Opinion of the Court
Clarence Thomas
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v.
CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 23–1229. Argued March 25, 2025—Decided June 18, 2025
The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a comprehensive venue framework
for judicial review of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions
designed to ensure proper distribution of cases among federal courts.
Under 42 U. S. C. §7607 (b)(1), “nationally applicable” EPA actions
must be challenged exclusively in the D. C. Circuit, while “locally or
regionally applicable” actions ordinarily belong in regional Circuits.
However, locally or regionally applicable actions that are “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect” must be reviewed in the
D. C. Circuit if EPA finds and publishes that such basis exists. This
tripartite system reflects congressional intent to channel nationally
significant EPA actions to the D. C. Circuit while keeping most region-
ally focused matters in local Circuits.
Under the CAA’s renewable fuel program, most domestic refineries
must blend specified amounts of ethanol and other renewable fuels
into transportation fuels they produce. The Act provides a phased ex-
emption scheme for small refineries—those processing no more than
75,000 barrels of crude oil daily—allowing them to petition EPA for
exemptions based on “disproportionate economic hardship.”
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Following this Court’s decision in HollyFrontier
Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., 594 U. S. 382 ,
which clarified that small refineries could obtain exemption “exten-
sions” even after their original exemptions had lapsed, the D. C. Cir-
cuit remanded pending exemption cases to EPA for reconsideration.
EPA then proposed and ultimately denied 105 small refinery exemp-
tion petitions in two omnibus notices issued in April and July 2022.
EPA’s denials were based on two principal determinations: first, its
interpretation that “disproportionate economic hardship” covers only
2 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Syllabus
hardship directly caused by renewable fuel program compliance; and
second, its economic theory that Renewable Identification Number
(RIN) costs are fully passed through to consumers, creating a presump-
tion against granting exemptions. EPA applied these determinations
uniformly while conducting confirmatory reviews of individual refin-
ery circumstances. EPA asserted in its denial notices that the denials
were reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit, either as “nationally appli-
cable” actions or, alternatively, as locally applicable actions “based on
a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
Small refineries challenged these denials in multiple regional Cir-
cuits. Most Circuits either dismissed the challenges for improper
venue or transferred them to the D. C. Circuit. However, the Fifth
Circuit retained jurisdiction, rejecting EPA’s venue arguments and
ruling for the refineries on the merits. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
EPA’s actions were merely locally applicable because their “legal ef-
fect” was limited to the petitioning refineries, and that the actions were
not based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect because EPA
still examined refinery-specific facts before issuing denials.
Held: EPA’s denials of small refinery exemption petitions are locally or
regionally applicable actions that fall within the “nationwide scope or
effect” exception, requiring venue in the D. C. Circuit. Pp. 6–21.
(a) Section 7607(b)(1) creates a two-step inquiry for determining
venue. First, courts assess whether an EPA action is nationally appli-
cable or only locally or regionally applicable. If nationally applicable,
the case belongs in the D. C. Circuit. If locally or regionally applicable,
courts proceed to the second step to determine whether the “nation-
wide scope or effect” exception applies to override the default rule of
regional Circuit review. Pp. 6–13.
(1) To identify the relevant “action,” courts must look to the au-
thorizing CAA provision rather than how EPA packages its decisions.
The enumerated “actions” in §7607(b)(1) make clear that this provision
“treats each activity the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to take as a
distinct ‘action.’ ” Kentucky v. EPA, 123 F. 4th 447 , 460. Because the
CAA allows “[a] small refinery” to “petition [EPA] for an extension of
[its] exemption” and requires EPA to “act on any petition submitted,”
each EPA denial of a refinery’s exemption petition constitutes its own
“action” for venue purposes. Pp. 7–8.
(2) An action is “nationally applicable” if it applies “[o]n its face”
throughout the entire country, or only “locally or regionally applicable”
if it applies only to particular localities or regions. Sierra Club v. EPA,
926 F. 3d 844, 849 . EPA’s denial of a single refinery’s exemption peti-
tion applies only to that refinery, a particular entity in a particular
place, making such denials paradigmatically “locally or regionally ap-
plicable” actions. Pp. 8–10.
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3
Syllabus
(3) EPA’s argument that it can control the unit of “action” for
venue purposes by aggregating similar petitions into omnibus notices
lacks any statutory limiting principle and would effectively give EPA
veto power over venue. EPA’s position that any action affecting more
than one Circuit is nationally applicable would render actions with
plainly local or regional focus “nationally applicable” simply because
the locality or region straddles Circuit lines. Pp. 10–13.
(b) Because EPA’s actions are locally or regionally applicable, the
Court must determine whether the “nationwide scope or effect” excep-
tion applies. This exception requires that (1) the action “is based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect,” and (2) EPA “finds and
publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” All agree
the second requirement is satisfied. Pp. 13–21.
(1) A “determination” refers to EPA’s justifications in taking the
action. Determinations are of nationwide “scope” if they apply
throughout the country “as a legal matter (de jure)” and of nationwide
“effect” if they so apply “as a practical [matter] (de facto).” Kentucky,
123 F. 4th, at 465. An EPA action is “based on” a determination of
nationwide scope or effect only if that determination “lie[s] at the core
of the agency action” and forms the primary explanation for and driver
of EPA’s action. Texas v. EPA, 829 F. 3d 405, 419 . This requires more
than but-for causation; it requires that a justification of nationwide
breadth be the most important part of EPA’s reasoning. Courts should
evaluate this de novo. Pp. 13–17.
(2) Applying this framework, EPA’s exemption denials were based
on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. EPA’s interpretation
of “disproportionate economic hardship” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) and its
RIN passthrough theory are clear determinations of nationwide scope
or effect that apply generically to all refineries regardless of geographic
location. These determinations formed the core basis for EPA’s denials
because EPA used them to reach a presumptive resolution to deny all
petitions, then considered refinery-specific factors only to confirm it
had no reason to depart from this presumptive disposition. Where
EPA relies on determinations of nationwide scope or effect to reach a
presumptive resolution, those determinations qualify as the primary
driver of its decision. EPA’s confirmatory review of refinery-specific
facts is “[m]erely peripheral” by comparison. Texas, 829 F. 3d, at 419 .
Pp. 17–18.
(3) The Court rejects EPA’s argument that “determination” covers
only the resolution of unsettled issues, as well as respondents’ argu-
ment that “determination” is a term of art applicable only when a CAA
provision textually directs EPA to make a “determination” for the en-
tire Nation. The Court also rejects the argument that EPA’s consider-
ation of refinery-specific facts precludes the exception’s application,
4 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Syllabus
noting that the exception requires an action be “based on,” not “based
solely on,” a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Pp. 18–21.
86 F. 4th 1121 , vacated and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALITO, SO-
TOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. GOR-
SUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 23–1229
_________________
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
PETITIONER v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT
REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 18, 2025]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a tripartite system
for determining venue in CAA litigation. Challenges to “na-
tionally applicable” Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) actions belong in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
D. C. Circuit, while challenges to “locally or regionally ap-
plicable” EPA actions ordinarily belong in a regional Cir-
cuit. 42 U. S. C. §7607 (b)(1). But, the CAA makes an ex-
ception for local or regional actions that are “based on a
determination of nationwide scope or effect” and accompa-
nied by an EPA finding of this basis, which also must be
challenged in the D. C. Circuit. Ibid. Applying this frame-
work to EPA’s 2022 denials of certain small refineries’ ex-
emption petitions, we hold that the refineries’ challenges
belong in the D. C. Circuit. EPA’s denials are only locally
or regionally applicable, but they fall within the “nation-
wide scope or effect” exception.
I
A
Section 7607(b)(1)—the CAA’s venue provision—governs
2 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
where petitioners should file challenges to EPA actions un-
der that statute. As originally enacted, §7607(b)(1) dictated
venue only for an enumerated subset of EPA actions. Cer-
tain actions with a national reach, such as “any national
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard”
(NAAQS) were reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit.
§1857h–5(b)(1) (1970 ed.). Area-specific “implementation
plan[s]” went to “the appropriate” regional Circuit. Ibid.
Any other unmentioned actions could be heard only in dis-
trict courts through their general grant of federal-question
jurisdiction. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S.
578, 584 (1980); see 28 U. S. C. §1331 .
