Opinion of the Court
Ketanji Brown Jackson
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 24–5774. Argued October 7, 2025—Decided January 14, 2026
This case concerns the relationship between two provisions of 18 U. S. C.
§924 : subsection (c)(1)(A)(i), which criminalizes using, carrying, or pos-
sessing a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, and subsection (j), which prescribes different penal-
ties—including, in certain circumstances, capital punishment—when
“a violation of subsection (c)” causes death. The question presented is
whether a single act that violates both provisions may yield two con-
victions—one under each provision—or only one.
The Second Circuit held that one such act may yield two convictions.
The Second Circuit acknowledged that subsection (c)(1) and subsection
(j) qualify as the same offense under the test in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U. S. 299 . But it believed that, as construed in Lora v.
United States, 599 U. S. 453 , the two provisions are separate offenses
for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative punishments.
Because the Second Circuit’s decision deepened a split among the
Courts of Appeals, this Court granted certiorari.
Held: Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both
§§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions.
One act that violates both provisions therefore may spawn only one
conviction. The part of the Second Circuit’s judgment that held other-
wise is reversed. Pp. 5–19.
(a) When enacted, §924(c) “made it a discrete offense” to use or carry
a firearm in connection with a predicate federal crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime. Abbott v. United States, 562 U. S. 8, 12 . A
§924(c) violation triggers a mandatory minimum sentence of at least
five years. Congress later added §924(j) to provide a different penalty
scheme for §924(c) violations that cause death. Section 924(j) has no
2 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
mandatory minimums; it instead authorized significant maximum
sentences, including the death penalty or life in prison when the un-
derlying violation is murder. Pp. 5–8.
(b) The question in this case is whether subsection (j) also increased
the number of convictions (rather than just the maximum sentence)
that can result from a fatal violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i). The Court re-
solves the question as a matter “of statutory construction,” because
“whether punishments . . . are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be
resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative
Branch has authorized.” Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 688 .
And the Court undertakes this exercise in statutory construction with
a thumb on the scale in the form of the Blockburger presumption,
which instructs that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the
same offense under two different statutes. It is undisputed that
§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) define the same offense per Blockburger.
But the Court has said that the Blockburger presumption can yield to
a plainly expressed contrary intent. This case therefore turns on
whether Congress plainly expressed an intent to overcome the Block-
burger presumption by authorizing multiple convictions for one act
that violates both §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j). To ascertain such in-
tent, the Court turns to statutory text, structure, and (for those who
accept its help) legislative history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) The text of §924 suggests strongly, perhaps conclusively, that
Congress did not disavow Blockburger here. Congress included Block-
burger-surmounting language twice within subsection (c) itself: It
mandated that a §924(c)(1) conviction must be “in addition to the pun-
ishment provided for” the predicate, and it also mandated that a con-
viction under §924(c)(5)—for using or carrying armor piercing ammu-
nition—must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the
predicate “or conviction under” §924. The Court has elsewhere called
such “in addition to” language “crystal clear” evidence of a legislature’s
intent to overcome Blockburger. But Congress used no similar lan-
guage with respect to the interplay between subsection (c)(1) and sub-
section (j). Pp. 10–14.
(1) The argument that subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence man-
date textually authorizes dual convictions misunderstands the in-
quiry. Blockburger addresses the permissibility of multiple convic-
tions, not just multiple sentences; the assumption underlying the
Blockburger rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish
the same offense under two different statutes, where punishment
means a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence.
Accordingly, §924(c)'s consecutive-sentence mandate simply speaks
past the question in this case: whether one act may result in two con-
victions. Before the consecutive-sentence mandate gains any
Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 3
Syllabus
relevance, a court must first determine whether two punishments
(convictions) may be imposed at all. Only if two convictions may coex-
ist does a court consult the consecutive-sentence mandate to arrange
properly the resulting sentences. Pp. 11–13.
(2) The argument that subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) have dif-
ferent focuses and thus target different wrongs that may be punished
cumulatively is equally unavailing. The conduct (or result) that differ-
entiates a greater offense from its lesser included offenses will often
introduce some new focus, and that reality cannot do much to overcome
the Blockburger presumption if the presumption is to retain its force.
Pp. 13–14.
(d) The statute’s operation and structure provide no indication Con-
gress expressed any will to overcome Blockburger. Lora answers any
concern that defendants convicted of and sentenced under subsection
(j) will be rewarded with more lenient sentences than those convicted
of the less serious subsection (c)(1) offense. There the Court explained
that subsection (j) eschews mandatory penalties in favor of sentencing
flexibility and reflects the seriousness of the offense using a different
approach than subsection (c)’s mandatory minimum penalties—by au-
thorizing the death penalty for murder and the same harsh punish-
ment that the Federal Criminal Code prescribes for other manslaugh-
ters. If prosecutors fear that a subsection (j) sentence will dip below
what subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) would otherwise guarantee, they are free
to choose subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)’s low-end rigidity over subsection (j)’s
high-end flexibility.
Neither the physical separation in the U. S. Code between subsec-
tion (c)(1) and subsection (j), nor the fact that subsection (j)’s sentenc-
ing scheme operates without reference to subsection (c)’s, overcomes
the Blockburger presumption. See Ball v. United States, 470 U. S. 856 .
If offenses share elements but have comprehensive, independently op-
erating penalty schemes, that suggests Congress intended to place in
front of prosecutors a menu, not a buffet.
Any analogy to Garrett v. United States, 471 U. S. 773 , in which the
Court found Blockburger overcome even without express statutory lan-
guage disclaiming the presumption, is inapt. Garrett involved a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise alleged to have spanned more than five
years, and the continuing nature of the offense played a decisive role
in the case. Garrett distinguished the facts there from what is involved
here: the classic relation of the lesser included offense to the greater
offense, wherein the very same conduct violates two statutes. Pp. 15–
19.
