Devillier v. Texas

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1

 Syllabus

 NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
 being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
 The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
 prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
 See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

 Syllabus

 DEVILLIER ET AL. v. TEXAS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
 THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 No. 22–913. Argued January 16, 2024—Decided April 16, 2024
Richard DeVillier and more than 120 other petitioners own property
 north of U. S. Interstate Highway 10 between Houston and Beaumont,
 Texas. The dispute here arose after the State of Texas took action to
 use portions of I–10 as a flood evacuation route, installing a roughly 3-
 foot-tall barrier along the highway median to act as a dam. When sub-
 sequent hurricanes and storms brought heavy rainfall, the median
 barrier performed as intended, keeping the south side of the highway
 open. But it also flooded petitioners’ land to the north, causing signif-
 icant damage to their property. DeVillier filed suit in Texas state
 court. He alleged that by building the median barrier and using his
 property to store stormwater, Texas had effected a taking of his prop-
 erty for which the State must pay just compensation. Other property
 owners filed similar suits. Texas removed the cases to federal court,
 where they were consolidated into a single proceeding with one
 operative complaint. The operative complaint includes inverse-
 condemnation claims under both the Texas Constitution and the Tak-
 ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As relevant, Texas moved to dis-
 miss the federal inverse-condemnation claim, arguing that a plaintiff
 has no cause of action arising directly under the Takings Clause. The
 District Court denied Texas’ motion, concluding that a property owner
 may sue a State directly under the Takings Clause. The Fifth Circuit
 reversed, holding “that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as ap-
 plied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not pro-
 vide a right of action for takings claims against a state.” 53 F. 4th 904
 (per curiam).
Held: DeVillier and the other property owners should be permitted to
 pursue their claims under the Takings Clause through the cause of
 action available under Texas law. The Takings Clause of the Fifth
2 DEVILLIER v. TEXAS

 Syllabus

 Amendment states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
 without just compensation.” The Court has explained that “a property
 owner acquires an irrevocable right to just compensation immediately
 upon a taking” “[b]ecause of ‘the self-executing character’ of the Tak-
 ings Clause ‘with respect to compensation.’ ” Knick v. Township of
 Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 192 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran
 Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 315 ). The
 question here concerns the procedural vehicle by which a property
 owner may seek to vindicate that right. Constitutional rights do not
 typically come with a built-in cause of action to allow for private en-
 forcement in courts, see Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482 , 490–491, and
 so they are asserted offensively pursuant to an independent cause of
 action designed for that purpose, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §1983 . DeVillier
 relies on First English and other cases to argue that the Takings
 Clause creates by its own force a cause of action authorizing suits for
 just compensation. But those cases do not directly confront whether
 the Takings Clause provides a cause of action. It would be imprudent
 to decide that question without first establishing the premise in the
 question presented that no other cause of action exists to vindicate the
 property owner’s rights under the Takings Clause. Texas state law
 does provide an inverse-condemnation cause of action by which prop-
 erty owners may seek just compensation against the State based on
 both the Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause. This case there-
 fore does not present the circumstance in which a property owner has
 no cause of action to seek just compensation. The Court therefore re-
 mands so that DeVillier and the other property owners may proceed
 through the cause of action available under Texas law. Pp. 4–7.
 53 F. 4th 904 , vacated and remanded.

 THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1

 Opinion of the Court

 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
 United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
 Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
 pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 _________________

 No. 22–913
 _________________

RICHARD DEVILLIER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. TEXAS
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 [April 16, 2024]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
 Richard DeVillier alleges that the State of Texas took his
property for stormwater storage. He sought just compensa-
tion under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, ar-
guing that the Constitution itself authorized him to bring
suit. We granted certiorari to decide whether “a person
whose property is taken without compensation [may] seek
redress under the self-executing Takings Clause even if the
legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a
cause of action.” Pet. for Cert. i. That question assumes
the property owner has no separate cause of action under
which to bring a claim based on the Takings Clause. But,
that is not the case here. Texas law provides a cause of ac-
tion that allows property owners to vindicate their rights
under the Takings Clause. We therefore vacate and re-
mand so that DeVillier’s claims may proceed under Texas’
state-law cause of action.
 I
 Richard DeVillier and more than 120 other petitioners
own property north of U. S. Interstate Highway 10 between
2 DEVILLIER v. TEXAS