In 1977, Congress replaced this patchwork system with
the CAA’s current scheme, which makes all EPA actions di-
rectly reviewable in a federal court of appeals. 91 Stat. 776
(codified as amended at 42 U. S. C. §7607 (b)(1)). The
amended statute specifies that, in addition to NAAQS and
other enumerated actions, “any other nationally applicable
. . . final action taken” by EPA under the CAA may be re-
viewed only in the D. C. Circuit. §7607(b)(1). And, in addi-
tion to implementation plans, “any other final action of
[EPA] under this chapter . . . which is locally or regionally
applicable” ordinarily may be reviewed only in a regional
Circuit. Ibid. Congress has since amended the CAA to
specify additional kinds of actions that fall within these two
categories. 91 Stat. 1404 ; 104 Stat. 2681 .
Congress also created a third venue category in the 1977
amendments. This category provided an exception to the
default rule that locally or regionally applicable actions
should be reviewed in the regional Circuits. Congress in-
structed that a locally or regionally applicable action must
be reviewed in the D. C. Circuit “if [it] is based on a deter-
mination of nationwide scope or effect” and “if in taking
such action [EPA] finds and publishes that such action is
based on such a determination.” §7607(b)(1).
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3
Opinion of the Court
B
The EPA actions at issue in this case relate to the CAA’s
renewable fuel program (RFP). The RFP “requires most do-
mestic refineries to blend a certain amount of ethanol and
other renewable fuels into the transportation fuels they
produce.” HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC v. Renew-
able Fuels Assn., 594 U. S. 382 , 385 (2021). Each covered
refinery’s precise obligation turns on its proportional share
of various “nationwide volume mandates.” Id., at 385–386;
see §§7545(o)(2)(A)(i), (o)(3); 40 CFR §80.1407 (a) (2024).
Covered refineries demonstrate compliance through a
system of Renewable Identification Number credits (RINs).
See 40 CFR §§80.1425 , 80.1426(a). A refinery generates
RINs whenever it blends renewable fuels, §80.1426(a), and
refineries may also buy and sell RINs, 42 U. S. C.
§7545 (o)(5)(B). Thus, each year, a refinery may show com-
pliance “thanks to its own blending efforts, the purchase of
credits from someone else, or a combination of both.” Hol-
lyFrontier, 594 U. S., at 386.
The CAA contains a phased exemption scheme for small
refineries—i.e., refineries whose “average aggregate daily
crude oil throughput for a calendar year . . . does not exceed
75,000 barrels.” §7545(o)(1)(K). The scheme exempted all
small refineries from RFP compliance until 2011.
§7545(o)(9)(A)(i). It then required EPA to extend this blan-
ket exemption, for at least two years, for all small refineries
found by a Department of Energy study to face “dispropor-
tionate economic hardship” if subjected to the RFP’s obliga-
tions. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). Finally, the scheme allows a small
refinery to “at any time petition [EPA] for an extension of
[its] exemption . . . for the reason of disproportionate eco-
nomic hardship.” §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). We interpreted this last
provision in HollyFrontier, holding that a small refinery
may obtain an “extension” even after its original exemption
has lapsed. Id., at 396.
4 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
C
This case arose in the aftermath of HollyFrontier. Pend-
ing that decision, the D. C. Circuit had been holding in
abeyance challenges to EPA’s resolution of 36 small refin-
eries’ exemption petitions for the 2018 compliance year. Af-
terwards, that court granted EPA’s motion for remand
without vacatur, so that EPA could reconsider its orders in
light of the HollyFrontier litigation. Order in Sinclair Wy-
oming Refining Co. v. EPA, No. 19–1196 etc. (CADC, Dec.
8, 2021), p. 3. The D. C. Circuit instructed EPA to issue its
new decisions within 120 days. Ibid.
Shortly thereafter, EPA noticed for public comment a pro-
posal to deny all pending exemption petitions. 86 Fed. Reg.
71000 (2021). EPA’s notice set out two principles. First,
EPA offered its interpretation of “disproportionate eco-
nomic hardship,” the CAA’s threshold for an exemption pe-
tition to be granted. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). On EPA’s view, that
phrase covers only hardship that is caused by RFP compli-
ance. App. in No. 22–60266 etc. (CA5), pp. 545–548. Sec-
ond, EPA theorized that, as a matter of economics, small
refineries ordinarily do not suffer disproportionate eco-
nomic hardship as a result of the RFP because “RIN costs
are fully passed through to consumers.” Id., at 549; see id.,
at 548–584. Based on this “RIN passthrough” theory, EPA
proposed denying all pending petitions “by finding the peti-
tioning refineries do not face [disproportionate economic
hardship] caused by compliance with their [RFP] obliga-
tions.” 86 Fed. Reg. 71000 .
After receiving comments, EPA followed through and de-
nied the pending exemption petitions in two omnibus no-
tices. EPA issued the first in April 2022 to deny the 36 pe-
titions subject to the D. C. Circuit’s deadline. 87 Fed. Reg.
24300 . EPA issued the second in July 2022, to deny an ad-
ditional 69 petitions from the 2016 to 2021 compliance
years. Id., at 34874 . In both notices, EPA relied primarily
on the principles from its proposal—namely, its statutory
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 5
Opinion of the Court
interpretation of “disproportionate economic hardship” and
its RIN passthrough theory. App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a,
107a, 242a, 249a. EPA treated the passthrough theory as
creating a presumption against granting exemptions, and
it examined the petitioning refineries’ evidence regarding
their specific circumstances to confirm that none of the re-
fineries had rebutted this presumption. See id., at 107a–
108a, 163a–168a, 249a–250a, 305a–310a.
EPA also asserted in the denial notices that its denials
were reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit. According to
EPA, the notices were “ ‘nationally applicable’ ” actions un-
der §7607(b)(1). Id., at 187a, 328a. Alternatively, if the ac-
tions were only “locally or regionally applicable,” then EPA
invoked the exception for actions “based on a determination
of ‘nationwide scope or effect.’ ” Ibid. EPA included in both
notices a finding that its new statutory interpretation and
RIN passthrough theory supplied the relevant determina-
tions of nationwide scope or effect. Id., at 187a–188a, 329a.
Notwithstanding EPA’s position, small refineries chal-
lenged these denials in a host of regional Circuits. Agreeing
with EPA that the litigation belonged in the D. C. Circuit,
most of these Circuits either dismissed the petitions for im-
proper venue or transferred them to the D. C. Circuit.1
The Fifth Circuit took a different approach. Evaluating
the petitions filed by six small refineries (respondents
here), the Fifth Circuit held that the litigation was properly
before it. The majority rejected the arguments for transfer
raised by EPA and a group of intervenors, reasoning that
EPA’s notices were merely locally or regionally applicable
——————
1 See, e.g., Orders in American Rfg. Group, Inc. v. EPA, No. 22–1991
(CA3, Aug. 9, 2022), ECF Doc. 23; Countrymark Rfg. & Logistics, LLC v.
EPA, No. 22–1878 (CA7, July 20, 2022), ECF Doc. 13; Calumet Mont.
Rfg., LLC v. EPA, No. 22–70124 (CA9, Oct. 25, 2022), ECF Doc. 16; Wy-
oming Rfg. Co. v. EPA, No. 22–9538 (CA10, Aug. 23, 2022), ECF Doc. 26;
see also Hunt Rfg. Co. v. EPA, 90 F. 4th 1107 , 1113 (CA11 2024).
6 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
actions, because their “legal effect” was limited to the peti-
tioning refineries. 86 F. 4th 1121 , 1131–1132 (2023). And,
contra EPA, the notices were not based on any determina-
tion of nationwide scope or effect. Both EPA’s new inter-
pretation and its RIN passthrough theory “fail[ed] to pro-
vide the agency with a sufficient basis to adjudicate
exemption petitions,” because EPA still looked to refinery-
specific facts before it issued its denials. Id., at 1133 . Ac-
cordingly, the case properly belonged in the Fifth Circuit,
and the majority proceeded to rule against EPA on the mer-
its, vacating and remanding EPA’s denials for further con-
sideration. Id., at 1133, 1142 .
Judge Higginbotham dissented on venue grounds. In his
view, EPA’s denial notices were nationally applicable be-
cause they applied throughout the country: EPA applied a
consistent approach to small refineries spanning “eighteen
different states, in the geographical boundaries of eight dif-
ferent circuit courts.” Id., at 1143–1144. And, if the notices
were only locally or regionally applicable, then EPA was
correct to find that the “nationwide scope or effect” excep-
tion applied: EPA’s statutory interpretation and its
passthrough theory were “core determinations” that have
nationwide scope or effect in that they “are applicable to all
small refineries no matter the location or market in which
they operate.” Id., at 1145 . We granted certiorari to clarify
where venue properly lies. 604 U. S. ___ (2024).
