving similar reg-
ulations enacted for similar reasons, has not once proposed
an analogy to O’Brien. Forgive another brief recap. See
supra, at 7–10. In all of those cases, States burdened pro-
tected speech for adults as a way of cutting off children’s
access to the expression. Two of those efforts involved in-
ternet speech. The same two made liability for infractions
turn on whether the publisher of the speech used an age
verification measure. One of them—Ashcroft—defined the
regulated speech identically to H. B. 1181 (using the Miller
test adapted for minors). Yet in none of the four cases did
even a single Justice float the idea that, because the re-
striction was geared toward protecting minors or involved
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

age verification, the statute somehow effected only an inci-
dental restriction. In every one, it was common ground
(even among the dissenting Justices) that the statute’s re-
striction on adults’ access to speech was direct. So our prec-
edents stand as an embarrassment to the majority’s reason-
ing.
 The majority’s primary—and deficient—response is that
those cases involved “outright bans” on speech, whereas
this one involves only a burden. Ante, at 25; see ante, at
21–25. To begin with, that assertion is factually inaccurate
as to three of the four. In Playboy, the law did not ban adult
cable channels, but instead limited their transmission to
hours when children were unlikely to be in the audience.
See 529 U. S., at 806, 812. (The allowable hours were
10 p.m. to 6 a.m.—when, the District Court found, between
50% and 70% of adult viewing occurs anyway. See ibid.) So
as the Court took care to explain, the statute did “not im-
pose a complete prohibition.” Id., at 812. Rather, it effected
only a “content-based burden[ ]”—as H. B. 1181 does. Ibid.3
The same is true of the statutes in Reno and Ashcroft, and
in a way even more similar to Texas’s law. Recall that un-
der those statutes, publishers using age verification
measures had an affirmative defense to all liability. See
supra, at 7–9. So as long as those measures were in place,
publishers could confidently press send on whatever sexual
——————
 3 The majority does not know what to do with the Playboy Court’s de-

scription, so merely asserts that channeling adult programming to even-
ing hours is a “ban[ ].” Ante, at 22, n. 9. But why? If a park’s hours were
limited to between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m., is there really a “ban” on entering
the park? Does it matter when people typically use the park—or watch
adult programming? If so, where is the tipping point? Questions like
these may not have easy answers (which is one good reason not to make
too much ride on the ban/burden line, see infra, at 20–21). But the im-
portant point here is that Playboy understood the statute before it as
imposing only a burden, not a ban—and still applied strict scrutiny. So
its analysis—not its “dicta,” but its so-called ratio decidendi—refutes the
majority’s position. Ante, at 22, n. 9.
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

content they wanted to transmit. The majority argues that
H. B. 1181 is yet more protective of publishers, because it
turns the affirmative defense into an element—putting the
burden on the State to show the absence of age verification
measures. See ante, at 24–25. But in this context, the dif-
ference between an affirmative defense and an element is
but a smidge: It will matter only when a jury thinks the
presence (or absence) of age verification is a literal toss-up
(which in the real world will be rare). And even if the dif-
ference is more than I think, it is one between two points on
a continuum—not (as the majority insists) the dividing line
between a “ban” and a “burden” on speech.
 Much more important, the distinction between bans and
burdens makes no difference to the level of scrutiny. When
a statute draws lines based on the content of speech, strict
scrutiny is required regardless of the amount of speech af-
fected. Playboy made that point, in this context, at some
length. “It is of no moment” to the level of scrutiny, the
Court stated, that a law restricting speech “does not impose
a complete prohibition.” 529 U. S., at 812 (emphasis
added). And if that weren’t clear enough: “The Govern-
ment’s content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigor-
ous scrutiny as its content-based bans.” Ibid. And if that
weren’t clear enough: When a statute regulates expressive
content, no “special consideration” is given to the govern-
ment “merely because the law can somehow be described as
a burden rather than outright suppression.” Id., at 826.
What’s more, Playboy is not alone in repudiating the major-
ity’s reasoning. The refusal to countenance the ban/burden
line the majority today peddles is fundamental to our free
speech doctrine. Take any subject—say, because it is close
to home, the Supreme Court. Ban speech about the Court;
tax speech about the Court ($20 a pop); limit speech about
the Court to certain times (Tuesdays and Thursdays); or (as
here) demand identification to gain access to websites ad-
dressing the Court. Ban or burden, the level of scrutiny is
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 KAGAN, J., dissenting