 Opinion of the Court

Houston and Beaumont, Texas.1 The State of Texas under-
took several projects to facilitate the use of that portion of
the highway as a flood-evacuation route. It installed a
roughly 3-foot-tall barrier along the highway median to act
as a dam, preventing stormwater from covering the south
side of the road.
 In August 2017, Hurricane Harvey brought heavy rain-
fall to southeast Texas. The new median barrier performed
as intended, keeping the south side of the highway open.
But, it also flooded petitioners’ land to the north, displacing
them from their homes, damaging businesses, ruining
crops, killing livestock, and destroying family heirlooms.
The same thing happened during Tropical Storm Imelda in
2019. As depicted, the median barrier kept the south side
of the highway open (on the left side of both pictures) by
holding back stormwater, which then submerged property
north of the highway (on the right side of both pictures):

Figure 1

——————
 1 Because this case comes to us at the pleading stage, we assume the

truth of the facts alleged in the operative complaint. See, e.g.,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 508, n. 1 (2002).
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3

 Opinion of the Court

Figure 2

 Because heavy rainfall is not uncommon in southeast
Texas, the median barrier will continue to cause flooding on
DeVillier’s land during future storms.
 DeVillier filed suit in Texas state court. He alleged that,
by building the median barrier and using his property to
store stormwater, Texas had effected a taking of his prop-
erty. DeVillier argued that he was therefore entitled to just
compensation under both the United States and Texas Con-
stitutions. Other property owners filed similar suits. Texas
removed the cases to federal court, where they were consol-
idated into a single proceeding with one operative
complaint. The operative complaint includes inverse-
condemnation claims under both the Texas Constitution
and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Knick
v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 186 (2019) (“Inverse
condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental
defendant to recover the value of property which has been
taken in fact by the governmental defendant” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
 As relevant, Texas moved to dismiss the federal inverse-
condemnation claim, arguing that a plaintiff has no cause
4 DEVILLIER v. TEXAS

 Opinion of the Court

of action arising directly under the Takings Clause. It con-
tended that only Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 , pro-
vides a vehicle to assert constitutional violations, and §1983
does not authorize claims against a State. DeVillier did not
dispute that he intended to bring his federal claim directly
under the Fifth Amendment. Instead, he responded that
the Takings Clause is “self-executing,” which, he argued,
means that the Clause itself provides a cause of action for
just compensation.
 The District Court denied Texas’ motion, concluding that
a property owner may sue a State directly under the Tak-
ings Clause. The Court of Appeals disagreed. In a one-
paragraph opinion, it “h[eld] that the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for
takings claims against a state.” 53 F. 4th 904 (CA5 2023)
(per curiam).
 We granted certiorari to decide whether a property owner
may sue for just compensation directly under the Takings
Clause. 600 U. S. ___ (2023). We now vacate and remand
for further proceedings.
 II
 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: “nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” We have explained that “a property owner
acquires an irrevocable right to just compensation immedi-
ately upon a taking” “[b]ecause of ‘the self-executing char-
acter’ of the Takings Clause ‘with respect to compensa-
tion.’ ” Knick, 588 U. S., at 192 (quoting First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 315 (1987)). Texas does not dispute
the nature of the substantive right to just compensation.
This case presents only a question regarding the procedural
vehicle by which a property owner may seek to vindicate
that right.
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5