II
Section 7607(b)(1) creates a two-step inquiry for deter-
mining venue. At the first step, we assess whether an EPA
action is nationally applicable, or only locally or regionally
applicable. If the action is nationally applicable, then our
inquiry ends: The case belongs in the D. C. Circuit. If the
action is locally or regionally applicable, then we proceed to
the second step. There, we ask whether the “nationwide
scope or effect” exception applies to override the default rule
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 7
Opinion of the Court
that locally or regionally applicable actions belong in the
regional Circuits. Turning to §7607(b)(1)’s first step, we
hold that the actions before us are only locally or regionally
applicable.
A
To properly categorize EPA’s actions at the first step, we
must determine what the relevant “action” is, and what it
means for an action to be “nationally applicable” as opposed
to “locally or regionally applicable.” Once those principles
are clarified, the categorization here is straightforward.
1
Because §7607(b)(1) pegs venue to the scope of the EPA
action being challenged, our threshold task is to identify the
“action” at issue. To do so, we must read “action” in its con-
text. That word means “a thing done.” Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 21 (1976) (Webster’s); see
also Black’s Law Dictionary 26 (5th ed. 1979) (Black’s)
(“something done”). But, we could define the “thing done”
by EPA in different ways. Both EPA’s denials of each indi-
vidual exemption petition and its aggregation of those de-
nials into omnibus notices are in a sense things done. The
former is an “activity the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to
take,” while the latter is how EPA has chosen to undertake
that activity. Kentucky v. EPA, 123 F. 4th 447 , 460 (CA6
2024).
To determine which framing matters for purposes of
§7607(b)(1), we look to the example “actions” this provision
enumerates. Section 7607(b)(1) lists various examples of
EPA actions that qualify as either “nationally applicable”
or “locally or regionally applicable.” For both these terms,
it then provides a catchall for “any other” “final action.”
And, we “interpret a ‘general or collective term’ . . . in light
of any ‘common attribute[s]’ shared by” statutory examples
of that term. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S.
8 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
450, 458 (2022).
The enumerated “actions” in §7607(b)(1) make clear that
this provision “treats each activity the Clean Air Act allows
the EPA to take as a distinct ‘action.’ ” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th,
at 460. These “actions” all refer to particular exercises of
EPA authority undertaken pursuant to particular CAA pro-
visions. For instance, the example of a NAAQS must be
understood by reference to §7409(a), which directs EPA to
issue a NAAQS “for each air pollutant,” and thus indicates
that each pollutant-specific standard is its own “action.”
Likewise, §7607(b)(1)’s example of EPA’s approval of an
“implementation plan under section 7410” must be read in
light of §7410, which makes clear that an implementation
plan is a proposal “submitted by a State,” and thus indi-
cates that EPA’s approval decision is state specific.
§7410(a)(2). In each case, the enumerated EPA “action” is
defined by reference to the substantive authority under
which EPA is acting. See id., at 461.
Accordingly, for both §7607(b)(1)’s enumerated examples
and “any other . . . final action taken” by EPA “under this
chapter,” we must look to the authorizing CAA provision to
identify the “action” at hand. This provision makes the
CAA’s framing of the relevant “action” controlling, regard-
less of how EPA chooses to package its decisions in the Fed-
eral Register.2
2
The next question is whether a given action is “nationally
applicable” or only “locally or regionally applicable.” Be-
cause §7607(b)(1) does not define those terms, we presump-
tively give those terms their ordinary meaning. Burrage v.
United States, 571 U. S. 204, 210 (2014). The word
“ ‘[n]ational’ contemplates an activity with a nationwide
——————
2 The Fifth Circuit therefore erred in summarily accepting EPA’s char-
acterization of its omnibus notices as the “two EPA actions” at issue in
this case. 86 F. 4th 1121 , 1129 (2023); see supra, at 5–6.
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 9
Opinion of the Court
scope,” while the words “local” and “regional” relate only to
particular “place[s]” or regions. See Black’s 845, 923. And,
the word “applicable” requires us to ask what the EPA ac-
tion in question “ ‘ha[s] reference to.’ ” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th,
at 459. Put another way, we ask whether the action “[o]n
its face” applies throughout the entire country, or only to
particular localities or regions. Sierra Club v. EPA, 926
F. 3d 844, 849 (CADC 2019).
The statutory context supplied by §7607(b)(1)’s enumer-
ated examples confirms the correctness of this ordinary-
meaning approach. The actions that §7607(b)(1) identifies
as “nationally applicable” facially apply nationwide. For ex-
ample, courts have identified a NAAQS—a “ ‘national pri-
mary or secondary ambient air quality standard’ ”—as
“[t]he textbook example of nationally applicable action.” Si-
erra Club v. EPA, 47 F. 4th 738 , 743 (CADC 2022). Con-
versely, the actions that the CAA enumerates as “locally or
regionally applicable” all have more particularized reach.
For instance, “the prototypical ‘locally or regionally appli-
cable’ action” is EPA’s approval of a state implementation
plan, which, as explained, is state specific. American Road
& Transp. Builders Assn. v. EPA, 705 F. 3d 453, 455 (CADC
2013) (majority opinion of Kavanaugh, J.); supra, at 8. Be-
cause catchall “clauses are to be read as bringing within a
statute categories similar in type to those specifically enu-
merated,” the examples make clear that the ordinary mean-
ing of the terms “nationally applicable” and “locally or re-
gionally applicable” controls. Federal Maritime Comm’n v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 734 (1973).3
——————
3 Because 42 U. S. C. §7607 (b)(1) requires all actions to be either na-
tionally applicable or locally or regionally applicable, difficult edge cases
may arise. For example, if an EPA action must “formally appl[y]” to “the
whole country” to be nationally applicable, Kentucky v. EPA, 123 F. 4th
447 , 460 (CA6 2024), then actions could apply to nearly the entire coun-
try yet still be locally or regionally applicable, see, e.g., §7545(i)(4). But,
if an action that formally applies to only a subset of the country can be
10 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
3
Applying these principles here, we treat each EPA denial
of a refinery’s exemption petition as its own “action” for
venue purposes. And, EPA’s denial of a single refinery’s pe-
tition plainly is only locally or regionally applicable.
This conclusion follows from how the CAA defines the
submission and evaluation of an RFP exemption petition.
The CAA allows “[a] small refinery” to “at any time petition
[EPA] for an extension of [its] exemption” from RFP obliga-
tions. §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). EPA, in turn, is to “evaluat[e] a
petition” and then “act on any petition submitted . . . not
later than 90 days after the date of receipt of the petition.”
§§7545(o)(9)(B)(ii)–(iii). Thus, the CAA pegs EPA’s “ac-
tions” under the exemption provision by reference to each
individual exemption petition.
Against this backdrop, our classification decision is
straightforward. By definition, EPA’s denial of a single re-
finery’s exemption petition only applies to that refinery,
which is a particular entity located in a particular place.
That limited reach makes EPA’s denials paradigmatically
“locally or regionally applicable” actions. See Sierra Club,
926 F. 3d, at 849 .
B
We are unpersuaded by EPA’s and the intervenors’ coun-
terarguments. EPA proffers its omnibus denial notices as
the relevant “actions” on the ground that it has the discre-
tion to structure its decisions. According to EPA, it is free
to “aggregate similar petitions for joint resolution” in a sin-
gle “action”—here, its omnibus Federal Register notices—
given its right as an agency “ ‘to fashion [its] own rules of
——————
nationally applicable, see ATK Launch Systems, Inc. v. EPA, 651 F. 3d
1194, 1197 (CA10 2011), then line-drawing questions may arise, Ken-
tucky, 123 F. 4th, at 460–462. This case, however, does not present these
issues.
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 11
Opinion of the Court
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of per-
mitting [it] to discharge [its] multitudinous duties.’ ” Brief
for Petitioner 26–27 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcast-
ing Co., 309 U. S. 134, 143 (1940)). But, whatever discre-
tion EPA has to manage its internal affairs, Congress con-
clusively defined the term “action” in §7607(b)(1) to focus on
the specific statutory authority EPA is exercising.