the same: strict. See, e.g., Turner, 512 U. S., at 642 (stating
the rule); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552 , 565–566
(2011) (same); see also, e.g., Reed, 576 U. S., at 159, 172 (ad-
hering to the rule when reviewing mere burdens); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
 502 U. S. 105, 116 (1991) (same). So the principal distinc-
tion the majority draws between this case and the four that
should control it is a non-distinction, by command of how
we have always understood the First Amendment.
 That leaves only the majority’s claim—again mistaken—
that the internet has changed too much to follow our prece-
dents’ lead. See ante, at 25–27. Of course technology has
developed, both swiftly and surely. And that fact might
matter (as indeed the burden/ban distinction might) to how
strict scrutiny applies—and particularly to whether the
State can show it has adopted the least speech-restrictive
means to achieve its goal. Ashcroft explicitly recognized
that point: It thought that, given the pace of technological
change, the District Court might make a different decision
than it had five years earlier about whether there were “less
restrictive alternative[s]” to COPA. 542 U. S., at 671–672.
To that extent—but to that extent only—the majority is
right that Ashcroft was “self-consciously narrow and fact-
bound.” Ante, at 26. Not, though, as to the level of scrutiny.
On that question, the Court was unequivocal that because
COPA was “a content-based speech restriction,” it must sat-
isfy the strict-scrutiny test. 542 U. S., at 665 ; see supra, at
8–9, and n. 1. For that was a matter of basic First Amend-
ment principle. And as this Court has understood: “What-
ever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-ad-
vancing technology, the basic principles of the First
Amendment do not vary.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603
U. S. 707, 733 (2024) (quoting Brown v. Entertainment Mer-
chants Assn., 564 U. S. 786, 790 (2011)); see TikTok Inc. v.
Garland, 604 U. S. ___ , ___ (2025) (GORSUCH, J., concurring
22 FREE SPEECH COALITION, INC. v. PAXTON

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

in judgment) (slip op., at 2) (“[E]ven as times and technolo-
gies change, ‘the principle of the right to free speech is al-
ways the same’ ” (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250
U. S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
 Except that those basic principles do vary today.
 III
 The last part of the majority’s opinion—plus some of its
footnotes—shows why all this matters. In concluding that
H. B. 1181 passes constitutional muster, the majority
states (correctly) that under intermediate scrutiny Texas
need not show it has selected the least speech-restrictive
way of accomplishing its goal. See ante, at 32. Even if there
were a mechanism that (1) as well or better prevented mi-
nors’ access to the covered materials and (2) imposed a
lesser burden on adults’ ability to view that expression,
Texas could spurn that “superior” method. Ante, at 34.
Likewise, the majority—because it is applying a more for-
giving standard—can ignore a host of questions about how
far H. B. 1181 burdens protected expression. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 67–68. In the fine print of two footnotes, the ma-
jority declares that it has no need to explore (1) whether
H. B. 1181 requires covered websites to demand age verifi-
cation for all their content or only for the subset that is ob-
scene for minors; (2) whether H. B. 1181 requires that cov-
ered speech be obscene “only to a minor (including a
toddler)” or “to all minors (including 17-year-olds)”; and
(3) whether H. B. 1181 permits websites to use “newer bio-
metric methods of age verification, like face scans,” that
pose fewer privacy concerns than submitting government
ID and transactional data. Ante, at 17, n. 7 (emphasis in
original); ante, at 34, n. 14. The majority explains that even
if Texas answered each of those questions in a maximally
burdensome way—requiring government ID to view speech
that is protected even for children because one-third of the
website’s contents are obscene for two-year-olds—H. B.
 Cite as: 606 U. S. ____ (2025) 23

 KAGAN, J., dissenting

1181 can go forward. And again, that is true even if Texas
has a less burdensome way of “equally or more effective[ly]”
achieving its objective. Ante, at 34.
 I would demand Texas show more, to ensure it is not un-
dervaluing the interest in free expression. Texas can of
course take measures to prevent minors from viewing ob-
scene-for-children speech. But if a scheme other than H. B.
1181 can just as well accomplish that objective and better
protect adults’ First Amendment freedoms, then Texas
should have to adopt it (or at least demonstrate some good
reason not to). A State may not care much about safeguard-
ing adults’ access to sexually explicit speech; a State may
even prefer to curtail those materials for everyone. Many
reasonable people, after all, view the speech at issue here
as ugly and harmful for any audience. But the First
Amendment protects those sexually explicit materials, for
every adult. So a State cannot target that expression, as
Texas has here, any more than is necessary to prevent it
from reaching children. That is what we have held in cases
indistinguishable from this one. And that is what founda-
tional First Amendment principles demand. Because the
majority departs from that right and settled law, I respect-
fully dissent.