102 F. 4th 60 , reversed in part and remanded.
4 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I,
II, III, IV–A, and IV–B, and an opinion with respect to Part IV–C, in
which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GORSUCH,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24–5774
_________________
DWAYNE BARRETT, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[January 14, 2026]
JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court, ex-
cept as to Part IV–C.*
This case concerns the relationship between two provi-
sions of 18 U. S. C. §924 . The first, §924(c)(1)(A)(i), crimi-
nalizes using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connec-
tion with a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime. The second, §924(j), prescribes different penalties—
including, in certain circumstances, capital punishment—
when “a violation of subsection (c)” causes death.
Every defendant subject to subsection (j) has also, neces-
sarily, violated subsection (c). We consider here whether a
defendant who commits a single act that violates both
§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) may be convicted only under one
provision or the other, or instead may suffer two convic-
tions.
All agree on the first step of the analysis: Subsection
(c)(1)(A)(i) and subsection (j) define the same offense under
the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S.
299 (1932). That consensus carries us most of the way to
resolving this case, as we have long presumed that Con-
gress intends to authorize only one conviction per offense.
——————
*Part IV–C of this opinion is joined only by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN.
2 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
We resolve the rest by concluding that this presumption
holds true here: Congress intended subsection (j) as an al-
ternative, not a supplement, to subsection (c)(1)(A)(i). At
the very least, Congress did not clearly manifest a contrary
intention, as it would have to do if it wished to authorize
two convictions in these circumstances. We thus reverse in
part the Second Circuit’s contrary judgment.
I
Dwayne Barrett committed a series of robberies between
August 2011 and January 2012. During one, Barrett’s con-
federate shot and killed Gamar Dafalla.
Of the seven charges on which Barrett was convicted,
three are relevant here. Count five charged Barrett with
Hobbs Act robbery of Dafalla under 18 U. S. C. §1951 . That
count served as the predicate for two more: Count six
charged Barrett with using a firearm during the commis-
sion of a crime of violence in violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i),1
and count seven charged him with thereby causing death in
violation of §924(j)(1).2 A jury found Barrett guilty on all
seven counts, and the District Court sentenced Barrett to a
total term of 90 years of imprisonment.
Barrett has since been aided by two of our decisions. Af-
ter we decided United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445 (2019),
and vacated the Second Circuit’s disposition of Barrett’s
——————
1 Count six of the indictment technically charged Barrett with violating
18 U. S. C. §924 (c)(1)(A)(iii), which applies when the firearm is dis-
charged rather than simply used, carried, or possessed. See 102 F. 4th
60, 70, n. 8 (CA2 2024). But the jury was charged with finding only that
Barrett possessed or used the firearm—a violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i), not
(iii)—and the District Court sentenced him in line with §924(c)(1)(A)(i).
Before us, all agree that Barrett’s count six conviction was for a violation
of §924(c)(1)(A)(i).
2 In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Barrett sought review of
whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” such that it
can serve as a predicate for a §924(c)(1) conviction. We did not grant
certiorari on that question, and do not pass on it here.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
Opinion of the Court
direct appeal in light of that decision, the Second Circuit
vacated one of Barrett’s §924(c) convictions not at issue
here. See 588 U. S. 918 (2019) (granting Barrett’s petition
for a writ of certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remand-
ing for further consideration in light of Davis); 937 F. 3d
126 , 127–128 (2019) (vacating the conviction). The District
Court then resentenced Barrett to 50 years in prison.
Twenty of those years came from concurrent sentences on
three Hobbs Act robbery counts, including, as relevant here,
count five. Twenty-five years came from a consecutive term
on count seven (the subsection (j) conviction), into which the
District Court merged count six (the subsection (c) convic-
tion).3
Then we decided Lora v. United States, 599 U. S. 453
(2023), which, like this case, addressed the relationship be-
tween subsections (c) and (j). Lora held that subsection (j)
does not incorporate subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence
mandate. That mandate requires a subsection (c) sentence
to run consecutively to “any other term of imprisonment im-
posed on the person.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). It does not, we held
in Lora, require the same of a subsection (j) sentence. Id.,
at 459. When the District Court sentenced Barrett in this
case, it had been under the opposite impression. So Barrett
appealed again, and, bound by Lora, the Second Circuit va-
cated Barrett’s sentence and remanded for another resen-
tencing. 102 F. 4th 60 , 85–88 (2024).
In doing so, the Court of Appeals also passed upon the
question that now comes before us. The District Court, re-
call, had declined to sentence Barrett separately on counts
six (under subsection (c)) and seven (under subsection (j)),
both of which had as their predicate the same fatal Dafalla
robbery charged in count five. The Court of Appeals re-
jected Barrett’s argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause
——————
3 The remaining five years, not relevant here, came from a consecutive
mandatory minimum sentence on a different §924(c) count.
4 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
required the District Court to stay that course when the
case returned for resentencing. The Court of Appeals did
acknowledge that the Government regularly concedes that
subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) overlap and may not be
punished cumulatively—a proposition with which the other
circuits regularly agree. Id., at 91, and n. 29 (collecting
cases). And it recognized that the two provisions qualify as
the same offense under the governing test laid out in Block-
burger. 102 F. 4th, at 89–90. But it believed that, “[a]s con-
strued in Lora,” the two provisions “are separate offenses
for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative pun-
ishments.” Id., at 89.
Textually, the court pointed to §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s mandate
that a subsection (c) sentence must run consecutively to any
other sentence—including, the court reasoned, to one under
subsection (j). Id., at 90–91. Practically, the court high-
lighted that a contrary ruling would permit defendants who
commit especially serious subsection (c) offenses—ones re-
sulting in death—to escape subsection (c)’s mandatory min-
imums, despite “Congress’s intent for every defendant con-
victed under that statute . . . to be incarcerated for no less
than the stated minimum term.” Id., at 90; see also id., at
93–94. And, turning to precedent, the court perceived our
statement in Lora that subsection (j) evinced a “ ‘different
approach to punishment’ ” than subsection (c) to establish
that the two provisions define different offenses raising no
double jeopardy concerns. 102 F. 4th, at 92–93 (quoting 599
U. S., at 462 ). The Court of Appeals therefore instructed
the District Court to impose separate convictions and sen-
tences on counts six and seven.