Tellingly, EPA’s position that it can control the unit of
“action” used to determine venue lacks any statutory limit-
ing principle. If EPA had free rein to group decisions into a
single “action” for venue purposes, then it could bundle even
unrelated matters into one Federal Register pronounce-
ment that is, in the aggregate, nationally applicable. Such
a possibility would effectively give EPA a veto power over
venue under the CAA. We see no reason to read §7607(b)(1)
to permit such gamesmanship. Absent indication that Con-
gress meant to give a party unfettered control over venue,
we will not read a venue provision to confer such broad dis-
cretion. Cf. Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129 , 133–134
(1993) (disfavoring a reading that would “give a prosecutor
unreviewable discretion” as to a sentencing enhancement’s
applicability).
Because EPA does not dispute that the actions here can
be nationally applicable only if it is right that the omnibus
denial notices are the relevant “actions,” we need not re-
solve EPA’s remaining arguments. At a minimum, how-
ever, we note that EPA’s theory for distinguishing between
nationally applicable and locally or regionally applicable ac-
tions cannot withstand scrutiny. EPA argues that any
agency action is nationally applicable if it affects more than
one Circuit. But, as we have recognized, the term “nation-
ally applicable” bears its ordinary meaning, supra, at 8–9,
and EPA’s view would render actions with a plainly local or
regional focus “nationally applicable” simply because the lo-
cality or region at issue straddles Circuit lines. For exam-
12 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
ple, some EPA air quality control regions cover metropoli-
tan areas that extend into two Circuits. It would defy cre-
dulity to say that an EPA action regarding such a region
would therefore be nationally applicable rather than locally
or regionally applicable. Cf. Brief for Small Refinery Re-
spondents 41 (“Can there be any doubt that an EPA disap-
proval of a regional implementation plan for only Region 90
(Metropolitan Kansas City) is a ‘regionally applicable’ ac-
tion . . . , even though that action touches both the Eighth
and Tenth Circuits?”). Whatever the precise line should be,
see n. 3, supra, EPA’s line cannot be it.
EPA justifies its position based on §7607(b)(1)’s language
equating regional Circuit review with review in “the appro-
priate circuit.” §7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). To be review-
able only in a single “appropriate circuit,” EPA contends,
the category of “locally or regionally applicable” actions
must be limited to those actions affecting only one Circuit.
But, in the absence of other evidence, §7607(b)(1)’s use of
the definite article “the” is too thin a reed to support EPA’s
conclusion. See 1 U. S. C. §1 (directing that “words import-
ing the singular include and apply to several persons, par-
ties, or things” “unless the context indicates otherwise”).
Finally, we find no merit in the intervenors’ arguments
for why the denial of an individual refinery’s exemption pe-
tition should still be considered nationally applicable. Ac-
cording to the intervenors, the individual denials are na-
tionally applicable because they have follow-on effects for
the amount of renewable fuel that must be produced under
the RFP and because EPA in issuing the denials announced
a new standard for adjudicating exemption petitions. But,
again, we determine an action’s range of applicability by
“look[ing] only to the face of the [action], rather than to its
practical effects.” American Road & Transp. Builders
Assn., 705 F. 3d, at 456 . Any follow-on implications of
EPA’s denials have no bearing on our analysis of their facial
applicability. Cf. Sierra Club, 47 F. 4th, at 744 (“ The fact
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 13
Opinion of the Court
that ‘EPA’s interpretive reasoning’ may have ‘precedential
effect in future EPA proceedings . . . does not make [an ac-
tion] nationally applicable’ ”).
III
Because we conclude that EPA’s actions were only locally
or regionally applicable, we must proceed to the second step
of the §7607(b)(1) inquiry. That is, we ask whether the “na-
tionwide scope or effect” exception applies to override the
default of regional Circuit review for locally or regionally
applicable actions. This exception channels an action to the
D. C. Circuit if (1) it “is based on a determination of nation-
wide scope or effect,” and (2) “in taking such action [EPA]
finds and publishes that such action is based on such a de-
termination.” §7607(b)(1). Here, all agree that the second
requirement is satisfied: EPA included the necessary find-
ing in both its April and June denial notices. Supra, at 5.
Accordingly, the question before us is whether EPA’s ex-
emption denials were “based on a determination of nation-
wide scope or effect.” We conclude that they were.
A
Here too, we begin by laying out the framework for decid-
ing whether an action is “based on a determination of na-
tionwide scope or effect.” We conclude that this require-
ment is met if such a determination supplies a core
justification for EPA’s action and that courts should evalu-
ate the basis for EPA’s determinations de novo. Applying
that framework, we hold that this case is one in which the
“nationwide scope or effect” exception applies.
1
To understand the phrase “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect,” we again turn to ordinary
meaning. Burrage, 571 U. S., at 210 . In particular, we look
to the plain meaning of this phrase’s component words,
which are all terms of everyday usage. And, we read these
14 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
words “in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of
Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989).
To begin, a “determination” is the “settling and ending of
a controversy,” or “the resolving of a question by argument
or reasoning.” Webster’s 616; see also 4 Oxford English Dic-
tionary 548 (2d ed. 1989) (“[t]he decision arrived at or prom-
ulgated; a determinate sentence, conclusion, or opinion”).
In an EPA action, EPA’s underlying “determinations are
the justifications [it] gives for the action,” which “can be
found in [its] explanation of its action.” Texas v. EPA, 829
F. 3d 405, 419 (CA5 2016).
In turn, a determination’s “scope” and “effect” refer, re-
spectively, to its “formal ‘area’ of operation” and to its “ ‘op-
erative influence.’ ” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th, at 465; see, e.g.,
American Heritage Dictionary 1164 (1969) (defining “scope”
as the “area covered by a given activity or subject”); Web-
ster’s 724 (defining “effect” as “something that is produced
by an agent or cause”). An agency’s determinations are of
“nationwide” scope or effect if they apply “throughout [the]
entire nation.” Id., at 1505. Taken together, an agency ac-
tion involves determinations of nationwide “scope” if they
apply throughout the country “as a legal matter (de jure)”
and determinations of nationwide “effect” if they so apply
“as a practical one (de facto).” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th, at 465.
Of course, nearly all agency actions can be said to involve
justifications of nationwide reach or consequence. For ex-
ample, most EPA actions presumably rely on EPA’s inter-
pretations of its governing statutes.
The key question, then, is the degree of causality con-
tained in the phrase “based on.” And, the meaning of that
phrase is context dependent. In many cases, it “indicates a
but-for causal relationship.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.
Burr, 551 U. S. 47, 63 (2007). But-for causation is a com-
paratively lenient standard, which is met so long as a result
“would not have occurred in the absence of—that is, but
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 15
Opinion of the Court
for—[a party’s] conduct.” Burrage, 571 U. S., at 211 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). In other cases, however,
more is needed. Congress sometimes uses phrases such as
“based on” to cover only “core” causes amounting to an ac-
tion’s “sine qua non” or “ ‘gravamen.’ ” See, e.g., Fry v. Na-
poleon Community Schools, 580 U. S. 154 , 167, 169 (2017);
OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. 27 , 35 (2015).
Section 7607(b)(1) incorporates the more demanding,
“core” understanding of “based on.” This constraint follows
from the function of the “nationwide scope or effect” excep-
tion as just that—an exception. Congress, after all, is un-
likely to intend for an exception to swallow the rule. See
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
605 U. S. ___ , ___ (2025) (slip op., at 15). Thus, in this con-
text, but-for causation is inadequate: In almost any case, a
determination of nationwide scope or effect will be at least
a but-for cause of EPA’s action, given that any EPA action
is downstream of EPA’s conclusions as to what its govern-
ing statutes permit or require. But, Congress made re-
gional Circuit review the default for locally or regionally ap-
plicable actions, so we must read the “nationwide scope or
effect” exception in a way that preserves regional Circuit
review as the norm.
It follows that an EPA action is “based on” a particular
determination only if that determination “lie[s] at the core
of the agency action,” so as to form the most important part
of the agency’s reasoning. Texas, 829 F. 3d, at 419 . Put
more concretely, an EPA action is based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect only if a justification of nation-
wide breadth is the primary explanation for and driver of
EPA’s action. A determination of nationwide scope or effect
does not rise to this level if EPA also relied in significant
part on other, “intensely factual” considerations, or if the
key driver of EPA’s action is otherwise debatable. Id., at
421 ; see also id., at 419 (“ The default presumption is that
16 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
petitions for review of locally or regionally applicable ac-
tions ‘may only be filed in the United States Court of Appeal
for the appropriate circuit’ ”).