 Opinion of the Court

 Constitutional rights do not typically come with a built-
in cause of action to allow for private enforcement in courts.
See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482 , 490–491 (2022). Instead,
constitutional rights are generally invoked defensively in
cases arising under other sources of law, or asserted offen-
sively pursuant to an independent cause of action designed
for that purpose, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §1983 . DeVillier ar-
gues that the Takings Clause is an exception. He relies on
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles to assert that the just-compensation
requirement of the Takings Clause is “self-executing” and
that “[s]tatutory recognition [is] not necessary” for takings
claims because they “are grounded in the Constitution it-
self.” 482 U. S., at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, the Takings Clause creates by its own force
a cause of action authorizing suits for just compensation.
 The cases that DeVillier cites do not directly confront
whether the Takings Clause provides a cause of action for
just compensation. First English itself proceeded under a
state-law cause of action. Id., at 313–314, n. 8. DeVillier
also points to several takings cases where property owners
sought injunctions to prevent the Government from inter-
fering with their property rights, such as by obtaining ease-
ments or imposing zoning regulations. See Dohany v. Rog-
ers, 281 U. S. 362, 364 (1930); Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v.
Morristown, 276 U. S. 182, 188 (1928); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 384 (1926); Cuyahoga
River Power Co. v. Akron, 240 U. S. 462, 463 (1916); Nor-
wood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 , 276 (1898). Because none of
those cases relied on §1983 for a cause of action, he reasons
that those cases must have proceeded directly under the
Constitution. But, the mere fact that the Takings Clause
provided the substantive rule of decision for the equitable
claims in those cases does not establish that it creates a
6 DEVILLIER v. TEXAS

 Opinion of the Court

cause of action for damages, a remedy that is legal, not eq-
uitable, in nature.2 That said, the absence of a case relying
on the Takings Clause for a cause of action does not by itself
prove there is no cause of action. It demonstrates only that
constitutional concerns do not arise when property owners
have other ways to seek just compensation. Our precedents
do not cleanly answer the question whether a plaintiff has
a cause of action arising directly under the Takings Clause.
 But, this case does not require us to resolve that question.
The question presented asks what would happen if a prop-
erty owner had no cause of action to vindicate his rights un-
der the Takings Clause. It would be imprudent to decide
that question without satisfying ourselves of the premise
that there is no cause of action. Our constitutional system
assigns to state officers “a coordinate responsibility to en-
force [the Constitution] according to their regular modes of
procedure.” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356, 367 (1990). It
therefore looks to “[t]he good faith of the States [to]
provid[e] an important assurance that ‘this Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law of the Land.’ ”
Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 755 (1999) (quoting U. S.
Const., Art. VI; original alterations omitted). We should
not “assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitu-
tion,” including the Takings Clause, because “States and
their officers are [also] bound by obligations imposed by the
Constitution.” 527 U. S., at 755 .
 The premise that Texas left DeVillier with no cause of ac-
tion to obtain the just compensation guaranteed by the Tak-
ings Clause does not hold. Texas state law provides a cause

——————
 2 The significance of DeVillier’s equitable cases is further obscured by

fundamental changes to the law of equity that postdate those decisions.
Compare Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 2 with A. Bellia & B. Clark, The Original
Source of the Cause of Action in Federal Courts, 101 Va. L. Rev. 609 , 653
(2015).
 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7

 Opinion of the Court

of action by which property owners may seek just compen-
sation against the State. As Texas explained at oral argu-
ment, its state-law inverse-condemnation cause of action
provides a vehicle for takings claims based on both the
Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 38; id., at 40 (citing Baytown v. Schrock, 645 S. W. 3d
174 (Tex. 2022)); Tr. of Oral Arg. 59–60. And, although
Texas asserted that proceeding under the state-law cause
of action would require an amendment to the complaint, it
also assured the Court that it would not oppose any attempt
by DeVillier and the other petitioners to seek one. Id., at
41, 61, 64 . This case therefore does not present the circum-
stance in which a property owner has no cause of action to
seek just compensation. On remand, DeVillier and the
other property owners should be permitted to pursue their
claims under the Takings Clause through the cause of ac-
tion available under Texas law.
 III
 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
 It is so ordered.