Because the Second Circuit’s decision deepened a split
among the Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari. 604
U. S. ___ (2025).4 And because the Government agrees with
——————
4 The Second Circuit’s decision aligned with United States v. Julian,
633 F. 3d 1250 , 1256–1257 (CA11 2011). It diverged from most appellate
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
Opinion of the Court
Barrett, we appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Sec-
ond Circuit’s judgment.5 We now reverse the Second Cir-
cuit’s judgment in relevant part.
II
A
When Congress passed 18 U. S. C. §924 (c) in 1968, the
new subsection “made it a discrete offense” to use or carry
a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime, known as predicates. Abbott v.
United States, 562 U. S. 8, 12 (2010).6 The original statute
left open two questions relevant to today’s case. It did not
specify whether a subsection (c) conviction could coexist
with, or instead must displace, a conviction for the under-
lying predicate. And assuming two convictions could coex-
ist, it did not specify whether the two resulting sentences
should run concurrently or consecutively.
Congress answered both questions in 1971. On the first,
Congress made clear that a subsection (c) conviction must
be “ ‘in addition to the punishment provided for the commis-
sion of ’ ” the predicate; that is, a violation of subsection (c)
ought to result in two convictions, one for subsection (c) and
one for the predicate. §13, 84 Stat. 1890 . On the second,
Congress mandated that the two resulting sentences run
——————
courts that have considered the question. See United States v. Ortiz-
Orellana, 90 F. 4th 689, 705 (CA4 2024) (“[A] sentencing court may not
impose cumulative punishments for §924(c) and §924(j) if those viola-
tions are based on the same conduct” (citing United States v. Palacios,
982 F. 3d 920 , 924–925 (CA4 2020)); United States v. Gonzales, 841 F. 3d
339, 358 (CA5 2016) (similar); United States v. García-Ortiz, 657 F. 3d
25 , 28–29 (CA1 2011) (similar).
5 We appointed Charles L. McCloud to brief and argue the case in sup-
port of the judgment below. 604 U. S. ___ (2025). Mr. McCloud has ably
discharged his responsibilities.
6 In response to our decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137
(1995), Congress later added “possession” to the list of subsection (c)’s
proscriptions, alongside use and carry. See United States v. O’Brien, 560
U. S. 218 , 232–233 (2010).
6 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
consecutively, not concurrently: “ ‘[T]he term of imprison-
ment imposed under this subsection [shall not] run concur-
rently with any term of imprisonment imposed for’ ” the
predicate. Ibid.
Congress later extended this second feature—the consec-
utive-sentence mandate—beyond the relationship between
subsection (c)’s sentence and the predicate’s sentence, so
that the consecutive-sentence mandate applies as between
a subsection (c) sentence and “any other term of imprison-
ment.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii); see United States v. Gonzales, 520
U. S. 1, 5 (1997). Congress did not, however, expand the
double-conviction mandate. That mandate still instructs
only that a subsection (c)(1) conviction shall be “in addition
to the punishment provided for [the underlying] crime of vi-
olence or drug trafficking crime”—that is, the predicate.
§924(c)(1)(A).
Subsection (c) can be violated in several ways but all trig-
ger mandatory minimum sentences. Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)
imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years;
other provisions within subsection (c)(1) impose mandatory
minimums up to life in prison, depending on the use and
type of weapon and the defendant’s recidivist history. See
§924(c)(1).7 So if the predicate offense carries a mandatory
minimum sentence of its own, then a defendant will face
“ ‘two consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for the
single use of a single firearm.’ ” Abbott, 562 U. S., at 20 .
This case asks whether a different subsection of §924,
subsection (j), piles yet another layer of punishment atop—
resulting in three stacked convictions and sentences—or in-
stead provides an alternative to subsection (c)(1)(A)(i).
——————
7 This too has changed over the years. Subsection (c) originally em-
ployed mandatory sentences—exactly 5 years, exactly 10, and so on. See
O’Brien, 560 U. S., at 229 . The statute traded its mandatory sentences
for mandatory minimums—with no maximums—in 1998. Ibid.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7
Opinion of the Court
B
Subsection (j) arrived “decades after subsection (c).”
Lora, 599 U. S., at 457 . Congress added it in 1994, in a pro-
vision entitled “Death Penalty for Gun Murders During
Federal Crimes of Violence and Drug Trafficking Crimes.”
§60013, 108 Stat. 1973 . The new subsection supplied a dif-
ferent penalty scheme for subsection (c) violations that
cause death. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) did not
impose mandatory minimums. Instead, it authorized sig-
nificant maximum sentences—including, true to the new
provision’s name, the death penalty if the underlying viola-
tion is a murder:
“A person who, in the course of a violation of subsec-
tion (c), causes the death of a person through the use of
a firearm, shall—
“(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section
1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for
any term of years or for life; and
“(2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in sec-
tion 1112), be punished as provided in that section.”
§924(j).
The references to §1111 and §1112 relate to the pre-exist-
ing murder and manslaughter statutes, respectively. Sec-
tion 1111 sets a maximum penalty of death or life impris-
onment for murder. 18 U. S. C. §1111 (b). And §1112 sets a
maximum penalty of 15 years for voluntary manslaughter
and 8 years for involuntary manslaughter. §1112(b).
Subsection (j) gave federal prosecutors tools they lacked
both in the pre-existing subsection (c) and in the pre-exist-
ing murder and manslaughter statutes. Subsection (c) does
not authorize the death penalty, for example. Subsection
(j) thus raised the ceiling of punishments §924 authorized,
and, in doing so, offered prosecutors flexibility of another
sort: time. See §3281 (“An indictment for any offense pun-
ishable by death may be found at any time without
8 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
limitation”). Section 1111—the general federal murder
statute—did already authorize the death penalty. But its
jurisdictional reach, as well as that of the manslaughter
statute (§1112), is limited to “the special maritime and ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States.” §§1111(b),
1112(b).8 The new subsection (j) had no such geographical
limitation; it borrowed instead subsection (c)’s broader ju-
risdictional hook. So subsection (j) expanded federal juris-
diction over more killings and authorized the death penalty
for those amounting to murder.