2
In deciding whether a particular EPA action is “based on
a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” courts
should assess EPA’s reasoning de novo. This standard fol-
lows from the structure of the “nationwide scope or effect”
exception: The exception applies only “if ” a locally or re-
gionally applicable action is based on a determination of na-
tionwide scope or effect “and if ” EPA, in taking the action,
finds and publishes that the action has this basis.
§7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). In other words, the CAA re-
quires both that EPA deem its action to have a qualifying
basis and that the action in fact have this basis. This dual
formulation does not naturally suggest that courts should
simply give EPA’s finding deference. Cf. Regalado Cuellar
v. United States, 553 U. S. 550, 565 (2008) (finding it “im-
plausible” to infer that Congress intended a particular
meaning, where it used a “more complex formulation”).
The upshot is that courts must “make an independent as-
sessment of the scope of [EPA’s] determinations.” Texas,
829 F. 3d, at 421 . That is, they should parse the reasoning
offered by EPA in taking an action to decide which determi-
nations primarily drove the action. Courts routinely ana-
lyze filings to identify their substance, and the language of
the “nationwide scope or effect” exception directs them to do
the same here.
In so holding, we do not downplay the importance of
EPA’s role. Because the “nationwide scope or effect” excep-
tion can apply only when “EPA so finds and publishes” that
it does, EPA can decide whether the exception is even po-
tentially relevant. Sierra Club, 47 F. 4th, at 746. And,
where EPA does invoke the exception, its explanation for
doing so will at a minimum focus the courts’ assessment of
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 17
Opinion of the Court
the possible determinations of nationwide scope or effect.4
Thus, EPA’s choices will matter, even as courts must assess
the bases for EPA’s actions themselves.
3
Applying this framework, we conclude that EPA’s denials
of the small refineries’ exemption petitions were based on
determinations of nationwide scope or effect. We agree with
EPA’s finding—published in both its April and June denial
notices—that its interpretation of the phrase “dispropor-
tionate economic hardship” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) and its
RIN passthrough theory were determinations of nationwide
scope or effect that formed the core basis for EPA’s denials.
Supra, at 5.
Both conclusions are clear determinations of nationwide
scope or effect: EPA invoked both its statutory interpreta-
tion and its passthrough theory in justifying its denials, and
both points apply generically to all refineries, regardless of
their geographic location. After all, the CAA is a federal
statute, and §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) by its terms applies nation-
wide. Likewise, EPA’s RIN passthrough theory is a finding
about how the national refinery market works. See supra,
at 4–5.
These conclusions also can be deemed the “basis” for
EPA’s denials here. EPA decided, in light of the foregoing
determinations, that it would presumptively deny all the
——————
4 This case does not present the question whether, given principles of
issue preservation, courts can forgo consideration of determinations that
EPA has not itself identified as the basis for its action. Cf. SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 88 (1943) (confining review of agency action
“to a judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which the [agency]
itself based its action”). But, we expect this issue to be outcome disposi-
tive only in rare cases. As a practical matter, an action is unlikely to be
based on a particular determination where EPA has failed, in promul-
gating the action, to identify that determination as the relevant determi-
nation of nationwide scope or effect.
18 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
exemption petitions before it. Supra, at 4–5. It then con-
sidered other, refinery-specific considerations only to con-
firm that it had no reason to depart from its presumptive
disposition. Supra, at 5. In this posture, EPA’s statutory
interpretation and passthrough theory plainly are the most
important parts of its reasoning. Or, put another way,
where EPA relies on determinations of nationwide scope or
effect to reach a presumptive resolution, those determina-
tions qualify as the primary driver of its decision. EPA’s
confirmatory review of refinery-specific facts is “[m]erely
peripheral” by comparison. Texas, 829 F. 3d, at 419 .
Accordingly, we agree with EPA that the “nationwide
scope or effect” exception applies here. The Fifth Circuit
should have transferred this case.
B
We are unpersuaded by the counterarguments raised by
EPA, respondents, the Fifth Circuit, and the dissent.
Although we agree with EPA’s bottom-line position that
the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies, we reject
its roundabout approach to the word “determination.” EPA
argues that “[t]he word ‘determination’ ” in §7607(b)(1)
“suggests a resolution of an unsettled issue,” such that EPA
does not make “determinations” when it “applies a previ-
ously established agency rule, policy, or interpretation to
new . . . circumstances.” Brief for Petitioner 41. We agree
with EPA that a “determination” here means the “ ‘settling
and ending of a controversy,’ ” ibid.; supra, at 14, but noth-
ing in that term or its use in §7607(b)(1) suggests that only
novel conclusions count. Rather, given §7607(b)(1)’s focus
on the face of the agency action, “determination” is most
naturally read to cover any EPA conclusion within the four
corners of an action.
Moreover, we do not see how EPA’s proposed approach
can be squared with its requested disposition. If a “deter-
mination” covers only the resolution of an unsettled issue,
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 19
Opinion of the Court
it is not obvious why EPA’s June denials contain any deter-
minations: EPA’s June notice purported to “appl[y] the ap-
proach . . . adopted in the April” notice. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 80a. EPA attempts to avoid this difficulty by propos-
ing a holistic assessment of novelty that considers factors
such as “whether EPA announced the rule or policy at
roughly the same time as the challenged agency action it-
self.” Brief for Petitioner 41. But, we do not see how this
amorphous test follows even from EPA’s view.5
Respondents argue that the word “determination” in
§7607(b)(1) is a term of art, wherein an agency action can
trigger the “nationwide scope or effect” exception only if it
is undertaken based on a CAA provision that “textually di-
rect[s] EPA to make a ‘determination’ for the entire nation.”
Brief for Small Refinery Respondents 32 (emphasis de-
leted). But, “determination” is “hardly a rarely used word,”
and nothing in the CAA’s context suggests that Congress
meant for its use in §7607(b)(1) to reach only CAA provi-
sions that happen to use some variant of that word.
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. 223, 235 (2011). Such
a limitation would at best lead to arbitrary outcomes, as
Congress did not act in a standardized way when using “de-
termination” as opposed to other words. Compare
§7410(k)(3) (not speaking in terms of “determinations”)
with §7410(k)(6) (requiring a “determination” when EPA
“[c]orrect[s]” its actions under §7410(k)(3)). At worst, re-
spondents’ approach would render the “nationwide scope or
effect” exception meaningless: Respondents have conceded
that their term-of-art view may render the exception “a null
set, or close to a null set.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 103–104. But,
Congress would not have gone to the trouble of creating a
——————
5 EPA also contends that §7607(b)(1)’s “based on” language speaks in
terms of but-for causation and that courts should assess the basis for
EPA’s actions deferentially, through arbitrary-and-capricious review.
For the reasons already explained, we reject those contentions. Supra,
at 14–16.
20 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
Opinion of the Court
superfluous exception, so we will not “force [a] term-of-art
definitio[n]” where it “plainly do[es] not fit.” Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 282 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The dissent would similarly limit the “nationwide scope
or effect” exception to reach only statutorily enumerated de-
terminations, but its arguments fare no better. The dissent
highlights that various CAA substantive provisions require
EPA to make particular “determinations” before taking an
action. Post, at 3–6, 10 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). But, it
does not follow that Congress meant to encompass only
statutorily enumerated determinations when it spoke gen-
erally in the exception of actions “based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect.” §7607(b)(1) (emphasis
added). And, although some statutes “ ‘distinguis[h] be-
tween “considerations” that inform [a] “determination,” and
the “determination” itself,’ ” post, at 10 (quoting Commis-
sioner v. Zuch, 605 U. S. ___ , ____ (2025) (slip op., at 6); al-
terations in original), statutes like the one in Zuch use “de-
termination” to refer to an agency’s ultimate decision, see
id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–6). In asking whether a deter-
mination supplies the basis for an EPA action, §7607(b)(1)
uses the term in a different sense. Likewise, the dissent’s
concern that our test could be difficult for “lower courts and
lawyers to apply” is not a problem of our creation. Post, at
11. Insofar as the reticulated venue framework that Con-
gress enacted creates difficulty for courts or litigants, “it is
a problem for Congress, not one that federal courts can fix.”
Lewis v. Chicago, 560 U. S. 205, 217 (2010).