III
This case asks whether subsection (j) also increased the
number of convictions—rather than simply the maximum
sentence—that can result from a fatal violation of
§924(c)(1)(A)(i). Barrett says it did not, and for support he
turns to the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause.
But while his argument arrives in constitutional garb, it
“cannot be separated entirely from a resolution of the ques-
tion of statutory construction.” Whalen v. United States,
445 U. S. 684, 688 (1980). That is because “the question
whether punishments . . . are unconstitutionally multiple
cannot be resolved without determining what punishments
the Legislative Branch has authorized.” Ibid. It is that
question of congressional authorization that we answer to-
day.9
——————
8 The “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States” covers, among other things, “lands reserved or acquired for the
use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdic-
tion thereof.” 18 U. S. C. §7 (3). It also pertains to locations like certain
“island[s], rock[s], or key[s] containing deposits of guano,” §7(4), and
spaceships “while . . . in flight.” §7(6).
9 Because we conclude that Congress did not authorize two convictions
in this context, we need not revisit whether Congress could do so con-
sistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause. See post, at 4 (GORSUCH, J.,
concurring in part).
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9
Opinion of the Court
We undertake this exercise in statutory interpretation
with a thumb on the scale, in the form of the Blockburger
presumption. Named for Blockburger v. United States, 284
U. S. 299 , the presumption instructs “that Congress ordi-
narily does not intend to punish the same offense under two
different statutes.” Whalen, 445 U. S., at 691–692.
The first step in the inquiry, then, is to determine
whether §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) define the “same of-
fense.” To make that determination, Blockburger requires
us to compare the provisions in question and ask whether
“each . . . requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”
284 U. S., at 304 . If the answer is yes, then the offenses
prescribed by each statute are different and the inquiry
generally ends. If the answer is no, then the statutes define
the same offense, and the Blockburger presumption is trig-
gered.
But because we have treated Blockburger as “a rule of
statutory construction to help determine legislative intent,”
we have said that its presumption can yield to a “plainly
expressed” intent to abandon it. Garrett v. United States,
471 U. S. 773 , 778–779 (1985); see also Whalen, 445 U. S.,
at 692 (requiring “a clear indication of contrary legislative
intent”). Accordingly, the second step of today’s analysis
requires us to search for a clear manifestation of Congress’s
intent to authorize more than one punishment.
All involved in this case share common ground as to the
first step of the analysis. The Court of Appeals, Barrett, the
Government, and Court-appointed amicus agree that
§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) define the same offense.10 After
all, the relationship between subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) and
——————
10 We express no view as to whether the same is true as to other ver-
sions of the §924(c) offense, as Barrett was convicted under
§924(c)(1)(A)(i). Put differently, while we recognize that §924(c) can be
violated in a number of ways, this case involves only the base offense
found at §924(c)(1)(A)(i). Our holding therefore applies only to that
clause.
10 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
subsection (j) is “the classic relation of the ‘lesser included
offense’ to the greater offense,” wherein “[t]he very same
conduct” violates two statutes, one which is fully subsumed
within the other. Garrett, 471 U. S., at 787 . And all lesser
included offenses are the “same” as their greater cousins
under Blockburger. See Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U. S. 224, 231 (1998) (“[T]he federal courts have
[long] presumed that Congress does not intend for a defend-
ant to be cumulatively punished for two crimes where one
crime is a lesser included offense of the other”).
This case therefore turns on the analysis’s second step:
discerning whether Congress clearly intended to authorize
multiple convictions for one act that violates both
§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j). To ascertain such intent, we
turn to statutory text, structure, and (for those who accept
its help) legislative history. See Garrett, 471 U. S., at 779 ;
United States v. Woodward, 469 U. S. 105, 109 (1985) (per
curiam) (consulting “[a]ll guides to legislative intent”).
Only if those tools leave us certain that Congress intended
to break from its normal practice and authorize multiple
convictions for the same offense will we shed the presump-
tion.
IV
A
We begin with the text. Textual clues are critical because
“Congress [i]s aware of the Blockburger rule and legislate[s]
with it in mind.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U. S. 333,
342 (1981). So Congress typically includes Blockburger-
surmounting language when it wishes to authorize dual
convictions for the same offense. See Brief for Petitioner
28, n. 3 (listing examples).
1
The text of §924 suggests strongly, perhaps conclusively,
that Congress did not disavow Blockburger here. Not for
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11
Opinion of the Court
lack of know-how: Congress twice wrote Blockburger-sur-
mounting language into subsection (c) itself. Congress
mandated that a §924(c)(1) conviction must be “in addition
to the punishment provided for” the predicate, and it also
mandated that a §924(c)(5) conviction—for using or carry-
ing “armor piercing ammunition”—must be “in addition to
the punishment provided for” the predicate “or conviction
under” §924. See §§924(c)(1)(A), (c)(5). We have elsewhere
called such “in addition to” language “crystal clear” evi-
dence of a legislature’s intent to overcome Blockburger.
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 362, 368 (1983).11
In short, “[w]hen Congress has the will” to authorize dual
convictions for the same offense, Congress “has no difficulty
in expressing it.” Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83
(1955). But Congress used no similar language with respect
to the interplay between subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j).
Its silence on the topic speaks volumes. See Albernaz, 450
U. S., at 341–342.
2
Like the Court of Appeals, see 102 F. 4th, at 90–93, ami-
cus challenges the premise of this assessment: He insists
that Congress has textually authorized dual convictions un-
der subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j). For proof, he points
to subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate. It reads:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . no
term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this
subsection shall run concurrently with any other term
of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any
term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence
——————
11 Significant too is the fact that Congress added the “ ‘in addition to’ ”
language to §924(c)(1) in 1971, see §13, 84 Stat. 1890 , and passed
§924(c)(5) in 2005, see §6(b), 119 Stat. 2102 . Congress thus demon-
strated its ability to overcome Blockburger in subsection (c) both before
and after it passed subsection (j) in 1994.
12 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was
used, carried, or possessed.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
As amicus would have it, this instruction permits—actu-
ally, requires—a subsection (c)(1) conviction to add on to
any other conviction, including one under subsection (j).
This deployment of the consecutive-sentence mandate
misunderstands today’s inquiry. The argument attempts to
make Blockburger purely about sentences—so that an in-
struction to run sentences consecutively rather than con-
currently makes clear Congress’s intent to overcome the
presumption. But Blockburger addresses the permissibility
of multiple convictions, not just multiple sentences. “The
assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Con-
gress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense
under two different statutes,” where “punishment” means
“a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sen-
tence.” Ball v. United States, 470 U. S. 856, 861 (1985). It
is for this reason that running sentences concurrently does
not avoid the problem; an unauthorized “ ‘second conviction,
even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible
punishment.’ ” Rutledge v. United States, 517 U. S. 292, 302
(1996) (quoting Ball, 470 U. S., at 865 ).
Accordingly, §924(c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate
simply speaks past the question in this case: whether one
act may result in two convictions. To that question it is no
answer to say, as the consecutive-sentence mandate does,
that a “term of imprisonment imposed” for a conviction
shall run consecutively to “any other term of imprisonment
imposed.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Before the consecutive-sen-
tence mandate gains any relevance, a court must first de-
termine whether two punishments (convictions) may be im-
posed at all. Only if two convictions may coexist does a
court consult the consecutive-sentence mandate, to arrange
properly the resulting sentences.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13
Opinion of the Court
This description is not merely the law as it exists; it is the
law as Congress understands it. When Congress amended
subsection (c) in 1971, it added two distinct instructions, as
recited above. The first—that a subsection (c)(1) conviction
must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the
predicate—answers the threshold question: May one act
spawn two convictions, one for subsection (c)(1) and one for
the predicate? The second—the consecutive-sentence man-
date—answers the follow-on question: Presuming the exist-
ence of two convictions, should their resulting sentences
run concurrently or consecutively? Cf. Dean v. United
States, 581 U. S. 62 , 69–70 (2017) (describing these provi-
sions as “two” distinct “limitations”). Amicus would have
the second instruction answer the first question. But Con-
gress has already addressed it: A subsection (c)(1) convic-
tion adds to the predicate conviction. See §924(c)(1)(A). No-
where does the statute prescribe the same in relation to a
subsection (j) conviction.12
3
Amicus’s second textual argument is equally unavailing.
Turning away from the concrete and toward the abstract,
amicus tells us that subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) have
different focuses. Subsection (c)(1), he points out, calibrates
its punishments to “the use of the firearm, the type of fire-
arm, and recidivism.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus
Curiae 10. By contrast, subsection (j) focuses on something
——————
12 Section 924(c) is not unique in this way. Congress frequently gives
these two distinct instructions, understanding that one speaks to the
dual-conviction question and the other to the sentence-arrangement is-
sue. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §§1028A(a)(2) (instructing that a conviction for
using false identification during and in relation to certain predicate fel-
onies shall be “in addition to the punishment provided for such felony”),
and (b)(2) (requiring in certain circumstances that the resulting addi-
tional sentence run consecutively to “any other term of imprisonment
imposed on the person under any other provision of law, including any
term of imprisonment imposed for the [predicate] felony”).
14 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
“irrelevant” to subsection (c)(1): the harm (namely, death)
inflicted. Ibid. From this amicus urges us to conclude that
the two subsections “target different wrongs” and thus may
be punished cumulatively. Ibid.; see also id., at 17–18.
In our search for congressional intent, we might in some
circumstances think that when two provisions focus on en-
tirely “different interests,” that suggests Congress intended
them to accumulate rather than swap out. See United
States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 724 (1993) (White, J., con-
curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also
Albernaz, 450 U. S., at 343 (observing that the Court’s con-
clusion about the permissibility of dual convictions was “re-
inforced by the fact that the two . . . statutes are directed to
separate evils”). Whatever those circumstances, this is not
one. Amicus stretches to find a common thread running
throughout subsection (c)(1)—he bundles firearm use, fire-
arm type, and recidivism and places them in opposition to
harm. But it is not obvious that those three features form
a theme of any significance such that they can create the
contrast amicus wants to glean from them.
In any event, the conduct (or result) that differentiates a
greater offense from its lesser included offenses will often
introduce some new “focus.” That reality cannot do much
to overcome the Blockburger presumption if the presump-
tion is to retain its force. See, e.g., Whalen, 445 U. S., at
691, n. 6 , 693–694 (Blockburger not overcome, despite some
contrary statutory language, for convictions on charges of
(1) rape and (2) killing in the course of rape); Illinois v. Vi-
tale, 447 U. S. 410 , 420–421 (1980) (Blockburger not over-
come as between felony and felony murder); Harris v. Ok-
lahoma, 433 U. S. 682 , 682–683 (1977) (per curiam) (same).
In sum, if Congress expressed any will to overcome Block-
burger in this scenario, it must be found somewhere other
than the statutory text.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 15
Opinion of the Court
B
Failing textual support, amicus turns to the statute’s op-
eration and structure. But this ground proves only slightly
more fertile. Primarily, amicus fears that defendants con-
victed of and sentenced under subsection (j) will be re-
warded with more lenient sentences than those convicted of
the less serious subsection (c)(1) offense. He points out that
subsection (c)(1) imposes mandatory minimums while sub-
section (j) speaks in terms of maximums. And he insists
that, rather than let subsection (j) offenders out from under
subsection (c)(1)’s mandatory minimums, Congress must
have intended to authorize subsection (c)(1)’s mandatory
minimums plus any punishment doled out under subsec-
tion (j). Cf. Abbott, 562 U. S., at 21 (rejecting construction
of §924(c) under which “the worst offenders would often se-
cure the shortest sentences”).