Finally, we are unpersuaded by respondents’ argument,
accepted by the Fifth Circuit, that the “nationwide scope or
effect” exception is inapplicable in light of EPA’s considera-
tion of refinery-specific facts. That exception requires that
an EPA action be “based on” a determination of nationwide
scope or effect, in contrast to another part of §7607(b)(1)
where Congress used the phrase “based solely on.” Accord-
ingly, EPA’s consideration of local facts does not preclude
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 21
Opinion of the Court
its invocation of the exception, either generally or here. So
long as a determination of nationwide scope or effect served
as the primary driver of EPA’s action, other, more “periph-
eral” determinations “are not relevant” for venue purposes.
Texas, 829 F. 3d, at 419 .
* * *
We agree with the Fifth Circuit that EPA’s actions here
are only locally or regionally applicable, although we clarify
that the relevant actions are EPA’s individual denials of the
small refineries’ exemption petitions. But, under a proper
understanding of §7607(b)(1), the “nationwide scope or ef-
fect” exception applies, and the case belongs in the D. C.
Circuit. The Fifth Circuit therefore erred in denying EPA’s
request to transfer. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 1
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 23–1229
_________________
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
PETITIONER v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT
REFINING, L.L.C., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June 18, 2025]
JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.
Though I would reach a different judgment, the Court
and I travel much of the way together. This case involves
six small refineries. Each petitioned the Environmental
Protection Agency for a hardship exemption from the Clean
Air Act’s renewable fuel mandates. The agency denied all
six refineries’ petitions. The question we face does not con-
cern the merits of what EPA did, only where the small re-
fineries’ lawsuit challenging the agency’s actions should be
heard. The Act instructs that litigation over “nationally ap-
plicable” EPA “actions” belongs in the D. C. Circuit, while
disputes over “locally or regionally applicable” agency “ac-
tions” generally belong in a regional circuit. 42 U. S. C.
§7607 (b)(1). In Parts I and II of its opinion, the Court con-
cludes that these rules presumptively route the dispute be-
fore us to a regional circuit because EPA’s decision to deny
an individual refinery’s petition for a hardship exemption
is a “locally or regionally applicable” action. With all that,
I agree.
But then, in Part III of its opinion, the Court pivots. Even
when a case challenges only a “locally or regionally applica-
ble” action, the Court observes, the Act routes it to the D. C.
2 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
Circuit if EPA’s action “is based on a determination of na-
tionwide scope or effect.” Applying a new multistep test it
announces, the Court concludes that EPA’s actions at issue
here were based on such a determination. As a result, the
Court holds, the right venue for this case turns out to be the
D. C. Circuit after all.
In my view, that pivot is a mistake. The Clean Air Act’s
venue provision works in harmony with its substantive pro-
visions. Throughout, those substantive provisions direct
EPA to make certain “determinations” before it may take
certain “actions.” When it comes to acting on a small refin-
ery’s hardship petition, nothing in the Act’s substantive
provisions calls on EPA to make a “determination of nation-
wide scope or effect.” Instead, the Act requires the agency
to evaluate only whether a particular small refinery seek-
ing an exemption would suffer a hardship without one. Ac-
cordingly, the Act’s venue provision routes this dispute to a
regional circuit, just as the Fifth Circuit recognized below.
The Court’s new and reticulated test for assessing venue
disputes under the Act strikes me as both mistaken and
likely to render simple venue questions unnecessarily diffi-
cult and expensive to resolve.
I
Start with how I would analyze this case. The Clean Air
Act’s venue provision, found in 42 U. S. C. §7607 (b)(1), sup-
plies three basic rules. First, challenges to “nationally ap-
plicable” agency “action[s]” must be brought in the D. C.
Circuit. Second, challenges to “locally or regionally” appli-
cable agency “action[s]” must be filed in the appropriate re-
gional circuit. Third, as an exception to the second rule,
challenges to locally or regionally applicable agency actions
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
belong in the D. C. Circuit if they are “based on a determi-
nation of nationwide scope or effect.”1 The central question
this case poses concerns the relationship between the sec-
ond and third rules: When is a locally or regionally appli-
cable “action” under the Clean Air Act “based on a determi-
nation of nationwide scope or effect”?
As I see it, the Act itself supplies the answer. Working in
concert with the Act’s venue provision, the Act’s substantive
provisions tell us what kinds of “actions” the agency is law-
fully authorized to take and when those actions may be
based on “determinations of nationwide scope or effect.”
Here, the relevant substantive provisions permit EPA to
take a specific “action”—namely, the granting or denying of
a small refinery’s hardship petition. But, by their terms,
those provisions do not call for a nationwide “determina-
tion” when the agency acts. Instead, the only decisions EPA
must make are refinery-specific ones. Accordingly, the dis-
pute before us belongs in an appropriate regional circuit.
A
To appreciate how the Act’s substantive and venue provi-
sions interact, begin with a look at the substantive provi-
sions addressing the renewable fuel standards that lie at
the heart of this case.
As a rule, §7545(o)(2) requires the Nation’s fuel supply to
include ethanol or other renewable fuels in fixed amounts
that increase over time. See HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refin-
ing, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., 594 U. S. 382 , 385–386
(2021). But the Act also permits EPA to take various ac-
tions inconsistent with that general rule if it makes certain
determinations. So, for example, §7545(o)(7)(A)(i) allows
EPA to waive some renewable fuel mandates “based on a
——————
1 To implicate this exception, EPA must also certify its belief that its
action “is based on . . . a determination” of nationwide scope or effect.
§7607(b)(1). But that requirement is irrelevant in this case because all
agree that EPA satisfied it, so I will not address it further. Ante, at 13.
4 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
determination” that enforcing them “would severely harm
the economy or environment of a State, a region, or the
United States.” Similarly, EPA may waive renewable fuel
requirements “based on a determination . . . that there is an
inadequate domestic [fuel] supply.” §7545(o)(7)(A)(ii). Sim-
ilarly again, §§7545(b)(4)(C)(ii) and (iii) permit EPA to
waive other standards if it “determines that . . . extreme
and unusual . . . circumstances exist in a State or region.”
Beyond those examples, §7545 discusses various other ac-
tions the agency may take after making various other de-
terminations. (In all, §7545 uses the word “determination”
or one of its cognates more than 70 times.)
Now apply these observations about §7545’s substantive
provisions to the Act’s venue provision. If, for example,
EPA waives a renewable fuel standard for a single State
under §7545(o)(7)(A)(i) “based on a determination” that
“implement[ing]” those standards “would severely harm the
economy . . . of a State,” §7607(b)(1) would route disputes
over that action to the appropriate regional circuit. After
all, a determination about the economy of a particular State
is hardly one of “nationwide scope or effect.” §7607(b)(1).
On the other hand, if EPA issues such a waiver based on a
“determination” that implementing the renewable fuel
standard in question “would severely harm the economy [of]
the United States,” §7607(b)(1) would channel any litiga-
tion over that action to the D. C. Circuit.
The substantive provisions at issue in today’s companion
case illustrate the same point. That litigation revolves
around federal air quality standards and the State Imple-
mentation Plans (SIPs) States must prepare to meet them.
See Oklahoma v. EPA, 605 U. S. ___ , ___–___ (2025) (slip
op., at 2–3). Section 7410 sets forth the general rules about
what SIPs must contain and how EPA must go about as-
sessing them. But that section also authorizes EPA to take
certain actions inconsistent with those rules after making
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 5
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
certain determinations. (For its part, §7410 uses “determi-
nation” or one of its cognates more than 20 times.) So, for
example, §7410(b) permits EPA to “extend the period for
[the] submission of any” SIP for up to 18 months “wherever
[the EPA Administrator] determines necessary.” And
§7410(g) allows EPA to “disapprov[e]” a Governor’s decision
to suspend a SIP component if the agency “determines” that
his decision “does not meet” certain statutory criteria (in-
cluding whether the suspension is necessary “to prevent
substantial increases in unemployment”).
Now consider where the Act’s venue provision sends dis-
putes about EPA actions under these substantive provi-
sions. Suppose EPA determines that it is “necessary” to ex-
tend the submission deadline for SIPs across the country,
and the agency acts accordingly pursuant to §7410(b). In
those circumstances, an argument might be made that
§7607(b)(1) routes disputes about that action to the D. C.
Circuit. Cf. Kentucky v. EPA, 123 F. 4th 447 , 466 (CA6
2024). But if EPA acts pursuant to §7410(g) to counter-
mand a Governor’s decision to suspend a SIP component
based on a determination that his decision defies the Act’s
terms, §7607(b)(1) would likely send any dispute over that
action to a regional circuit.