Lora answers this concern without breaking a sweat.
There, we explained that subsection (j)—along with several
other provisions enacted simultaneously—“eschews man-
datory penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility.” 599
U. S., at 462 . It was not lost on us in Lora, nor is it now,
that subsection (j) defines an especially serious offense.
Subsection (j) simply “reflects th[at] seriousness . . . using a
different approach than subsection (c)’s mandatory penal-
ties”: by authorizing the death penalty for murder and “the
same harsh punishment that the Federal Criminal Code
prescribes for other manslaughters.” Id., at 463 . It is for
this reason, among others, that Lora—anticipating the
question this case presents—explained that our conclusion
in that case “aligns with” the mutually exclusive relation-
ship between subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) and subsection (j) that
we endorse today. Id., at 461 .
Just as subsection (j)’s seriousness is not lost on us, we
are confident—as Congress apparently was—that it will not
be lost on sentencing judges. Bound by 18 U. S. C. §3553 (a)
to craft a sentence that, among other considerations,
16 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
reflects “the seriousness of the offense” and avoids “unwar-
ranted sentence disparities” among similarly situated de-
fendants, sentencing judges will doubtless recognize the
relevance of a victim’s death when sentencing under sub-
section (j). Amicus’s worry thus strikes us as more theoret-
ical than realistic. But if it threatens to manifest, it is not
without remedy: If, in a given case, prosecutors fear that a
subsection (j) sentence will dip below what subsection
(c)(1)(A)(i) would otherwise guarantee, they are free to
choose subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)’s low-end rigidity over subsec-
tion (j)’s high-end flexibility. See Ball, 470 U. S., at 860–
861, nn. 7–8.13
There is a textual answer to this concern, too, and here
(again) §924(c)(5) plays the foil. That provision, which per-
tains to the use of armor-piercing ammunition, states that,
“in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate
“or conviction under this section,” a defendant shall face a
mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years “and,” if death
results, shall be sentenced in accordance with a scheme
that mirrors subsection (j)’s. (Emphasis added.) This illus-
trates that, when Congress wished to preserve a mandatory
minimum it feared might otherwise disappear, it so speci-
fied. But subsection (j), we explained in Lora, is “cast from
a different mold.” 599 U. S., at 461 .
Next, amicus highlights the physical separation in the
U. S. Code between subsections (c)(1) and (j). And he un-
derscores their independent operation, emphasizing that
——————
13 Amicus molds this same basic argument into many forms, sketching
situations in which the maximum sentence under subsection (j) could, at
times, dip below the minimum sentence under subsection (c)(1) (though
not under subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)). See, e.g., Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae 47, n. 8. But the most this line of attack shows is that
Congress could rationally have designed subsection (j) to supplement ra-
ther than provide an alternative to subsection (c)(1). It does not come
close to showing that Congress actually intended to do so, much less that
it has clearly indicated such intent.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 17
Opinion of the Court
subsection (j)’s sentencing scheme operates without refer-
ence to subsection (c)’s.
We have not bought such arguments before. Consider,
for instance, the statutes at issue in Ball—statutes whose
elements overlapped but whose sentencing schemes di-
verged. Those provisions, which were then located at 18
U. S. C. §§922 (h) and 1202(a), prohibited certain categories
of people from, respectively, receiving and possessing cer-
tain firearms. The provisions occupied parts of the Code
much farther apart than the subsections of §924 at issue
here. And in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114
(1979), we explained that each statute, “in conjunction with
its own sentencing provision, operate[d] independently of
the other,” such that the statutes were “each fully enforce-
able on [their] own terms.” Id., at 118–121. We therefore
concluded that the provisions did not incorporate each
other’s penalties. Id., at 119 . Yet, six years later (in Ball),
we concluded that the two independent provisions were also
mutually exclusive under Blockburger. See Ball, 470 U. S.,
at 861–864.
What Batchelder is to Ball, Lora is to this case. Subsec-
tion (j) shares subsection (c)’s elements but not its sentenc-
ing scheme. See Lora, 599 U. S., at 458–459. “Instead, sub-
section (j) supplies its own comprehensive set of penalties
that apply instead of subsection (c)’s.” Id., at 460. And as
in Ball, this dynamic magnifies (rather than eliminates) the
likelihood that the Blockburger presumption holds true. Af-
ter all, if offenses that share elements—as they must to sat-
isfy Blockburger—have penalties that operate on their own
rather than by reference to each other, see Batchelder, 442
U. S., at 118–121; Lora, 599 U. S., at 458–459, that sug-
gests Congress intended to place in front of prosecutors a
menu, not a buffet. Accord, Jeffers v. United States, 432
U. S. 137 , 156–157 (1977) (plurality opinion) (one provi-
sion’s “comprehensive penalty structure” indicated that it
18 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
was not intended to supplement a lesser included provi-
sion).
Finally, amicus analogizes this case to Garrett, in which
we found Blockburger overcome even without express stat-
utory language disclaiming the presumption. Garrett ex-
amined the relationship between the continuing criminal
enterprise (CCE) statute and its constituent offenses. See
471 U. S., at 779–781.
The distinctions from Garrett are legion, because the jus-
tifications we offered for that decision are legion. But, most
straightforwardly, Garrett distinguished “the classic rela-
tion of the ‘lesser included offense’ to the greater offense,”
wherein “[t]he very same conduct” violates two statutes.
Id., at 787 (contrasting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (1977),
which involved joyriding and auto theft—both of which
were violated by driving a stolen car). In Garrett, by con-
trast, “the continuing criminal enterprise was alleged to
have spanned more than five years.” 471 U. S., at 788 . The
Court did not believe that Congress wished to require the
Government to choose between prosecuting the defendant
for early predicates and forfeiting a later CCE charge, on
the one hand, and allowing him to go on breaking the law
to preserve the possibility of a CCE charge, on the other.