B
With that much in hand, return to the question whether
the Act’s venue provision directs this lawsuit to a regional
circuit or the D. C. Circuit.
As we have seen, §7545 lays out the Act’s substantive re-
newable fuel standards and generally requires refineries to
mix a certain (and regularly increasing) amount of renewa-
ble fuels into the transportation fuel they produce. See Part
I–A, supra; HollyFrontier, 594 U. S., at 385–386. But §7545
also allows EPA to exempt small refineries from these man-
dates “for the reason of disproportionate economic hard-
ship.” §7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Seeking to take advantage of this
6 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
provision, the six small refineries before us individually pe-
titioned EPA for hardship exemptions. See 86 F. 4th 1121 ,
1129–1130 (CA5 2023). In the end, the agency denied each
refinery’s request. App. to Pet. for Cert. 251a–252a; id., at
305a–310a. Now, the small refineries seek to challenge
EPA’s actions in court. That challenge belongs in a regional
circuit because nothing in the Act’s relevant substantive
provisions calls for EPA to act on a determination of nation-
wide scope or effect.
Just walk through the substantive provisions addressing
small refineries one by one. To account for the fact that
small refineries may have more difficulty meeting evolving
renewable fuel mandates than their larger rivals, Congress
in 2005 granted them a blanket exemption until 2011. See
§7545(o)(9)(A); HollyFrontier, 594 U. S., at 386–387. After
that, Congress directed EPA to extend a small refinery’s ex-
emption “for a period of not less than 2 additional years” if
the “Secretary of Energy determines” that the refinery in
question “would be subject to a disproportionate economic
hardship if required to comply” with the Act’s renewable
fuel mandates. §7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). Even beyond that,
Congress permitted a small refinery to petition “at any
time” for “an extension” of its “exemption . . . for the reason
of disproportionate economic hardship.” §7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
When it comes to deciding whether to grant or deny such a
petition, the Act directs EPA to “consul[t] with the Secre-
tary of Energy,” consider his “determin[ation]” whether “a”
particular “small refinery” would suffer “disproportionate
economic hardship if required to comply,” and consider
“other economic factors.” §§7545(o)(9)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). No-
where does the Act call for a determination of nationwide
scope or effect. To the contrary, after the blanket exemption
for small refineries expired in 2011, all agency actions and
determinations became refinery-specific ones.
Any doubt on that score is resolved by comparing these
substantive provisions with others we have encountered.
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 7
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
Section 7545(o)(7)(A), remember, allows EPA to waive cer-
tain renewable fuel standards “based on a determination
. . . that implementation of the requirement would severely
harm the economy or environment of . . . the United
States,” or “based on a determination . . . that there is an
inadequate domestic [fuel] supply.” As that provision illus-
trates, when it wished to do so, Congress knew how to say
that EPA may take a certain action based on a determina-
tion of nationwide scope or effect. That we have nothing
like that here is a telling sign that the small-refinery provi-
sions work differently and do not task EPA with taking any
nationally applicable action or making any determination
of nationwide scope or effect. See Feliciano v. Department
of Transportation, 605 U. S. ___ , ___ (2025) (slip op., at 6).
EPA’s own statements convey the same message. The
agency represents that it “ ‘consider[s] each petition on the
merits’ ” and examines “ ‘individual refinery information’ ”
when passing on individual hardship petitions. 86 F. 4th,
at 1133. EPA represents, too, that it “determined that none
of the petitioning small refineries” merited a hardship ex-
emption only after completing “a thorough evaluation of the
data and information provided” by each small refinery.
Brief for Petitioner 10; App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a–95a.
To be sure, EPA also highlights two features of its admin-
istrative proceedings that, it says, prove the agency took a
“nationally applicable action,” or at least made a “determi-
nation of nationwide scope or effect.” For one, EPA empha-
sizes that it bundled the petitions from the six small refin-
eries before us together with a host of other similar
petitions and dispatched them all in a pair of administra-
tive decisions. See Brief for Petitioner 28; 86 F. 4th, at
1129–1130. For another, the agency stresses that, in eval-
uating each refinery’s petition, it relied on a single interpre-
tation of the statutory phrase “ ‘disproportionate economic
hardship’ ” and a single economic model (the agency’s “RIN
passthrough theory”). Ante, at 5.
8 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
The Court correctly holds that none of this transforms
EPA’s challenged actions into “nationally applicable” ac-
tions. Ante, at 10. Yes, the agency may choose to bundle
petitions together for administrative convenience. And,
yes, the agency may apply similar reasoning when faced
with similar petitions. But, as the Court recognizes, the
only “action” the Act’s substantive provisions call on EPA to
take is to grant or deny an individual hardship petition—
and that is a locally applicable action, not a national one.
Ibid.
As I see it, this same insight defeats EPA’s suggestion
that its actions were “based on a determination of nation-
wide scope or effect.” §7607(b)(1). As a matter of adminis-
trative convenience, the agency may choose to address a
number of petitions collectively rather than separately.
And the agency of course may (and, to avoid acting arbitrar-
ily and capriciously, generally must) apply consistent rea-
soning to like petitions. But the Act’s venue provision does
not route cases to one circuit or another based on how EPA
packages them or the quality or nature of its reasoning. In-
stead, the Act’s venue provision asks whether the agency
based its action on a determination of nationwide scope or
effect. And, as the Act’s substantive provisions make clear,
EPA does no such thing when it passes on an individual
small refinery’s hardship petition.
II
Turn now to how the Court resolves this case. As we have
seen, the Court first holds that EPA’s decision whether to
grant or deny an individual small refinery’s hardship peti-
tion is a locally or regionally applicable “action.” See Part
II, ante. Accordingly, the Court starts with the (correct)
presumption that the suit before us belongs in a regional
circuit. Ibid. But then, the Court reverses course. While
EPA’s challenged actions are local or regional ones, the
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 9
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
Court concludes, this case belongs in the D. C. Circuit be-
cause the agency’s actions were “based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect.” See Part III, ante. That por-
tion of the Court’s opinion strikes me as both mistaken and
likely to cause confusion about where Clean Air Act dis-
putes should be heard.
To understand why, consider how the Court proceeds.
Pursuing what it calls an “ordinary-meaning” approach, the
Court observes that the word “determination” often refers
to the “ ‘settling and ending of a controversy.’ ” Ante, at 14
(quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 616
(1976)). Extrapolating from that dictionary definition, the
Court reasons that “any EPA conclusion within the four cor-
ners of an action” qualifies as a “determination.” Ante, at
18 (emphasis added).
But, the Court continues, whether an action is “ ‘based
on’ ” a conclusion of nationwide scope or effect depends on a
“degree of causality.” Ante, at 14. Nor will just any degree
of causality do. Proving that some nationwide conclusion
(or now, the Court adds, “justification” or “reasoning”) is the
“but-for” cause of the agency’s action will not suffice. Ante,
at 14–15. Instead, EPA must establish that some nation-
wide conclusion (or justification or reasoning) qualifies as
the “gravamen” or “core” or “driver” of its action. Ante, at
15 (internal quotation marks omitted). And when EPA’s
actions rely “in significant part on . . . ‘intensely factual’
considerations” or when “the key driver of EPA’s action is
otherwise debatable,” that standard will not be satisfied.
Ibid.
Applying all those ideas to this case, the Court holds that
all of EPA’s challenged actions were based on a determina-
tion of nationwide scope or effect. That is so, the Court says,
because EPA’s actions (its decisions to deny the small refin-
eries’ petitions) rested at their “core” on a common (or “na-
tionwide”) understanding of the statutory phrase “ ‘dispro-
portionate economic hardship’ ” and a common (or
10 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
“nationwide”) economic model. Ante, at 17 (quoting
§7545(o)(9)(B)(i)). To be sure, the Court acknowledges, the
agency also undertook a “review of refinery-specific facts.”
Ante, at 18. But on the Court’s account, those “refinery-
specific facts” mattered less to the outcomes here than
EPA’s statutory interpretation and its economic model.
Ibid.
I find that chain of reasoning unpersuasive for a few rea-
sons. For one thing, it seems to me pretty far afield from
the statutory text. As we have seen, the Clean Air Act’s
venue provision speaks of actions and determinations, and
the Act’s substantive provisions do too. And when a sub-
stantive provision calls for either a nationally applicable
“action” or a “determination” of nationwide scope or effect,
it says so. To decide where a case belongs, then, no special
judicially devised test is required. Instead, lawyers and
judges need only open the statute books, find the relevant
substantive provision, and follow its lead. As we have seen,
the Court takes just this approach when addressing the
meaning of the term “action” in the Act’s venue provision.