Id., at 788–790. The continuing nature of the offense
played a decisive role in the case: “One who insists that the
music stop and the piper be paid at a particular point,” we
reasoned, “must at least have stopped dancing himself be-
fore he may seek such an accounting.” Id., at 790 .14
——————
14 We have also explained that Garrett “merely adhered to our under-
standing that legislatures have traditionally perceived a qualitative dif-
ference between conspiracy-like crimes and the substantive offenses
upon which they are predicated.” Rutledge v. United States, 517 U. S.
292 , 300–301, n. 12 (1996). The case before us now does not implicate
that dynamic.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 19
Opinion of JACKSON, J.
Today’s circumstances are markedly different. Here, we
have nothing more than “the classic relation of the ‘lesser
included offense’ to the greater offense.” Id., at 787 .
C
Amicus turns finally to legislative history. We have said
that legislative history may “fortif[y]” a conclusion that
Congress intends to overcome Blockburger. See Garrett,
471 U. S., at 782 . But the legislative history amicus offers
pertains to double convicting for subsection (c) and its pred-
icates—a practice Congress expressly authorized in the
text. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 26–28.
For obvious reasons, this is unhelpful data for interpreting
the relationship between subsections (c) and (j). If any-
thing, it illuminates the sort of discussion that character-
izes congressional deliberation over legislation that does in-
tend to authorize cumulative punishment—and thus
highlights the notable absence of any similar deliberation
over subsection (j). See Brief for National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 5–10.
Rather, the only legislative history that is relevant to to-
day’s inquiry accords with Barrett’s understanding of sub-
section (j). That legislative history suggests that, rather
than stacking punishment or creating a brand “[n]ew . . .
offens[e],” subsection (j) (at the time styled subsection (i))
“made” a “capital offens[e]” out of a “[p]re-existing
crim[e]”—the one at subsection (c). Cong. Research Serv.,
C. Doyle, Crime Control Act of 1994: Capital Punishment
Provisions Summarized, pp. 3–4 (94–721 S, 1994); see also
140 Cong. Rec. 11158 (1994) (Sen. Biden remarking that the
new provision “says if you are guilty of committing a crime
that results in the death of an individual through the use of
a gun, you are eligible for the death penalty, assuming it is
a Federal crime”).
Like its silence in the statutory text, Congress’s debate-
floor silence says a lot. The Blockburger presumption is
20 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
“long-settled,” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 710
(2019), muscular, and fundamental to our law. We think it
highly unlikely that the “ ‘lawyer’s body’ ” that is Congress,
Albernaz, 450 U. S., at 341 (quoting Callanan v. United
States, 364 U. S. 587, 594 (1961)), discarded Blockburger
without comment here.
* * *
Congress has not authorized convictions under both 18
U. S. C. §§924 (c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for one act that violates
both provisions. The part of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals that held otherwise is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
GORSUCH, J., concurring in part
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 24–5774
_________________
DWAYNE BARRETT, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[January 14, 2026]
JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in part.
On the morning of December 12, 2011, Dwayne Barrett
participated in an armed robbery that left a man dead. For
this, Mr. Barrett was convicted twice in federal court. Once
for using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18
U. S. C. §924 (c)(1)(A). And once for causing a death during
a §924(c) violation in violation of §924(j). 102 F. 4th 60, 67
(CA2 2024). For his two convictions, the Second Circuit or-
dered two separate punishments: a prison term for his
§924(c)(1)(A) violation, plus another, consecutive prison
term for his §924(j) violation. All of which raises the ques-
tion: If Mr. Barrett is convicted and punished for both
crimes, has he been “twice put in jeopardy” for “the same
offence” in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause? U. S.
Const., Amdt. 5.
There is no doubt how we would answer that question if
the government had prosecuted Mr. Barrett under
§924(c)(1)(A) and §924(j) in two successive proceedings.
The analysis would begin and end with Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932). Under Blockburger,
two provisions create the same offense for double jeopardy
purposes unless each provision has an element the other
lacks. Id., at 304 . Here, all agree that §924(c)(1)(A) has no
element that §924(j) lacks. So the two provisions create the
same offense, and the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar
2 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
GORSUCH, J., concurring in part
the second prosecution. United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S.
688, 696 (1993).
What happens, though, where (as here) the government
brings two charges for the same offense concurrently in the
same proceeding rather than successively in two separate
ones? That question does not appear to have arisen much
in our Nation’s early years. Maybe it didn’t in part because
criminal codes were considerably thinner then, affording
prosecutors fewer opportunities to bring overlapping
charges. Maybe it didn’t in part, too, because of the tradi-
tional maxim that “an indictment should not include more
than one felony,” which left multiple-count indictments vul-
nerable to being quashed by trial judges. Pointer v. United
States, 151 U. S. 396, 403 (1894). But if the question didn’t
arise much in the past, it is of obvious relevance in our
times. These days, federal and state criminal codes have
exploded, with scores of repetitive offenses on the books.
Frequently, also, today’s prosecutors bring as many over-
lapping felony charges as they can in a single case to see
what will stick, and courts often tolerate the practice.
The litigants before us proceed on the unexamined prem-
ise that Blockburger works differently in concurrent prose-
cutions than it does in successive ones. In concurrent pros-
ecutions, they assume, Blockburger operates as a mere
“presumption” for ascertaining congressional “inten[t].”
E.g., Brief for Petitioner 2 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Because §924(c)(1)(A) and §924(j) create the same of-
fense under Blockburger, they say, we should presume that
just one of Mr. Barrett’s convictions can stand unless Con-
gress has clearly directed otherwise. The only question that
divides the litigants is whether, in fact, Congress included
clear directions in §924 authorizing both convictions. See
Brief for Petitioner 18–26; Brief for United States 15–23;
Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 15–28.