There, it concludes EPA took no nationally applicable “ac-
tion” because the Act’s substantive provisions “pe[g]” an ac-
tion to a decision to grant or deny an individual hardship
petition. Ante, at 10; see Part I–B, supra. On my view, we
should employ that same statute-driven approach to the
meaning of “a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
For another thing, the Court’s test conflates a determina-
tion with the reasons that inform it. Statutes often “distin-
guis[h] between ‘considerations’ that inform [a] ‘determina-
tion,’ and the ‘determination’ itself.” Commissioner v. Zuch,
605 U. S. ___ , ___ (2025) (slip op., at 6) (alteration omitted).
The Clean Air Act is no different. It authorizes EPA to take
certain actions (like waiving renewable fuel mandates or
disapproving a single Governor’s suspension of a SIP com-
ponent). The Act authorizes those actions if certain deter-
minations are made (like a determination that enforcing
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 11
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
the renewable fuel mandates would severely harm the na-
tional economy or a determination that a Governor’s partial
SIP suspension doesn’t satisfy certain criteria). And to sup-
port its determinations, the agency may offer any number
of reasons. To avoid accusations of arbitrary and capricious
decisionmaking, too, the agency will usually employ con-
sistent reasoning in like cases. See, e.g., Encino Motorcars,
LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 211 , 222 (2016). But none of that
means we should conflate the determinations EPA must
make under the Act with the reasons the agency offers to
support them.
For another thing still, I worry that the Court’s test will
prove tough for lower courts and lawyers to apply in prac-
tice. Having conflated a “determination” with the agency’s
underlying reasoning, the Court must find some way to go
about sorting and weighing all the reasons EPA may ad-
vance. But just consider what its approach entails. First,
lawyers and judges must consult the full scope of the
agency’s reasoning (in this case, reasoning that runs over
280 pages). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a–330a. Next, law-
yers and judges must “parse” out which aspects of that rea-
soning are particular to a locality or region and which are
national in scope or effect. Ante, at 16. Finally, lawyers
and judges must weigh those two sets of reasons against
each other and decide which set was the true “driver” of the
agency’s decision and which was more “peripheral” to it.
Ante, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“ ‘[L]itigation over whether the case is in the right court
is essentially a waste of time and resources.’ ” Navarro Sav-
ings Assn. v. Lee, 446 U. S. 458, 464, n. 13 (1980). When it
comes to the simple preliminary question where a case
should be filed, the rules of the road should be “clear and
easy to apply.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of
Chicago, 583 U. S. 17 , 25 (2017); see Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U. S. 77 , 94–95 (2010). The test the Court announces
today can claim neither of those virtues. For the lawyers
12 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
and judges tasked with applying it, I can only wish them
luck.
III
To get a sense of the challenges the Court’s test poses for
future litigants and lower courts, compare this case to its
companion. See Oklahoma v. EPA, 605 U. S. ___ (2025).
As we have seen, that dispute involves SIPs, plans States
must submit to EPA outlining how they intend to comply
with national air quality standards. See Part I–A, supra;
§7410. Among other things, a State’s SIP must address the
Act’s “Good Neighbor Provision.” Ohio v. EPA, 603 U. S.
279 , 283–284 (2024). Because “air currents can carry pol-
lution across state borders,” id., at 283 , that provision re-
quires each SIP to contain “adequate” measures to prevent
in-state “emissions activity” from interfering with other
States’ ability to satisfy federal air quality standards,
§7410(a)(2)(D). In a single rule, EPA rejected 21 SIPs—in-
cluding Utah’s and Oklahoma’s—because, in the agency’s
view, none satisfied the Act’s Good Neighbor provision. Ok-
lahoma, 605 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4) (citing 88
Fed. Reg. 9336 (2023)). Now, Oklahoma, Utah, and certain
industry groups seek to challenge EPA’s actions in court,
and they argue that their litigation belongs in a regional
circuit. Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).
EPA responds that the SIPs case is, in every way that
matters, like the small refineries’ case and thus belongs in
the D. C. Circuit too. After all, the agency points out, it em-
ployed a common statutory interpretation and a common
methodology to assess each State’s proposed SIP—just as it
did when considering the small refineries’ petitions. If the
one case belongs in the D. C. Circuit, EPA argues, so must
the other. See Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–
1067 etc., pp. 30, 34–36; Tr. of Oral Arg. in Oklahoma v.
EPA, O. T. 2024, No. 23–1067 etc., pp. 39, 47.
Along those lines, EPA observes that, in assessing each
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 13
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
SIP, it asked whether the state plan before it would contrib-
ute more than “1% of the permissible ozone level to a down-
wind State.” Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12);
Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 9, 35.
In practice, EPA argues, that 1% threshold proved critical.
SIPs that “fell under the 1 percent de minimis threshold”
were “approved on [that] ground.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No.
23–1067 etc., at 38–39. Meanwhile, all (or nearly all) the
SIPs that exceeded the 1% threshold—including Okla-
homa’s and Utah’s—were rejected. See Brief for Federal
Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 7; Brief for State of
New York et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 23–1067 etc., pp.
24–25, n. 20. Accordingly, the agency argues, even if it took
a local or regional “action” with respect to each SIP, nation-
wide determinations proved “essential to EPA’s reasoning
in disapproving the state plans.” Brief for Federal Respond-
ents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 37.
The Court disagrees. As it must under the test it an-
nounces, the Court begins by consulting all the various rea-
sons EPA offered (some 60-plus pages of them appear in the
Federal Register). Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at ___–___ (slip
op., at 10–13).2 In doing so, the Court acknowledges that
EPA used a common (or nationwide) statutory interpreta-
tion and a common (or nationwide) methodology when as-
sessing all of the SIPs. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). The
Court recognizes, too, that the 1% threshold played a sig-
nificant role in separating the SIPs EPA approved from
those it rejected. See id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–13).
Still, when it comes to weighing the role that EPA’s com-
mon (or nationwide) justifications played, the Court con-
cludes, they were not the “primary drivers” of the agency’s
challenged actions. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). Instead,
——————
2 See 88 Fed. Reg. 9336 (omnibus rule); 87 Fed. Reg. 31470 (2022) (Air
Plan Disapproval; Utah); id., at 9798 (Air Plan Disapproval; Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas).
14 EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
“factual determinations particular to the State at issue”
predominated. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Relying on that assessment, the Court
holds that Oklahoma’s and Utah’s lawsuit challenging
EPA’s rejection of their SIPs belongs in a regional circuit.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13).
Maybe that’s right. But I can certainly imagine arriving
at the opposite outcome under the Court’s test. After all,
EPA used a common statutory interpretation and a com-
mon methodology when assessing all of the SIPs, proceed-
ing much as it did when evaluating the small refineries’
hardship petitions. In both cases, too, the agency factored
in certain local considerations, like individual “Stat[e] cir-
cumstances” in the SIPs case, id., at ___ (slip op., at 10), and
individualized “data and information” in the small refiner-
ies’ case, App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a–95a. Of course, the
Court thinks EPA leaned more heavily on individualized
reasons in the SIPs case, and more heavily on common ones
in the small refineries’ case. Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 11). But without any objective standard for
weighing which predominates, there seems to me ample
room for good-faith disagreement between litigants and
among lower courts. And it is just that kind of ambiguity
that promises protracted and expensive venue litigation go-
ing forward.
To avoid that problem, I would resolve the SIPs case the
same way I would resolve the small refineries’ case: by
looking to the Act itself. Section 7410(k)(3) requires EPA to
approve or disapprove SIPs and, in passing on them, to as-
sess whether each individual State has or has not complied
with its obligations under federal law. See id., at ___ (slip
op., at 3). Nowhere does that substantive provision call for
a nationally applicable action or task EPA with making a
determination of nationwide scope or effect. And no more
is needed to know that, under the Act’s venue provision, the
SIPs dispute before us belongs in a regional circuit. Id., at
Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 15
GORSUCH, J., dissenting
___ (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1).
*
At the end of the day, venue rules are like traffic laws.
They simply tell litigants where to go, and they should be
easy to follow. As I read it, the Clean Air Act provides a
clear rule for cases like this one. Applying that rule here, I
would direct the parties to the appropriate regional circuit.
The Court doing otherwise, I respectfully dissent.