Addressing the case as the litigants have framed it, the
Court today holds that nothing in §924 overcomes the
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
GORSUCH, J., concurring in part
“Blockburger presumption,” so only one of Mr. Barrett’s con-
victions can stand. Ante, at 1–2, 9. I agree with that as far
as it goes. But it’s also hard not to wonder where the liti-
gants’ presumptive version of Blockburger comes from. If
the Constitution always prohibits the government from se-
curing two convictions for the same offense in successive
prosecutions, why would it sometimes tolerate a different
result in concurrent prosecutions?
One thing here is certain. The litigants framed this case
the way they did because our cases speak confusingly about
the role of the Double Jeopardy Clause in concurrent pros-
ecutions. This Court has sometimes said that the Clause
“ ‘protects against multiple punishments for the same of-
fense.’ ” Schiro v. Farley, 510 U. S. 222, 229 (1994) (quoting
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969)). And
we have held that multiple convictions for the same of-
fense—even when secured in a single proceeding—count as
multiple punishments. Ball v. United States, 470 U. S. 856,
865 (1985). From this, it would seem to follow that Con-
gress cannot authorize multiple convictions for the same of-
fense in concurrent prosecutions. But this Court has also
sometimes said that, in the concurrent-prosecution context,
the Clause merely directs courts to ascertain statutory
meaning accurately. “ ‘The question of what punishments
are constitutionally permissible,’” we once wrote, “‘is no dif-
ferent from the question of what punishments the Legisla-
tive Branch intended to be imposed.’ ” Missouri v. Hunter,
459 U. S. 359, 368 (1983) (quoting Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U. S. 333, 344 (1981); emphasis added; altera-
tion omitted); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U. S.
773, 778 (1985).
Someday, we will need to resolve the tension in our case
law. And when we do, I see two likely solutions. One would
be to say out loud what some of our cases imply: that the
constitutional phrase “the same offence,” Amdt. 5, means
different things in different contexts. In the successive-
4 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
GORSUCH, J., concurring in part
prosecution context, two charges amount to the same of-
fense if they fail the Blockburger test. But in the concur-
rent-prosecution context, two charges amount to the same
offense only if they fail the Blockburger test and Congress
has not clearly intended punishment under both. That so-
lution, though, would be a curious one indeed. Not only
would it allow Congress to permit in the concurrent-prose-
cution context what we have long held the Constitution for-
bids in the successive-prosecution context. Really, it is a
little “embarrassing to assert that the single term ‘same of-
fence’ ” in the Double Jeopardy Clause “has two different
meanings.” Dixon, 509 U. S., at 704 .
A second solution would be to recognize, as others of our
cases imply, that two charges amount to the same offense
under the Double Jeopardy Clause if they fail the Block-
burger test—full stop. So a defendant cannot be prosecuted
for both charges in successive proceedings. Nor may he be
convicted twice (much less sentenced twice) for both
charges just because they happen to be brought concur-
rently. True, this approach would require us to admit that
Blockburger is not, after all, a mere presumption in the con-
current-prosecution context. But saying that much would
give the constitutional phrase “the same offence” a con-
sistent meaning and treat like cases alike.
Nor would taking that step represent some giant leap.
Our cases discussing Blockburger as a mere presumption in
the concurrent-prosecution context were decided during a
relatively brief period when this Court didn’t take Block-
burger very seriously in any context, even when it came to
successive prosecutions. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U. S.
508, 510 (1990) (finding a double jeopardy violation based
on a same-transaction test, divorced from Blockburger).
Since then, however, we have expressly renounced that ap-
proach, reaffirming that Blockburger’s “long-settled rule”
controls what counts as “an ‘offence’ for double jeopardy
purposes” in successive prosecutions. Gamble v. United
Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5
GORSUCH, J., concurring in part
States, 587 U. S. 678, 710 (2019); see also Dixon, 509 U. S.,
at 696, 704 (overruling Grady). Tellingly, too, in all the
years since Dixon, we have not found a single case in which
the “Blockburger presumption” against concurrent prosecu-
tions for the same offense was, in fact, overcome by a clear
congressional command. Cf. Rutledge v. United States, 517
U. S. 292, 303 (1996) (rejecting the government’s argument
that “the presumption against allowing multiple punish-
ments for the same crime” was “overcome”). In short, the
analytical foundations of the presumptive version of Block-
burger have been gravely undermined by subsequent devel-
opments.
Perhaps some might worry about the consequences of this
second solution. Today, after all, prosecutors routinely
bring concurrent charges for greater offenses and their
lesser included variants, giving juries several degrees of
culpability to choose from. One might wonder whether af-
fording the Double Jeopardy Clause the same meaning in
the concurrent-prosecution context that it already enjoys in
the successive-prosecution context would render this prac-
tice illegal. It would not. A jury could reach a guilty verdict
on two charges that constitute the same offense, but no dou-
ble jeopardy problem would arise so long as the court does
not enter judgments of conviction on both. It may not be
clear at a trial’s outset which charge (if any) will yield a
conviction. But it will be certain all along that, when judg-
ment day comes, the defendant will be convicted and pun-
ished only once for any given offense. See Ball, 470 U. S.,
at 865 .
Today, to be sure, the Court has no occasion to tangle
with any of this. The parties have not asked us to address
the tension in our case law. Nor does anything here turn
on its resolution, given the Court’s holding that one of Mr.
Barrett’s convictions must go even under the merely pre-
sumptive version of Blockburger. All this, the Court rightly
takes care to acknowledge. See ante, at 8, n. 9 (“Because
6 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES
GORSUCH, J., concurring in part
we conclude that Congress did not authorize two convic-
tions in this context, we need not revisit whether Congress
could do so consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause”).
On that understanding, I join all but Part IV–C of
JUSTICE JACKSON’s opinion. But while today’s decision is
correct as far as it goes, sooner or later we will have to clear
up the confusion—and to my eyes, this case serves as a
poster child for how that confusion should be resolved. Mr.
Barrett really was charged twice for one offense. He really
was convicted twice. Before our intervention, he really was
set to be criminally punished twice. And whatever Con-
gress might or might not intend, that is double jeopardy.